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

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

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

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FIRELESS SACRIFICES: PINDAR'S *OLYMPIAN* 7 AND THE PANATHENAIC FESTIVAL

Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode celebrates the Olympic boxing victory in 464 won by Diagoras of the Rhodian family of the Eratidai.[1] Just as appropriately, however, the poem can be described as a brilliant hymn to Rhodes. Pindar himself, as early as the conclusion of the proem (13–14), declares that his purpose is to honor the island and, in one of his closing statements (93–94), insists on the interaction between *oikos* and *polis*: in particular that the *polis* will share in the festivities honoring the *oikos*.[2] The exaltation of the victor appears to set off the central mythic panel, which constitutes a proud encomium of the island state of Rhodes.[3] It is my intention here to explore and substantiate this claim, which, let it be said in advance, is also supported by the fate of the poem as an artifact of public importance. As ancient testimony informs us (Gorgon *FGrHist* 515 F 18), the ode was dedicated in golden letters at Athena's temple at Lindos.[4]

The mythic section of the ode falls into three parts, which are narrated in reverse chronological order. First is the story of the Tirynthian Tlepolemos, who killed his grand-uncle and, at the instigation of Apollo, fled to Rhodes (20–34). Second comes the birth of Athena, the fireless sacrifice offered to her by the Rhodians who failed to heed Helios' instructions, and their subsequent reward (34–53). And third,

[1] For the text of Pindar I use Snell and Maehler, for the scholia Drachmann.

[2] For other instances of the whole polis sharing in the *kōmos* see *Ol.* 11.15–20, *Nem.* 2.24, 3.1–5. On the conventional character of the transition from victor to polis see Bundy, *Studia* 20–22, 81–93. On the intricacies of this relationship between praise of victor and praise of polis see Kurke, *Oikonomia* 125–92.

[3] For the epinician itself as bridging the gap between the victor and the polis see Crotty, *Song*, and Burnett, *Bacchylides* 50 and 175 n. 6.

[4] Cited in the scholia (Drachmann I 195). On this dedication as a public gesture, an act of public sharing and display, see Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* 162, 174–75.

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further back in time, Pindar relates the birth of Rhodes, island and nymph at the same time, and her marriage to Helios (54–76). I begin with the second part, the central section of the ode (34–53).

I

Among the striking features of this narrative, the fireless rites offered to Athena stand out. The very limited number of such rites in the Greek world fully justifies Walter Burkert's remark that "sacrifices without fire are rare, conscious exceptions."[5] For the sake of precision, we have to make a distinction between fireless and bloodless offerings.[6] The absence of fire from the latter would hardly be remarkable, of course, but there is no indication that Pindar's *apura hiera* are bloodless. If *semnan thusian* (43) is to be taken at its face value, then Helios prescribed not the offering of a *pelanos,* but a regular animal sacrifice.[7]

In any case the Rhodian rite, when performed to honor an Olympian deity such as Athena, appears to be strange, as Pindar himself suggests (46–47). And its eccentricity is all the more striking if one bears in mind the way in which Athena was celebrated in the most famous of her festivals, the Panathenaia. Such a comparison of local ritual variants is especially apt in the case of *Ol.* 7. Not only would Diagoras' earlier victory at the Panathenaia (82) have acquainted him with the Athenian festival (even if he had no previous knowledge of its rites) but, more importantly perhaps, we should stress that under the growing influence of the Panhellenic games, including the Panathenaia, the local traditions of song and poetry, with all their repertory of myths, were bound to confront one another as they were put forward before a Panhellenic audience.[8]

This is not the place to discuss the question of the evolution and the "meaning" of the various aspects of the Panathenaia.[9] Numerous studies have variously approached this manifold festival, which concurrently celebrated the birth of Athena and the emergence of the polis. If

[5] *Greek Religion* 60–64 and n. 48.

[6] See Stengel, "Apura."

[7] See Bresson, *Mythe* 59 n. 41.

[8] On the list of Diagoras' athletic victories see Young, *Three Odes* 91. On the effect of the athletic games on the poetic treatment of myths, and specifically their Panhellenization, see Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* 82–145.

[9] For a recent comprehensive study see Robertson, "Origins."

(to give an example of the festival's richness) the procession and the Parthenon frieze represented synchronically the entity of the polis, the birth of Erikhthonios was emblematic of the diachronic autochthony of the Athenians.[10] For our purpose here, however, it is sufficient to point out that the overall character of the Panathenaia, including the torch race and the myth of Erikhthonios, was already shaped by the first half of the fifth century, that is, by the time Pindar immortalized Diagoras' Olympic victory.[11]

One of the central events of the yearly celebration at Athens was the fetching of new fire by means of a torch race. Rites that aim primarily at renewal of fire are attested throughout the Greek world, and it is not unlikely that the Panathenaic torch race was an agonistic expansion of a ritual core that consisted in the transport of new fire.[12] In any case the torch race of the Panathenaia was run from the Academy, where Hephaistos was among the deities worshiped, uphill to the Acropolis through the Agora. As to the exact starting point of the race, the sources present us with two distinct and seemingly contradictory alternatives: the altar of Prometheus (Paus. 1.30.1–2) and the altar of Eros (Plut. *Sol.* 1.7; schol. Plat. *Phdr.* 231e). Yet the conflict can be resolved if we assume that torches were lit at the altar of Prometheus but the runners started the actual race from the altar of Eros.[13] Be that as it may, Prometheus, Hephaistos, and Eros are all associated in the Academy, where Athena received pride of place, since the main precinct was consecrated to her (Soph. *OC* 55–56 with schol.; Apollod. *FGrHist* 244 F 147; Paus. 1.30.1–2; Athen. 13.12.561e).[14]

The deities brought together in the ritual of the torch race are also explicitly associated in the Panathenaic myth. Its outline is as follows

[10] For a summary bibliography see Robertson, "Origins" 232 n. 2. On Athenian autochthony as celebrated in the festival see Loraux, *Les enfants* 35–73, esp. 45–48.

[11] Robertson, "Origins" 269–88. More specifically, representations of Erikhthonios' birth on vases abound in the second quarter of the fifth century; see Metzger, "Athéna" 295–303, esp. 298.

[12] See Brelich, *Paides* 326–37, who suggests, however, that the torch race was only part of the quadrennial celebration, a "festa di rinnovamento" on a grander scale. Burkert, *Greek Religion* 232, is confident that the torch race was a feature of the New Year festivities; cf. Robertson, "Origins" 241, 281–88. I am inclined towards the latter, but either view would not affect the present argument. On new-fire rites in general see Burkert, "Jason," and Robertson, "Origins" 276–81.

[13] Brelich, *Paides* 333–34, and Robertson, "Origins" 258–61.

[14] Robertson, "Origins" 258–62.

(Apollod. 3.14.6 with Frazer's notes in the Loeb edition; cf. Eratosth. *Catast.* 13; Hygin. *Fab.* 166). Hephaistos or, in other versions, Prometheus[15] desired Athena and pursued her until he spilled his semen on her thigh. Athena used a piece of wool to wipe it off. The semen fell on the Earth, who gave birth to a marvelous creature, Erikhthonios/Erekhtheus.[16] He was nursed by Athena in her temple on the Acropolis and eventually instituted the Panathenaia and gave the Athenians their name (Marmor Parium *FGrHist* 239 A 10; cf. Hdt. 8.44).[17]

It was that event that the Panathenaic torch race commemorated; or, conversely, the myth served as the *aition* for the ritual.[18] The runners, possibly reenacting Hephaistos' pursuit, started at the altar of Eros in the Academy and ran with their torches uphill to the Acropolis. The victor's torch was used to light the fire on the altar of Athena (schol. Plat. *Phdr.* 213e) on the east side of the Parthenon, in front of the depiction of her birth on the east pediment (Paus. 1.24.5).[19] The apparent shift of emphasis here from the birth of Erikhthonios to that of Athena should not detain us. On the contrary, it is significant because it illustrates that both the birth of Athena and that of Erikhthonios were celebrated at the Panathenaia.[20] (The close link of the two births in ritual may have given rise to the tradition, attested in *Etymologicum Magnum* s.v. *Erekhtheus,* that Hephaistos pursued Athena the moment she sprang from the head of Zeus.) At any rate it is important to note

[15] Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 2.1249, citing Duris *FGrHist* 76 F 47. The two fire gods alternate also in the accounts of Athena's birth. In E. *Ion* 452–57, for instance, it is Prometheus who helps Zeus give birth; cf. Apollod. 1.3.6; schol. *Il.* 1.195; schol. *Ol.* 7.36 (Drachmann I 215).

[16] The relation between Erekhtheus and Erikhthonius is complicated. To some extent they seem to be interchangeable in the sources (schol. *Il.* 2.547; *Et. Magn.* s.v. *Erekhtheus*). Loraux, *Les enfants* 46–47, assumes their identity and remarks that the sources refer to Erikhthonios as a child or youth, but to Erekhtheus as an adult and king. Robertson, "Origins" 254–58, keeps the two figures completely distinct. The problem, though important in its own terms, is not crucial for our investigation.

[17] On Erikhthonios' institution of the Panathenaia see also Apollod. 3.14.6; Harpocr. s.v. "Panathenaia" (citing Hellan. *FGrHist* 323a F 2 and Androt. *FGrHist* 324 F 2); Eratosth: *Catast.* 13; Hygin. *Astron.* 2.13.

[18] Robertson, "Origins" 265, 275. In my use of the term *aition* in a broader sense that does not imply derivation of myth from ritual I follow Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* 279 n. 2; cf. Burkert, *Structure* 56–58.

[19] The pediment that Pausanias saw was of course later than Pindar's ode, yet its placement there may have followed some precedent; cf. Boardman, *Greek Sculpture* 154.

[20] On the Panathenaia as Athena's birthday see schol. Lykophr. *Alex.* 520, citing Kallisthenes *FGrHist* 124 F 52; schol. *Il.* 8.39; cf. Loraux, *Les enfants* 145–46 and n. 119.

that both myth and rite at the Panathenaia bespeak the importance of fire in worshiping the patron goddess of Athens. More specifically, both myth and rite conjoin Athena with the fire god, Hephaistos or Prometheus, and Eros.[21]

We have already mentioned that the Panathenaic torch race can be—and in fact has been—described as essentially a new-fire rite.[22] Moreover, it is not uncommon to find such rites associated with tales of sexual tension, occasionally resulting in violation and/or other violence. The Lemnian rite, often mentioned in this context,[23] should perhaps be placed at the end of the spectrum. Not only does its location reach the outskirts of the Greek world, but also the violence of its myth attains unusual limits. The Panathenaic example may be tamer, yet it fits the pattern, since the violence breaks through to the surface of its myth: the fire god Hephaistos did attempt to rape Athena, and his pursuit of the goddess may very well correspond to, or rather be the *aition* of, the torch race up the Acropolis.[24] But we need not digress further. Even leaving aside the Lemnian festival and the new-fire rites, we can already appreciate the contrast between Athens and Rhodes. The Panathenaic torch race with its *aition* is a sufficient backdrop to bring into sharp relief the striking absence of fire from the Rhodian rite and its *aition* in *Ol.* 7. Athena seems to be honored in two opposite ways in Athens and in Rhodes.[25]

Frequently, however, a contrast presupposes some degree of analogy. And if we turn back to Pindar, we note that points of similarity between *Ol.* 7 and the Panathenaic rite abound. First, we must note an

[21] It is worth noting that before the institution of a torch race for Pan (Hdt. 6.105), torch races were a feature of the Panathenaia, the Hephaisteia, and the Prometheia (Harpocr. s.v. "lampas"; Suda s.v. "lampados"; Bekker, *Anecd.* 277; schol. Arist. *Frogs* 131, 1087.

[22] See note 12 above.

[23] Burkert, "Jason" 1–16; *Homo Necans* 190–96; Robertson, "Origins" 274–81.

[24] On the influence of the Lemnian fire rite upon the Athenian imagery see Robertson, "Origins" 274–81, and Martin, "Fire." Both Martin and Burkert, "Jason," construe the Athenian festivals around the year ending and the New Year as multiforms to some degree of the Lemnian festival.

[25] The contrast is even more striking, given the perpetual fire of Athena's lamp on the Acropolis (Paus. 1.26.6–7, with Frazer's commentary; Strabo 9.1.16; Plut. *Sulla* 13.3; schol. *Od.* 19.34). Further, the overview by Robertson, "Origins" 241–53, of other festivals of Athena similar to the Panathenaia reveals that the Rhodian rite was unique. The oddity of the rite is ascribed by Duchemin, "Pindare" 119–26, to its kinship with a New Eastern theme attested in 1 *Kings* 17–18.

obvious one: the very occasion of the fireless sacrifice in Rhodes is the birth of Athena, and legend identified her birthday with the day of her festival in Athens.[26] A second correspondence is the presence of the fire god, Hephaistos and/or Prometheus, who we have remarked were strongly linked with Athena in Athens both spatially (in the Academy) and ritually (at the torch race with its aetiology). In *Ol.* 7 they may not be as conspicuous as in Athens. Nonetheless, Hephaistos assists Zeus in giving birth (35–37), and Prometheus makes a short, yet much disputed appearance (43–44).[27] There seems to be no reason to deny his presence, however, especially in conjunction with the sacrifice that Helios enjoined on the Rhodians. Helios' command is rephrased in a *gnōmē* that not only broadens the particular (the use of fire for the sacrifice) but also extends it to its mythical origins, i.e., Prometheus (Hes. *Theog.* 535–37, *Erga* 42–52).

A third and more important link between Pindar's ode and the Athenian festival is the phrase *sperma . . . phlogos* (48), in which we catch a glimpse of the sexual and fertilizing role of the fire god as we saw it in the case of the Panathenaia. The Pindaric syntagm endows the literal meanings "fire" and "sperm" with a metaphorical dimension.[28] The *phlox* becomes more than the literal flame that would be used for the sacrifice, and the *sperma*, which towards the end of the ode is used in a context that suggests the sexual meaning (93), takes in the present

[26] See note 20 above.

[27] Prometheus' name in *Ol.* 7.44 is printed with a lowercase *p* by recent editors (Bowra, Snell, and Turyn, in contrast to Boeckh, Schneidewin, Fraccaroli, and Gildersleeve) and construed as the equivalent of *promētheias*; cf. Farnell, *Pindar* II 53–54. But besides the lack of parallels for this use of *promatheus* (*PV* 86 is not a real parallel) and Pindar's use of abstract expressions similar to *Ol.* 7.44 (e.g., *Pyth.* 5.27, *Ol.* 8.82, 10.3–6), I cannot imagine that anyone hearing PROMATHEOS at an oral performance would fail to think of the god. In fact, the same would be true of anyone reading the word until the ninth century; cf. scholia recentia ad loc. (Drachmann I 218). Hence I agree with Verdenius, *Commentaries* on 44, and Bresson, *Mythe* 44–59; cf. Young, *Three Odes* 85 n. 2. In the terms propounded by Bundy, *Studia* 36–37, Prometheus "hypostasizes" both the general principle of the *gnōmē* and its particular application in the case of the Rhodians.

[28] An analogous effect may be achieved in the combination *thumon ianaien* (43). The verb *ianō* in Homer can mean "to heat" (*Od.* 8.426; 10.359), "to melt" (*Od.* 12.175). And *thumos*, besides the presence of its cognate *thusian* in the previous line (42), is derived, already in Plat. *Crat.* 419e, *apo tēs thuseōs kai zeseōs tēs psukhēs*. This juxtaposition of verb and object becomes particularly pointed in the context of the sacrifice.

passage the form of fire.[29] The collocation *sperma . . . phlogos* is thus not merely a poetic image but assumes a multiple reference, fluctuating as it does between fire and sexuality, between the literal and the metaphorical. The homology between fire and sexuality in the context of the Rhodian rite was, moreover, already perceived in antiquity, albeit implicitly: we learn from the scholiast on *Ol.* 7.48 (Drachmann I 219–20) that Apollonios attributed the fireless sacrifices of the Rhodians to their enmity with Hephaistos on the grounds that the fire god had attempted to rape Athena. Besides the equation of fire and sexuality, Apollonios' explication is also noteworthy because it applied a characteristically Athenian *aition* to an exclusively Rhodian rite.

The analogies between Pindar's account and the Panathenaia suggest that, in the Pindaric version, the original intention of the Rhodians was apparently the establishment of a regular sacrifice like that of the Panathenaia. As in Athens, they would take the fire and bring it to their Acropolis, where they would light the altar of the goddess. Their model was similar to that of the Athenians. Unfortunately they forgot to take fire with them, as Pindar seems to inform us (45–48), or rather as most scholars tend to construe the relevant passage.[30] Sheer forgetfulness, however, is highly improbable. The Rhodians were, after all, warned well in advance by Helios to heed their future *khreos* and honor the birth of Athena with a solemn sacrifice (39–41). For all their hastiness to be the first (*prōtoi,* 42), how could they possibly forget to provide for the most essential part of the prescribed rite? Moreover, the misinterpretation of *lāthā* has led scholars who strive to explain the Rhodians' blessings to unlikely speculations: it was for their good intentions that Zeus and Athena rewarded the Heliadai. But besides the fact that, in archaic

[29] See Rubin, "Epinician Symbols" 75, who equates the "seed of flame" with the "seed of life," and Robertson, "Origins" 268–69. The sexual significance of fire in Greek myth is exemplified, e.g., in the incineration of Semele (Apollod. 3.4.3); cf. Caldwell, "Psychoanalytic Interpretation" 379. It might not be out of place to point up the use of fire in marriage rites; see Furley, *Fire* 187–210. On the Indo-European roots of the link between fire (celestial or sacrificial) and procreation see Nagy, *Greek Mythology* 143–201. On fire and sexuality in general see Bachelard, *Feu.*

[30] See, e.g., Farnell, *Pindar* I 39; Norwood, *Pindar* 142–43; Méautis, *Pindare* 408; Sullivan, "Strand" 220. More circumspect are Lawall, "Cup" 37–38 ("the Rhodians forgot the commands of Helios and offered a fireless sacrifice to the goddess"), and Young, *Three Odes* 85 ("the failure of the Heliadae to use fire in their sacrifice").

Greek thought, good intentions (as opposed to outcomes) are hardly an issue, this hypothesis does not find any support whatsoever in the text.[31]

I believe that both an attentive examination of the intricacies in the Pindaric account and a close comparison with the Panathenaic rite could yield an alternative explanation that ultimately does more justice to the epinician function of the ode. If, in order to comply with Helios' command, the Rhodians had to be the first to honor the goddess, against whom were they competing? Pindar does not mention it, but his *prōtoi* implies priority in time over an adversary, and who can fail to think of the Athenians? Not the scholiast (Drachmann I 216–17), who remarks: "The Athenians happened to be the first to sacrifice; therefore the goddess settled there (sc. in Athens) but honored the Rhodians too."[32] The competition between the Athenians and the Rhodians is explicitly stated in the account of the event supplied by Diodoros (5.56):

> ἀνδρωθεῖσι δὲ τοῖς Ἡλιάδαις εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἥλιον, ὅτι οἵτινες ἂν Ἀθηνᾷ θύσωσι πρῶτοι, παρ' ἑαυτοῖς ἕξουσι τὴν θεὸν· τὸ δ' αὐτὸ λέγεται διασαφῆσαι τοῖς τὴν Ἀττικὴν κατοικοῦσι· διὸ καί φασι τοὺς μὲν Ἡλιάδας διὰ τὴν σπουδὴν ἐπιλαθομένους ἐνεγκεῖν πῦρ ἐπιθεῖναι τὰ θύματα, τὸν δὲ τότε βασιλεύοντα τῶν Ἀθηναίων Κέκροπα ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς θῦσαι ὕστερον.

And Philostratos *Imag.* 2.27 is even more direct:

> καὶ θύουσι ἤδη τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ δῆμοι δύο **ἐπὶ δυοῖν ἀκροπόλεων**, Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι . . .

Philostratos' account of Athena's birth bears an especially strong resemblance to Pindar's, but whatever the precise relation of the two passages to *Ol.* 7, the point remains that Pindar's allusive narrative can be supplemented by the two later writers.

Athens and Rhodes are far apart. But if we forget about the dis-

[31] Even though it originates perhaps in a statement of the scholiast (Drachmann I 217). Only Bresson, *Mythe* 43–59, as far as I know, offers a richer explanation, without, however, questioning the commonly assumed meaning of *lāthā*. In his view, forgetting the fire implies that the Rhodians revert to the pre-Promethean condition: forgetfulness is a way of honoring Zeus, without at the same time offending Prometheus.

[32] Cf. Jurenka, "Diagoras Lied" 187–90; Farnell, *Pindar* I 39; Young, *Three Odes* 84–85.

tance for a moment and focus on the temporal sequence instead, we may flesh out even more the mythological and ritual subtext of Pindar's narrative. It is unnecessary to stress, of course, that the contest between Athens and Rhodes, and the association of the Rhodian non-sacrifice with the Panathenaia as well, do not refer to the reconstruction of historical facts but to mythic representation. Nonetheless it is significant that Diodoros (5.56) places the contest between the Athenians and the Rhodians at the time of the reign of Kekrops. Kekrops, in turn, is present as an adult at the birth of Erikhthonios, as depicted on Athenian vases.[33] Thus Diodoros' dating of the contest squares very well with the Panathenaic legend. The contest between Rhodes and Athens for Athena's favor at the time of her birth would then precede by one step the birth of Erikhthonios.

In mythic terms, therefore, we can imagine that Athena is born and the Athenians and the Rhodians are in a hurry to carry fire to the top of their Acropolis and be the first to honor the goddess' birth with a solemn sacrifice. Behind this description of the contest one can discern, I believe, the model of the Panathenaic torch race. There are two *akropoleis* to be sure, but the two altars, which are to be consecrated by fire, celebrate a single event, Athena's birth. They are the terminating points of two running teams that compete in a single race. The birth of Athena, the institution or the renewal of the altar on the Acropolis, the agonistic fetching of fire with the hint at the fire god's sexuality, all are elements that unite the failure of the Rhodians and the success of the Athenians in one larger picture, that of a hypothetical primordial torch race between Rhodes and Athens, which is similar to the actual races at the Panathenaia.[34]

Let us follow the course of this primordial race. The Rhodians are the first to run up to the Acropolis, yet they do not have fire. The Athenians follow in the second place, but they can use their fire to kindle the altar for the sacrifice that will entice Athena to become their patron goddess. Instead of the Rhodians' forgetfulness at the beginning of the race, we can postulate that the fire of the Rhodians went out shortly before the end of the race. In fact this would conform exactly

[33] Loraux, *Les enfants* 61–62 and n. 129.

[34] It is likely that *lampadēdromiai* were relay races, as A. *Ag.* 312–14 implies; cf. Robertson, "Origins" 281–82 and n. 99. Further, if the teams represented the Athenian *phylai* (Brelich, *Paides* 326–27), it would be a small step for Pindar to postulate an overarching torch race between teams that represented two competing *poleis*.

with the rule at the Panathenaic torch race, as Pausanias preserves it (1.30.2):

> τὸ δὲ ἀγώνισμα ὁμοῦ τῷ δρόμῳ φυλάξαι τὴν δᾷδα ἔτι καιομένην ἐστίν, ἀποσβεσθείσης δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῆς νίκης τῷ πρώτῳ, δευτέρῳ δὲ ἀντ' αὐτοῦ μέτεστιν· εἰ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ καίοιτο, ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ κρατῶν· εἰ δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀποσβεσθείη, οὐδείς ἐστιν ὅτῳ καταλείπεται ἡ νίκη.

In light of this passage, the Rhodians of the poem correspond to the runner(s) who arrived first but did not manage to keep the torch alight until the end. It is such a mishap of the Rhodians, I believe, that is reflected in the strange word order of *Ol.* 7.48:

> καὶ τοὶ γὰρ αἰθοίσας ἔχοντες σπέρμ' ἀνέβαν φλογὸς οὔ.

The placement of the negative *ou* at the very end is rare, if not unique.[35] Here it illustrates very concretely, almost iconically, what actually happened. The Rhodians ran the race maintaining fire all along until the end, when their torch was unexpectedly extinguished. The delay of the negative produces suspense and mirrors the tension of the race.

Another point still requires consideration: the word *lāthā* (45), usually construed as "forgetfulness" or "oblivion," might be taken to imply that the Rhodians actually forgot to take fire from the beginning. But there is no need to assume such a restricted application. Apart from the fact that gnomic statements such as this widen the import of the particular without having to correspond point by point to the details of the narrative, a more general paraphrase such as "the Rhodians forgot the commands of Helios"[36] would fit with both the Pindaric diction and with the context of the torch race. Moreover, the diction of the gnomic statement under discussion should put us on our guard. The *gnōmē*, although general, is phrased in spatial terms (*parelkei, hodon, exō*), which may thus allude to the course of the race.[37] The sentence καὶ παρέλκει πραγμάτων ὀρθὰν ὁδὸν ἔξω φρενῶν (46–47) seems to define

[35] The parallels of Verdenius, *Commentaries* on line 48, are not convincing, as in both S. *Aj.* 545 and *Ant.* 255 we have an inversion of the negative; cf. Kühner and Gerth, *Grammatik* II 2 179; Schwyzer and Debrunner, *Grammatik* II 595. Gildersleeve, commenting on the line in *Pindar*, grasped the force of the word order: the verse could almost be printed as a question, *ou* being the unexpected answer.

[36] See, e.g., Lawall, "Cup" 37–38.

[37] On *ortha hodos* see Becker, *Das Bild* 95, who points to the image of the course but stresses instead the sailing metaphor.

the content of *lāthā* in the specific ritual context of the torch race.[38] And further, *lāthā* may retain something of the meaning of the verb *lanthanō*, "to escape the notice (of),"[39] thus denoting not merely "forgetfulness" but also "failure to notice," in our case failure to notice that the torch was about to go out. The failure of the Rhodian runners constitutes, therefore, a ritual mistake. This typical use of *lāthā* for ritually incorrect behavior is corroborated by the application of its opposite, *mnē–*, to ritual correctness.[40]

Even if one is reluctant to relinquish the traditional—or rather unexamined—interpretation of *lāthā*, it is enough for the purpose of the present argument to grant that at least a secondary meaning, "failure to notice," cannot be precluded.[41] This shade of meaning is underlined by the word *atekmarta* (45), "without mark, signs, warnings," that describes the oncoming *lāthā*.[42] It is worth adding that we find in Aristophanes the same concern with fire, and the same diction, but of course with a comic touch that plays up the chorus' old age. The chorus of the old men in the parodos of the *Lysistrata* climb up to the Propylaia carrying their firepots and singing (292–94):

ἀλλ' ὅμως βαδιστέον,
καὶ τὸ πῦρ φυσητέον,
μή μ' ἀποσβεσθὲν **λάθῃ πρὸς τῇ τελευτῇ τῆς ὁδοῦ**.[43]

[38] For the sake of completeness we may say that a particular (line 42) is widened by a *gnōmē* (43–44), which is reaffirmed in the reverse *gnōmē* about *lāthā* (45–47). The diction of the second *gnōmē* in turn narrows down the focus and prepares for the return to the particular of the narrative. On the relation of *gnōmē* and particular see Bundy, *Studia* 28.

[39] Slater, *Lexicon* s.v. *lathō, lanthanō*.

[40] Nagy, *Greek Mythology* 70 (also 110); cf. also 210–13 on the expression *oude me/se/he lēthei*.

[41] See also *Nem.* 8.24, where the point is that, in the context of the quarrel over Akhilleus' armor, the proud *aglōssia* of Aias causes his case to go unnoticed, unrecognized (see scholia in Drachmann III 144). On the strong semantic link between *alēthēs/alētheia* and *lanthanō*, which colors the former as "not allowing itself to be unnoticed," see Krischer, "Etumos" 161–64. For Pindaric instances of *alathēs/alatheia* where the meaning "not unnoticed, not unrecognized" is prominent see *Ol.* 6.89, 13.94, *Nem.* 5.17; cf. *Ol.* 7.59. In *Ol.* 8.2, moreover, Olympia is termed *despoin' alatheias*, presumably because it confers unmistakable recognition upon the victor (cf. *Ol.* 1.4–7).

[42] Cf. *Pyth.* 10.63: *ta d' es eniauton atekmarton pronoēsai* (notice the use of *pro–* as in *Ol.* 7.44). For an Aeschylean use of the word to describe the unpredictable onset of a disaster see *Pers.* 909–12 (notice the use of *enebe* in line 909 which parallels *epi . . . bainei* in *Ol.* 7.45); cf. Verdenius, *Commentaries* on line 45.

[43] Note also the context: old men assert their declining masculinity and try to

The Rhodians did not succeed in meeting all the ritual requirements of the torch race: they arrived first at the finish, but with their torch extinguished. Nevertheless they were rewarded lavishly, both by Zeus and by Athena, and their reward deserves our attention in view of the Panathenaic torch race. The winner of the Athenian race received money (30 drachmas) and a water jug (*hydria*).[44] It has been found "strange and unexplained, why he should not receive jars of olive oil like the other athletic victors at the Panathenaic festival."[45] Whatever the answer may be, Pindar's passage combines gold and water in the image of the golden rain.[46] The reward to the first runners at Rhodes came, of course, in far larger quantities than the prize of the Panathenaic torch race (49–50):

κείνοισι μὲν ξανθὰν ἀγαγὼν νεφέλαν
πολὺν ὗσε χρυσόν

The reward of the Rhodians reverses in fact the rule of the Panathenaic race. Under Athenian regulations the victorious Athenians should receive money and a water jug. But in this mythical primordial torch race Pindar implicitly transforms and reverses those regulations. The items that make up the Athenian first prize are fused into the bountiful image of the golden shower and are bestowed not upon the official winners but upon the first runners, despite their extinguished torch.[47]

The second reward granted to the Rhodians is even more intrigu-

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"burn" the sex-striking women that are shut up in the Acropolis. Although the picture in *Lysistrata* does not refer explicitly to the Panathenaia, it can be paralleled by the parody of the runners mocked by the potters at the Panathenaia in *Frogs* 1089–98; cf. Martin, "Fire" 99–100.

[44] Dittenberger, *Sylloge*[3] 1055.77 (= *IG* II[2] 2311.77). Although the inscription dates from ca. 400, there is no reason to postulate a major change since the first half of the fifth century.

[45] Parke, *Festivals* 46.

[46] I cannot see why the expression *khruseais niphadessi* (34) has led scholars to invent a second precipitation; see, e.g., Rubin, "Epinician Symbols" 74–75. The treatment by Bresson, *Mythe* 132 n. 41, has, I think, concluded the matter.

[47] Whether or not Pindar's image of the golden rain is, as Bowra, *Pindar* 283, believed, a literal elaboration of the metaphor in *Il.* 2.670, the parallel with the Panathenaic festival holds true. Moreover, the image of the golden shower melts together the liquid wine and the golden goblet of the proem, which are emblematic of the wedding feast and its associations.

ing. Athena offered them the art of creating objects similar to living beings (50–53). This gift is unusual, since the art of creating artifacts similar to living beings is traditionally the realm of Hephaistos.[48] It is true that Hephaistos is frequently paired with Athena as the givers of all the arts to mortals.[49] Their cooperation is especially pronounced in Athens, where Athena, under the title *Hephaistia,* and Hephaistos stood side by side in the Hephaisteion.[50] Even on the Acropolis Hephaistos had an altar at the entrance to the Erekhtheion.[51] Further, the worship of Athena under the title *Erganē* at the Khalkeia is so closely bound up with the presence of Hephaistos that it is unclear which, if any, of the two gods preceded the other in the evolution of this festival of the bronzesmiths.[52] And as we have seen, the fire god is conspicuous even at the Panathenaia, Athena's festival par excellence.[53] The consistent bond of Hephaistos and Athena in myth and ritual highlights the importance of fire in the formation of the technical intelligence that underlies the development of human craft.[54] To be effective this bond had to be proclaimed and renewed on many a ritual occasion in the course of the calendar year.[55] To this overwhelming emphasis on the links between Hephaistos and Athena in the Athenian sources we need

[48] See, e.g., his assistants and the scenes on Akhilleus' shield (*Il.* 18.417–20, 483–608) or the dogs and *kouroi* in Alkinoös' palace (*Od.* 7.91–94, 100–102; cf. 8.555–65). See also Hes. *Theog.* 581–84; cf. Delcourt, *Héphaistos* 48–64.

[49] *Od.* 6.232–35 = 23.159–62 (*tekhnēn pantoien*); *H. Hom. Heph* 1–3; Pind. *Pa.* 8.65–67; Hes. *Theog.* 573–75; cf. Vernant and Detienne, *Les ruses* 264–65. Hephaistos and Athena are also paired by virtue of their miraculous birth: in Hes. *Theog.* 927–29 Hephaistos is born by Hera alone in retaliation for Athena's birth by Zeus alone; see also *H. Hom. Apoll.* 317; Apollod. 1.3.5; cf. Delcourt, *Héphaistos* 31–33.

[50] Paus. 1.14.6 explains their cohabitation through Erikhthonios. See also *IG* II² 223 B 4; cf. Loraux, *Les enfants* 56 n. 98 and Brommer, *Hephaistos* 75–90. On the association of Hephaistos and Athena in Athens in general, see Delcourt, *Héphaistos* 191–203; Loraux, *Les enfants* 123 and n. 16; Brommer, *Hephaistos* 157–59.

[51] Paus. 1.26.5; cf. Loraux, *Les enfants* 30.

[52] For the sources and a summary of the problems concerning the Khalkeia see Parke, *Festivals* 92–93. Interestingly, the weaving of Athena's *peplos* began at this festival of the bronzesmiths, exactly nine months before the Panathenaia and the celebration of Erikhthonios' birth. On the possible worship of Athena *Erganē* also on the Acropolis see Loraux, *Les enfants* 136 n. 73; Martin, *Healing* 80–81.

[53] Robertson, "Origins" 269–81.

[54] See Plat. *Prot.* 321d–e, *Crit.* 109c–d; cf. Sol. 1.49–50. On technical intelligence as belonging to Hephaistos and Athena see Vernant and Detienne, *Les ruses* 264–65.

[55] New fire and craft are also associated in the case of Lemnos; cf. Burkert, "Jason" 1–16.

to add, only for the sake of completeness, the temple of Athena *Khalkioikos* in Sparta.[56]

In light of all this Athenian evidence, therefore, to find Athena as the only bestower of all the art (*tekhnan pasan,* 50–51) to mortals is unprecedented and makes Pindar's account unique.[57] Hephaistos' absence is all the more striking since it is his own craft that brings about Athena's birth in the poem (35–37), as emphasized by the two datives: *tekhnaisin* and especially *khalkelatōi pelekei,* a collocation which implies the use of fire. The *tekhnē* that Athena bestows on the Rhodians, on the other hand, achieves what is elsewhere the product of Hephaistos' art, that is, artifacts resembling living beings. But the means explored by the Rhodian Athena are different: the dative *aristoponois khersi* (51), without explicitly precluding the use of fire, stresses nonetheless a skill that is solely based on the excellent work of the hands. The *adolos* in the following *gnōmē* (53) has been construed as an answer to the reputation of malice and magic accompanying the art of the Telkhines, whom ancient legend located in Rhodes (Diod. 4.76.1, 5.56; Zenob 3.7; Palaiph. *De Incred.* 22; Zenon *FGrHist* 523 F 1).[58] This is not impossible, but the phrasing of the *gnōmē* may also allude to the absence of fire from the art of the Heliadai, which thus does not depend on Prometheus' *dolos*.[59] In other words, the *fired tekhnē* of Hephaistos gives way, in the course of the Pindaric narrative, to the *fireless tekhnē* of Athena. The absence of Hephaistos as a giver of art to mortals matches the absence of fire from the rite held in Athena's honor.

Yet the art that the Rhodians receive from Athena is not simply restricted to the creation of objects that resemble living beings. The diction of line 52 (ἔργα δὲ ζωοῖσιν ἐρπόντεσσί θ' ὁμοῖα κέλευθοι φέρον) suggests something more complex. The primary sense of *pherō* is, of

[56]Paus. 10.5.12; E. *Hel.* 228; cf. Arist. *Lys.* 1320; Thuc. 1.128, 134.

[57]The element of surprise may be stressed by the use of enjambment: *tekhnan* is the last word of the third antistrophe, *pasan* the first word of the third epode. In *Ol.* 13.65–78 Athena does not construct the golden bridle but merely teaches its usage; cf. Vernant and Detienne, *Les ruses* 191. Also in *Pyth.* 12 she is not involved in metalwork, since she invents the music of the *aulos,* not the object itself (6–7, 19). In both cases the *tekhnē* is restricted and, more importantly, does not require the virgin goddess to use fire.

[58]For various views on precisely what Pindar's allusion entails see Gildersleeve, *Pindar* on line 53; Bowra, *Pindar* 339. The reference to the Telkhines is rejected by Young, *Three Odes* 86 n. 2, by Ruck, "Marginalia" 129–32, and by Verdenius, *Commentaries* on line 53.

[59]Bresson, *Mythe* 52–53.

course, "to bring, to carry," but when used of trees or land it can also mean "to bring forth, to produce."[60] It is as if the streets (*keleuthoi*) themselves gave birth to *erga* similar to living beings. In the myth of the Panathenaic festival, as we saw, Hephaistos' semen falls on the ground, and the earth gives birth to Erikhthonios. The fire god is as necessary in autochthony as in the production of artifacts. Autochthony and the production of living beings through art seem to be homologous.[61] In Pindar's account, too, the production of Rhodian artifacts is described in a way that approximates it to emergence from the earth. As Erikhthonios is either protected by snakes (Apollod. 3.14.6 with Frazer's n. 2 in the Loeb edition; Eur. *Ion* 20–26) or pictured as being half serpent himself (Paus. 1.24.7; *Et. Magn.* s.v. *Erekhtheus*; Hyg. *Fab.* 166; *Astron.* 2.13), so the word *herpontessin* in *Ol.* 7 may evoke the reptilian associations of creatures borne by the Earth, like Erikhthonios.[62] Even the phrase *kleos bathu* (53), the "deep," profound glory of the Rhodians, may be meant to have chthonic overtones.[63] Athenian autochthony and craft are thus collapsed, in Pindar's version of the Rhodian myth, into the striking picture of the artifacts that crawl on the ground.

To sum up so far, Pindar brings out in relief the correspondence between the two ways of honoring Athena: the Rhodian fireless rite with its *aition* and the Panathenaic torch race with its *aition*. He integrates the two rites into one larger picture by alluding to a primordial torch race in which the Rhodians and the Athenians compete for Athena's favor as if in accordance with the regulations of the Panathenaic

[60] See *Od.* 4.229, 9.131; Hes. *Erga* 117; Hdt. 6.139; cf. Pind. *Nem.* 11.41; E. *Hec.* 593; Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.22; and esp. Pl. *Tim.* 24c (*topos andras pherei*); cf. LSJ s.v. *pherō* V.

[61] This homology is expressed at the foot of Athena's statue on the Acropolis, where Pheidias represented side by side Pandora, the living artifact par excellence (Hes. *Theog.* 570–84), and autochthonous Erikhthonios (Paus. 1.24.6–7); cf. Loraux, *Les enfants* 122–23.

[62] See Rubin, "Epinician Symbols" 75. Despite Verdenius, *Commentaries* on line 52, *herpein* is not a neutral word. Pindar (fr. 70b.1–3) uses it of old-style dithyramb in a metaphorical way that suggests the movements of a snake (contra Bowra, *Pindar* 195). Generally, the root *herp–*, even when not used explicitly of reptiles and other creeping things (LSJ s.v. *herpeton* II) (a) denotes movement that is close to the ground (e.g., *Il.* 17.447; *Od.* 4.418, 12.395; Pind. fr. 106; and many others) or (b) evokes a special connection with the earth (Alkman 89.3 *PMG*). Alternatively, (c) it designates movement, often but not exclusively metaphorical, that is stealthy or secret (S. *Aj.* 157, 287, *Phil.* 1223, *Ant.* 585, 618; E. *Hel.* 316; cf. Pind. *Ol.* 6.97, 13.103, *Nem.* 4.43). Also, I cannot resist the possible echo of Erikhthonios' name in *epikhthonion* (51).

[63] See *bathun klaron* in *Ol.* 13.62, an ode also performed in 464 B.C.

race. Thus Pindar sets up a contrast between the association of Athena with Hephaistos/fire in Athens and the separation of Athena from Hephaistos/fire in Rhodes. In both cases Athena remains a virgin. In Athens, however, we find a paradox: the "metaphorical" semen of the fire god is necessary in art just as his "actual" semen is necessary in the procreation of living beings (Erikhthonios). As a result the virginity of Athena seems to be impaired in Athens: she is a quasi-mother, since Erikhthonios is nurtured in her temple, after being conceived through the desire she rouses.[64] The Rhodian Athena, in contrast, is totally untouched by Hephaistos' fiery desire.[65] Artifacts can be produced without Hephaistos' intervention, and, consequently, the Rhodian rites can be fireless.

II

What is the significance of Pindar's tour de force? To answer this question we have to compare the ways in which Athena and Rhodes are presented in *Ol.* 7. Athena is born from a father, yet her birth presupposes sexual union (Hes. *Theog.* 888–90). In fact in *Ol.* 7 she appears only at the side of her father, never alone: first, when she jumps from the head of Zeus (πατέρος Ἀθαναία κορυφὰν κατ' ἄκραν, 37);[66] second, when the Heliadai are instructed to appease the father and the daughter (πατρί τε . . . κόρᾳ τ' ἐγχειβρόμῳ, 43); and third, when Athena, following the lead of her father, bestows boons on the Rhodians (κείνοισι μὲν . . . Ζεύς . . . αὐτὰ δὲ, 49–51). These three instances are the only times she is mentioned in the ode. They may display a tendency toward the increasing independence of Athena from Zeus, but

[64] Although Erikhthonios/Erekhtheus is called son of Ge (*Il.* 2.548; Hdt. 8.55; E. *Ion* 267, etc.) or son of Ge and Hephaistos (Isoc. *Panath.* 126; Plut. *Orat. Vit.* 843e, etc.), he is also seen as the son of Hephaistos and Athena (Apollod. 3.14.6; Paus. 1.14.6; Luc. *Salt.* 39; August. *Civ. Dei* 18.12). On the multiple origin of Erikhthonios and on Athena's various functions see Loraux, *Les enfants* 22, 57–65, esp. 57–60, on Athena as mother and nurse; cf. E. *Herakl.* 771. That Hephaistos' semen fell on the earth via Athena's thigh may not be accidental in light of Dionysus' birth from Zeus' thigh (E. *Ba.* 243–44, 294–95), which illustrates the belief in the vital, nourishing power that resides in the thighbone.

[65] On the Rhodians' awareness of the implications see the scholiast on 48 (Drachmann I 219–20) citing Apollonios.

[66] Here the inclusion of her name between *pateros* and *koruphan* might lead one to believe, before *koruphan* is heard, that *pateros* is a genitive of possession taken closely with *Athanaia*.

the umbilical cord, so to speak, is never entirely severed. Athena remains the virgin daughter of the father. In turn she can assist with the creation of living beings without needing the male element, the fire of the fire god, the quasi-husband of the Athenian Athena.

On the other hand, Rhodes, island and nymph at the same time, is miraculously born without a father. Although in other versions she does not lack one (schol. *Ol.* 7.14 in Drachmann I 204), in *Ol.* 7 she is said either to be Aphrodite's daughter (14) or to grow out of the sea (62, 69–70).[67] Her main feature is that she is destined, already before her birth, to become Helios' wife (67). The combination of these two elements (fatherless birth and giving birth through sexual union) is emphasized twice through juxtaposition: once when the name of the island is first introduced in the beginning of the poem (*paid' Aphroditas Aelioio te numphan,* 14), and a second time at the moment of her birth (69–71):[68]

> βλάστε μὲν ἐξ ἁλὸς ὑγρᾶς
> νᾶσος, ἔχει τέ νιν ὀξειᾶν ὁ γενέθλιος ἀκτίνων πατήρ,
> πῦρ πνεόντων ἀρχὸς ἵππων.

As drawn in *Ol.* 7, Athena and Rhodes are totally opposite, or rather they are placed in perfect complementarity. While Athena's birth from a father has been characterized as "le produit d' une opération métallurgique,"[69] Rhodes' birth without a father is depicted in terms that recall the growth of plants. And whereas Athena is determined to remain unmarried (cf. *H. Hom. Aphr.* 7–15; Aesch. *Eum.* 736–38), the defining characteristic of Rhodes is her destiny to be the bride of Helios, the primordial fire, who fertilizes the soil and begets renowned offspring.

But why does Pindar set up this complementarity between Athena and Rhodes? How does their juxtaposition in the Pindaric account fit with the contrast that we have explored between the myth and rites of the Panathenaia, on the one hand, and the Rhodian myth and rites, on the other? Further, to return to the initial aim of this paper, to what

[67] For a comparison of the births of Athena and Rhodes see also Bresson, *Mythe* 61–63.

[68] The word order of line 14 seems to suggest that Helios the husband replaces the father. It is noteworthy that at 70 Helios is predicated as father, but of course not of Rhodes. Yet Asclepiades, according to the scholiast (Drachmann I 203), gives Helios and Aphrodite as Rhodes' parents.

[69] Vernant and Detienne, *Les ruses* 177; cf. Duchemin, "Pindare" 127 n. 1.

extent do these sets of oppositions contribute to the exaltation of the victor's homeland?

In Athens, as we have seen, Athena is both the virgin daughter of Zeus and the quasi–mother/wife. In Rhodes, in contrast, Athena is only the virgin daughter of the father. This becomes feasible because the function of the mother/wife is taken over by Rhodes, who, having no loyalties to a father, is emphatically depicted as the mother and wife.

This split of the two roles, namely the virgin and the mother/wife, between Athena and Rhodes respectively, which is effected in the Rhodian myth, carries further implications. In Athens, Athena presides over the production of living beings, whether by autochthony (illustrated in the birth of Erikhthonios) or by art,[70] both of which are linked in that they require the cooperation of the fire god, Hephaistos.[71] The Rhodian Athena, on the contrary, presides only over the arts; autochthony is the contribution of Rhodes. And unlike in Athens, where Hephaistos' semen, literal and metaphorical, is necessary for both autochthony and the arts, in Rhodes the fire god is dispensed with, as living beings can be produced otherwise. Autochthony is the outcome of Helios' primordial fire (71–73), while artifacts that resemble living beings are achieved with the excellent handwork assisted by the golden rain of Zeus (49–52). This golden shower that can impregnate and generate is familiar from two myths also attested in Pindar: those of Danaë (*Pyth.* 12.17–18) and of Alkmene (*Isthm.* 7.5).[72] The fact that in our poem Zeus' shower falls on an island, not a woman, does not invalidate the parallel: the double character of Rhodes, nymph and island, is emphasized time and again (13–14, esp. 62–76). What is more remarkable, however, is that in *Ol.* 7 the impregnating force of Zeus' golden shower is only secondary: it does not produce by itself but only via the skillful handwork of the Heliadai, and it assists in the production not of living

[70] Quite literally, since autochthony (Erikhthonios) and production of living beings by art (Pandora) are represented together at the base of Athena's statue by Pheidias (Paus. 1.24.6–7).

[71] The Athenians can be called "children of Hephaistos" (A. *Eum.* 13; Hsch. s.v. *Hēphaistiadai*). That is the reason (see Simon, *Die Götter* 215) why Hephaistos was honored with torches at the Apatouria, the festival of the phratries (Istros *FGrHist* 334 F 2).

[72] Despite Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 367 n. 1, who considered the shower in *Isth.* 7 simply as a blessing. Rubin, "Epinician Symbols" 74–75, points to "the latent hierogamy motif." See also note 47 above.

(Athens)		FUNCTION	*(Rhodes)*
Athena	<	virgin/daughter	Athena
		mother/wife	Rhodes
Hephaistos	<	fire for craft	Zeus' golden rain
		fire for autochthony	Helios

FIGURE 1

beings but of artifacts resembling living beings. More importantly, it only improves a land which has long before been fertilized.

Rhodes is fertilized, of course, by Helios, the primeval fire, which exists from the beginning. Helios is termed "the father of the piercing beams, the master of the fire-breathing horses" (70–71). The association of fire and the male element is apparent. The male fire of Helios impregnated the land of Rhodes and begot the Heliadai well before the birth of Athena. That is illustrated by the reverse narrative order of the poem, and as a result it emerges that the Rhodians trace their descent back to autochthonous birth from a land fertilized by that primordial fire of the sun. Figure 1 summarizes the basic differences between the Athenian myth of autochthony and Pindar's Rhodian version.

It should be clear by now that the Rhodians could claim priority over the Athenians on various counts. In the retrogressive narrative of the poem the birth of the Heliadai, the Rhodian autochthons, comes well before the birth of Athena and the consequent engendering of Erikhthonios, the ancestor of the Athenians.[73] Yet temporal priority, for all its prestige, is not the only point scored by the Rhodians. Athenian autochthony requires, as we have seen, the agency of both the earth and Athena—a cooperation that causes a certain amount of indeterminacy, fraught with tensions.[74] Such tensions are absent in the Rhodian case because Rhodes' twofold nature embraces the capacities of both the earth and the human mother.

Furthermore, if Erikhthonios is for the Athenians the emblem of their autochthony, he is still the offspring of the male fire god whose

[73] Harpocr. s.v. *Autokhthones*. On the importance of autochthony as a concept shaping civic identity see Loraux, *Les enfants* 35–75 and, with emphasis on the idea of temporal priority, Rosivach, "Autochthony" 302–5. He also notes (298) that *Ol.* 7.30 is the earliest use of *khthōn* "in the sense of 'land, country' to refer to the territory of a specific people."

[74] Loraux, *Les enfants* 12–15, 58–60.

semen fertilized the earth. Without it the Athenian soil would remain barren. Hence the Athenians need a yearly torch race to honor Athena and Erikhthonios and, of course, to renew the fertility of the land and the productivity of their craftsmen. The land of the Rhodians, on the other hand, is fertilized once and for all as soon as it comes to light (literally). What is more, it is rendered fertile not by the technical fire of Hephaistos, contaminated by usage, but by the pure and primeval fire of the sun: for in Greek ritual practice, the ultimate source of new fire, unimpaired and unpolluted, is the sun.[75] Thus, while the Athenians have to renew their fire and transfer it through the annual torch race, the Rhodians do not need to, because the pure and unpolluted fire of Helios is enclosed, so to speak, in their land and lives on in their race. It has only to be reactivated by the golden shower of Zeus, and the excellent skill offered by Athena. In fact the gold and the fertility of the earth would assimilate Rhodes to the Golden Age (Hes. *Erga* 109–26), were it not for the element of labor (*aristoponois khersi*) that defines the state of the Heliadai as human.

Last but not least comes the paradox of Athena's virginity, which the goddess in Athens has to preserve and yet at the same time receive the semen of the fire god and "mediate" in the conception and birth of Erikhthonios. It has been noted that "the oxymoron of virginal maternity" in Athenian ideology "promises fertility without the dangerous corollary of sexuality."[76] The Rhodian variant, in contrast, not only avoids that dangerous corollary of sexuality, but also circumvents, through its ritual oddity, the oxymoron of maternal virginity.

III

The Rhodian myth of autochthony, therefore, is shown to claim a certain superiority to its Athenian counterpart. But two further questions remain. What is Pindar's motivation for privileging Rhodes over Athens? And, in fact, if motivation implies also invention, to what ex-

[75] See Burkert, "Jason" 6 and n. 1. Plut. *Numa* 9.5–6 informs us that whenever the perpetual fire was extinguished, as in Delphi by the Medes, it could not be reset from another fire, but a fresh, new flame, pure and unpolluted, had to be kindled from the sun. On the possible Indo-European origins of the connection between sacrificial fire and the sun, see Nagy, *Greek Mythology* 146–50.

[76] Zeitlin, "Misogyny" 172.

tent are we allowed to speak of Pindaric invention and not of Rhodian tradition? Let us take up the former question first. The transition from the victor's praise to exaltation of the polis is, of course, in keeping with the main thrust of the epinician genre.[77] Further, Rhodes' involvement in the quasi-athletic contest of the torch race seems to fit very well with the epinician atmosphere. Yet this does not account for the pervasive, however implicit, polemic against Athens. Even though the worship of Athena, shared by the two cities, could be a sufficient reason for agonistic comparison, we ought to investigate the relationship between Athens and Rhodes at the time of the composition of the ode.

Despite the lack of evidence for the years around 464, it would be hardly surprising if political tensions did not exist, in view of the pronounced tendencies of the Rhodian aristocracy and the violence of later events. Although Rhodes was a member of the Delian League, the aristocracy at least were highly conscious of their Doric background, to which Pindar clearly alludes: Ἀργείᾳ σὺν αἰχμᾷ (19), Ἡρακλέως εὐρυσθενεῖ γέννᾳ (22–23).[78] Especially the Eratidai, the *genos* of Diagoras, seemed to be particularly eager to proclaim their origin: one of Diagoras' sons was significantly named Dorieus (Drachmann I 197–98; cf. Paus. 6.7.1–3). It is fair to suppose that they viewed with suspicion the Athenians' increasing power within the Confederacy as exemplified by recent events: the crushing of the Naxian revolt and the attempt to colonize the *Ennea Hodoi*. At the time of Diagoras' victory, the Thasian revolt was already under way.[79] Tensions broke out during the Peloponnesian War, when the family predictably sided with the Spartans, aiming at the secession of Rhodes. Especially memorable are Dorieus' active participation and reversals of fortune, as described by Pausanias (6.7.1–7, citing Androtion; see also Thuc. 8.35.1–2; Diod. 13.38.5, 45.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2–1.5.19). Against this background of political tensions the agonistic treatment of myth in *Ol.* 7 should come as no surprise. Manipulation of myth, required by the need to privilege the Rhodian rite over the Athenian, evinces a subtly yet unmistakably polemical

[77] See note 2 above.

[78] On the Dorian traditions of Rhodes and especially of its aristocracy see Méautis, *Pindare* 401–4, and Bresson, *Mythe* 153–57.

[79] For a summary of Rhodian history see von Gaertringen, "Rhodos" 753–63. For an account of the consolidation of Athenian power at this period see Fine, *Greeks* 343–50. On the chronology see Unz, "Chronology" 68–85.

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comparison of the two *poleis*, especially since it involves the core of civic identity, that is, autochthony.[80]

But whatever the details of the specific historical circumstances, Pindar's presentation of the Rhodian myth can be placed in the context of the wider trend of Panhellenism, which had a profound impact upon lyric poetry, as Nagy has recently demonstrated.[81] Under the influence of the Panhellenic athletic games and other factors such as the evolution of the polis, lyric poetry (in our case epinician) attempted to transcend the occasionality of the victory and the performance. In order to be effective, that is, to exhibit a Panhellenic relevance and achieve a Panhellenic audience, Pindaric song had to transcend its epichoric character. "Each of [the] victory odes," Nagy writes, "aimed at translating its occasion into a Panhellenic event."[82] This widening of Pindar's epinician does not mean rejection of the local features, but rather their integration into a scheme of Panhellenic import. "Thus whenever the chorus, as representative of the polis, speaks about things epichoric, it does so with a Panhellenic point of view."[83] Nagy shows how the treatment of the myth of Pelops in *Ol.* 1 reflects this Panhellenization, but I believe *Ol.* 7 is also a good case in point. Even if the phrase *diorthōsai logon* (21) applies, strictly speaking, only to the tale of Tlepolemos, it nonetheless betrays a corrective disposition that might permeate the whole mythic section.[84] Thus the fireless sacrifice to Athena may be an eccentricity of merely local import, yet its oddity is transcended in the course of the narrative, since the Rhodian rite is incorporated clearly, though indirectly, within a larger Panhellenic framework. The Panhellenic model is provided, in the case of the ode, by a latecomer among the Panhellenic festivals, the Panathenaia. Pindar's Rhodian version appropriates the Panathenaic model and thus attains a Panhellenic relevance and acceptance which the odd Rhodian rite could not assume by itself. At the same time, the underlying allusion to the model of the

[80] The argument of Rosivach, "Autochthony," that the idea of Athenian autochthony became prominent in the first half of the fifth century would chime in well with Pindar's allusions to Rhodian autochthony. On the political function of myth in general, both within the city and in the relationships between cities, see Nilsson, *Cults* 49–87. On the function of myth as a means of communication see Burkert, *Structure* 24–26.

[81] On Panhellenism and its impact on epic and lyric see Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* passim.

[82] Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* 114.

[83] Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* 145.

[84] See Defradas, "Septième Olympique" 34–50.

Panathenaic torch race, while conceding that Athena became the patron goddess of Athens,[85] brings into relief the superiority of the Rhodian fireless rite.

Thus we can escape the vexing dilemma of whether Pindar's account is based on Rhodian legend or is poetic invention. Whatever the precise degree to which Pindar departs from the earlier Rhodian version, if at all, it is most important to keep in mind the character of the victory ode as a public pronouncement. The chorus, after all, can represent the community of the polis.[86] Therefore, rather than trying to disentangle the threads of Pindaric invention and Rhodian tradition, we should assume a dynamic process in which the ideology of the polis and the mythmaking of Pindar interact with each other to transcend the occasionality of the local and transform Diagoras' ode into a golden inscription—that is, a Panhellenic monument.

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[85] Rival self-asserting myths of communities may contain concessions to each other, especially when bound by indisputable facts of cult. An example is afforded by the Megarian vs. Messenian myths of Ino's vs. Leukothea's emergence; see briefly Nagy, "Theognis and Megara" 79–80.

[86] Burnett, *Bacchylides* 50 and 175 n. 6. This paper, a version of which was presented at the annual meeting of CAMWS in Columbia, Missouri, in April 1990, was conceived at a Princeton University seminar offered by W. R. Connor. I thank him as well as R. P. Martin, Froma Zeitlin, Daniel Mendelsohn, Sarah Monoson, and the referee of this journal for many helpful suggestions.

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HERODOTUS' USE OF PROSPECTIVE SENTENCES AND THE STORY OF RHAMPSINITUS AND THE THIEF IN THE *HISTORIES*

This study is a part of an attempt to analyze the work of Herodotus in terms of performance rather than as a text to be read, and it is based on two assumptions. The first is that the *Histories* evidently constitutes a performance in the ordinary sense of the word, being composed of sections which individually or in combination were designed to be delivered orally in front of an audience and whose performance has in turn helped to shape the text we now have.[1] The second assumption concerns the applicability to the *Histories* of the term "performative" from the point of view of speech–act theory. "Performative" in this sense denotes an utterance that "does" something.[2] On the one hand we may regard the *Histories* as a whole, seen from the outside, as performative. By verbal means it performs certain "world–changing" actions: it explicitly confers *kleos* (saving events of men and wonderful deeds of Greeks and non–Greeks from becoming "evanescent" with time and "unglorious," according to the formulation of the first sentence), and it indirectly warns.[3] On the other hand, if we look at the

[1] As Nagy states, *Pindar's Homer* 220, the inquiry Herodotus says he is presenting in the proem (ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις), "is not a public oral performance as such, but it is a public demonstration of a performance." For the likelihood that parts of the *Histories* may have been in the public domain before the publication of the whole and for evidence of oral performances see, most recently, Evans, *Herodotus* 90, 94–104. On the uses of writing in the fifth century and its relationship with oral modes of communication see Thomas, *Oral Tradition* 15–34.

[2] I owe this distinction between the wider and the more specialized use of "performance" to Martin, *Language of Heroes* 47 and passim, who applies both meanings to his analysis of heroic utterances in the *Iliad*. For the definition and discussion of "performative" I base myself on the study of Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, the initiator of speech–act theory; and on subsequent elaborations especially by Searle, "Classification" and *Expression and Meaning*; and Bach and Harnish, *Linguistic Communication*; as well as the useful compendiums provided by Prince, *Dictionary of Narratology*. On the appropriateness of applying speech–act theory to literary works see van Dijk, "Pragmatics and Poetics"; Pratt, *Speech–Act Theory* esp. 132–51; Searle, *Expression and Meaning* 58–75.

[3] See the detailed discussion by Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* 262–63, 303–13, 314–38, who draws a parallel between the medium of Herodotus and the *ainos* of Pindar on the basis of their equivalent performative roles. A world–changing, as opposed to world–describing, utterance is one which attempts to get the world to match the words—e.g., a

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discourse of Herodotus from within, it appears composed of different types of sentences, or groups of sentences, which can be classified in terms of their different performative roles and force.

The very notion of speech-act originated with Austin's distinction between goal-directed utterances (such as promises, commands, and verdicts) and true-or-false statements of facts, which he called "constatives" (of the type "Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz" or "The earth is flat"). Austin went on to show how this preliminary distinction is untenable, since saying, reporting, and narrating are also actions performed by words.[4] Current speech-act theorists accordingly reject the notion of a nonperformative utterance and rather classify utterances by type on the basis of the action each of them performs. Thus Searle's classification of illocutionary acts includes five categories: representatives (the speaker commits to something being the case, e.g., stating, reporting); directives (the speaker attempts to get the hearer to do something, e.g., commanding, advising); commissives (the speaker commits to some future course of action, e.g., promising, expressing intention); expressives (the speaker expresses a psychological state, e.g., congratulating, apologizing); declarations (the speaker brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist, e.g., naming a child, declaring war, appointing someone to office).[5]

The sentences which Austin used as paradigms of "constative" are regarded as representatives in Searle's taxonomy, but they differ from others of that class in that they are implicit rather than explicit performatives (that is, not in the form "*I declare* that the earth is flat," although that is their deep structure) and have no additional features besides the speaker's committing to something's being the case.[6] For

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command, verdict or promise—and not vice versa. The distinction is formulated by Searle, "Classification" 3–4. Cf. Pratt, *Speech-Act Theory* 142–43.

[4] Austin, *How to Do Things with Words,* 132–49.

[5] Searle, "Classification" 10–16. "Illocutionary act" designates an act performed *in* saying something. The first taxonomy was compiled by Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* 150–63, and many different versions have appeared since. Cf., e.g., Bach and Harnish, *Linguistic Communication* 39–119.

[6] Searle, "Classification" 10–11, focuses his description on explicit representatives and broadens the category to include illocutionary acts of "boast" and "lament" ("representatives with the added feature that they have something to do with the interest of the speaker") as well as "conclude" and "deduce" ("representatives with the added feature that they mark a certain relation between the representative illocutionary act and the rest of the discourse or the context of the utterance").

the purposes of our discussion on Herodotus, these implicit representatives should be grouped in a special category, because they constitute the basic units of narrative or description, and in turn narrative and description represent the two essential modes through which the speech–act of the *Histories* pursues its overall goals.

We can now state that in Herodotus' discourse, series of narrative (or descriptive) statements of the type we have just described are irregularly interspersed with sentences or clauses which either clearly fall in one of the classes of Searle's illocutionary acts other than the representative, or in any case have an illocutionary purpose (be it implicit or explicit) different from that of stating, reporting, etc.[7]

The subdivision I have just made between implicit representatives (Austin's original "constatives") and other performatives roughly corresponds to a distinction of a different order, between narrative and metanarrative.[8] While the narrative describes the "outside world," the metanarrative (more or less explicitly) describes the narrative.[9] Most metanarrative sentences come either before or after the narrative segment to which they refer and may therefore be catalogued as either

[7]For example, explicit praise (as at 7.135.1, "The daring of these men is worthy of wonder, and in addition so are their words"), though, I suppose, Searle (on the basis of note 6 above) would attribute it to the class of representatives.

[8]Most (though not all) statements belong to narrative, and most (though not all) performatives of the second group are metanarrative. To show the precise extent to which this is true would require a discussion beyond the scope of this paper.

[9]Here, and from now on, the term "narrative" includes description and is employed in antithesis with "metanarrative" and in a broader sense than usual. For different restricted definitions see, e.g., Labov, *Language in the Inner City* 359; Prince, *Dictionary of Narratology* s.v. "narrative"; and Coste, *Narrative as Communication* 36. In my use of the term, the narrative is made up of all referential facts, and its minimal units may be represented by statements in the mode of *do* or *happen* or *is* in the present or in the past, including what some critics would call "description." Any "piece" of narrative, more or less autonomous and made out of one or more statements, will be called a "narrative segment." An obvious illustration of metanarrative, on the other hand, is provided by titles of chapters in some modern novels. Regardless of its form, "Mr. Pip Goes to London," if it is a title, does not describe an action but rather the topic of the coming narrative. In light of the earlier distinction, moreover, the sentence clearly has a different performative function from that of a formally identical statement of fact. It does not report; it implicitly promises a narrative and is semantically equivalent to "I will narrate what happened when, or how it came about that, Mr. Pip went to London." It is, in other words, a commissive. For the concept of metanarrative or metanarration as talk about the narrative see Babcock, "Story in the Story," and Bauman, *Story, Performance and Event* 98–101.

introductions or conclusions, identifying a narrative segment which follows or capping one that precedes. Each of these two categories may in turn be subdivided into a limited number of different types according to their syntactical structure and the relationship of their propositional content to the narrative to which they refer.[10] What all introductions and conclusions have in common, however, is that they all *in some way* summarize what will be narrated or what has been narrated. These sentences are rhetorical signs of a didactic communication from the speaker to the audience, and although their illocutionary purposes must be assessed in the specific cases, generally speaking they bid the audience to receive the narration in a certain manner, they announce narratives to come, and they effect in the *logos* subdivisions necessary for its comprehension ("I end," "I begin").[11]

Among these metanarrative statements, the *prospective sentence* is, according to my definition, the type of introduction in which the primary element of summarization is represented by a forward-looking demonstrative (a form of ὅδε, τοιόσδε, or οὗτος) which either modifies or replaces an expressive nominal element (subject, object, predicate, or adverb).[12] For example:

> Σάρδιες δὲ ἥλωσαν ὧδε (1.84.1)
> They captured Sardis in this way (i.e., in the following way).
>
> κατ'αὐτὸν δὲ Κροῖσον τάδε ἐγίνετο (1.85.1)
> Concerning Croesus himself, these things (i.e., the following things) happened.

[10] Some of these types are described in Munson, *Transitions* 28–33.

[11] Thus Barthes, "Discourse of History" 130, observes that traditionally the initial sentence of a history constitutes a "performative opening, for in it speech is usually a solemn act of foundation." In most cases metanarrative sentences are indirect speech-acts, in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another (typically a statement). For indirect speech-acts in ordinary communication in English see Searle, *Expressions and Meaning* 30–57.

[12] Munson, *Transitions* 28. There is otherwise no other ready-made terminology which distinguishes among different types of introductory and concluding statements. Van Groningen, *Composition Littéraire* 44, applies the term *cheville prospective* to all introductions. "Framing-sentences" (Immerwahr, *Form and Thought* 12) and "shifters of organization" (Barthes, *Discourse of History* 129) are among the terms which have been used to denote a general category of metanarrative sentences which includes the prospective type.

Utterances of this type may attain various degrees of complexity and fulfill a number of performative functions by virtue of additional elements besides those which make them "prospectives." Considered in their barest form, however, prospective sentences are at least semantically equivalent to illocutionary acts which promise information and indirectly request attention. They are metanarrative because "the following things" and "in the following way" mean "the things I am going to recount" and "in the way I am going to recount"; in other words, the prospective demonstratives refer not to the material of the narrative, but to the narrative itself.

Prospective sentences constitute, with retrospective conclusions (their approximate counterpart),[13] one of the most pervasive features of Herodotus' expository style and are largely responsible for the chopped-up rhythm of his account. In Thucydides' book 2, for example, we find eight prospective sentences in all; in chapters 1–124 of Thucydides' book 1 there are five. On the other hand, two passages of equal length in Herodotus, taken at random from books 3 and 7, contain forty-four and twenty-six respectively.[14]

Prospective sentences can be external or internal to a varying degree. In an absolute sense, the only external prospective is one which, occurring at the beginning of a work, summarizes and identifies the whole. This is the case, for example, of Herodotus' first sentence (Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε . . .) and the opening of Hecataeus' *Genealogiai* (*FGrHist* 1 fr. 1, Ἑκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω . . .), both highly expressive programmatic-prospective introductions.[15] Within a complex narrative unit, however, we may call "external" those prospective sentences that are equivalent to

[13] These are statements that end a narrative segment, in which the primary element of summarization is represented by a backward-looking demonstrative referring to the narrative "above": e.g., 1.22.4, κατὰ μὲν τὸν πρὸς Μιλησίους τε καὶ Θρασύβουλον πόλεμον Ἀλυάττῃ ὧδε ἔσχε, where ὧδε means "in the way I have just reported."

[14] The higher frequency of prospective pronouns in Herodotus than in Thucydides, as recorded by Müller, *Satzbau* 71, though not conclusive for the limited category of prospective sentences, points in the same direction. In my own count I am not including prospective sentences of the type "he said the following" (τάδε ἔφη, etc.) introducing direct speeches, which are almost compulsory in the mixed dramatic mode and whose number therefore largely depends on the number of separate direct utterances reported in the text.

[15] See below, note 24, for the "programmatic" element.

chapter headings or titles for semiautonomous narratives, that is for narrative segments that could be excerpted from the context and told as separate stories. External prospectives frequently (though irregularly) mark articulation points in the narrative of the *Histories*: the two quoted above, for example, delimit two consecutive chapters in the account of the Persian conquest of Lydia. But in the narrative style of Herodotus this large-scale organizing role of prospective sentences is merely an extension of their primary *internal* function—that of pointing out in advance a particular element within the narrative and of introducing even very small segments that have no autonomy whatsoever.

> ταῦτα ἐπιλεξάμενος ὁ Πολυκράτης καὶ νόῳ λαβὼν ὡς οἱ εὖ ὑπετίθετο ὁ Ἄμασις, ἐδίζητο ἐπ' ᾧ ἂν μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσηθείη ἀπολομένῳ τῶν κειμηλίων, διζήμενος δ' εὕρισκε τόδε· ἦν οἱ σφρηγὶς τὴν ἐφόρεε χρουσόδετος, σμαράγδου μὲν λίθου ἐοῦσα, ἔργον δὲ ἦν Θεοδώρου τοῦ Τηλεκλέος Σαμίου. ἐπεὶ ὦν ταύτην οἱ ἐδόκεε ἀποβαλεῖν, ἐποίεε τοιάδε· πεντηκόντερον πληρώσας ἀνδρῶν ἐσέβη ἐς αὐτὴν, . . . (3.41.1–2)
>
> Polycrates, upon reading these words and realizing that Amasis was giving him good advice, began to search among his treasures one for the loss of which his heart would especially suffer, and thus searching, *he found the following*: he had a seal which he wore mounted on a gold ring, made of emerald, the work of Theodorus, son of Telecles the Samian. Since, then, he decided to throw that away, *he did the following*: having manned a fifty-oared ship, he went on board . . .

Prospective sentences like those just quoted, as inexpressive as they may be, still subsume a narrator who organizes his own discourse[16] and who openly controls the pace of the narrative, forcing the recipient of the narration to take in the story in progressive stages and to focus his attention on the salient points so preannounced. This narrator is not necessarily always identical with the *histor*—that is, the narrator of the *Histories*, the "I" of the text.[17] He is rather a more vaguely

[16] Barthes, *Discourse of History* 128.

[17] The term *histor*, which here and elsewhere I borrow from Dewald, "Narrative Surface," denotes the narrator of the *Histories* not only qua narrator but also in his guise of researcher, collector, editor and critic of the *logoi*, and composer and organizer of the whole, as he emerges from the text itself, and as distinct from the historical author Herodotus. Because the distinction is important but relatively new, *histor* constitutes a useful conventional term. Moreover, in spite of the criticism of Evans, "Six New Studies" 95, that the term is not found in Herodotus and means "mediator" in Homer (see *Iliad*

definable "teller of the story" at that particular point, a narrative voice which in the reader's perception has the faculty of including both the *histor* and his possible source (especially if the narrative is in indirect speech), or either one of the two, according to the context.

One can easily understand why external prospective sentences would constitute a commonplace feature of serious expository discourse and how they answer to the practical demands of the genre. They represent one of the "shifters of organization" which Barthes identifies as typical of historical discourse.[18] They help to subdivide and group the material and to identify the topic at a given point:

> Ἰητρικὴν ὅστις βούλεται ὀρθῶς ζητεῖν, τάδε χρὴ ποιεῖν·
> Whoever wishes to investigate medicine correctly should do this.
> (Hippocr. *Airs, Waters, Places* 1)

> νοσήματά τε τάδε ἐπιχώρια εἶναι·
> The endemic diseases are these. (*Airs, Waters, Places* 3)

> οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ηὐξήθησαν.
> This is how the Athenians came to the circumstances in which their power grew. (Thuc. 1.89.1)

The greater frequency of external prospectives in Herodotus is thus partly explained as a means of acknowledging and counterbalancing the exceptional diversity of his material and the number of articulations in his *logos* in comparison with the more linear works of other fifth-century prose writers. Prospective sentences at once make the subdivision explicit, emphasize the part, and connect it to what precedes.

Internal prospectives, by contrast, do not fulfill as clear a practical function in a written work. They are the most expendable of metanarrative interventions, so that some translators of Herodotus occasionally edit them out of the text, as the following example shows (all the meta-

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18.501), its application to Herodotus is entirely appropriate. As Nagy demonstrates, *Pindar's Homer* 250–61, *historia* ("inquiry"), like *histor,* expresses a juridical concept; Herodotus presents himself at the outset as practicer of *historia,* and like the arbitrator in the Homeric passage he takes a position on who is *aitios* ("responsible"). For the narrator of the *Histories* see also Marincola, "Herodotean Narrative," and Darbo-Peschanski, *Discours du particulier* 107–12.

[18] Barthes, "Discourse of History," 128–31.

narrative sentences are underlined in the Greek and italicized in the English):

θῶμα δὲ μέγα εἶδον πυθόμενος παρὰ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων [external summary introduction].[19] τῶν γὰρ ὀστέων κεχυμένων χωρὶς ἑκατέρων τῶν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ πεσόντων (χωρὶς μὲν γάρ τῶν Περσέων ἔκειτο τὰ ὀστέα, ὡς ἐχωρίσθη κατ' ἀρχάς, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων), αἱ μὲν τῶν Περσέων κεφαλαί εἰσι ἀσθενέες οὕτω ὥστε, εἰ θέλοις ψήφῳ μούνῃ βαλεῖν, διατετρανέεις, αἱ δὲ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οὕτω δή τι ἰσχυραί, μόγις ἂν λίθῳ παίσας διαρρήξειας. **αἴτιον δὲ τούτου τόδε ἔλεγον,** καὶ ἐμέ γε εὐπετέως ἔπειθον [internal prospective introduction, with gloss], ὅτι Αἰγύπτιοι μὲν αὐτίκα ἀπὸ παιδίων ἀρξάμενοι ξυρῶνται τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἥλιον παχύνεται τὸ ὀστέον. τὠυτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ μὴ φαλακροῦσθαι αἴτιόν ἐστι· Αἰγυπτίων γὰρ ἄν τις ἐλαχίστους ἴδοιτο φαλακροὺς πάντων ἀνθρώπων. τούτοισι μὲν δὴ τοῦτό ἐστι αἴτιον ἰσχυρὰς φορέειν τὰς κεφαλὰς [internal retrospective conclusion], τοῖσι δὲ Πέρσῃσι ὅτι ἀσθενέας φορέουσι τὰς κεφαλάς, **αἴτιον τόδε** [internal prospective introduction]· σκιητροφέουσι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πίλους τιάρας φορέοντες. ταῦτα μέν νυν τοιαῦτα [ἐόντα εἶδον] [external retrospective conclusion]· εἶδον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ὅμοια τούτοισι ἐν Παπρήμι τῶν ἅμα Ἀχαιμένει τῷ Δαρείου διαφθαρέντων ὑπὸ Ἰνάρῳ τοῦ Λίβυος. (3.12)

I saw a great wonder here, having learned it from the natives. The bones of those who have fallen in that battle were all scattered about, the bones of the Persians separate on the one side, those of the Egyptians on the other, just as the two armies had been separated at the beginning. The skulls of the Persians are so brittle that, if you struck them with a pebble only, you would go right through them; but those of the Egyptians are so stout that you would scarcely break them with the stroke of a stone. *The reason the natives give for this—and I was persuaded by them*—was* that the Egyptians from childhood on shave their heads, and the bones grow thicker through exposure to the sun. The same reason holds for the scarcity of baldness among them. For one sees fewer bald men in Egypt than anywhere else in the world. *This, then, is the reason why their skulls are so thick, and it is the same reason why the Persians, on the other hand, have such brittle skulls.** For from *their* childhood they shelter their heads by wearing woollen caps. *That is the way this matter of the skulls was.* I saw something similar in the case of those Persians who were killed along with Achaemenes, son of Darius, by Inarus the Libyan at Papremis.

[19] I call a "summary introduction" one that, unlike the prospective and programmatic types (see below, note 26), does not formally look forward to what follows, although it does so in context.

[Asterisks mark the points at which the prospective element has been eliminated.][20]

I have cited the Greek passage in full to show how internal prospective sentences may, as in this case, cooperate with other narrative and metanarrative strategies for engaging the recipient.[21] In particular the fragmentation of the narrative by means of retrospectives recalling what has just been said and prospectives preparing for what is about to be said suggests an effort at step–by–step clarity typical of oral presentation.[22] This hypothesis is destined to remain largely impressionistic, since although we all have experience of informal forward–pointing markers in ordinary speech ("I'll tell you what"; "So, this is what we do"),[23] prospective sentences or their equivalent are not an inevitable feature of sustained oral narration.[24] A parallel to internal prospective

[20]Grene, *Herodotus*, p. 212. See also 3.41 (quoted above) in the translation by Rawlinson, *Persian Wars*, p. 231, for another example of omitted prospectives.

[21]Celebratory summary (θῶμα), repetition of key terms (χωρίς, ἐχωρίσθη, three times; αἴτιον, four times, etc.), first–person interventions (εἶδον, three times; ἐμέ . . . ἔπειθον); use of the second–person address to the audience (θέλοις, διατετρανέεις, διαρρήξειας), retrospective conclusions.

[22]For other stylistic features perhaps due to the influence of oral storytelling in Herodotus see Lang, *Herodotean Narrative* 1–69. Is the *histor* treating his own narrative as a performance, or is he faithfully reproducing the performances of others, oral narratives that he himself has received? The text of the *Histories* reveals that both types of factors may be at play: 3.12 would constitute an example of the former, but the second cannot be excluded for many narratives of events in the past, including the Rhampsinitus story discussed below. Various types of signs of interaction with the audience in the *Histories* are listed by Evans, *Herodotus* 100–102. For Herodotus' dependence on oral tradition, rather than written sources, see most recently Thomas, *Oral Tradition* 4, 96, 98, 171–72, 198, 235, 238–82; Evans, *Herodotus* 105–43.

[23]Direct speeches in Herodotus contain several prospective sentences equivalent to these. They may anticipate performative utterances such as exhortations or reproaches (e.g., 7.39.1, εὖ νῦν τάδε ἐξεπίστασο) or introduce narratives (e.g., 1.117.4, ποιέω δὲ ὧδε).

[24]The exact form of original oral narratives cannot be determined from old–fashioned collections (e.g., the Grimm fairytales). Prospective sentences and other deictic sentences involving demonstratives are frequent in the alphabetic *Popol Vuh*, which represents a reconstruction of readers' performances of the ancient Mayan hieroglyphic (see, e.g., Tedlock, *Popol Vuh* 105). In the contemporary narratives exactly transcribed by Labov, *Language in the Inner City* 354–95, retrospective conclusions, but not prospective introductions, are a common feature. Prospective sentences sometimes occur at the beginning of the narratives of practical jokes collected by Bauman, *Story, Performance and Event*, e.g., 37, 42. Tannen, "Oral and Literate Strategies," analyzes samples of oral and written narratives to demonstrate how strategies normally connected with oral communication are found in written discourse of certain genres.

clauses among modern narratives, however, can perhaps be found in the habit of certain oral folk–narrators from different parts of the world of connecting the episodes of a story by means of a direct question addressed to the audience: "Why couldn't they find their shoes? The shoemaker picked them up. And what did the shoemaker do next?" And so on.[25] Herodotus only uses this type of open–ended direct question once, accompanying it with a programmatic introduction:[26]

> ποῦ δῆτα, εἴποι τις ἄν, ταῦτα ἀναισιμοῦται; ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦτο φράσω. (3.6.2)
>
> Where on earth, one might ask, are these (i.e., the empty jars) used? I will explain this too.[27]

The open–ended direct question and the prospective sentence are to some extent analogous. With the open–ended direct question, the implicit riddle which a given narrative segment will in any case elicit from the recipient becomes explicitly formulated by the narrator either as a challenge to the recipient of the narrative ("Guess why/what. You tell me"), or—in the Herodotean example just quoted—as if it were coming from the recipient of the narrative himself ("You ask why/what. I will tell you"). The internal prospective leaves the riddle implicit but provides the terms of its formulation (what he did, why he did, in which way, etc.) and marks a moment of suspense which functions as additional encouragement for the hearer to pose the question to himself, before the narrative segment that provides the answer: "Since then Polycrates decided to throw that away, *this is what he did*:" (pause: Guess what. I will tell you.) "He manned a fifty–oared ship and went on board. . . ."

What is important is not so much to demonstrate the oral origin of

[25] This stylistic feature is noticed by Thompson, *Folktale* 17, and Dorson, "Oral Style" 39.

[26] I call "programmatic introduction" one which contains an explicit reference to the act of narrating, often (though not inevitably) couched in the narrator's first–person.

[27] For rhetorical questions in the *Histories* see Lang, *Herodotean Narrative* 38–41, who however fails to distinguish between introductory and other types of questions and, within the class of introductory questions, between open– and close–ended, the latter more properly rhetorical (the only instance in Herodotus is at 7.21.1, "For, what people did Xerxes not lead out of Asia to Greece? What stream of water, except for large rivers, was not dried up by the army who drank at them?"). Both types are Homeric, as Lang saw.

this method for establishing contact with the recipient of the narration, as rather to observe how it characterizes a certain type of discourse. Internal prospective sentences mark an especially significant moment of choice, in which the narrative can take different directions depending on the option selected by the narrative agent who happens to be in control (the character who *acts* or, at a different level, the *histor* or the alleged source who *knows*). In Herodotus, especially the report of a clever or outrageous or unexpected action in the middle of a story tends to be introduced by inexpressive prospective sentences of the type "he did/devised the following," emphasizing that the action of the character in question at that particular point of the story is one, and perhaps one of the most unpredictable, among several possible choices and will be determinant for the course of the narrative or its outcome.[28]

The frequency of internal prospectives in those parts of the *Histories* closest to the genre of folktale is perhaps due to the fact that the surprising resolution is typical of this genre of narratives. At the same time, however, prospective sentences occur throughout the *Histories,* scattered in narratives of all types of contents, from battle narratives to ethnographical passages, and their presence or absence is rather a question of pace and mode of narration. Thus we find no internal prospectives in the Gyges–Cambyses episode, the Atys–Adrastus story, and the flashback on Cyrus' survival—to take some famous examples—which contain no fewer folktale elements and unusual actions than the story of Polycrates cited above. These passages emplot the story in the tragic mode, and the narrator qua narrator is almost totally absent from them—though the *histor* may occasionally appear in the role of audience, on this side of the narrated.[29] They employ a discourse entirely different from that of more punctiliously didactic or ironic narratives in which a narrator appears in charge of the narration and organizes it for the benefit of the recipients.

The limiting case for the use of prospective sentences in Herodotus is the story of Rhampsinitus and the thief in *Histories* 2.121, a folk-

[28] See, e.g., 1.21.1, 48.2, 80.2, 96.2, etc.

[29] See, e.g., the chilling concluding gloss at 1.119.7, ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ ἔμελλε, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκέω, ἁλίσας θάπτειν τὰ πάντα. Harpagus has just exited from the stage carrying the miserable remains of his son. Where will he go? Presumably to take care of the burial, supposes the narrator as spectator, who knows no more than the rest of the audience. For the "emplotment" of history in the tragic and other modes see White, *Tropics of Discourse* 58–74.

tale attested in several different versions throughout the world.[30] What distinguishes this version from its Greek parallels or antecedents is that here several perhaps originally independent stories have been joined together to produce a longer chain.[31] The strung-along effect is enhanced by the discourse: in no other passage of the *Histories* do we find prospective introductions used to organize the narrative with such frequency and regularity to the exclusion of other metanarrative sentences. Prospective pointers distinguish six out of eight equivalent cardinal functions or functional sequences (here given an asterisk):[32]

1. The king builds storage to keep treasure in it: τὸν δὲ ἐργαζόμενον ἐπιβουλεύοντα τάδε μηχανᾶσθαι.
*2. The builder and his sons devise an opening in the storage to steal the treasure; they steal part of it: ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς ἀνοίξαντι αἰεὶ ἐλάσσω φαίνεσθαι τὰ χρήματα (τοὺς γὰρ κλέπτας οὐκ ἀνιέναι κεραίζοντας), ποιῆσαι μιν τάδε.
*3. The king sets a trap to catch the thieves; he catches one of them.
4. The thief decapitates his trapped brother; he escapes with

[30] Elwell, "Tale of Thievery"; Aly, *Volksmärchen* 67. Lloyd, *Herodotus Book II* 2.53–54, gives a complete bibliography on probable prototypes and descendants and identifies two basic common folk motifs: that of the discomfiture of the ruler and that of the wily thief. See Thompson, *Motif Index* H.507, 1.0.2, K.346.1.1, and K.301ff.

[31] Fehling, *Herodotus and His "Sources"* 210–11, identifies three originally separate strands in the tale and argues that they were put together by Herodotus himself: (1) theft from the king's treasure and the thief's escape by decapitation of his brother (Charax *FGrHist* 103 F 5 and Paus. 9.37.5–6, both ultimately from the *Telegony*, as Proclus' summary indicates); (2) men guarding the headless body being made drunk, from an unknown source; (3) prostitution of the king's daughter, transferred from Herodotus 2.126.

[32] "Function," in the sense given to the term by Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale* 21, is an act seen in terms of the role it plays in the story to which it belongs, regardless of how and by whom it is performed. Barthes, "Introduction to Structural Analysis," considers functions in greater detail, distinguishing within Proppian functions nuclei or "cardinal functions" that "constitute veritable hinges of the narrative" from "others which merely 'fill' the narrative space separating the hinge functions." Though the distinction is excessively fluid also because nothing in narrative is mere filler—see 108 with 114—it works in relative terms: in the story of Rhampsinitus and the thief, the death of the builder, for example, or the intervention of the thieves' mother may be regarded as secondary actions. A succession of nuclei linked together by a relation of solidarity is an actional sequence, which in turn constitutes a nameable functional unit (e.g., "clever action"). Most of the clever actions marked in the scheme constitute sequences of several actions.

brother's head, protecting his own identity: ἀπορεύμενον δέ μιν τάδε ποιῆσαι.

*5. The king sets a trap to catch the thief, using the other thief's headless body: ὡς δὲ χαλεπῶς ἐλαμβάνετο ἡ μήτερ τοῦ περιεόντος παιδὸς καὶ πολλά πρὸς αὐτὴν λέγων οὐκ ἔπειθε, ἐπιτεχνήσασθαι τοιάδε μιν.

*6. The thief makes the guards drunk and steals the body: τὸν δὲ βασιλέα, ὡς αὐτῷ ἀπηγγέλθη τοῦ φωρὸς ὁ νέκυς ἐκκεκλεμμένος. δεινὰ ποιέειν, πάντως δὲ βουλόμενον εὑρεθῆναι ὅστις κοτὲ εἴη ὁ ταῦτα μηχανώμενος, ποιῆσαί μιν τάδε, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιστά.

*7. The king sets a trap by prostituting his daughter: ὡς δὲ τὴν παῖδα ποιέειν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς προσταχθέντα, τὸν φῶρα πυθόμεμος τῶν εἵνεκα ταῦτα ἐπρήσσετο, βουληθέντα πολυτροπίῃ τοῦ βασιλέος περιγενέσθαι ποιέειν τάδε.

*8. The thief escapes using the limb of an unknown dead man.

The narrative segments listed above follow a regular pattern, each including an initial clever action followed by the achievement of its intended result, if that occurs. The prospective introductions show a fairly typical form, in which units of contents (that is, functions) and units of discourse (the summarizing elements) appear side by side: in most cases a circumstantial clause or group of clauses which belongs to the narrative and rushes it through ("since after opening the chamber two or three times he saw that evidently the treasure was less and less . . .") precedes the metanarrative prospective element, corresponding to the main clause of the sentence, which stops the narrative short.[33]

The last prospective, marking function 8 in the scheme above, formulates explicitly the idea of a race of cunning intelligence between king and thief (βουληθέντα πολυτροπίῃ τοῦ βασιλέος περιγενέσθαι) as it announces the action which will determine the final winner. All the preceding narrative segments in the list are functions of this race in which each of the two opponents in turn tries to outsmart the other for the purpose of *keeping* (preserving the treasure, saving one's life) and *taking* (stealing the treasure, catching the thief).

[33] The reverse pattern, in which the prospective element appears in a subordinate or participial clause, is sometimes used externally to introduce anachronic narratives: e.g., 1.73.2, . . . γενόμενον γαμβρὸν Κροίσῳ ὧδε.

The thief's career is represented by a series of increasingly advantageous compromises between gains and losses: he steals part of the treasure (2), but has to give up his brother, although he keeps his brother's head, which allows him to save himself (4), and later he also manages to steal his brother's body by wasting and giving away a great quantity of wine (6). In the clever action that closes the series (8), the thief succeeds in saving something valuable (himself) while giving up something worthless (the mutilated limb taken from an unknown man already dead), in contrast with his previous escape, achieved at the high cost of leaving behind the mutilated body of his brother, whom he had to kill. For the losing side, a similar alternation of keeping/catching and letting go/giving up follows a descending curve. The king builds a stone chamber in order to preserve his treasure, but that causes him to be deprived of some of it. He sets a trap and catches one of the thieves, but only as a headless corpse, which provides him with a second inexpensive trap, but which he must subsequently surrender. The king's prostitution of his own daughter (7) represents the last and highest expenditure for the sake of gaining and is more strongly emphasized than the others in the prospective introduction by the addition of a gloss with the grammatical first-person (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιστά, 122.ε1). This is the first clear appearance of the *histor* in the narration, since the prospective sentences in themselves are, as we have already observed, merely signs of the story being told, either by the *histor* or by the sources implied in the *oratio obliqua* construction (presumably the "Egyptian priests" of 2.120.1). Here the *histor*'s expression of disbelief devalues as historical fact the segment of the narrative most crucial from the point of view of signification.[34]

The king's prostitution of his own daughter corresponds in fact to a scandalous and unbelievable narrative moment, when the two adversaries, who are lexically defined as opposite (king–thief), start becoming one. As when the thief decapitated his brother, blood ties are here traded in by the king for the purpose of obtaining something else, and the king outrageously accepts the race of wit on the thief's own terms: in order to be equal to the thief in *sophiē*, the king must be also *anosios* to the same degree (τὸ σοφόν and τὸ ἀνόσιον are in fact the terms used

[34]The appearance of several infinitives in subordinate clauses throughout the story in indirect speech (ἔχειν, 121.α1; τυχεῖν, 121.β1, etc.) indicates disbelief in the story in general. See Cooper, "Intrusive Oblique Infinitives." For the value of false stories in Herodotus see Lateiner, *Historical Method* 77.

in the narrative at 122.ε4; cf. πολυφροσύνη and τόλμη at 121.ζ1).[35] This leveling off of king and thief on the basis of the inseparability of shrewdness and impiety paves the way for the final reconciliation and contraction of marriage kinship between the two. Just as the king becomes equivalent to the thief, so the thief becomes, so to speak, kingly: he marries the king's daughter and is praised as the one who knows most among men (ὡς πλεῖστα ἐπισταμένῳ ἀνθρώπων). The story of this race ironically contributes to the exploration of two themes of great importance in Herodotus, for which the narrative throughout the *Histories* keeps offering contradictory evidence. The first is that of the possibility of the convergence of opposites (e.g., Greek and barbarian), which includes the narrower question of whether a king is essentially different or essentially similar to other human beings. The second is the question of whether *sophiē* need be a moral or an amoral virtue.[36]

The prospective announcements that reveal the structure of the tale of Rhampsinitus and the thief slow down and scan the narrative, although not at the cost of violating the required dramatic pace. Thus the thief's decapitation of his brother at the entreaty of the latter (4) is portrayed as a hasty and desperate solution and is not mediated prospectively. Each prospective introduction which breaks a continuum naturally draws attention to the individual item. Here the cumulative effect is that the particular actions lifted out of the context in the same way become conspicuous as equivalent items in a series. Though prospective sentences often are, as are most of these, meaningless shifters which do not in their contents interpret the facts of the narrative, yet they can serve the purpose of evaluation. In a more general sense, this tale in Herodotus is a small example of how meaning is produced by the cooperation of two different levels, the level of functions (the story itself) and the level of discourse (how the story is told).

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[35] Ἀνόσιος and οὐχ ὅσιος are strong evaluative terms elsewhere in the *Histories*, denoting disregard for what is "sacred," either in the proper sense (i.e., "pertaining to the divine") or with a broader meaning. See Powell, *Lexicon* s.vv., and Darbo-Peschanski, *Discours du particulier* 42–43, 64–69.

[36] See especially the stories of private individuals who become kings: Gyges (1.8–13), Deioces (1.96–100), Cyrus (1.107–30), and Darius (3.84–87). On *sophiē* and morality see, e.g., Munson, "Artemisia" 103–4.

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ZEUS IN EURIPIDES' *MEDEA*

This essay argues that the numerous references to the gods in Euripides' *Medea,* by Medea, the nurse, the messenger, the chorus, and Jason, are intended to suggest to the audience a theological background to the action, a background whose main features owe much to the traditional conception of the gods' working in the world as described or presupposed in serious poetry from Homer to Menander. Most of my readers, I fear, will regard a paper on the theme of gods and men in *Medea* as an exercise in paradox. But in view of the number of references to the gods in the play, it is the assumption that it is nonmythological in its basic outlook that deserves to be called paradoxical. One may legitimately speak of the Greek–barbarian theme in the play on the basis of three prominent passages, or the male–female theme on the basis of half a dozen. Both in their number and their placement, the passages on the gods provide more than adequate justification for speaking of the theme of the divine governance of the universe in *Medea.* It is hard to explain why so few have paid attention to this theme and no one has devoted an entire article to it.[1] I wish to show that the text of *Medea* strongly suggests, and would have suggested to its first audience, that what happens to Jason happens by the will of Zeus in punishment for his perjury. And it will become apparent, I hope, that certain long-discussed difficulties, notably the chance appearance of Aegeus precisely when he is needed, are not the result of Euripides' carelessness or of a desire for effects at any price but intelligible parts of a coherent theological design.

[1] Some of the points I make here were anticipated by Burnett, "*Medea*" 1–24. I do not know why that article has had so little effect on the scholarly debate, unless it is because of the speculative nature of her remarks on the prehistory of "revenge tragedy," speculation which in no way vitiates the cogency of her observations (12–17) on the fundamental importance of Zeus and oaths in the play. In view of the way these observations have been ignored, it does not seem to me otiose to restate some of them and to set out all the evidence from *Medea* in support of them, something Burnett did not do. Other remarks tending to support a theological interpretation are those of Schlesinger, "Zu *Medea*," translated and abridged in Segal, *Tragedy* 294–310; Knox, "The *Medea*," esp. 204–6 (*Word and Action* 301–2); Heath, *Poetics* 57.

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SOME PROBLEMS IN *MEDEA*

Medea has generally been seen as a drama taking place essentially on the human plane. Conacher, for example, classifies it as "realistic," in contrast to "mythological," tragedy, and in this he is followed by many other interpreters.[2] The supernatural ending, of course, is not purely domestic or societal, but many feel it is somehow detachable from the rest. This view derives support from Aristotle, who, as is well known, regarded the end of *Medea* as inorganic and contrived (*Poet.* 1454a36).

But even if we ignore the dragon–chariot, all is not smooth going. Viewed as a purely human drama and apart from the end, *Medea* is about the wrath of the heroine. Yet the extremity of that wrath, which leads Medea to murder her own children, is something that has given some interpreters pause. Page registers the difficulty when he couples the child murder with the dragon–chariot as part of the "fantastic conclusion" of the play. "The murder of the children," he writes, "caused by jealousy and anger against their own father, is mere brutality; if it moves us at all, it does so towards incredulity and horror." He concludes that Medea murders her children because she is a foreigner and escapes in a magic chariot because she is a witch, neither of these traits being central to the domestic struggles ("the emotions of the woman whose love has turned to hatred and . . . those of the man who loves no longer") that are the play's real center.[3] Page's view is an extreme one, and it has not found many answering voices in the later literature. That would be more reassuring than it is if one could see any evidence that others had found a more satisfactory solution to this problem.

There are other approaches besides Page's, some more plausible than others. For Pohlenz, *Medea* is a *Seelendrama,* an exploration of the inner life of the heroine. The purpose of *Medea* and other similar plays of Euripides' early period is to give an artistic depiction of a psychological sequence of events, a subject the more objective earlier

[2] Conacher, *Euripidean Drama* 181–98. Most explicit are Pohlenz, *Tragödie* I 260, 263, and Easterling, "Infanticide." Easterling says (177), "Then there is the striking absence of a cosmic frame of reference: we are given no sense of divine motivation or sanction or control." But see note 1 above for exceptions to this tendency.

[3] Page, *Medea* xiv–xv.

literature declined to take for its own.[4] Kitto points out the difficulties of this view, noting that if the creator of Medea and Hecuba was attempting psychological portraiture, he has left all the work of depicting the psychological process to his audience: "we can hardly help admitting either that Euripides was a child in these matters, or that the conventions of his theatre almost disabled him."[5] In the particular case of *Medea* it does not help that the act Euripides depicts and is trying to make us understand is one that, while occurring in society, is of a pathological sort that one associates with the police blotter.[6]

On a slightly different view, Euripides is examining society. *Medea* shows the barely submerged tensions in Greek culture between men, who manage affairs as seems best to themselves, and women, whose interests are sacrificed so that this may be so. There is much to be said in favor of this view, and clearly the theme of men and women is an important one in the play. Yet it does not, by itself, quite "save the phenomena." The oppression of women is a universal in Greek society, yet Medea, as the chorus point out (1282–85), is virtually a singularity. She is also a foreigner, and if we thought Euripides intended to show the tensions in *Greek* society, it is hard to see why he would turn to this story.

Another group of interpretations sees in the play certain generalities about the human makeup. Kitto summarizes its meaning thus: "we have in us, besides reason, non–rational emotions that may run wild, thwarting our reason and bringing calamity. In the last analysis Euripides' tragic hero is mankind."[7] This too is clearly a theme of the play. But stated thus it seems jejune: did anyone doubt that irrational actions take place, and did Euripides feel this needed showing?

[4] See Pohlenz, *Tragödie* I 252–65.

[5] Kitto, *Form and Meaning* 214.

[6] Cf. Easterling, "Infanticide" 186, who cites sociological statistics on child murder in the United Kingdom and Denmark. It *may* be that Euripides wants his audience to "understand" the phenomenon of child murder against the background of ordinary existence (we cannot disprove this), but if so it is odd that the chorus are made to stress the unintelligibility and uniqueness of Medea's act.

[7] Kitto, *Tragedy* 197. Easterling, "Infanticide" 191, writes in a similar vein: "The sense that Euripides seems to be making out of all this is as comfortless as the conclusions to which he points in the *Hippolytus* and the *Bacchae*. What a vulnerable thing is civilization, when man's passions are so powerfully destructive."

More promising, because it is closer both to the text of the play and to the concerns of the genre, is an approach which sees Medea as the exemplification of the heroic.[8] Numerous passages in the play cast Medea in the mold of an Achilles, an Ajax, or an Antigone, but Knox points out the essential differences: Medea by the play's end is not dead but triumphant; she, unlike them, does not feel herself abandoned by the gods but supported by them; and in her final appearance she has herself many of the attributes of divinity.[9] Heroism explains certain features of Medea's characterization, notably her fearlessness of consequence to herself. But the murder of her children is not a typically heroic act, and her appearance as a sort of deus ex machina at the end is not typically heroic exodos.

The infanticide is thus one of the problems in this play that still remains to a degree opaque. But the play has another large problem, not at the end but at its very center, the notorious problem of Aegeus' bolt-from-the-blue appearance, already commented on unfavorably by Aristotle in the fourth century. "It is right," says Aristotle, "to censure both irrationality and baseness of character where, with no necessity, the dramatist pointlessly makes use of irrationality, as Euripides makes use of Aegeus."[10] Aegeus is an "irrationality," that is, an event without a natural human cause. He comes along precisely when needed not as a result of anything in the play up to that point, and not even for the purpose of seeing Medea, but merely, so it seems, to advance the plot. Von Fritz well says that Aegeus' appearance precisely in the ten or twelve hours when he is needed is asking a lot not only of the reader in his study but also of the spectator in the theatre:

> Der schwerste [Anstoss] ist der, dass Aigeus bei Euripides ganz offenkundig nur zu dem Zweck eingeführt wird, Medea ein Asyl zu verschaffen. Sogar bei Neophron war sein Erscheinen wenigstens etwas besser motiviert als bei Euripides. Dass er gerade innerhalb der zehn oder zwölf Stunden, wo Medea ihn braucht, völlig zufällig mit ihr zusammentreffen soll, obwohl er nicht die geringste Absicht dazu gehabt hat und ganz woanders hin unterwegs ist, heisst nicht nur dem nachrechnenden Leser,

[8] See esp. Knox, "The *Medea*," and Bongie, "Heroic Elements."

[9] Knox, "The *Medea*" 203–11 (*Word and Action* 301–6).

[10] *Poet.* 1461b19–21. Since Euripides *does* "make use of" the irrationality, I propose to read *anagkēs ousēs ⟨eis⟩ mēden* (cf. Gomperz's similar conjecture ⟨*pros*⟩), the corruption being easily explained by assuming that ⟨*eis*⟩ was omitted by haplography after *-ēs*.

> sondern selbst dem Zuschauer im Theater, der nicht so genau nachrechnen kann, etwas viel zumuten. Dafür soll man den Euripides ruhig tadeln.[11]

But Euripides could have put Aegeus' offer of asylum in the play as one of its presuppositions, or even if he had wanted Aegeus to make the offer in the course of the play, he could have mentioned his presence in Corinth earlier on. That is what Robinson Jeffers does pointedly several times in his otherwise quite close adaptation. Neophron, whom Page convincingly places after Euripides, addresses this problem by at least making Aegeus come looking for Medea. Why did Euripides not see the simple point that the use of unexplained coincidence to further the plot is rather unsatisfying? The first point to be considered is that coincidence—frequently identified as divinely caused—is an important ingredient in the plays of all three tragic poets. The second is that Aristotle had his reasons for failing to recognize or accept this fact.

It is clear that significant coincidence is part of the design of many fifth-century plays. In Aeschylus' *Septem* we find the terrifying coincidence that all the other champions are assigned when Eteocles learns that his brother is at the seventh gate. This is fundamental to the plot, which could not take place without it, and Eteocles is right to see in it the hand of Apollo destroying the offspring of Laius. In Sophocles' *Antigone* a dust storm allows Antigone to approach her brother's body unseen and then dissipates, revealing her to the eyes of the guard. There is some reason to regard this as divinely sent coincidence.[12] In Euripides' *Ion* a chance blasphemy prevents Ion from drinking the poisoned wine, and when he has poured it on the ground a bird comes along to drink it up and promptly dies of the poison. It is clear by the end of the play that Apollo has saved his son's life, revealed the poison plot, and brought about the mutual recognition of mother and son. In other plays,

[11] Von Fritz, "Die Entwicklung" 77 (*Antike* 386). The problem becomes even more acute, of course, if Neophron was not Euripides' imitator, as Page tried to show (convincingly to my mind), but his predecessor. It is easy to see why Neophron might have altered Euripides but difficult to explain the converse. The attempts by von Fritz (ibid.) and Rohdich (*Tragödie* 51–52) to show why (on the assumption of Neophron's priority) Euripides might have altered the motivation of Aegeus do not convince. Michelini's attack ("Neophron") on Page's conclusions leaves the most important of his arguments still standing.

[12] See Scodel, "Doublets."

the divine nature of the coincidence is not explicitly remarked on, but that does not prevent it from being integral to the plot. If Aeschylus had raised the question at all why it was Cilissa rather than someone sympathetic to Aegisthus who is sent with a message to him, a message it is essential to alter, he would surely have had someone comment on it as a favorable and perhaps providential occurrence.

Aristotle—with his own philosophical agenda—was in one respect not well placed to appreciate what the tragic poets were trying to do. As Gerald Else showed, his view of tragedy represents a deliberate jettisoning of its claims to deal with the superhuman or metaphysical realm.[13] Tragic action is reduced to "what is probable or necessary" defined in purely mundane terms, because the gods, or God, cannot be regarded by a philosopher as the source of human misfortune and unhappiness. Notoriously, the gods are mentioned only twice in the entire *Poetics*,[14] and the only duty they are assigned is that of filling in the unknowable past or future for the audience. Aristotle carefully banishes the role of the gods in *Oedipus* to a place *exō tēs tragōidias*, somewhat disingenuously since Apollo is clearly at work in the play itself. The intervention of the gods would be an *alogon*, the same word Aristotle applies to the chance arrival of Aegeus. Yet though Aristotle does not admit divinely sent coincidence into the drama he is prescribing, we have seen that fifth-century tragedy has quite a bit of it. We should consider carefully whether the arrival of Aegeus is not another instance.

Aristotle's presuppositions led him to reject two things about *Medea* that also cause moderns concern, the divine intervention at the end of the play and the chance arrival of Aegeus. The question arises naturally whether we should follow his lead, or whether a truncated view of tragedy like Aristotle's might be responsible for many of the difficulties interpreters have had with *Medea*. Is the chance event at the play's center meant to be understood as a dramatic convenience or as a manifestation of divine guidance of mortal affairs? Do any other things in the play, the dragon-chariot apart, suggest the presence of divinity? Can the supposition that the gods are at work help us in any way to understand the other great problem in the play, the pathological direction taken by Medea's wrath against Jason?

[13] Else, *Poetics*, esp. 306–7, 473–75; also Halliwell, *Poetics* 12. This is denied by Heath, "Universality" 395–97.

[14] The principal instance is 1454b2–6, but see also 1460b35–61a1.

SOME PASSAGES ABOUT THE GODS IN *MEDEA*

The play is filled from beginning to end with references to Zeus, the gods, oaths, and divine punishment. I here transcribe for brief comment a fraction of them.

The chorus begin with what might have been a casual and insignificant reference to Zeus:

> ἄιες, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Γᾶ καὶ φῶς,
> ἀχὰν οἵαν ἁ δύστανος
> μέλπει νύμφα; (148–50)

But they go on to assure Medea that Zeus will take her part:

> εἰ δὲ σὸς πόσις καινὰ λέχη σεβίζει
> κείνωι τόδε μὴ χαράσσου·
> Ζεύς σοι τάδε συνδικήσει. (155–58)

They explain her invocation of Themis by reference to Themis' father Zeus, steward of oaths:

> κλύεθ' οἷα λέγει κἀπιβοᾶται
> Θέμιν εὐκταίαν Ζῆνά θ', ὃς ὅρκων
> θνητοῖς ταμίας νενόμισται; (168–70)

They point out that Medea calls on Themis because reliance on Jason's oaths had brought her to Hellas:

> θεοκλυτεῖ δ' ἄδικα παθοῦσα
> τὰν Ζηνὸς ὁρκίαν Θέμιν, ἅ νιν ἔβασεν
> Ἑλλάδ' ἐς ἀντίπορον κτλ. (208–10)

Thus four references to Zeus and oaths within sixty lines. This is just the beginning, for there are other references to Jason's broken oaths in 21, 161, 439–40, 492–95, and the extended foil to these in the oaths of the pious Aegeus (745–55), as well as the references in 1000 (*anomōs*) and 1391–92. Medea calls on Zeus not to forget who is responsible for her troubles (332) and rebukes him for failing to provide a way of detecting base men (516–19). It is particularly striking that her first words after the departure of Aegeus, who has arrived so opportunely for her revenge plans, are ὦ Ζεῦ δίκη τε Ζηνός (764). Medea and the chorus are made

to suggest that Zeus has a reason to punish Jason, while Medea's words hint that he is actually at work in the arrival of her rescuer Aegeus.

Both before and after Medea's revenge, Medea, the chorus, and the messenger are made to say that the gods will bring about, or have brought about, the punishment of Jason. Before the fact the chorus predict (158, quoted above) that Zeus will take Medea's part. Medea's last words to Jason at the end of their first scene together foretell Jason's downfall and claim that this prediction is divinely inspired:

> νύμφευ'· ἴσως γάρ, σὺν θεοῖς δ' εἰρήσεται,
> γαμεῖς τοιοῦτον ὥστε θρηνεῖσθαι γάμον. (625–26)

Later, after the departure of Aegeus, Medea links her revenge on Jason to his broken promises and explicitly claims the help of the gods:

> ἡμάρτανον τόθ' ἡνίκ' ἐξελίμπανον
> δόμους πατρώιους, ἀνδρὸς Ἕλληνος λόγοις
> πεισθεῖσ', ὃς ἡμῖν σὺν θεῶι τείσει δίκην. (800–802)

After the murder of Creon and his daughter, the messenger and the chorus both see in events the hand of the gods:

> (Αγ). τὰ θνητὰ δ' οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἡγοῦμαι σκιάν,
> οὐδ' ἂν τρέσας εἴποιμι τοὺς σοφοὺς βροτῶν
> δοκοῦντας εἶναι καὶ μεριμνητὰς λόγων
> τούτους μεγίστην μωρίαν ὀφλισκάνειν.
> θνητῶν γὰρ οὐδείς ἐστιν εὐδαίμων ἀνήρ·
> ὄλβου δ' ἐπιρρυέντος εὐτυχέστερος
> ἄλλου γένοιτ' ἂν ἄλλος, εὐδαίμων δ' ἂν οὔ.
> Χο. ἔοιχ' ὁ δαίμων πολλὰ τῆιδ' ἐν ἡμέραι
> κακὰ ξυνάπτειν ἐνδίκως Ἰάσονι. (1224–32)

Note that Messenger's words on the dangers to its possessor of cleverness and rhetorical skill (1225–27) unconsciously echo those of Medea in 580–83. Furthermore, his final lines (1228–30) emphasize the unknowability of the future for mortals and the radical insecurity of their fortunes, a sentiment invariably linked with thoughts of either divine *phthonos* or divine justice. The chorus agree with this general assessment: they note the justice of the punishment (*endikōs*) and also the likelihood that forces greater than human had a hand in it.

In the light of this repeatedly suggested background of divine ret-

ribution, Jason's own comments show up in a wonderfully ironic light. He assures his sons (914–15) that—God willing and touch wood—he has made excellent provision for their future. He predicts (916–19) that with the help of whatever divinity has smiled on him so far he will secure high position for them at Corinth:

> ὑμῖν δέ, παῖδες, οὐκ ἀφροντίστως πατὴρ
> πολλὴν ἔθηκε σὺν θεοῖς σωτηρίαν.
> οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς τῆσδε γῆς Κορινθίας
> τὰ πρῶτ' ἔσεσθαι σὺν κασιγνήτοις ἔτι.
> ἀλλ' αὐξάνεσθε· τἄλλα δ' ἐξεργάζεται
> πατήρ τε καὶ θεῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν εὐμενής. (914–19)

The irony of these lines has been well prepared by all the preceding suggestions that Jason, far from being the darling of the gods, is about to be signally punished.

GOD, CHANCE, AND WRATH IN *MEDEA*

Can we reach a plausible interpretation of the play by reading it against the divine background these passages suggest? A plausible reading of a work intended for performance is one that is able to proceed through the work scene by scene and speech by speech and find thematically significant material throughout. Before we produce this *erzählende Analyse,*[15] however, it will be important to reflect in a more general way on the workings of the gods in earlier writers.

How, in Greek literature, is Zeus thought to punish offenses against himself? Zeus rarely employs the thunderbolt or intervenes in any overtly miraculous way.[16] Instead he works through natural events. Sometimes human agents, who have their own motives for revenge, are taken up in Zeus's plan and become agents (mostly unwitting) of his justice. Such is the case, Aeschylus' chorus of old men tell us, with Agamemnon, who has his own reasons for being angry with the house of Priam but whose wrath is made to serve the purpose of Zeus Xenios. The punishment of Creon in *Antigone* is similar. The agents of his punishment, Antigone, Haemon, and Eurydice, act out of their affections

[15]The phrase is from the preface to Lesky's *Tragische Dichtung.*

[16]The best exposition of this view of the gods' activity in the world is Lloyd-Jones, *Justice.*

for brother, affianced bride, and son, affections that Creon's high-handedness has outraged. At the same time they succeed in punishing Creon for his offenses against the unwritten laws of the gods, though none of them explicitly saw that as their role.

In the case of Agamemnon the agent of divine justice himself perishes when he has served his turn, and there are indications that his role in the punishment of Priam was deliberately shaped by Zeus (notably the sacrifice of Iphigenia) so as to cause his own subsequent destruction in order to settle a quite different score. Agamemnon and Priam are both destroyed by Zeus's Erinyes for different reasons. Likewise, there is a strong suggestion in the second stasimon and elsewhere in *Antigone* that Antigone's fate is what it is because of her Labdacid inheritance, that in punishing Creon for his transgression of immemorial custom she is also serving to bring about her own ruin and with it the ruin of the house of Laius. Her heroic stubbornness in the face of death is at once morally admirable, necessary for her role in the punishment of Creon, and part of her father's *damnosa hereditas* leading to her own destruction.

The relevance of all this to our play should now be clear. Zeus has an excellent reason for punishing Jason, Jason is in fact punished, and both before and after the punishment everyone agrees in ascribing it to Zeus or to the gods in general. The agent of the punishment is a woman whose heroic sense of honor smarts under the insult of being cast aside, ἠτιμασμένη. The revenge her anger leads her to take is one that involves inflicting misery on herself, the ruin of her future happiness even if not the actual end of her life. There are suggestions that Zeus has his own score to settle with her, notably for the murder of her brother. And, as we will see, the change in her plan of revenge looks very much like the result of an intervention of Zeus, an intervention that both destroys Jason in a manner that befits his perjury and insures that Medea herself will be punished as well. All this comes about in spite of circumstances that would seem to make such a revenge highly unlikely on any human estimate of probabilities: truly τῶν ἀδοκήτων πόρον ηὗρε θεός.

In the opening monologue the nurse describes Medea's first reaction to the news that she has been cast off: anger and chagrin that her trust in Jason's oath and her benefactions to him have been repaid in this way, grief at having betrayed her father, her country, and her home for a man who has now dishonored her, and the knowledge (34–35) that she has no community or family to support her. The nurse, who knows

her well, fears that she will take no slight measures to avenge the insult to herself.

It looks, however, as if this will prove impossible. For the *paedagogus* tells the nurse that Creon means to banish her at once. Medea's own words from offstage—combining suicidal wishes, curses against the children, her husband, and the ruling house of Corinth, appeals to the gods, and apostrophes to her father and homeland—show the force of her heroic rage, but if she is banished, this rage will come to nothing.

In the first episode she wins the support and complicity of the chorus in a speech that emphasizes her helplessness: she is a woman (230–51), and therefore at an extreme disadvantage, but she is also a woman in exile and therefore lacks even such support as relatives, especially male relatives, provide to their helpless female kin (252–58).

The encounter with Creon shows Medea once more using all her skill to win sympathy. Here, however, she is not at first successful. Even when she kneels in supplication before Creon, she meets with outright refusal.[17] Only when she changes her request to a single day's grace does Creon relent. That fact underscores Medea's helplessness and the surprising character of later events. No one could reasonably expect a woman in her position to carry off a stunning revenge in such a short time. When Creon says at the end of the scene, "Now stay, if stay you must, for one more day: you will not do the harm I fear by then," he shows by his confidence what ordinary human reasoning could expect in this situation.[18]

[17]There is some doubt about the stage action. Gould ("Hiketeia" 85–86) claims that until line 338 Medea makes only a "figurative" supplication, i.e., she does not bring to bear the full religious force of the suppliant gesture by kneeling and grasping Creon's knees, hands, or chin. He points to Creon's "you are wasting *words*" (325) and the combination of "knees" with "daughter" in 324 as evidence that her supplication is merely verbal. The first of these arguments has some force, though if someone means to ignore the suppliant gesture he might choose to say nothing about it. On the other side, however, in 339 Creon asks why Medea is using force and does not *let go of* his hand; but if Gould is right in saying that she seizes it only in 338, we would expect him to say "Why are you seizing my hand?" (I agree with him and Diggle, *Fabulae* ad loc., that Wilamowitz's conjecture is right here.) Though all is not perfectly clear, I conclude that 324 marks the beginning of her formal supplication.

[18]Nauck's deletion of 355–56, accepted by Diggle, is unjustified. These lines do not contradict 350: no one would maintain that when Creon says "I see that I am making a mistake" he means that he thinks he will probably come to harm at Medea's hands. There are many kinds of mistakes, and the one he has in view is simply that of increasing his trouble by prolonging contact with a troublesome person. In 355–56 Creon makes it clear

There may well be a second reason why Euripides inserted this scene, which his play could easily have dispensed with. It includes a scene of supplication, in which Medea kneels before Creon and grasps his knees. She begs him with her grasp upon him for one thing, that he not send her into exile, and he repeatedly rejects her pleas (325; 327, where *gar,* of course, means "yes, for"; 333) and threatens force (335). This deliberate refusal to show *aidōs* (326–27) is an offense against Zeus Hikesios, and it gives the lie to his claim (349) that he has too much *aidōs* for his own good. Creon's fate does not bulk very large in the play, but it too can be explained from the perspective of Zeus, this time as god of suppliants.

As soon as Creon has departed, the chorus, as if to drive home the main point of the preceding scene, emphasize the helplessness of Medea's position: she has no *proxenos,* no house, no land to save her.[19] But what looks like helplessness from their perspective does not seem so to Medea. Creon thinks that the threat of death will overawe Medea for the one day she has been allowed to remain, but she is not overawed. Medea means now to kill Jason, Creon, and Creon's daughter, and of the two plans she has, one involves action at close quarters, the use of fire or sword to kill the inhabitants of the palace. The only drawback to this is that she might be caught before killing her enemies, and then her death would allow them to have the laugh on her. (She is not, it would appear, worried about the prospect of being killed *after* a successful assassination; see 393.) Better, she concludes, to use magical drugs, her specialty, even though she would not have the satisfaction of being present at the death of her enemies.

But this plan too has its drawbacks. If she has no place of refuge after the deed, her life will be, she implies, that of a helpless fugitive, and she would better have taken her revenge and then perished.[20] She decides finally to wait to see whether a place of refuge presents itself. If so, she will take the route of magic drugs and live on to savor her revenge. If not, she means to stab her enemies with the sword though this surely means her own death as well. Her oath by Hecate that no man shall grieve her heart with impunity, and her determination as princess and granddaughter of Helios not to be mocked, show the kind

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that he is not quixotically running the risk of death in order to grant Medea's request. See also Mastronarde's review of Diggle, 153–54.

[19] On the correct reading, *tina proxenian . . . exeurēseis,* see Kovacs, "Treading the Circle" 267–68.

[20] Schlesinger ("Zu *Medea*" 43) gives a clear and accurate analysis of this speech.

of heroic mettle that makes unreliable the rational calculations of Creon, which assume ordinarily self-protective prudence in his subjects.[21]

In the first stasimon the chorus sympathize with Medea and rejoice that now the Muses will no longer sing of woman's infidelity. But their second stanzaic pair alludes to Medea's disadvantages in the coming contest: she dwells in a foreign land, which now has exiled her, she has no father to take her part, and another woman has usurped her place.

The next scene, the first encounter between Jason and Medea, is not strictly necessary to the plot. Rather, it shows us clearly what manner of man Jason is. Medea regards his coming—in kindness, he says, to see that she lacks nothing in her exile—as a piece of shamelessness: Jason, like Creon, lacks *aidōs*. But she is glad he has come so that she may tell him what she thinks of him. The benefactions to him that she mentions—saving his life, taking his enmities for her own, accepting his oath, honoring his supplication of her, bearing his children—place him under several weighty and sacred obligations, and he has trampled on them all.

Jason's speech makes it clear that he does not attach much weight to such obligations or to the sentiments that accompany them.[22] His oaths and his relation to Medea have no independent value. Everything is instrumental to his prosperity and that of his family. His plan, he says in 547–68, would have meant the prosperity of everyone, Medea included, if only she had not been so irrational. He has increased his own standing and that of his children in Corinthian society, but even Medea would have benefited if she had not been so galled about being sexually abandoned. "What need have you of children?" he asks (565), meaning that Medea should have no objection to his turning his marital attentions elsewhere.[23] The decisive arguments for Jason are always those of solid, rational advantage. And he, of course, has no notion that he will have to pay for abandoning her: she is a mere woman, and a letter of

[21] Cf. the sentiments of the Chorus in S. *Ant.* 220. They assume that with death as the price of disobedience there will be no takers. Creon assumes that some may run the risk out of foolish greed for gain but not otherwise. Neither reckons with Antigone.

[22] Cf. Strohm, *Euripides* 9, who says "Er wünscht eine völlig 'durchrationalisierte' Welt (567); der Zuschauer weiss, dass in ihr für Dankbarkeit und Rücksicht kein Platz wäre." Rohdich (*Tragödie* 55–59) well describes Jason's overconfidence in the power of reason to gain advantage and win happiness.

[23] This half-line is misunderstood, oddly, by Burnett ("*Medea*" 14), who thinks it means that Jason intends to take Medea's children from her.

introduction to friends elsewhere and a bag of money should be enough to be quit of her. Medea's final lines in the scene (625–26, quoted above) predict, in words she claims will prove divinely inspired, that he will pay the penalty for his perfidy. But this makes no impression on Jason or on anyone who views Medea's situation in purely human terms. In the following stasimon the chorus sing of the tragedy of excessive love and the misery of having no friends or city to take one's part. They are thinking of the hopelessness of Medea's plight, and they estimate the probabilities exactly as Jason does.

Then Aegeus enters. The unannounced arrival of a man of royal rank who addresses Medea by name in his very first words is indeed a theatrical bolt from the blue, and Euripides, so far from trying to conceal the fact that this is an unforeseeable event that chimes in unexpectedly with Medea's designs, has gone out of his way to emphasize it. This, as Aristotle rightly says, is an *alogon*. But it is important to see such things from the viewpoint of archaic poetry rather than of fourth-century philosophy. It is in part because of coincidences, chance intersections of events, that the future is opaque to human reason. In fact, the word for what is opaque to reason and cannot be foreseen is *tuchē*. But such unforeseeable intersections are often regarded in Greek literature as the result of Zeus's design. One of the ways he works his will unobtrusively[24] and without the aid of overt intervention is by causing two or more natural actions, each with its natural motivation, to intersect and produce a result not intended by any of the agents. Coincidence, though opaque to human reason, serves the divine will, and there is a theological point in Pindar's description (*Ol.* 12.1–2) of Tuche as daughter of Zeus.

Aegeus arrives and after an initial discussion of his own errand to Delphi offers Medea the asylum her first plan of revenge requires. He swears an oath never to deliver her up to her enemies and goes his way. The arrival of Aegeus is either mere happenstance, illegitimately pressed into service by a dramatist who could have found something more satisfactory, or it is a coincidence brought about by the gods. The evidence of the play thus far suggests that the gods are responsible and are favoring Medea's plan of revenge. And as if to make sure that no one in his audience misses the point, the first words Euripides gives Medea as soon as Aegeus is out of earshot are ὦ Ζεῦ δίκη τε Ζηνός (764). Zeus

[24] Cf. the formulation in *Tro.* 887–88, πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἄγεις.

and Zeus's justice are manifest in this coincidence, though, as we shall see, the result will not be a blessing for Medea.

Medea is a heroic figure, willing to go to all lengths, including her own death, to avoid being laughed at by her enemies. To this extent, then, the intervention of Zeus was unnecessary: Medea was in any case going to take her revenge, whether she had a place of refuge or no. But the arrival of Aegeus, unwitting emissary of Zeus, has another function: it subtracts one name from the list of her intended murder victims, and adds two others.

It has long been noted that Aegeus' complaint about his childless state, though it provokes no noticeable reaction in Medea during the interview itself, seems to have suggested to her a more terrible revenge on Jason than she had as yet imagined, not death but a childless old age. For the plan Medea announces to the horrified chorus on Aegeus' departure is not either of her original plans, both of which aimed at the death of Jason, Creon, and his bride, but a plan to kill first Jason's new bride, so that he shall never have children by her, and then the children he has, who are also Medea's children.

This last is a monstrous crime of which the chorus can make no sense. The sense of it has troubled interpreters as well. What could possess a woman, even one of heroic mettle, to destroy her own children?[25] The answer the play seems to suggest is "Zeus." Aegeus' errand to Delphi intersects with Medea's desire for a place of refuge for the furtherance of her revenge. Medea is allowed to suggest pointedly that this intersection is the work of Zeus. The one incidental result, the furthering of Medea's design, seems to be a part of Zeus's intention. The same can reasonably be concluded of the other, the change in her plan of revenge. There is reason to think that it is Zeus's will that she should murder her children. Jason's punishment is the perfect one for an oathbreaker, as will shortly be shown. But the agent of divine vengeance will be punished in her turn. That is the way Zeus works.

Let us take Jason's punishment first. Curiously, we are never told the exact terms of his oath to Medea. But a common form of oath called down in case of perjury not only the death of the perjurer himself but also the destruction of his line after him (*exōleia*) (cf. the explicit terms in Andocides 1.98). Even where *exōleia* is not explicitly mentioned in an

[25] It is scarcely useful to reply that in the case of some women something evidently does. We are not concerned with the real life on the police blotter—where the pathological frequently comes into play—but with life refracted through the lens of tragic art.

oath, it was felt to be the fitting punishment for perjury. The oracle in Herodotus 6.86, for example, says expressly that root-and-branch destruction will be Glaucus' penalty for breaking his oath even though the oath itself did not explicitly mention it. In our play Aegeus swears an oath, and Medea makes him call down on himself, if he should violate it, "what befalls those of mortals who are impious" (755), and it is natural to think that *exōleia* is included (cf. *Hipp.* 1341). It appears, then, that the murder of Jason's children punishes him in a fashion recognizably appropriate for perjury. Zeus caused the paths of Aegeus and Medea to cross in order to bring this punishment about.[26]

But in order for Medea to be the agent of this punishment she must be made to act in ways that violate her own maternal feelings and interests. In the course of exacting her revenge she will do herself great hurt. It is possible that Zeus knows this and does not care, that like Stalin he does not mind breaking eggs to make an omelet. But it is also possible that on the analogy of other agents of Zeus's justice, Medea in the act of executing Zeus's punishment is helping to bring about her own. Agamemnon, after serving justice on the house of Priam, perishes himself in payment for the crimes of his own family. In carrying out Zeus's justice he is required to kill Iphigenia, and this is both terrible in itself and the proximate cause of his death at the hands of Clytaemestra. As the chorus in Aeschylus tell the story, his judgment had to be impaired by a visitation of *atē* before he could carry out the slaughter. This may provide a good analogy to the case of Medea.

Two separate theses deserve to be advanced—with all due tentativeness—about the child murder: first, that Medea's judgment is impaired, and that the gods are responsible, particularly Zeus; second, that Zeus's plan encompasses not only the punishment of Jason but also that of Medea herself for the murder of her brother. There are indications of both of these in the text.

When Medea has announced her new plan of revenge to the chorus, they forbid her, out of concern for her and for the laws of mortals, to kill her children. Medea replies that it is all very well for them to talk thus since they have not suffered as she has. The chorus point out the obvious consequences of her plan.

[26] On oaths in Greek and Athenian life see Burkert, *Religion* 377–82 (Eng. tr. 250–52); Mikalson, *Popular Religion* 31–38. On the importance of oaths in *Medea* see Burnett, "*Medea*" 13–15.

Χο. ἀλλὰ κτανεῖν σὸν σπέρμα τολμήσεις, γύναι;
Μη. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα δηχθείη πόσις.
Χο. σὺ δ' ἂν γένοιο γ' ἀθλιωτάτη γυνή.
Μη. ἴτω· περισσοὶ πάντες οὖν μέσωι λόγοι. (816–19)

Medea explains that the death of her children will serve to hurt her husband. When the chorus point out that she would also be hurting herself, she admits this but says only that all words uttered in the meanwhile are superfluous (or, on another interpretation, that no compromise will serve). The impression Medea makes shares something with the unreasoning devotion to their own purposes and principles shown by heroic figures. But where they are sometimes brusque and too impatient to spell out why they are acting thus to admonishers who miss the main point (e.g., the duty to bury one's kin), Medea has no case to make even if she had chosen to try to make it.

The chorus go on in the stasimon that follows to ask how she could possibly steel herself to kill her children when they fall as suppliants before her feet. They are not mistaken in attributing maternal feelings to Medea. That is shown in the next episode, where thoughts of the coming murder cause tears to break the perfect composure of her deception of Jason. The thought of their coming death at her hands does affect her, in spite of her dismissive ἴτω. The deception scene as a whole is a marvel of dramatic force: Medea the mother weeps at what Medea the avenger is about to perform, while Jason smugly congratulates himself on the providential care the gods are showering on him.

But it is after the following stasimon, when the *paedagogus* has brought the children back with news that they have been freed from the sentence of exile, that the force of these feelings becomes most evident. And here Medea is also allowed by the poet to say for the first time what it is that forces her to trample these maternal feelings underfoot. "Why do you weep when I have brought you good news?" says the *paedagogus,* not realizing that his putatively good news means that Medea's plan to murder the children is in its last stages. Medea replies (1013–14):

πολλή μ' ἀνάγκη, πρέσβυ· ταῦτα γὰρ θεοὶ
κἀγὼ κακῶς φρονοῦσ' ἐμηχανησάμην.

Euripides makes Medea ascribe her misery to "the gods and my own folly." We should not slight the first half of her formulation. Medea, like many another victim of *atē,* acts with impaired judgment, *kakōs phronei,* because of the intervention of the gods.

The great monologue that follows (1021–80) shows once more the strength of the feelings her mad desire for revenge must overcome and thereby shows the strength of what conquers these feelings. In the first part (1021–39) Medea speaks in ambiguous language about her coming separation from her children. She realizes that her maternal hopes are destined never to be fulfilled, but she is nevertheless prepared to pay this price for revenge. In 1040–48 she is suddenly overcome by the sight of the children's smiling gaze and declares that she will give up her plan: it makes no sense to hurt Jason with the children's death if she herself must suffer twice as much pain. (The chorus had made precisely this point before but had been ignored.) This is a crucial part of the speech, for it shows that Medea's plan makes no sense and that with one part of her she knows it.

But in 1049 her heroic anger, her fear of mockery, and her sense that she must take revenge return. She sends the children into the house for sacrifice, then retracts her command so that she may take her last leave of them. Once more their physical presence works on her maternal feelings, but this time she does not think of changing her plans. She sends the children into the house so that the sight of them will not overwhelm her (*nikōmai,* 1077) with a sense of her own misfortune. Then once more she tells us what we know already, that her revenge makes no real sense but that she must nevertheless carry it out:

καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα τολμήσω κακά,
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,
ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς.[27] (1078–80)

These famous lines express on the purely human level the tragic conflict of Medea's decision as it appears to Medea herself. They are not, of course, about the morality of killing her children but about whether she is willing to pay the full price her vengeance demands.[28] Medea sees clearly that her plan of revenge is ruinous to herself. Yet she confesses that wrath overcomes the force of this clear calculation. The tone of unreasoning persistence, in spite of admitted and admittedly relevant facts, is not unlike that of Achilles at *Iliad* 9.644–48. Medea's

[27] On the reading *tolmēsō* and the sense of the whole passage see Kovacs, "Monologue" 343–52.

[28] On this point see Christmann, *Bemerkungen* 125–45; Lloyd-Jones, "*Medea* 1056–80; Kovacs, "Monologue."

words θυμὸς . . . ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς are almost an allusion to the *Iliad* and the Achilles theme of ruinous wrath. Later in the poem (19.270–74) Achilles explains his wrath as *atē* sent by Zeus. The allusion suggests that Medea's wrath, like that of Achilles, goes to such extremes because divinely sent *atē* accompanies and augments it, diminishing her judgment so that she *kakōs phronei.*

There follows a curious anapaestic interlude on the griefs of having children and the painlessness of being childless, lines in which the chorus' shock at Medea's plan is replaced by a spirit of resignation that seems almost to regard their coming death as part of the same divine dispensation that sends diphtheria (see esp. 1109–11). Then the messenger reports the death of Creon and his daughter in a passage of nearly one hundred lines, ending with the reflection (1224–30, quoted above) that human cleverness and rhetorical skill incur the greatest punishment. All mortals alike stand under the threat of unforeseeable reverse. The chorus chime in: the gods seem to have punished Jason justly.

And now the time has come for the last part of Medea's plan: the Corinthians will soon be upon her and will kill the children for their part in the murder of Creon and his daughter, and she cannot put off killing them any longer. She emphasizes once more that she is working her own misery, that she must blot from her mind for this day the knowledge that it is her own dear children she is killing, that she will mourn and be wretched in the future. Then she goes in. The chorus call upon Helios and ask him to remove the Erinys from the house. They may be thinking of Medea herself as an Erinys, in much the same way as Aeschylus spoke of an Erinys or an Alastor as embodied in the Atridae, Helen, or Clytaemestra (*Ag.* 59, 737–49, 1497–1504) or as Euripides' Cassandra represents herself as an Erinys to the house of Agamemnon (*Tro.* 457, 356–60). Or they may be thinking of a separate supernatural being at work in the house. In either case they attribute Medea's behavior to divine causes. And they repeat this same judgment immediately after the murder when they cite the only other example of child murder known to them, Ino, who was driven mad by the gods and by Zeus's wife. They end with an apostrophe to the γυναικῶν λέχος πολύπονον, which wrought so many woes to mortals.

After the murder has been committed, Jason enters, hurrying to save the life of his children from the only danger he imagines to be threatening them, the vengeance of the Corinthians for their part in the murder of Creon and his daughter. When he learns the truth and sees Medea aloft in the chariot, the bodies of his sons beside her, he is

incredulous that she could have done such a deed. With the same Greek chauvinism he displayed earlier in the play, he says that his mistake was in marrying a barbarian: no Greek woman would have killed her children to avenge a slight to her marriage bed.

But he has a theological explanation for his misfortune as well:

> τὸν σὸν δ' ἀλάστορ' εἰς ἔμ' ἔσκηψαν θεοί·
> κτανοῦσα γὰρ δὴ σὸν κάσιν παρέστιον
> τὸ καλλίπρωιρον εἰσέβης Ἀργοῦς σκάφος. (1333–35)

The gods were exacting punishment from Medea for the murder of her brother, and since he took her aboard his ship with her brother's blood on her hands, the *alastōr* has fallen on him. It is hard to know how seriously we are meant to take this fleeting reference. On the one hand the tone of self-excuse is repugnant: Jason refuses to admit that he did anything wrong in abandoning Medea, and he views himself as the innocent victim of punishment intended for her, his only fault being to take in a blood-guilty person. On the other hand, his νῦν φρονῶ, τότ' οὐ φρονῶν (1329), like Admetus' ἄρτι μανθάνω (*Alc.* 940), betokens realization of the truth. Although it is the only passage in the text to relate the murder of Apsyrtus to what has happened, and although Medea's guilt is given so little prominence in the play, it is possible that Jason's words tie up a theological loose end by explaining why in the ordinance of Zeus Medea deserves to suffer herself while carrying out the gods' punishment of Jason.

The last interchange between Jason and Medea gives both of them, not Medea alone, something to say, and it is noteworthy that Jason has the last word. Medea begins (1351–57) by declining to make a long speech: Zeus knows what she did for Jason and how he requited her. He was not going to insult her bed with impunity, nor were the princess and Creon. She has done what she needed to do to wound him. The first part of the stichomythia that follows (1361–68) shows Medea replying with stunning if irrational repartee to the exclamations, plaints, and rhetorical questions of Jason. In the second (1370–77) it is Jason who has the function of capping or replying to Medea.

Then Medea, in answer to Jason's request to be allowed to bury his sons, assumes the role of deus ex machina and foretells the future. In her view Jason's future is grim: not only will he be childless but he will also die ignominiously. As for herself, after burying the children in the sanctuary of Hera Akraia and establishing a festival and rites in

their honor, she will go to live with Aegeus as his wife. (The implications of *sunoikēsousa* agree with the sequel to the myth as treated in tragedy.) It would seem that the wretchedness Medea predicted for herself has been entirely forgotten.

But Medea's knowledge of Jason's future may not be the whole truth. Jason calls down on Medea the Erinys of her dead children, and the speech in which he calls Zeus to witness what Medea has done in killing his children and refusing to let him take their bodies is, apart from the final anapaests, the last in the whole play. Just what happened to Medea in *Aegeus* or whether its story formed part of the spectators' expectations as they heard Jason's final words, we cannot tell. But the prominent position of these lines suggests that there may yet be in store for her a fate more painful than even the sharpest pangs of remorse.[29]

A lawyer with a difficult brief to argue will manipulate his argument so that the most impressive evidence stands at the end of his speech. In my case there is no need to manipulate. It is Euripides who has put in the most prominent place in the play the clearest expression of its theological background, the five anapaestic dimeters that are the last words spoken. We need only to vindicate their genuineness against Hartung, who proposed deletion, and Diggle, who deletes.[30]

πολλῶν ταμίας Ζεὺς ἐν 'Ολύμπωι,
πολλὰ δ' ἀέλπτως κραίνουσι θεοί·
καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη,
τῶν δ' ἀδοκήτων πόρον ηὗρε θεός.
τοιόνδ' ἀπέβη τόδε πρᾶγμα. (1415–19)

The chief kind of consideration that prompts editors to delete this and similar choral tags is verbatim repetition. *Alcestis, Andromache, Helen,* and *Bacchae* all end with the same five lines, identical with the end of *Medea* except that in the other four plays the first reads πολλαὶ μορφαὶ

[29]There is some reason to put *Aegeus* earlier than *Medea*; cf. Alfieri, "Da Spina" 613–19, and Shefton, "Medea." It seems a fair inference from the scholium to *Med.* 167 that someone in the play alluded to Medea's murder of her brother. The likeliest occasion to do so would be in the context of meting out punishment at the play's end. If, therefore, *Aegeus* preceded *Medea,* Jason's final words in the play may be intended to remind the audience of Medea's later punishment. But it is also possible that Jason's speech makes no such allusion and is merely an indication to the audience that Medea's triumph, though complete in the present, is not the end of the matter.

[30]I have argued this case at greater length in "Treading the Circle" 268–69.

τῶν δαιμονίων. It would be possible to argue that of the four cases other than *Medea* the lines are genuine in one and interpolated in the other three. But such an argument breaks down in the case of *Medea,* for whoever added the lines changed the first of them, most strangely for someone who is *ex hypothesi* a borrower of the ready-made and who has no strong incentive to alter his original. The only person with a motive to alter the end of *Alcestis* to fit *Medea* is Euripides himself. We can already see, I think, why Euripides would want to change the general reference to *ta daimonia* to a more specific reference to Zeus, since Zeus figures so prominently in what the characters say and (I have argued) in what actually happens to them. By contrast, someone perfunctorily providing tailpieces for dramas he regards as naked without them would be unlikely to feel the force of such a motive, nor would he be moved to improve on a perfectly good ready-made choral tag by composing an anapaestic dimeter.

But when we look at the wording of this line, something even more striking emerges. Zeus is called the *tamias* of many things. The same metaphor is applied to the same god at 169–70 (quoted above), where the chorus say that Zeus is regarded as the *tamias* of oaths for mortals. It does not seem at all likely that anyone borrowing the end of *Alcestis* to fill out an imagined lack in *Medea* would change the first line and in changing it hit on a metaphor used with no particular prominence elsewhere in the play and with a slightly different sense of *tamias* ("guardian" rather than "dispenser") but which turns out to be surprisingly apt here. Deletion in this case seems particularly rash.

These lines, therefore, are almost certainly genuine. On this a further consequence follows: they are not a mere tag, borrowed by Euripides from an earlier play to give a perfunctory windup to his latest, but lines deliberately adapted by him to fit their new setting. Looked at in this light as a comment on the preceding action, the lines become a weighty piece of evidence that we are intended to sense the hidden hand of the gods in the action of the play. No final lines of any play, of course, manage to touch on all its important themes.[31] But many of the most important themes I have discussed above are here *in nuce,* and only a fastidious modern distaste for the nourishing commonplaces of the archaic Greek outlook—a distaste antiquity can be shown not to have shared—will make us ignore what these lines tell us.

[31] See Roberts, "Parting Words."

"Zeus on Olympus is the dispenser of many things." Zeus is the guardian of oaths (*tamias* in a slightly different sense), and he punishes perjury. He also dispenses the unpredictable future,[32] especially the otherwise unaccountable coincidence: ὦ Ζεῦ, δίκη τε Ζηνός, said Medea of Aegeus' unlooked–for appearance. He dispenses punishment by working through the agency of human beings, using their wrath for his purposes by augmenting it beyond all reason, sending *atē* and the Erinys that is its companion and embodiment to take mortals one or two significant steps beyond what they were otherwise inclined to do. Though it is often repellant in the extreme, his justice can frequently be clearly traced after the fact. "And there is nothing of this which is not Zeus," say the chorus (or Hyllus) of disaster only slightly less calamitous (Heracles dead by his wife's hand, his wife by her own) at the end of *Trachiniae*.

"The gods bring to pass many things contrary to expectation, and what was looked for is not accomplished, but a god finds a way to work the unexpected. Such is the end of *this* story." This theme—the opaqueness of the future and the impotence of human reason to predict it—is closely allied to the sovereignty of Zeus. These lines describe an important aspect of the action underlined in the above discussion, that on no human estimate of the probabilities could either Creon or Jason have predicted that a woman, without friends or family and under sentence of exile, could work such a crushing vengeance. In part chance had a hand, notably the incalculable arrival of Aegeus, and in part Medea's heroic nature: she was willing to take the risk of death in order to punish her enemies, a risk–taking inconceivable to calculating persons like Creon or Jason. In part this heroic nature is pushed a step beyond even heroism to the point where Medea, without being able to explain why she is doing so, acts in ways that not only *risk* destroying her happiness but are certain to do so. In all this, the chorus suggest, we should see the hand of Zeus, steward of oaths and of many other things, who punishes offenders against his laws in surprising ways and may also bring down the agents of his justice in their turn.

The thesis of this paper, that the hand of the gods is to be seen in the action of the play, runs counter to a climate of opinion which believes (mostly on the evidence of a biographical tradition whose head

[32]Cf. S. fr. 590 Radt (*Tereus*), quoted by Roberts, "Parting Words" 57, which calls Zeus *tōn mellontōn tamias*.

and font is Old Comedy)[33] that Euripides has little in common with the archaic Greek outlook that informs epic, lyric, Herodotus, and earlier tragedy. But *Medea* contains much that suggests that we should not ignore but give full weight to the continuities between Euripidean tragedy and the world view it inherited from earlier poetry. The plot, the characters, the *dianoia,* all draw our attention to the radical insecurity of human life, the opaqueness of the future, and the impotence of human reason and human contrivance to control circumstance even when the grounds for confidence are the strongest.[34]

This is not to say either that the themes other interpreters have found in the play are negligible or that there are not significant differences between Euripides and the other tragic poets. To take the first point, the themes of male versus female and of Greek versus barbarian are important ingredients in the play, and there is the unmistakable implication that the self-satisfied Greek male has missed something important about the world. But these themes are deepened when integrated into the play's larger thematic structure. For both the female and the foreigner are likely to be regarded as powerless and contemptible precisely by those who have no firm grasp of the deceitful character of human perception and expectation. Contempt for the putatively weak turns out to be a mistake: καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη. In Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides alike, characters who express contempt for women—men such as Creon in *Antigone*—frequently come to a bad end. The belief that one can ignore or grind down the powerless is part of a tragic delusion.

A second caveat also deserves to be entered, that Euripides' outlook is not identical to that of Aeschylus or Sophocles. *Medea* ends with a murderess triumphant. The portrayal of the gods' justice is, it could be argued, much more repellent here than in the other tragic poets. But while these differences must be noted, they should not cause us to dismiss the commonality between Euripides and his predecessors. Divine malignity is merely the other side of the coin of the mutability of

[33] I discuss this biographical tradition in the introduction to my forthcoming Loeb edition of the plays.

[34] Schlesinger ("Zu *Medea*" 52–53), almost alone of the play's interpreters, brings out the commonality between Euripides and the other two tragic poets: "Ihnen allen ist gemeinsam die Darstellung der menschlichen Existenz in ihrer unbedingten Abhängigkeit von einer übermenschlichen und dem Verstand nicht zugänglichen Gewalt, die wir ruhig die göttliche Vorsehung nennen können."

human fortune. Euripides, like other Greek writers, was steeped in a poetic tradition that emphasized both, and no doubt he found frequent confirmation of the traditional view of man's condition in his own experience and those of others.[35] There is no good reason to think he had outgrown such views, no reason to overlook the plain sense of comment after comment in *Medea,* that the gods' rough justice rules the world, that the impious are punished—though sometimes by means of a criminal act far more ghastly than the offense—and that the confident expectations of blind mortals are often defeated.[36]

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[35] Cf. the epitaph on the Athenians who fell at Syracuse, attributed by Plutarch to Euripides (*Epigrammata Graeca,* ed. Page, 44, lines 482–83), that claims "these men won eight victories, while the gods remained impartial to both sides."

[36] My thanks are owed to the Second Annual Festival of Greek Drama at the University of London for the occasion to give this paper, under a different title, in March 1989. The paper has benefitted from comments and criticisms made there. Under its present title it was also given to the Cambridge Literary Seminar, the University of Leeds, the Oxford Classical Society, the University of Colorado, and the University of Virginia. I am especially grateful for chastening or encouraging comments from W. G. Arnott, Jenny Strauss Clay, Patricia Easterling, James Diggle, Simon Goldhill, and Malcolm Heath. I would also like to thank Sheila Murnaghan, who allowed herself to be unmasked as my anonymous referee, for salutary criticisms.

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THE DATES OF ARISTOPHANES' *CLOUDS* II AND EUPOLIS' *BAPTAI*: A REPLY TO E. C. KOPFF

E. Christian Kopff's recent article "The Date of Aristophanes' *Nubes* II," challenging the accepted date of ca. 418 for the revision of *Clouds* and carrying with it a lower date for Eupolis' *Baptai* (i.e., 413–412, after his date of 414–413 for *Clouds* II), crossed in the presses with my own study, "Dating and Re-dating Eupolis." In that paper I argued for the traditional higher dates of ca. 418 for *Clouds* II and 417–415 for *Baptai,* although I disassociate *Baptai* from the revised *Clouds*. In this paper I attempt to answer Kopff's arguments for the lower dates for both comedies and to restate the case for placing both in the first half of the 410s.

Kopff's thesis depends upon a number of assumptions about *Clouds* II, which for the sake of brevity and convenience I set down as follows:

1. The ostracism of Hyperbolos is not necessarily a *terminus ante quem* for the revision of *Clouds*.
2. Eupolis fr. 89 (*Baptai*) responds to *Cl.* 551–58; thus *Baptai* must be later than *Clouds* II.
3. Two passages from *Clouds,* lines 335 (quoting Philoxenos of Kythera) and 830 (an allusion to the atheistic Diagoras of Melos), demand a date after 415/4.
4. The text that we have should be assumed to belong to the revision, "and the burden of proof rests on those who would attribute individual passages to the first edition" (Kopff 326).
5. A date of 414–413 for *Clouds* II places it in the tense atmosphere after the scandals of 415 and confirms that the play was a serious attack on Sokrates and the moral implications of his teaching.

In considering each of these points in turn I shall show that Kopff's arguments for lowering the date of the revision of *Clouds* do not convince.

Kopff's first point concerns the ostracism of Hyperbolos and the traditionally held view that Hyperbolos must have still been in Athens when Aristophanes complains of the series of attacks made against the demagogue. We must leave as unsettled the actual date of the ostra-

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cism—the spring of 417, 416, or 415 has each been proposed,[1] with 416 in my opinion having the inside track—and consider whether *Cl.* 551–58 could have been written after the ostracism of Hyperbolos. I must agree with Kopff that the essential purpose of these lines is not so much to attack Hyperbolos but to score points in the ongoing "war between the poets."[2] Aristophanes is building the case for the originality of his comedy by showing that his *Knights* was the model for Eupolis' *Marikas* and the other subsequent caricatures of Hyperbolos. That much is true, but at the same time the passage is much more effective if Hyperbolos is still around. The present tense of ἐρείδουσι (558) and κολετρῶσ' (552) is odd if several years have passed since these plays were performed and if Hyperbolos is no longer in Athens. These lines imply that *now* all the poets are after Hyperbolos. Thus the natural assumption from these lines is that *Clouds* II belongs to the same time as the other plays and the other jokes at Hyperbolos, that is, before his ostracism and disappearance from Athens.

Kopff adduces as evidence that Hyperbolos could be (and was) attacked after his departure from Athens a fragment from Platon (203 K–A):[3]

> καίτοι πέπραγε τῶν τρόπων μὲν ἄξια,
> αὑτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν στιγμάτων ἀνάξια·
> οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων εἵνεκ' ὄστρακ' εὑρέθη.

He could have added *Thesm.* 839–45 and *Frogs* 570 as well. We cannot deny this, but surely Platon fr. 203 is a very special instance, perhaps written soon after the event and comparable to Aristophanes' dismissal of Kleon soon after the latter's death in 422/1 (*Peace* 47–49, 269–70)—*pace* Kopff (319), Aristophanes does mention the demise of Kleon. The whole point of Platon's reference seems to be the ostracism of Hyperbolos; this is not the case with *Cl.* 551–58.

Kopff does not consider the other mentions of Hyperbolos in *Clouds*. The business at 623–25 is plainly from the original version (563–626 form a complete epirrhematic syzygy, with Kleon alive and

[1] The fullest study remains Andrewes, *Historical Commentary* 257–64, but a good summary of the arguments for 416 or 415 can be found in Phillips, "Some Ostraka" 127 n. 19.

[2] Well described by Heath, "Aristophanes" 152.

[3] Citations of the comic fragments are from Kassel and Austin.

well at 581–94) and needs no further discussion.[4] At 874–76 Sokrates wonders how the untutored Pheidippides could learn ἀπόφευξιν δίκης / ἢ κλῆσιν ἢ χαύνωσιν ἀναπειστηρίαν, but recalls that καίτοι γε ταλάντου τοῦτ' ἔμαθεν Ὑπέρβολος. On Kopff's general assumption (my item 4 above) a passage is to be assigned to the revision unless proven otherwise; thus 874–76 should, like 830–31, which Kopff (323) definitely does attribute to the revision, be part of *Clouds* II. In that case the revised *Clouds* contains another joke at Hyperbolos, one that is exactly that and not part of Aristophanes' expounding on comedy, a reference which should indicate Hyperbolos' presence at Athens.

Also at 1060–66 the benefits of *sōphrosynē* are weighed up, and Wrong concludes: Ὑπέρβολος δ' οὐκ τῶν λύχνων πλεῖν ἢ τάλαντα πολλὰ / εἴληφε διὰ πονηρίαν. On both Kopff's assumption and the evidence of *Hyp.* I (Dover) these lines from the agon should belong to the second version. Here then is one more allusion to Hyperbolos, rather wasted if the demagogue is in exile. The perfect tense of εἴληφε suggests a current situation, not one several years old. Kopff is right to stress that attacking Hyperbolos is not Aristophanes' principal aim at *Cl.* 551–58, but these lines and especially the jokes at 874–76 and 1064–66 (which Kopff would see as part of *Clouds* II) are much better suited to the period before Hyperbolos' ostracism.

Kopff's second assumption concerns fr. 89 of Eupolis' *Baptai,*

†κἀκεῖνος† τοὺς Ἱππέας
ξυνεποίησα τῷ φαλακρῷ ⟨– –⟩ κἀδωρησάμην,

which he understands as Eupolis' reply to the charges in *Cl.* 551–58. This would be evidence for the production of *Clouds* II and for public knowledge of Aristophanes' attack on Eupolis. Yet the decided majority of critical opinion argues that *Clouds* as we have it was not, indeed could not have been, produced at an official festival.[5] When we consider a main parabasis very obviously in two versions, a mutilated second parabasis (only an epirrhema remaining at 1115–30), the loss of a choral song at 888,[6] the strange *volte face* of the chorus, and the reversal of the

[4] On this passage and its implications for the early career of Hyperbolos see Camon, "Cariche pubbliche di Iperbolo" and "Figura e ambiente."

[5] Among recent scholars only Kopff and Fowler support the view that *Clouds* II was produced.

[6] See Dover, *Clouds* xcii–xciii.

comic fantasy implicit in the burning of the *phrontistērion*, it does seem incredible that Aristophanes could have allowed this play to go forward for production, or that the archon could have accepted it. Circulation as a written text is a possibility (cf. Dionysos reading *Andromeda* at *Frogs* 52–53), but such a text could not have been sufficiently well known for Eupolis' public reply.

The evidence also suggests that the ancients had no knowledge of a second production. Dover has argued persuasively that the chronological confusion in the scholia and hypotheses over the production of *Clouds* can be explained by the presence in the *didaskalia* of only one production of *Clouds*, namely that in the archonship of Isagoras (424/3). To be sure the author of *Hyp.* II (Dover) states that the second *Clouds* was produced ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀμεινίου (423/2), but this is clearly wrong, since the second version mentions Eupolis' *Marikas* (553), which belongs to the Lenaia of 421 (scholia ad loc. and *Hyp.* I *Peace*). The author presumably selected the next archon-year after the original production as his choice for the date of the revision. The lack of any firm and reasonable date in the tradition suggests strongly that *Clouds* II was never produced.

To what then was Eupolis replying in fr. 89, if not to *Cl.* 551–58? The answer would have to be to some other comedy. Elsewhere I have followed the argument of Fritzsche, who drew attention to Ar. fr. 58 (*Anagyros*), in the eupolidean metre, ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμῆς χλανίδος τρεῖς ἁπληγίδας ποιῶν, and suggested that the subject is Eupolis, attacked for plundering Aristophanes' *Knights* to create plays such as *Marikas*.[7] One can note the use of the same metaphor of clothing as at ἐκστρέψας (*Cl.* 554).[8] *Anagyros* would thus have a parabasis in the eupolidean metre with affinities to that in *Clouds*. It could well have contained an attack on Eupolis, and possibly have used some of the same lines as in *Clouds*. Any part of *Cl.* 545–62 could have been transferred to (or from) another comedy. On this explanation fr. 89 would be replying to the parabasis of *Anagyros*, and *Baptai* need not be later than *Clouds* II at all.[9]

[7] Storey, "Dating" 21; Fritzsche, *Quaestiones* 144. Others who accept Fritzsche's approach include Geissler, *Chronologie* 50; Hofmann, "Zum *Anagyros*" 1–10; Perusino, "Aristofane e il *Maricante*" 412 n. 3. Heath, "Aristophanes" 158 n. 21 raises the possibility.

[8] Dover, *Clouds* 170.

[9] Confirmation of a date in the early 410s for *Anagyros* is not forthcoming from the remains. There are no *kōmōidoumenoi* in the fragments, unless *perdix* (fr. 57) is the *Perdix*

On Kopff's dating, *Baptai* belongs late in Eupolis' career (413 or 412). But this is a most unsatisfactory date for the comedy. The play had much to do with Alkibiades (scholia π Juv. 2.92; scholia Aristid. 3.8; Themist. 8.10; Cicero *Ad Att.* 6.1.18; also Platonios 1.18–19), but in 413 or 412 Alkibiades was both absent from Athens and in very bad odour. A comedy making fun of the carryings-on of an absent and discredited leader strikes me as improbable indeed. There may even have been a legal ban on the mention of Alkibiades at this time, as Sommerstein has elaborated Droysen's suggestion that the shadowy "decree of Syrakosios" (scholia *Birds* 1297; Phrynichos fr. 27) was a prohibition of the mention in comedy of those convicted in the scandals of 415—the point being to make them non-persons.[10] In that case Alkibiades would not have been available to Eupolis as a comic target.

Kopff does not allow for the tradition about Alkibiades' reaction to *Baptai* and his reported revenge against the poet. The ancient sources record a couplet attributed to the politician,

> †βάπτε με σὺ/ἐν† θυμέλῃσιν· ἐγὼ δὲ σὲ κύμασι πόντου
> βαπτίζων ὀλέσω νάμασι πικροτάτοις,

and a story which in its fullest form relates how Eupolis was drowned at sea by Alkibiades on his way to Sicily (scholia Aristid. 3.8; Platonios 1.13; Themist. 8.10; Cicero *Ad Att.* 6.1.18). The latter was disproved as early as Eratosthenes (apud Cicero), but as West maintains, the couplet and tradition of Alkibiades' wrath could be genuine.[11] If genuine, it requires an Alkibiades in Athens to see *Baptai* and to react to it. The comedy belongs in the years 418–415, and is badly misplaced in 413–412.

The first part of Kopff's third point concerns *Cl.* 335, a quotation from a dithyrambic poet, ὑγρᾶν Νεφελᾶν στρεπταίγλαν δάϊον ὁρμάν. The scholia attribute the rare word στρεπταίγλαν to Philoxenos the dithyrambic poet, that is, Philoxenos of Kythera, born in 435/4 (*Marm. Par.*) and captured as a boy by the Athenians (Suda φ 393).[12] On these dates Philoxenos could hardly have written anything for Aristophanes

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of *Birds* 1292 (414 B.C.). In connection with *Clouds* it is worth noting that frs. 42, 43, and 64 all have to do with horses.

[10] Sommerstein, "Decree" 101–8, following Droysen, "Vögel" 59–60.

[11] West, *Iambi* 29–30, *Studies* 17.

[12] Presumably in the Athenian expedition of 425 (Thuc. 4.53ff.). On Philoxenos see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb* 45–48; Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci* 423–32.

to quote in 423 (*Clouds* I) or even ca. 418 (the usual date for *Clouds* II). Dover sees a paradox here: "Either Σ^{RVE} or *Marm. Par.* is wrong."[13] But Kopff contends that if Philoxenos were a precocious young poet (cf. Eupolis' debut at age seventeen [Suda ε 3657]), he could have written a poem by 415 that Aristophanes could have picked up in a revision of *Clouds* in 414–413 for a remarkable and striking phrase.

However, even the late 410s seem too early for a poet who really belongs to the early fourth century.[14] The best explanation of scholia on *Cl.* 335 is to suppose that the scholiast sought out the unusual word στρεπταίγλαν, found it in Philoxenos of Kythera, and ignored the chronological difficulty. The text of the scholia, e.g., that of Σ^{V} (τοῦτο Φιλόξενος ὁ διθυραμβοποιός εἶπεν ἐν διθυράμβῳ τινι), means only that the scholiast (or his source) knew that the word occurred in Philoxenos and not necessarily that this was Aristophanes' source. The word is found only here and in Philoxenos, but we know too little of the fifth-century dithyramb to say with confidence that a word or phrase could not have been used earlier. The scholiasts' lack of attention to chronology can be paralleled at *Wasps* 1025, where the scholiast alleges that 1023–28 reply to a charge in Eupolis' *Autolykos*, two years later than *Wasps* (Ath. 216d). Several critics have recognized that Philoxenos cannot be Aristophanes' source at *Cl.* 335, and Kopff's attempt to rescue the scholiast is not really convincing.[15]

Kopff's second passage is *Cl.* 830–31:

> ΦΕΙ. τίς φησι ταῦτα; ΣΤΡ. Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος
> καὶ Χαιρεφῶν, ὃς οἶδε τὰ ψυλλῶν ἴχνη.

The epithet ὁ Μήλιος is clearly an allusion to Diagoras of Melos, celebrated in antiquity as poet, philosopher, and atheist, and the object of an Athenian decree cited by Aristophanes at *Birds* 1073–74 and elaborated upon by the scholiast, who cites the evidence of Melanthios (*FGrH* 326 F 3) and Krateros (*FGrH* 342 F 16). These lines follow the passage in which Strepsiades attempts to convince his son that Zeus no longer rules but Dinos, and we may infer that to call Sokrates "the Melian" was to tar him with the same brush that was used on Diagoras

[13] Dover, *Clouds* 145.

[14] See Ath. 6e; Ael. *V.H.* 12.44; Ar. *Pl.* 290ff. and scholia.

[15] E.g., Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb* 48; Starkie, *Clouds* 88; T. Bergk in Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci* on fr. 17.

in antiquity.[16] The career and chronology of Diagoras are matters of considerable dispute and beyond the scope of this paper,[17] and I shall confine my comments to certain of Kopff's points. First his claim (323) that the confusion over Diagoras' dates comes about "because *Nubes* 830 is always dated to the first production in 423" is simply not the case. The confusion over his dates is due to the ancient *testimonia,* which give an *akmē* of 482/1 or 468/7 (see Woodbury 179 n. 12); his association with such varied figures of the fifth century as Herakleides, Protagoras, Empedokles, Bacchylides, and Pindar; an appearance in Aristophanes (*Cl.* 830, *Birds* 1073, and perhaps *Frogs* 320);[18] and the decree against him dated by several sources to 415/4.[19]

I agree with Kopff and Woodbury that the decree against Diagoras is to be dated to 415/4, shortly before Aristophanes' mention of it at *Birds* 1073–74 and not to an earlier period, that is, the late 430s (Jacoby) or before 417 (Sommerstein).[20] But I disagree with Kopff's conclusion that this was the only time when Diagoras was notorious and thus good comic material. He appears to reject all the ancient evidence for Diagoras' earlier activity as "Hellenistic constructs based on the intellectual company Diagoras was assumed to have kept" (325). Woodbury has argued that 415/4 was the latest date that the ancients had for Diagoras' activity and that his career seems to parallel that of Protagoras and to belong to the years 467–415, that is, with considerable activity before 415. I suspect that Diagoras was well known to the Athenians for a number of years and that the "witch hunt" atmosphere prevailing in 415 provoked the decree against a notorious figure who happened also to come from Melos, conquered by the Athenians in 416/5.

I disagree also with Kopff's view of Diagoras as "the author of pious lyric poetry" who "wrote a work that contrasted the glorious moral claims of the Eleusinian mysteries with the actual *Realpolitik* of the Athenian democracy" (328). In this he would associate Diagoras with Thucydides in the sensitive intellectual's response to the events at

[16] See Woodbury, "Diagoras," esp. nn. 2, 46, 85.

[17] See Woodbury, "Diagoras" 178 n. 1, and Kopff, "Date," nn. 15, 16, 20, 21, for bibliography.

[18] See Woodbury, "Diagoras" 187.

[19] Scholia to *Birds* 1070; also the testimony of the Arabic historian al-Mubassir, for whom see Kopff, "Date" 324, and Woodbury, "Diagoras" 189.

[20] Kopff, "Date" 323–26, esp. 325 n. 20; Woodbury, "Diagoras" 179–96; Jacoby, *Diagoras*; Sommerstein, *Birds* 272.

Melos.[21] But there is much to be said for Woodbury's view of Diagoras as a poet, rather than a philosopher or "leader of progressive thought," of the same stamp as Kinesias (whose notorious behaviour was equated with atheism at Ath. 551e). On this view Diagoras becomes an unconventional poet whose poems about the gods were taken seriously in the tense atmosphere of 415.

The matter of the two versions of *Clouds* and what could belong to each is well-trodden ground indeed and, as Dover remarks, was intensively examined by critics of the last century in their attempt to recreate the lost *Clouds*. I would raise two points only here.

First, Kopff (323) does acknowledge the evidence of *Hyp.* I (Dover), but does not pursue its implications. The following is Dover's text:

> 1. τοῦτο ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ προτέρῳ, διεσκεύασται δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους, ὡς ἂν δὴ ἀναδιδάξαι μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ προθυμηθέντος, οὐκέτι δὲ δι' ἥνποτε αἰτίαν ποιήσαντος. 2. καθόλου μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν παρὰ πᾶν μέρος †γεγεννημένη διορθώσις† · τὰ μὲν γὰρ περιῄρηται, τὰ δὲ παραπέπλεκται καὶ ἐν τῇ τάξει καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν προσώπων διαλλαγῇ μετεσχημάτισται. 3. ἃ δὲ ὁλοσχερῆ τῆς διασκευῆς τοιαῦτα ὄντα τετύχηκεν. αὐτίκα ἡ παράβασις τοῦ χόρου ἤμειπται, καὶ ὅπου ὁ δίκαιος λόγος πρὸς τὸν ἄδικον λαλεῖ, καὶ τελευταῖον ὅπου καίεται ἡ διατριβὴ Σωκράτους.

The statement τοῦτο ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ προτέρῳ should indicate a fundamental similarity between the two versions, and the verb διεσκεύασται should be compared with Galen's definition of the term ἐπιδιεσκευάσθαι (*In Hipp. vict. acut.* 1.4), where Eupolis' *Autolykos* is the classic example: ὅταν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχον τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς πλείστας τῶν ῥήσεων τὰς αὐτὰς τινὰ μὲν ἀφῃρμένα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ προτέρου συγγράμματος ἔχῃ, τινὰ δὲ προσκείμενα, τινὰ δ' ὑπηλλαγμένα. The second part of the hypothesis is hard to follow, but the parallel with Galen's use of ἐπιδιεσκευάσθαι would lead us to expect "some things removed, some things added, some changed," which is roughly what we get with περιῄρηται . . . παραπέπλεκται . . . μετεσχημάτισται, with the implication that the revision was not all that substantial. Finally, only three places

[21] I have never been convinced that Melos created any sensation at Athens. Thucydides' reaction is that of a man not in Athens at the time, operating from the standpoint of hindsight and formulating a quasi-tragic view of Melos and Sicily. I do not believe that Euripides' *Troades* has very much to do with Melos, although Sicily is certainly in his mind. Note also that Aristophanes can joke about a "Melian famine" at *Birds* 186.

were considerably altered: the parabasis (proper), the agon,[22] and the final scene "where the school of Sokrates is burned down." What the hypothesis does suggest is that Kopff's assumption is rather extreme, and that one might rather assume the original except where the revision can be documented.

Second, I would consider the evidence of the *kōmōidoumenoi* in the text of *Clouds* as we have it. This is not the place to undertake a full and exhaustive analysis of the personal jokes in the play, but it is clear that many belong in the context of the 420s rather than the 410s. Some *kōmōidoumenoi* "enjoyed" a long career in comedy and thus cannot help in this sort of inquiry, e.g., Kleisthenes (355) in every extant comedy from 425 to 405; others could belong to either decade, e.g., Leogoras (109), still alive in 415 (And. 1).

I would argue that the following are creatures of the 420s and thus part of the original version of the comedy:

1. Megakles (46, 70, 124, 800, 815)—chariot-victor in 436 (schol. Pind. *Pyth.* 7), treasurer of Athene in 428/7 (*IG* I³ 297–99, 322–24), and the man meant by ὁ Κοισύρας at *Ach.* 614
2. Hieronymos and Simon (348–55), the former known only at *Ach.* 388 and the latter only at 399 and Eupolis fr. 235 (*Poleis*, probably in 422)[23]
3. Simon and Theoros (399–400), the latter a familiar target of the late 420s (see *Ach.* 134–73, *Kn.* 608, *Wasps* 42–51, 418–19)
4. Philoxenos and Amynias (680–92), the former being the *katapygon* of *Wasps* 84, Eupolis fr. 249 (*Poleis*) and Phrynichos fr. 49 (*Satyroi*),[24] and the latter mentioned several times in *Wasps* (74–75, 466, 1267–74), at Eupolis fr. 222 (*Poleis*), and at Kratinos fr. 227 (*Seriphioi*)[25]

[22] I cannot agree with Rogers (*Clouds* xv–xvii) that only the speech of "Right" was altered. The debate still continues whether the agon between the *logoi* was part of the first play or an entirely new addition. See Dover, *Clouds* xc–xciii, and Taplin's recent suggestion ("Phallology" 93–96) that the avian figures of the "Getty Vase" represent the *logoi* dressed as fighting cocks. See also now the study of the versions of *Clouds* in Hubbard, *Mask*, whose arguments I shall be discussing in a forthcoming review in *EMC*.

[23] Storey, "Dating" 18–20.

[24] This seems to be a comedy of the 420s; see Geissler, *Chronologie* xiii, 35. Incidentally, Philoxenos is *not* the father of Eryxis at *Frogs* 934, as I shall show elsewhere.

[25] If Amynias is also the creditor of *Clouds* 31, this part of the prologue is from the original version. The suggestion is attractive because of the horsy interests of the family; see Davies, *Propertied Families* 471, and MacDowell, *Wasps* 139–40.

5. Karkinos (1260–61), who with his sons was a favourite target of the late 420s (*Wasps* 1501–end, *Peace* 781–95, Pherekrates fr. 15 [*Agrioi*]) and was himself a general in the late 430s (Thuc. 2.23.2).[26]

Other *kōmōidoumenoi* are not so easily assigned to the 420s or 410s, e.g., Kleonymos at 670–76,[27] or Antimachos at 1023 (an Antimachos is insulted at *Ach.* 1150ff., but another, or even the same man, occurs at Eupolis fr. 134 [*Demoi*], a comedy of the 410s), or even the sons of Hippokrates (1001, from the agon which we might expect to be from the later version), who were made fun of as early as the mid–420s (Ar. fr. 116 [*Georgoi*]; for the date see frr. 103, 111), also at Eupolis fr. 112 (*Demoi*), and as late as ca. 410 (Ar. fr. 568 [*Triphales*]; for the date see frr. 563–64).

Among the *kōmōidoumenoi* of *Clouds* we must consider briefly the figure of Chairephon. Kopff would want *all* references to him to belong to the revision, accepting the argument advanced by Dover, that as first *Clouds* is absent from what seems to be a comprehensive entry on Chairephon's appearance in Old Comedy, derived from a handbook of *kōmōidoumenoi* (scholia Plat. *Apol.* 20e), Chairephon was thus not a feature of that version. Kopff, I think, misrepresents what Dover (xcv–xcvii) says, since Dover goes on to favour his second possibility, that in the original Strepsiades was admitted to the school by Chairephon, and thus does not assign all mention of him to the second version. In any case Chairephon was a *kōmōidoumenos* in his own right in the 420s, at *Wasps* 1412–14, Kratinos fr. 215 (*Pytine,* at the same festival as the first *Clouds*), Eupolis fr. 253 (*Poleis*) and fr. 180 (*Kolakes,* of 421). His lifelong association with Sokrates (Plat. *Apol.* 21a) makes it unlikely that Aristophanes would have passed over such a target in his play of 423 about Sokrates. The most reasonable hypothesis is that Chairephon was mentioned in *both* versions.

To these *kōmōidoumenoi* I would add the reference at 5–7 to the war and the desertion of slaves and that at 186 to the captured Spartans from Pylos as part of the original *Clouds,* and draw two conclusions from this evidence.

First, several passages in the parts of the comedy not mentioned by the hypothesis as especially revised seem to belong to the original version. This goes a long way to counter Kopff's assertion that we must

[26] On Karkinos see Snell, *TGFr* I 21, 128–31; Davies, *Propertied Families* 383–85; MacDowell, *Wasps* 326.

[27] On the comic depiction of Kleonymos see Storey, "Blameless Shield."

assume the revision unless proven otherwise, and I agree with Reckford's summation that the two versions should be considered as "mostly identical."[28]

Second, while several passages appear to belong to the original version, there are none which must belong to the revision, except in the parts that we know to have been substantially revised. In fact in terms of the *kōmōidoumenoi* only in the parabasis proper, where a complete rewriting has taken place, do we get jokes that must belong to the later version (those at Eupolis, Hermippos, and Hyperbolos). In the agon the jokes at Antimachos, the sons of Hippokrates, and Hyperbolos could belong to either version, and we do not know how much of the agon was recast and to what extent. This suggests to me that Aristophanes had not yet excised the 420s material from the comedy, nor had he added the newly topical jokes for a revision in the 410s. Thus I cannot agree with Fisher or Kopff that what we have is a reasonably complete or producible version; rather with Whitman I see the second *Clouds* as only partially revised, a project undertaken and then abandoned.[29]

Kopff's final point—Aristophanes' attitude toward Sokrates and his purpose in writing *Clouds*—is such a well-worn topic that I hesitate to add one more voice to the clamour, but a few of Kopff's points deserve comment. First, there is the danger of a circular argument: dating *Clouds* II after the scandals of 415/4 would make it an anti-Sokratic play, and because it is anti-Sokrates, the date after 415/4 is confirmed. Neither is a secure assumption, and *Birds* 1553–64 (from the same time as Kopff would place the revised *Clouds*) is not particularly hostile to Sokrates at all. Second, the idea that Pheidippides might suggest Alkibiades (and thus direct audience hostility against Sokrates) is not really on. The references to Megakles show that the role of the son was part of the first version, when Alkibiades was certainly known (Ach. 716, frr. 203.6, 224 [*Daitales*]) but hardly the *enfant terrible* that Kopff would envisage.[30] Pheidippides is a comic type, the irresponsible and spendthrift young aristocrat; we meet him again as Kallias in *Kolakes*, and if any real person is likely to lurk behind Pheidippides, it is

[28] Reckford, *Aristophanes* 394.

[29] Fisher's *Clouds* is entirely based on the assumption that the play as we have it was complete and ready for production; Whitman, *Aristophanes* 123.

[30] The most recent study of the comic depiction of Alkibiades is Moorton, "Aristophanes" 345–60, esp. 346–47. For the improbable fantasies of Vickers on this matter see Storey, "Dating" 24 n. 90.

Kallias not Alkibiades. Aristophanes does not hide his targets behind subtle disguises; if Pheidippides were intended to be Alkibiades, we (and the audience) would be in no doubt.

Finally Kopff takes little account of the evidence of Plato's *Symposium* and concentrates on the hostile tone which he detects at *Apol.* 18c–19c—his citation of *Laws* 936a is misleading in that this is only a possible reference to the Aristophanic caricature of Sokrates. But even the mention of Aristophanes in *Apology* need not be hostile. Heath has shown that the tone may be ridicule rather than critical, that is, "the charges against me are more worthy of a comic poet than of a serious law case."[31] Aristophanes' easy presence in the gathering of philosophers (see *Symp.* 218b) and the offhand comment of Alkibiades about *Clouds* (221b) suggest that by the time of *Symposium* Plato bore no hostility toward Aristophanes. The ancient sources are full of indignation and resentment at the comic portrait of Sokrates, but some see the whole thing as fun rather than satire. Plutarch *Eth.* 10c and Lucian *Halieus* 14, 25 are good examples of a more tempered response. Kopff's summation that "Aristophanes is serious, deadly serious" (327) may not fit the fun and games of the Dionysia and may attribute to comedy a satirical level and purpose that neither poet nor audience may have expected.[32]

The implication of *Cl.* 518–62 is that the motive for the revision of *Clouds* was artistic, that is, the failure of the earlier version and the desire to fire one more round in the "war between the poets," the great game involving comedian, audience, and competitors. On such a motive the revision should be earlier rather than later, closer to the first play and to the comedies such as *Marikas* and *Artopolides* which provoked his response. I would maintain that shortly after 420, in the wake of *Marikas* and perhaps of *Autolykos,* which also seems to carry on the "war" (see Eupolis frr. 61, 65), he set out to respond to the lack of success of *Clouds,* ἡγούμενος . . . καὶ ταύτην σοφώτατ' ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κωμῳδιῶν (*Cl.* 512; see also *Wasps* 54–66, 1044–45). He may have been serious, deadly serious even, but about his comic reputation. If, as

[31] Heath, *Political Comedy* 9–12.

[32] The political or personal seriousness of Aristophanes in his comedy is of course the great question of modern comic scholarship and certainly beyond the scope of this paper. I would call attention to three recent studies which stress the humour and the carnival-like atmosphere of the festivals and argue for a less serious view of the comedian: Halliwell, "Satire"; Heath, *Political Comedy*; and Reckford, *Aristophanes.*

Kopff suggests, after the scandals of 415 he wanted to attack Sokrates for his corrupting effect upon the young, he would have been more likely to have written a brand new play with a new theme (cf. *Knights* and *Wasps*, both anti–Kleon plays), not revise a failed comedy nearly a decade old.[33]

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[33]This paper was prepared during a very enjoyable sabbatical term at the University of Canterbury (New Zealand). I must express my appreciation to K. H. Lee, now of the University of Sydney, for his comments, which were of great value in formulating this response.

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THE LACUNA AT ARISTOTLE'S *POETICS* 1457b33

In *Poetics* 21, 1457b1–58a7, Aristotle first gives a list of types of words and then discusses these in the order of the list. The fourth item is κόσμος, but this is not mentioned at all in the subsequent discussion, although Aristotle otherwise keeps to his list of 1457b1–2. As early as 1548, Francesco Robortello posited a lacuna at 1457b33 between parts 3 and 5, those on metaphor and coined words, and Vinzenzo Maggi (Madius) and later editors have followed him.[1] As Gudeman remarks (ad loc.), it would have been strange if Aristotle had omitted to discuss this type, to which he refers again without further explanation in 1458a33 and 1459a14, both times after metaphor. We may be sure therefore that at 1457b33 Aristotle examined κόσμος and that this discussion was left out at some time for whatever reason.

Scholars do not agree on what Aristotle meant here by κόσμος. For instance, Lucas and Janko think of the *nomen adiectivum*, especially the *epitheton ornans*,[2] whereas others have come up with different interpretations.[3] But its occurrence in *Rhetoric* 1408a14 (ἐὰν [. . .] μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος) with the example πότνια συκῆ strengthens the interpretation "ornament" = *epitheton*.[4] It is true that Aristotle also uses ἐπίθετον (*Rhet.* 1405a10, b21, 1406a11ff., 1407b31, 1408b11) but this term covers for Aristotle "any accessory expression, genitival and other qualifications as well as adjectives."[5] I add that in *Rhet.* 1408a6–9 Aristotle discusses the use of privative adjectives like ἄλυρον (μέλος) as a means of conferring pomp on style, and he phrases this process thus: ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν, "the poets employ epithets from negations."[6]

[1] For Robortello's priority I here follow Gudeman, *Peri poiētikēs* 361. Among editors who do not accept a lacuna are Vahlen and Gallavotti, ad loc.

[2] Lucas, *Poetics* 205; Janko, *Poetics* 130–31.

[3] E.g., Bywater, *Art of Poetry* 280–81: "an equivalent synonym, equivalent"; Rostagni, *Poetica* 129: "probabilm. intendendo sinomini, sinecdoche, antonomasia, metonomia." Gallavotti, ad loc., interprets *kosmos* as a term covering the four following types.

[4] Bywater's objection that *potnia* is a *glotta* is unconvincing. See also Dupont-Roc and Lallot, *La poétique* 342.

[5] As remarked by M. E. Hubbard in Russell and Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism* 139 n. 3.

[6] Cf. Bonitz, *Index* 699b37, for more examples.

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After its first editor, Bruno Snell, Lucas points out that in the so-called Theophrastus papyrus, 46–49,[7] the author first discusses metaphor, then ἐπίθετον, which is followed by a yet unknown category of μετουσία, followed in turn by the types of coined words, etc. As Lucas says (205), "In the Theophrastus papyrus 46–59 . . . we have compound and other epithets, σίδηρος αἴθων, χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις. Something similar may be missing here." But in saying this Lucas shows that he has insufficiently exploited both the Theophrastus papyrus and Snell's commentary, for he omits to observe that under ἐπίθετον the author not only discusses the types of epithets mentioned above but also, at the end, privative adjectives. This fact helps us to explain why the lacuna at 1457b33 came about and to fill in at least the last part of Aristotle's discussion of κόσμος.

The text of the papyrus, lines 49–56, runs as follows:

> ἐπίθετον δὲ τὸ μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λεγόμενον, οἷον σίδηρος αἴθων, καὶ χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις. γίνεται δὲ καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ τριπλοῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκός, ὃ δὴ στέρησίν τινες καλοῦσιν, οἷον τὸν σακεσφόρον, ἀρηίφιλον· τὸ δὲ τριπλοῦν· βοτρυοκαρποτόκον καὶ ἀστερομαρμαροφεγγές, τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἄπ{λ}ουν, ἄπτερον.[8]

Now its author on the whole keeps faithfully to the Aristotelian order: the types he discusses are γλῶττα (very probably),[9] μεταφορά, ἐπίθετον, μετουσία, πεποιημένον, ἀφῃρημένον, ἐπεκτεταμένον, συγκεκομμένον, and ἐξηλλαγμένον. He introduces the novel term μετουσία, not right after metaphor, where we would expect it because of its close relations with metaphor,[10] but only when he has gone through the types which have to do with meaning and will start a discussion of the types that are conspicuous because of their form. The best explanation of this

[7] Lucas, *Poetics*, ad loc.; Snell, "Pap. Hamburg 128" = Pack, *Literary Texts* 1052. Text and English translation now appear as Appendix 9 in Fortenbaugh et al., *Theophrastus*. The papyrus is dated ca. 200 B.C.

[8] "[Men call] epithets that which is used in conjunction with ordinary words, e.g., 'blazing' iron and 'dazzling' gold. There is also double and triple [epithet] and [that] in respect to what does not apply, which some call 'privation,' e.g., [double]: 'shield-bearing, Ares-loving'; triple: 'grape-fruit-productive' and 'star-crystal-bright'; and that which is not in respect to what does apply: 'footless, unwinged'" (tr. Fortenbaugh).

[9] *Kyrion* will have been mentioned before this, but the papyrus has some parts of words only.

[10] Elsewhere I shall discuss the whole text of the papyrus and its authorship. I shall argue, e.g., that the Aristotelian notion of metaphor has been split up here into metaphor in a restricted sense (*metaphora*) and metonymy/synecdoche (*metousia*) respectively.

procedure is that the author of the papyrus closely sticks to the Aristotelian order and therefore cannot but place the new term in the first slot available. This explanation at the same time confirms the view that the Aristotelian κόσμος is equivalent to the papyrus' ἐπίθετον.

This passage has at the end the subtype of the "epithet in respect to what does not apply," that is, privative adjectives, as the examples show. The addition "which some call privation" can only be a reference to the Aristotelian use of στέρησις I mentioned above. When we now look at the passage in *Poetics* 1457b33, we see that the part on metaphor (1457b6–33) ends with a discussion of metaphorical expressions such as φιάλην ἄοινον for "shield." We will recall that the same relationship between metaphor and privative adjectives was pointed out in *Rhet.* 1408a6–9. In view of the text of the papyrus it therefore is a reasonable supposition that at the end of the part on "ornament" Aristotle remarked that a privative expression could also serve as "ornament" and exemplified this use by φιάλην ἄοινον. Later a scribe's eye jumped from the first ἄοινον to the second one, and for this reason the part on "ornament" got lost. We have an excellent parallel for this mechanism in 1455a14–15, where the Parisinus no longer has the words given in the Riccardianus because of *saut du même au même.*[11]

Does the papyrus help us to fill the lacuna to a greater extent? Very probably the first examples of the papyrus point to something similar in the lacuna, that is, embellishing adjectives. But did Aristotle also discuss here compound epithets, as Lucas apparently suggests? If he did so, Aristotle would have discussed compound words two times. For at the beginning of chapter 21 (1457a30–b1) he had given a short section to the types of words which are ἁπλοῦν, διπλοῦν, τριπλοῦν, τετραπλοῦν, and πολλαπλοῦν. He then referred to the large number of compound (proper) names in Marseilles and gave some examples, out of which only Ἑρμοκαϊκόξανθος has been kept.[12] This discussion concerns compound and other multiple words in general, be they nouns,

[11] Gudeman, *Peri poiētikēs* 361, had already given this explanation but did not suggest how to supply the lacuna. Dupont-Roc and Lallot, *La poétique* 342, deny the possibility of any paleographical argument. Other occurrences are, e.g., 1450b10 and 1456b33.

[12] Robert, "Bulletin" 203, points out parallels to this name in both Marseilles (*Kaïkos, Poseidermos*) and Emporion, one of its colonies (*Hermokaïkos*). For this reference I thank my colleague S. R. Slings. Commentators and translators have missed these parallels. These prove that Aristotle's example is not an adjective, as Gallavotti, e.g., says, nor need it come from a poem like the burlesque *Margites,* as Bywater and Janko suggest.

adjectives, or verbs. Now it is quite possible that in the lacuna at 1457b33 Aristotle again said something about compounding words, in this case compound adjectives, in the same way as the author of the papyrus seems to have done later in the (very fragmentary) first part and again in lines 49–56. However, when looking at the usage of both ἐπίθετον and διπλοῦν in the *Rhetoric* we observe that in 1405b36–6b5 (cf. also 1408b11) Aristotle keeps these terms strictly apart, even in such a way that the same word (ἀντίμιμος) is called both ἐπίθετον and διπλοῦν and not, for example, an ἐπίθετον διπλοῦν (06b30). Even the discussion in *Rhet.* 1404b1ff., esp. lines 26–36, on the differences between poetical and prose styles will not sustain the view that compound words were referred to in the part on "ornament." There Aristotle starts with an explicit reference to his discussion of types of *nomina* in the *Poetics* and then tells which types to use in prose and which not. Standard proper words and metaphors are acceptable in prose, but not γλῶτται καὶ διπλᾶ ὀνόματα καὶ πεποιημένα. It looks as if Aristotle here mentions the first five types of 1457b1–3 and only specifies κόσμος by compound adjectives. But other passages in the *Rhetoric* refute this interpretation, as we have seen. On the whole, therefore, I think that in the lacuna Aristotle did not discuss compound adjectives but only embellishing epithets and privative adjectives.

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ARISTOTLE ON 'ΕΝΤΕΛΕΧΕΙΑ: A REPLY TO DANIEL GRAHAM

Daniel Graham's recent article "The Etymology of 'Εντελέχεια" is the work of a good scholar, but it is flawed by a particular blind spot, stated right at the beginning. "[W]e are fortunate to know," he says, "the philosophical concept which [ἐντελέχεια] expressed." True, centuries—millennia—of philosophical tradition have held that ἐντελέχεια means, as Graham himself thinks it means,[1] "perfection" or "being complete" in the sense of "being at an end"; but as Graham points out in the course of the article, Aristotle himself all but gives a derivation that appears to make its meaning slightly different from this. Graham then rejects this derivation and gives another one which would make the word agree with its commonly accepted meaning.[2]

In some respects, it is a noble effort, and it has behind it some powerful philologists, like Herman Diels, who think more or less along the same lines. It is also true that this derivation does skirt a couple of problems that earlier philologists faced. Nevertheless, one would think that if Aristotle coined the word, it would be more plausible to take the word in Aristotle's sense and see if that fit the way he used it better than the traditional meaning, and call the tradition wrong rather than the one who made up the word in the first place.

The derivation Graham wishes to reject was given by Kurt von Fritz earlier in this century and is "one often endorsed by philosophers, though not by philologists, who follow Diels." The derivation is "from ἐν (ἑαυτῷ) τέλος ἔχειν, 'have an end in itself.' Von Fritz's suggestion is based on a study of Aristotelian philosophical terms which seems to imply that Aristotle makes up words out of phrases, and it has the advantage of making contact with some of Aristotle's metaphysical interests."[3]

[1] Graham, "Etymology" 79.

[2] Similarly in Graham's *Two Systems* 185. The article is evidently an expansion of the point made there.

[3] Graham, "Etymology" 75. In n. 9 he cites my article, "The Meaning of 'Energeia' and 'Entelecheia' in Aristotle," as agreeing with him without being aware of his exposition. This is perfectly true; at the time I wrote I did not know that he had said this. In n. 10, however, he seems to imply that I think the term means "actualization," which is not the case.

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He then says that Aristotle himself seems to think that this derivation is the correct one, quoting the following passage (which he calls T2) in support of this position: "For the ἔργον is a τέλος, and the ἐνέργεια is the ἔργον. Therefore the term ἐνέργεια derives from ἔργον, and it tends to mean ἐντελέχεια."[4] On p. 76, he says, "But since the word roots Aristotle produces in T2 appear only in the von Fritz interpretation, Aristotle must be confirming that view. Thus we seem to have an argument for the correctness of the von Fritz reading from Aristotle's own analysis of the term."

But this presents Graham with the formidable argument that if Aristotle himself thought this was the derivation, then how could it not be? To handle this, he says (77) that

> Aristotle coined the terms; how could the etymologies not be sound? All too easily. The ability to coin words in one's native language is a competence based on the internalization of complex transformation rules. But the ability to explain those neologisms depends upon a capacity to reason logically about a pre-logical skill. Just as one can produce an infinite number of grammatically correct utterances without being able to explain why they are grammatical, one can coin an infinite number of new words without being able to explain why they are correctly formed and meaningful.

This is an ingenious way around the difficulty; but I think it confuses two different things dealing with etymology: knowing whether a coined word is well formed, and knowing the components from which you formed it. For instance, whoever formed the word "photograph" must have known that he formed it from the Greek words for "light" and "writing," but evidently was not aware that, based on the way "-graph" words are formed, it is the camera that should be called the "photograph," and the picture the "photogram." "Photograph" is thus an ill-formed word. And, in fact, one could present an argument that ἐντελέχεια is not a very well-formed Greek word, because it looks too much as if it were formed from ἐντελεχής, which does not exist; but this would only say that Aristotle was not aware of misleading possibilities in his neologism, not that he did not actually form it from the roots he thought he was forming it from.

[4] *Meta.* Θ.8.1050a21–23. The Greek here says "tends toward" (*synteinei*), which does not necessarily imply "tends to mean," but that is not quite relevant at the moment.

And when you think about it, how *could* a person form a compound word and not know what he put it together from? Imagine the people who coined "laser" not realizing that it was an acronym from "light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation." How could they have put the word together? *That* part of forming a word cannot be unconscious.

So the particular thing that Graham wants Aristotle to be unaware of as he was making up his word is, it would seem, the one thing that it would be psychologically impossible to be unaware of. This presents a serious obstacle to his view.

But there are others. Graham says (79) that the word was formed from ἐντελῶς ἔχειν because "surely it is the state of being complete that Aristotle wants to stress in his semantic contrast to the activity of ἐνέργεια." Here it can be seen that it is the a priori supposition that the word *has* to mean "being complete" as opposed to "having the end inside" that tips the scales. It might very well be that, philosophically speaking, Aristotle wanted a static rather than an active word; but "having the end within" is just as static as "being complete" in the sense of "being *at* the end."

Further, if ἐντελέχεια means "being at the end," we then run into the further problem of why Aristotle would coin a new and (everyone admits) awkward expression to mean the same thing as other words that were already in Greek—and which he often used himself. He used τελείωμα once; τελείως three times, τελετή four, τελειότης five, τελείωσις six, τελέως twelve, τελευτή fifty-four, τελευταίος ninety-eight, and τέλειος 198 times. Considering that ἐντελέχεια (with its rather awkward dative form ἐντελεχείᾳ as the substitute for an adjective or adverb) appears in his writings only 138 times, it seems odd that he would have felt the need for a new word which was indistinguishable in meaning from words he used more than twice as often.[5]

But there are still other problems: for instance, the fact that, in spite of all the words dealing with "completeness" Aristotle employed, he never once used the word ἐντελῶς, which Graham says he actually formed ἐντελέχεια from—and, as Graham points out (79n.), he only used the adjective ἐντελής once (though this is where Diels thinks he got

[5]These counts are from *TLG*. Depending on whether unauthentic works are included or not and which variants one accepts, etc., results will vary somewhat. The point here is not the exact numbers, but that Aristotle was very familiar with a large number of words meaning "completeness."

ἐντελέχεια). Why make up a word from something that is not part of your vocabulary, when you have half a dozen words familiar to you to form it from?

Not only that, but if ἐντελέχεια means "the state of being complete," it clearly means it not as "the state of being *full*" (as the Latin basis of "complete" would connote), but as "the state of being *at the end,*" because of the τέλος in its root. But if this is so, what could Aristotle be trying to say in *Physics* 8.5, 257b6–9, in his assertion that "movement is an incomplete (ἀτελής) ἐντελέχεια"? This interpretation of ἐντελέχεια makes him say that movement is a "state of being at the end which is not at the end." An "incomplete" being–at–an–end in English masks what in Greek is an oxymoron at best; it would be the equivalent of saying a "nonterminal termination." It is one thing to be *nearly* or *not quite* at the end; but you cannot be *at* the end as not at the end. This is even worse than being "incompletely complete," as opposed to "not quite complete."

Nor does it really make sense for Aristotle to say,

> For example, what does not exist can be thought of and desired, but cannot be in motion. This is because these things would then be internally active [ἐνεργείᾳ], though [as nonexistent] they are not internally active. That is, some nonexistent beings exist potentially; but they don't *exist* because they are not in ἐντελέχεια,

when he has asserted several times (using either ἐντελέχεια or ἐνέργεια) that motions are incomplete.[6] What Graham says Aristotle "surely" means by the term now makes him say that nonbeings can be desired but not in motion, *because* as nonbeings they are potential but not complete—when he has said that as in motion they are not complete, either. I do not see how any sense could be made out of this.

So Graham's derivation and the traditional interpretation of ἐντελέχεια create serious problems with the apparent coherence of Aristotle's thought. Does von Fritz's derivation and its meaning of "having the end within" circumvent these difficulties?

First, let us consider Aristotle's possible reason for forming a new word. As background, it should be noted that he was not especially

[6] *Meta.* Θ.3.1047a30–b2. Motions are also called "incomplete" in *Ph.* 3.2.201b27–202a3; *De An.* 2.5.417a14–17, 3.7.431a1–7; *Meta.* Θ.6.1048b28–35, K.9.1066a18–26.

given to coining neologisms.[7] Nevertheless, the other correlative of δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, was also a coinage, and one made very early in his philosophical life, in the *Protrepticus*.[8] Without going into detail in that passage (which is too long to quote), it is clear that what he was looking for was what the Scholastics would later call "immanent activity," characteristic of living beings. He gives ποιεῖν as a kind of synonym, but it will not do, because he also wants to include πάσχειν in its meaning. He gives πράττειν, but this implies a "making," which he wants to avoid. He gives χρῆσθαι, as in "using" a faculty, but this does not stress "being active." And he even gives ἔργον as the correlative of the noun; but of course this can mean the "thing done" as well as the "doing." In short he shows that there is no word that precisely means "being internally active" in the broadest possible sense; and so he made up the word from the rare active form of ἐργάζεσθαι; but instead of calling the noun ἐνεργία, as one would expect, he said ἐνέργεια, to preclude the possibility that anyone would think that it was formed from ἐνεργός, and meant "effectiveness" and not "being internally active."[9]

What the passage indicates for our purposes is two things: (1) Aristotle was very careful in his formation of a neologism—as one would expect from a person who stressed subtle differences in language; and (2) there was no word in Greek that expressed what he wanted without having misleading implications.

Now then, after Aristotle broke with Plato's view of subsistent Forms, he was looking for a way to "instantiate" them, as they say today. He hit upon the fact that δύναμις has two meanings, that of "power" and "ability to be," and developed a theory of being "in potency" in the sense of "being deprived" of the Form in question. In this view, something which was "potentially" something else *lacked* or did not possess that something else; and it then directed itself toward that possession as its end. Thus the Form became its end.

[7] Words central to his thought are generally such common words as *physis, eidos, morphē, hylē, ousia,* and even *dynamis,* the correlative of the two neologisms for "act."

[8] Ross, fr. 14, pp. 49–50.

[9] Graham, *Two Systems* 168, thinks that it *was* formed from *energos* and that the verb *energein* was formed also from the adjective. But this would still make the noun *energia.* It makes much more sense to see the noun as formed from the verb, not the adjective, since its very form pictures the verb and not the adjective, not to mention the fact that the adjective's meaning is misleading, since its force is almost exactly that of our English expression "what works," in the sense of what works *in the object acted on,* not what is working *in the agent.*

Hence the meaning of the correlative of δύναμις as "lacking" the Form or end would have to be that of *possessing* the Form, not that of being *at* the end. But there is no word in Greek which means "possessing the end"; and so Aristotle again would have to invent one, whose prima facie etymology would mean just this: that is, ἐν, "internal," by analogy with the ἐν in ἐνέργεια, τέλος, "end," ἔχειν, "to have," with the noun ending in -εια by further analogy with ἐνέργεια from ἐνεργεῖν. Thus there is a good reason why Aristotle would form a neologism, and why it would have this particular derivation.

As to this derivation's fitting the texts better than the traditional meaning, it makes sense to say that motion is an incomplete *internalization* of an end, if it is precisely what the being is doing to get the end inside it, and it has so far only partially succeeded. A thing cannot be at the end as not at the end, but an end (a Form) can be only partially internalized.

And in the last sentence of the quotation above—"That is, some nonexistent beings exist potentially; but they do not *exist* because they do not have their ends within them"—the passage ceases to be enigmatic with this meaning for ἐντελέχεια. The whole passage says that nonbeings (which, of course, are inactive) can be desired, but not in motion, because to be in motion you have to be internally active; and potential beings do not exist as such because the end in question (the form, by which they are what they are) is not within them.

Of course, when they are moving the end is partially inside them, as a growing boy shows some of the characteristics of his future manhood; but it can be seen in this case that *as* potentially and not yet actively a man, he does not yet exist as a man, precisely because what-it-is-to-be-a-man is not within him. He *exists,* however, because he is internally active and, in fact, performing the internal activity of growing or becoming a man.

Thus it seems that the derivation Graham admits that Aristotle himself gives makes his thought coherent, and the meaning that comes from Graham's derivation and the one traditionally given to the word reduces him to conundrums.

Many other passages, in fact, light up once one takes "internal activity" for ἐνέργεια and "having the end within" for ἐντελέχεια. But this is not the place to pursue the matter further, because there are too many other fascinating complications one would have to go through to do justice to the subject—such as that for every instance of ἐντελέχεια, there is an instance of ἐνέργεια in what is apparently exactly the same

sense, and that Aristotle defined ἐνέργεια using a set of examples, stressing that the true meaning can only come through grasping the examples, but in another book defined "being not in potency" using ἐντελέχεια and the same examples.[10]

Suffice it for purposes of this discussion that Graham's analysis, which is perhaps the best attempt so far to justify the traditional sense of the term, is by no means the last word on the subject of ἐντελέχεια.

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[10]To confront all the facets of the issue really requires a whole book. I have recently given such a treatment in Blair, 'Ενέργεια *and* 'Εντελέχεια. To see what a minefield this subject is, cf. Colubaritsis, "La notion de *entelecheia* dans la *Métaphysique*." He did a far-ranging study of Aristotle's use of the term, including its relation to *energeia*, concluding that each word meant sometimes "activity" and sometimes "completeness" (or even "having the end within"). But when all is said and done, he leaves us with the conundrum of Aristotle's needing something precise to express two senses of the opposite of *dynamis*, coining two different words—and then giving *each* of the words both meanings.

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WAS THE ATHENIAN EKKLESIA CONVENED ACCORDING TO THE FESTIVAL CALENDAR OR THE BOULEUTIC CALENDAR?

The scholion on Demosthenes 24.20 is the only source in which it is explicitly[1] stated that *ekklēsia synklētos* was an extra meeting of the assembly and not just one of the ordinary sessions summoned in a special way: that is, with shorter notice than usual and/or by a decree of the council or the people, not simply by the *prytaneis* on their own initiative. The scholion runs as follows: κατὰ μῆνα τρεῖς ἐκκλησίας ἐποιοῦντο . . . πλὴν εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τις κατέλαβε πολέμου, ὥστε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου ἄλλην ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι πλέον τῶν ὡρισμένων. καὶ ἐγίνετο ἡ πρώτη ἐνδεκάτῃ τοῦ μηνός, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα περὶ τὴν εἰκάδα, ἡ δὲ τρίτη περὶ τὴν τριακοστήν.[2]

In a number of studies I have maintained that the information provided by the scholiast is wrong or, at best, anachronistic.[3] It is certainly wrong for the period of ten *phylai,* when the Athenians summoned four meetings in a prytany and not three in a month; if the scholion can be trusted it must bear on the period of the twelve *phylai,* when a prytany (in an ordinary year) was—more or less—concurrent with a month.

In two recent articles, however, Edward Harris has argued that the scholion should be trusted, not only for the period of twelve tribes, but even for the period from ca. 360 (the first attestation of a dated meeting of the Assembly) to 307/6 (when the ten tribes were changed into twelve). In the first article he discusses the scholion in connection with the other evidence we have for *ekklēsiai synklētoi.*[4] In the second he provides us with an extremely valuable study of meetings of the *ekklesia*

[1] Implicitly Harpokration s.v. σύγκλητος ἐκκλησία seems to hold the same view, but cf. Hansen, *Ecclesia* II 180. Harpokration's note is repeated in *Suda* and *Etym. Magn.* s.v. σύγκλητος. Cf. also Poll. 8.116.

[2] Dilts no. 53, p. 325. See also schol. Dem. 19.123 (Dilts nos. 263a, 263b, p. 49); schol. Aeschin. 1.60; Phot. s.v. κυρία ἐκκλησία; schol. Ar. *Ach.* 19.

[3] See Hansen, "How Often Did the Athenian *Ecclesia* Meet" (*Ecclesia* I 35–72), "'Εκκλησία Σύγκλητος in Hellenistic Athens" (I 73–81), "The Number of *Ecclesiai* in Fourth-Century Athens" (*Ecclesia* II 167–73, with F. Mitchel), and "How Often Did the Athenian *Ekklesia* Meet? A Reply" (II 177–94).

[4] Harris, "How Often."

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dated according to the festival calendar.[5] He has collected the evidence (mainly epigraphical) and asserts that even for the period of the ten tribes, most assemblies were held around the 11th, 20th, and 30th day of a month. He concludes:

> The normal schedule of regular meetings of the Assembly was obviously dictated in both periods by the festival calendar. . . . Since the Assembly had to hold forty regular meetings during the year in the period of the ten tribes, and probably thirty-six a year in the period of the twelve tribes, there had to be a meeting about once every ten days. . . . Our examination of the evidence, both epigraphical and literary, has revealed that the information about the normal schedule of Assembly meetings found in the scholium on Dem. 24.20 is accurate for the period of the ten tribes beginning at the latest around 360 and also for the period of the twelve tribes. . . . Whatever [the scholiast's] source, his information is clearly reliable. And that ought also to apply to his statement that the Athenians normally held three meetings of the Assembly each month, but might in emergency circumstances hold an extra meeting.[6]

Harris's conclusion does not tally with Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.3, οἱ δὲ πρυτανεύοντες . . . συνάγουσιν . . . τὸν δῆμον τετράκις τῆς πρυτανείας ἑκάστης. Here we are told that the *prytaneis* have to summon the people four times in a prytany (and not three times in a month), and later in the same chapter (43.4–6) Aristotle describes the agenda for each of the four meetings to be held in a prytany.

In one section Harris acknowledges the discrepancy between the scholion on Dem. 24.20 and Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.3 and asks: "but what about the period of the ten tribes when a prytany was longer than a month and when there must have been four months in which there were more than three regular meetings?" His only answer to this question is to point out that the evidence of the dated decrees of the period 360–306 indicates that even during the period of the ten tribes, meetings clustered around the 11th, the 20th, and the 30th day of the month.[7] But since that answer does not remove but only reinforces the discrepancy between *Ath. Pol.* 43.3 and the scholion, I must repeat the question and answer it myself: according to the scholiast's view, the first four *ekklēsiai* in the year must have been held on Hekatombaion 11, ca. 20, ca.

[5] Harris, "When."
[6] Harris, "When" 340–41.
[7] Harris, "When" 336–39.

30 and on Metageitnion 11; but the first prytany must have ended, in an ordinary year, on Metageitnion 6 or 7, and, in an intercalary year, on Metageitnion 9 or 10.[8] A similar problem must have occurred three more times in the course of the year. So, if we follow the scholion (and Harris) we will have to reject the information given at *Ath. Pol.* 43.3, and I do not like to sacrifice Aristotle's (or his pupil's) evidence about contemporary matters in order to vindicate the reliability of a scholion on Demosthenes.

As stated above, Harris's only answer is that the scholion is supported by the evidence of dated decrees. He has meticulously listed the decrees which date meetings of the Assembly according to the festival calendar and discovered that even for the period of the ten tribes, meetings of the *ekklēsia* tend to fall around the 10th, the 20th, and the 30th of a month.

I have two objections. (1) The pattern he has found does not warrant his conclusion: from the fact that most meetings of the Assembly fell on certain days of the month it does not follow that the *ekklēsia* was summoned according to the festival calendar, not according to the bouleutic calendar. (2) He has omitted a discussion of all the decrees which state the day of the prytany without referring to the day of the month. In order to substantiate my objections I will have to give a brief survey of how the Athenians dated their decrees, or rather the assemblies in which the decrees were passed.

Athenian laws and decrees of the late fifth century and early fourth recorded the year, the prytany, and, sometimes, the number of the prytany; cf., e.g., *IG* II² 43.1–5, ἐπὶ Ναυσινίκο ἄρχόντος. Καλλίβιος Κηφισοφῶντος Παιανιεὺς ἐγραμμάτευεν. ἐπὶ τῆς Ἱπποθωντίδο[ς ἑβδ]όμης πρυτανείας. ἔδοξε. . . . But no law or decree offered any information about the day on which the decision was made, or rather the version published on stone had no date recorded, whereas the version kept in the Metroön probably had (cf. below). But from ca. 370 the Athenians began, in the published version of the decrees of the people, to specify the date of the *ekklēsia* in which the decree had been pro-

[8] I follow the generally accepted view that the first prytany had thirty–six days in an ordinary year and thirty–nine in an intercalary year. In both types of year the month Hekatombaion would have either twenty–nine or thirty days; cf. Pritchett and Neugebauer, *Calendars* 112; Meritt, *Year* 9. Thus the four equations are Pryt. II.1 = Metageitnion 8 (ordinary year, hollow month), Metageitnion 7 (ordinary year, full month), Metageitnion 11 (intercalary year, hollow month), Metageitnion 10 (intercalary year, full month).

posed and carried: cf., e.g., *IG* II² 105.1–5, [ἐπὶ τῆς Αἰαντίδος ἑβδόμης π]ρυταν[είας, Μόσχος Κυδαθηναιεὺς ἐγραμ]μάτευε [δευτέραι (?) καὶ τριακοστῆι τῆς πρυ]τανεία[ς τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφιζε . . .]. For about a generation the only date recorded, if any, was the day of the prytany; and what started as an optional piece of information in the preamble became more and more regular, so that, from ca. 350, most decrees of the people stated the prytany date of the *ekklēsia* in question.[9] Around ca. 340 the preambles of the decrees of the people became even more elaborate and specific: it became common to record the type of meeting (*ekklēsia* or *ekklēsia kyria*), and the day of the month was added to the day of the prytany, so that meetings of the *ekklēsia* were from now on dated both according to the bouleutic calendar and according to the festival calendar. This form of dating is first attested in 341/40,[10] and the first attestation of what for centuries became the standard formula is found in a decree of 338/7: *IG* II² 237.1–4, [ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδιονίδος δ]ε[κ]ά[της] π[ρυτα]νείας, ἧι Φ[ίλιππος Ἀντιφήμου Εἰρεσίδης ἐγρ]αμ[μά]τευεν, Θαργη[λιῶνος δευτέραι φθίνοντος, ἕκτη]ι [τῆ]ς πρυτανείας. τῶ[ν προέδρων ἐ]πεψήφιζεν. . . . In ca. 335 the double date became a fixed element in the preambles of popular decrees, and thereafter we find not one single unquestionable example of a decree that follows the old style and records the prytany date only.[11] On the other hand, it is worth noting that the new form of dating according to the festival calendar never replaced the prytany date. In the period of the ten *phylai* I have found only four decrees that record the day and the month but not the number of prytany and the day of the prytany.[12]

[9]Some decrees, however, are still left without any indication of the day on which they were passed: *IG* II² 206, 208, 209, 212, 213, 215, 218; *Hesperia* 8 (1939) 5–12 no. 3, 43 (1974) 322–24 no. 3. Other possible examples are *IG* II² 207, 214, 227, 248; *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 1–2 no. 2; *SEG* 21.241. On *IG* II² 216 cf. *SEG* 14.47; on *IG* II² 219 cf. *Hesperia* 8 (1939) 172–73 no. 3. The latest secure occurrence of an undated preamble is *IG* II² 337.26–33, passed in 333/2.

[10]*IG* II² 229.4–5. Cf. Henry, *Prescripts* 37.

[11]Cf. Table 1, notes b and c.

[12](1) *IG* II² 335 = Schwenk no. 23 (334/3). The preambles of *IG* II² 405 (see *SEG* 21.275 [Schwenk no. 24]) and *IG* II² 414a (see *SEG* 21.276 [Schwenk no. 25]), both supposed to be passed in the same meeting, are completely restored. (2) *Hesperia* 9 (1940) 327–28 no. 36 (see *SEG* 35.67 [Schwenk no. 19]) (335/4). (3) *IG* II² 454 (308/7), heavily restored (cf. *SEG* 21.293 = Dow, *Hesperia* 32 [1963] 350, where the text is restored with a shorter line and dated 324/3). (4) *AJP* 61 (1940) 358 (339/8). This decree, long known only from a transcript and believed to be a forgery, is now generally accepted after a squeeze of it was found. It is, however, highly anomalous: in addition to recording the festival calen-

If Harris were right in his view that *ekklēsiai* were summoned according to the day of the month but not according to the day of the prytany, we should expect the day of the month to have been recorded first and the prytany date either later or not at all. That the Athenians went on recording the prytany date for about thirty years before they even thought of recording the day of the month shows conclusively that, officially, it was the prytany date that mattered, not the date according to the festival calendar. Table 1 lists the decrees that record the prytany date without the festival calendar date.

In addition to the decrees listed here there is one more attestation of a preamble that records the prytany calendar date without the festival calendar date: an unpublished fragment of a decree proposed and carried by Alkibiades in 422/1 and republished in ca. 403.[13] Between the standard formulae "in the archonship of Alkaios" (line 3) and "decided by the council and the people" (line 5) we find the date: "on the 19th day of the prytany" (line 4). Why this isolated reference to a prytany date some thirty to fifty years before the Athenians began to date their popular decrees by the day? The republication must have been based on a text which included the prytany calendar date, probably the text filed in the public archive in the Metroön.[14] If this explanation is on the right lines, it follows that the texts of popular decrees filed in the Metroön regularly included a reference to the day on which the decision was made, but that this piece of information was not recorded in the copies published on stone until after ca. 370.

Such an interpretation is in fact supported by Diokles' law passed in ca. 403 and quoted by Demosthenes at 24.42: Διοκλῆς εἶπεν. τοὺς νόμους . . . τοὺς . . . μετ' Εὐκλείδην τεθέντας καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τιθεμένους κυρίους εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη, πλὴν εἴ τῳ προσγέγραπται χρόνος ὅντινα δεῖ ἄρχειν. ἐπιγράψαι δὲ τοῖς μὲν νῦν κειμένοις τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν. τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, ὃς

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dar date without any reference to the prytany calendar, the prescript strangely omits the name of the proposer, and the *proedros* is recorded without *demotikon* and, what is worse, with *patronymikon*; cf. Hansen, "Decree of 347/6" 77 n. 5, 79.

[13] To be published by P. Matthiou. The only published reference so far appears in Develin, *Officials* 429. Part of a decree of ca. 403 is found in a modern house at the top of Odos Thrasyllou, southeast of the Acropolis.

[14] Cf. also the honours for Lykourgos. The republication of the decree on stone (*IG* II² 457) has no date at all, but Plut. *Mor.* 852A records both the tribe and the number of the prytany (Ἀντιοχίδος ἕκτης) but not the day of the prytany. The presumption is that the original in the Metroön had both the prytany date and the festival calendar date.

TABLE 1. Decrees that record the prytany date without the festival calendar date

Source (date B.C.)	Day of Prytany	References[a]
IG II²:		
105.3–4 (368/7?)	32, 34, 35, or 37	*IG* II² 523; *SEG* 14.46, 32.58
109.5 (363/2)	30	
116.7–8 (361/60)	12	
117.4–5 (361/60)	?	
118.1–2 (364/3 or 359/8?)	?	*SEG* 32.63; Whitehead in *AHB* 3 (1989) 102–7
123.4–5 (357/6)	8	
127.5 (356/5)	11	
130.5 (355/4)	3	*SEG* 22.88, 24.85
172.1 (*ante* 353/2)	3, 4, or 5	*SEG* 32.67
205.5–6 (351/50)	26	*SEG* 14.51
219.5–6 (345/4)	16 or 21	*Hesperia* 8 (1939) 172–73; *SEG* 32.76
220.1–2 (344/3)	16 or 21	
220.26–27 (345/4)	10	
224.4 (343/2)	4	
225.2 (343/2)	4	
228.3–4 (341/40)	29	Osborne D15

Source: Hansen, "When did the Athenian *Ecclesia* Meet?" (*Ecclesia* I 82–102, esp. the list of dated decrees, 90–93).

[a]References to Meritt, Osborne, and Pritchett and Neugebauer are to the works given in full in the Bibliography.

TABLE 1 (cont'd)

Source (date B.C.)	Day of Prytany	References[a]
IG II² (cont'd):		
229.4–5 (341/40)	37	addenda; Pritchett & Neugebauer 43, Meritt 73
231.4 (340/39)	11	
233.2 (340/39)	8	
332.4–5 (353/2?)	22?	Pritchett & Neugebauer 44–45; Schwenk no. 20
366.4–5 (366/5?)	16	Schwenk no. 80[b]
545.2 (*post* 333/2)	?	
800.4 (326/5?)	?	*SEG* 21.289[c]
Hesperia:		
8 (1939) 12–17 (357/6)	29	
26 (1957) 231–33 (362–55)	36	*SEG* 17.19
40 (1971) 183–86 (*post* 333/2)	30+[d]	

[b]The decree was passed in the archonship of Kephisodoros, i.e., either in 366/5 or in 323/2. Because of the letter forms Kirchner and Schwenk prefer the later year, but two of the formulae strongly support the year 366/5. (1) The latest indubitable attestations of a prytany date without a festival calendar date are *IG* II² 231 and 233, both passed in 340/39. (2) In *IG* II² 366 the name of the proposer is recorded without patronymic and demotic, but after 354/3 a proposer of a decree of the people is invariably given his full name with patronymic and demotic added; see Hansen *Ecclesia* II 125–26 with n. 6. On the other hand, it is universally agreed that the inscription is a privately published text, summary in form. Thus it need not follow any official rules.

[c]Line 5 runs: [. . . . . 21 . . . . . .] ἐκκλησία. The formula to be expected before ἐκκλησία is (invariably) the prytany date. The line is non-stoichedon, about twenty-nine letters, and, e.g., τετάρτηι or πέμπτηι or ἐνδεκάτηι τῆς πρυτανείας would fill the missing part of the line perfectly. On the other hand, it is unexpected, in 326/5, to find the prytany date recorded without any mention of the festival calendar date.

[d]As with *IG* II² 800, I am rather uneasy about a restoration which combines a prytany date without a festival calendar date (not attested after 340/39) with a list of *symproedroi* (not attested before 333/2).

ἂν τυγχάνῃ γραμματεύων, προσγραφέτω παραχρῆμα τὸν νόμον κύριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτέθη. Like the decrees, the extant laws published on stone do not record the day on which they were passed until much later (and never do it consistently),[15] but it is obvious from Diokles' law that laws passed after the archonship of Eukleides and filed in the archive must have recorded the day on which the *nomothetai* had made the decision.[16] Combining the unpublished fragment of Alkibiades' decree with Diokles' law, we must infer that both the laws and the decrees filed in the Metroön were dated by the number and day of the prytany long before it became regular to date the copies published on stone.

A passage in Aischines 2, however, shows that the festival calendar date too was recorded in the texts filed in the archive at least several years before it was added to the preambles of the copies published on stone:

> κάλλιστον γὰρ, οἶμαι, πρᾶγμα καὶ χρησιμώτατον τοῖς διαβαλλομένοις παρ' ὑμῖν γίγνεται. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα καὶ τοὺς ἐπιψηφίσαντας ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις γράμμασι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον φυλάττετε . . . (91) . . . Οὐ μόνον τοίνυν διετρίψαμεν τὰς λοιπὰς ἡμέρας τοῦ μηνὸς, ἀλλὰ Μουνιχιῶνος ἐξωρμήσαμεν. καὶ τούτου τὴν βουλὴν μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ψήφισμα, ὃ κελεύει ἀπιέναι τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρκους καί μοι λέγε τὸ τῆς βουλῆς ψήφισμα. ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ. προσανάγνωθι δὴ καὶ τὸν χρόνον, ὅστις ἦν. ΧΡΟΝΟΣ. ἀκούετε, ὅτι Μουνιχιῶνος ἐψηφίσθη τρίτῃ ἱσταμένου. (2.89–91)

Aischines is discussing the year 347/6, but the earliest extant preamble with a festival calendar date is, as mentioned above, a decree of 341/40. William West's lucid discussion of the Aischines passage concludes: "In short, it is entirely possible that the dates of decrees (by lunar month and day) were always recorded in the prescripts of archival copies, from at least the late fifth century at the time the central archive was founded. The recording of the date would establish a basis for filing the decrees by dates as well as keying them to the conciliar calendar."[17]

I agree with West's main point, that dates were probably used for

[15] *SEG* 26.72 (375/4, no date by the day); *Agora* I 7495 (unpublished) (354/3, 7th day of pryt. Antiochis); *IG* II² 140 (353/2, 21st day of pryt. Pandionis); *SEG* 12.87 (337/6, no date by the day); *SEG* 18.13 (336/4, apparently no date by the day); *IG* II² 333 (335/4, 6 Skir., no prytany calendar date).

[16] Hansen, "Diokles' Law" 71.

[17] West, "Public Archives" 537.

filing the decrees; but I believe that it was the prytany date that was used, not only in the beginning of the fourth century, when it is the only one referred to (cf. the republication of Alkibiades' decree and the numerous prescripts, from ca. 370 and to ca. 340, which record the prytany date), but also in the second half of the century, when the festival calendar date was added. I base my view on the following observation. After ca. 340, most preambles of laws and decrees provide us with four pieces of information about the date: the name of the month, the day of the month, the number of the prytany, and the day of the prytany. But quite a few prescripts record the day of the month combined with the number and day of the prytany, but give no information about the name of the month (cf., e.g., *IG* II² 360.1–4, ἐπ' Ἀντικλέους ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Αἰδεῖγος πέμπτης πρυτανείας, ἧι Ἀντιφῶν Κοροίβου Ἐλευσί ἐγραμμάτευεν. ἐνδεκάτηι. τετάρτηι καὶ τριακοστῆι τῆς πρυτανείας. Conversely, there is no example of a decree that records the name and day of the month combined with the day of the prytany but without any mention of the number of the prytany. Thus if one of the two dates is defective, it is always the festival calendar date that is lacking, not the prytany date. The inference is that the prytany date was the more important of the two and must have been used for the filing of the decrees even after the festival calendar date was added. Table 2 lists the preambles that omit the name of the month.

Thus the epigraphical evidence supports the information given at Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.3: the Athenians convened their Assembly according to the prytany calendar, not the festival calendar, and we must conclude that the scholion on Dem. 24.20, if it is trustworthy, informs us about the Hellenistic period, when the month was more or less coextensive with the prytany, but not about the period of the ten *phylai,* when the bouleutic and the festival calendars coincided the first thirty days of every year, but not the remaining 324 or 325 days.

But if the Assembly was summoned and its decrees were filed in accordance with the prytany calendar, we will have to answer two other questions. (1) Why did the Athenians, from the 340s, add the festival calendar date to the prytany date? And why did the orators invariably refer to the festival calendar dates of the decrees they quoted or paraphrased? (2) Why did the Athenians show such a marked preference for convening meetings of the *ekklēsia* on certain days of the month, namely the 11th and the 29th or 30th, whereas there is no similar preference for any particular day of the prytany?[18]

[18] See Hansen, *Ecclesia* I 87.

TABLE 2. Preambles that omit the name of the month

Source (date B.C.)	Festival	Bouleutic calendar date
IG II²:		
229.4–5 (341/40)	30	?.37
330.3 (335/4)	30	III.17
330.48 (336/5)	30	X.37
331.3–4 (335/4)	30	X.34 or 35 or 36
348.2–3 (331/30)	13–9	VIII.3–7
354.5–6 (328/7)	30	VIII.?
356.5–7 (327/6)	29	IV.26
357.5–6 (327/6)	30	?.?
360.3–4 (325/4)	11	V.34
383b.6–7 + add. (320/19)	29	III.10 (*SEG* 21.305)
449.2–3 (*ante* 318/7)	18	VI.6 (?)
IG VII:		
4252.5–6	11	IX.23[a]
Hesperia:		
7 (1938) 291–92 (339/8)	?	X.32 (*SEG* 16.52)[b]

[a] Passed on the same day as *IG* VII 4253, where the name of the month (Thargelion) is duly recorded.

[b] The first four lines of the inscription (the preamble) are non-stoichedon and have forty-one to forty-three letters. In lines 2–3 the editor, Schweigert, restored . . . ἐγραμμά[τευεν Σκιροφοριῶνος? δε]υτέραι καὶ τριακοστῆι της πρυτανείας. But to record the name of the month without the day of the month seems to have happened only in cases where the day of the month coincided with the day of the prytany, as, for example, in *IG* II² 365.3–4, Ἑκατομβαιῶνος ἐνδεκάτηι τῆς πρυτανείας; cf. also *IG* II² 451. It is much more reasonable to suppose that the missing part of the line recorded the day of the month without mentioning the name (see the other preambles listed here). There can be no doubt about the prytany date, X.32. The perfect equations are: Skir. 24 (if the year was intercalary) or Skir. 26–27 (if the year was ordinary). Given the slight variations that are so frequently attested, any day between 23 and 28 will fit, and we can choose between the following restorations to fill the missing thirteen to fifteen letters: ὀγδόηι φθίνοντος (the 23rd, fifteen letters), ἕκτηι φθίνοντος (the 25th, fourteen letters), ἕκτηι μετ' εἰκάδας (the 25th, fifteen letters), and τρίτηι φθίνοντος (the 28th, fifteen letters).

(1) The festival calendar was the one with which every citizen was familiar, whereas the bouleutic calendar was an innovation, created either in ca. 507 or in 461 (see below), reformed in 408 (?), and used exclusively for the running of the *boulē* and the *ekklēsia*. Thus whereas everybody would have an idea of when it was the 16th of Pyanopsion, nobody (except the *prytaneis* themselves) would offhand recognize the 33rd day of the 3rd prytany.[19]

An obvious parallel is the modern system of numbered weeks (adopted in Germany and other continental countries though virtually unknown in the United Kingdom and in the United States), whereby it has become customary to announce that an annual meeting will be held in, say, "week 35." Such a date does not mean very much even to those who are summoned to the meeting, but if they check their diaries, they will learn that in 1992 week 35 is the week running from the 24th to the 30th of August. In most cases summonses to such meetings are given a double date: "In 1992 the annual meeting of —— will be held in week 35, August 24–28." I believe that the double dating of Athenian *ekklēsiai* is an analogous case: assemblies were summoned according to the official, but artificial, bouleutic calendar. When, ca. 370, a date was added to the preamble of decrees of the people it was, of course, the prytany date that was recorded, but since the Athenians had all their other activities structured according to the festival calendar, they found it convenient, after a generation or so, when preambles of decrees became more elaborate, to add the day of the month to the day of the prytany. Sometimes it was felt that it was enough to state the day of the month, since the name of the month would be obvious to those who had participated in the meeting. Similarly, the orators preferred to identify assembly meetings by the festival calendar date; they knew all too well that technical language was viewed with suspicion by their audiences, and that is why, for example, the *ekklēsiai* in which the Philokrates peace was debated and concluded are referred to as the assemblies held on Elaphebolion 18 and 19,[20] and not as the assemblies held on (probably) the 14th and 15th day of the 8th prytany.[21]

(2) Harris has shown, in my opinion conclusively, that the Athenians preferred to hold their *ekklēsiai* on certain days of the month. For the period of the twelve tribes the epigraphical evidence he has collected clearly supports the information given in the scholion on Dem.

[19] *IG* VII 4254.2–7.
[20] Aeschin. 2.61; Dem. 19.57, etc. Cf. also *IG* II² 212.56–57, 1673.9–10.
[21] Cf. Hansen, *Ecclesia* I 69.

24.20: out of 126 regular meetings, twenty-eight were held on the 9th or 11th day of the month, twenty-seven on the 18th or 21st, and thirty-two on the 29th or 30th.[22] With the minor amendment (as he explains)[23] that the first meeting might fall on the 9th instead of the 11th, the scholiast is vindicated.

For the period of the ten tribes the evidence is more complex: of forty-one attested meetings, nine were held on the 11th and thirteen on the 29th or 30th day of the month,[24] but there is no conspicuous concentration of meetings around the 20th.[25] The preference for meetings held on the 11th or the last day of a month can easily be explained: meetings of the Assembly were most conveniently held when a high number of citizens would be in Athens for other reasons—in connection with participation in a major festival, or trade in the agora, or the like. Interest and rent was mostly paid by the month; Strepsiades in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (1134, 1179, 1197) is sufficient evidence of how important a day the

[22] Harris, "When" 335.

[23] Harris, "When" 336.

[24] Harris, "When" 339, lists only two meetings held on the 29th as against eleven held on the 30th. But this is an artificial distribution. The last day of the month was called ἕνη καὶ νέα irrespective of whether it fell on the 30th day of a full month or the 29th day of a hollow month. Since in most cases we do not know which months were full and which were hollow, Mikalson (*Calendar* 9) has found it convenient to subsume all meetings held on the ἕνη καὶ νέα under the 30th. Harris follows Mikalson and ought, perhaps, to have added a note explaining that several of the meetings listed under the 30th probably fell on the 29th day of a hollow month.

[25] Harris, "When" 339. For the period of the ten tribes Harris lists forty-one attested meetings of the Assembly dated according to the festival calendar, but in my opinion more can be added. Following Mikalson, Harris accepts as evidence "only those restorations which are demonstrably correct" (327 n. 6). This is a sound principle but must be differently applied in Harris's case. Mikalson must reject all dates in which the name of the month cannot be confidently restored. Harris, on the other hand, concentrates on days of the month and, in addition to the decrees accepted by Mikalson, should therefore include all the preserved preambles in which the day of the month can be confidently restored (but not the name of the month). Harris does include nine preambles in which the name of the month is not preserved but ought, in my opinion, to have included at least six more: *IG* II² 335.5–6, [Βοηδρομιῶνος] ἕκτηι μετ' [εἰκάδας] (25th day of the month securely attested); 368.4–6, [Βοηδρομιῶνος ἐν]άτει ἰσταμέν[ου] (9th day of the month securely attested); 382.5–6, [Ποσειδεῶνος ὑστέρου τ]ετράδι ἐπὶ δέκ[α] (14th day of the month securely attested); 454.3–4, [Σκιροφοριῶνος πέμπ]τει μετ' εἰκά[δας] (22nd, 23rd, 26th or 28th day of the month, probably the 26th); 546.3, δεκάτει ὑ[στέραι—] (21st day of the month securely attested); 727.4–5 (SEG 21.324), [——όγδ]όηι ἐπ[ὶ δέκα] (18th day of the month securely attested). These additions modify Harris's conclusion but do not alter it substantially. The pattern he has discovered still stands.

ἕνη καὶ νέα was for economic transactions. Next, as pointed out by Harris (340), of the first eight days of every month seven were festival days.[26] So the Athenians found it convenient to hold one of the four *ekklēsiai* in a prytany on the last day of the month (in some of the prytanies there may even have been two sessions of the Assembly held on a ἕνη καὶ νέα). For the same reason—as Harris says—many assemblies were held on the 11th: after the numerous festival days (1–4 and 6–8) a new meeting of the Assembly would be appropriate. Let me add that the 5th, the 9th, and the 10th might often be too early, since the necessary *probouleumata* had to be prepared by the *boulē*, which (like the *ekklēsia*) was not summoned on festival days. Assuming that it often took the *boulē* three days to prepare the business for the people, the 11th would be a convenient day for having an *ekklēsia*.

David Lewis has suggested another explanation: originally the Assembly was summoned in accordance with the festival calendar.[27] A change was made only when the prytany system was introduced, either in ca. 507 or in 461; but since the Athenians were used to having meetings on certain days of the month, especially on the 11th and on the ἕνη καὶ νέα, they preferred to have their assemblies convened on these days even after the introduction of the bouleutic calendar. I find this idea very attractive and will only add that it is fully compatible with the explanation suggested above.[28]

Conclusion. The four assemblies per prytany described in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.3–6 as well as the numerous decrees dated according to the prytany calendar without reference, or with only an imperfect reference, to the festival calendar show that the Athenians convened four *ekklēsiai* per prytany rather than three per month as stated by the scholiast on Dem. 24.20 and asserted by Harris in his article in *AJP* 112 (1991).

[26]Harris, "When" 340. In his review of Mikalson's *Calendar* Lewis is sceptical about the fullness of the festival programme in the first decade of the month, pointing out that Mikalson had suppressed evidence for days 4 and 8.

[27]Lewis, in conversation, January 1992.

[28]I am most grateful to David Lewis for the very seminal conversation we had about these problems and for drawing my attention to the unpublished decree (see note 13 above), to the decree discussed in *AJP* 61 (see note 12 above), and to the information given in notes 14 and 26. Lewis had already aired the view that the festival calendar was important for convening the Assembly even in the period of the ten *phylai*, many years ago in an unpublished lecture, "M. H. Hansen on the Athenian '*Ecclesia*,'" read at the Norman Baynes Annual Meeting of the U. K. Ancient Historians held in Birmingham on 25 September 1984.

Harris has demonstrated, conclusively in my opinion, that even in the period of the ten tribes many sessions were held on the 11th and the 30th day of the month, but that does not conflict with the Assembly's having been run by prytanies rather than by months; and, before the period of the twelve tribes, there is no conspicuous clustering of meetings around the 20th day of the month. The scholion on Dem. 24.20 reflects the practice in the Hellenistic period (when a month was more or less coextensive with a prytany), and that information, including the definition of ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος, cannot be used as evidence for how the meetings of the Athenian Assembly were organized in the period of the ten tribes.

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VIRGIL AND THE EUPHRATES

In a note ("Virgil and the Euphrates," *AJP* 105 [1984] 339), Ruth F. Scodel and Richard F. Thomas make the observation that the Euphrates is mentioned three times only in Virgil's works, and each time six lines from the end of a book (*G.* 1.509, 4.561, *Aen.* 8.726). They propose the reason for this to be that the Euphrates appears, under the periphrasis *Assuriou potamoio,* "the Assyrian river," six lines from the end of Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo* (*Hy.* 2.108). Virgil's intention (they suggest) is thus to allude to Callimachus. My purpose here is to take Scodel and Thomas's intriguing observation as a starting point. The matter may seem a small one, but it is sometimes through such small things that one can gain an insight into the working of a poet's imagination.

To begin with, it should be noted that the inference drawn from their observation can be broken down into two separate propositions: (1) Virgil was himself conscious that he named the Euphrates six lines from the end of certain books and otherwise not at all; (2) his purpose in doing so was to allude to Callimachus. The first step is to consider if we should accept each of these propositions.

We can assent to the first without any hesitation. Virgil was a slow and careful craftsman; he was also more interested in the effects of proper names, and more skilful in their use, than any other poet of antiquity—perhaps more skilful than any poet of any age, not excepting Milton. It is very hard to believe that he could not have been conscious of what he was doing when he planted the name Euphrates where he did. A strong sceptic might perhaps hold that Virgil knew that he was mentioning the Euphrates only in the perorations of books without noticing the *exact* symmetry with which he was in fact deploying the name, but even this is very unlikely.

The second proposition is not quite so certain. As we shall see shortly, the concept of a conscious allusion is not as straightforward as it may appear, and it requires some clarification and refinement. For the moment my answer is that he probably did have Callimachus in mind, but that answer comes with some qualifications, the nature of which will emerge in due course.

At the least, the proposition that Virgil is alluding to Callimachus needs some modification:

(1) A clear distinction must be made between the *Georgics* and the

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Aeneid. At the time that Virgil was writing the latter, Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo* was a quite well known poem by a well respected poet; and it can be added that its closing lines contained motifs which Latin poets were ready to exploit. But at the same period the *Georgics* was one of the two greatest poems yet written in Latin; it was incomparably the finest poetry of the past twenty years; and it was of necessity intimately known to Virgil himself. There is room for debate on how large Callimachus bulked in the minds of Roman poets, but it cannot be doubted either that the *Georgics* was much better known both to Virgil and his likely readers than Callimachus' Second Hymn or that the occurrence of the name Euphrates in the *Georgics* twice in the same place and nowhere else is a much more striking matter than the occurrence of Euphrates once, and then in periphrasis, in one among many poems of Callimachus. Insofar as there is an allusion to an earlier poem in the use of the name Euphrates in the *Aeneid,* it must be primarily to the *Georgics.* A secondary allusion to Callimachus, if it exists at all, must be very much subordinate.

(2) We are working on the presumption that some sort of allusion to Callimachus exists somewhere in Virgil's use of the name Euphrates. Even so, it should be plain, upon reflection, that this can hardly be his main intention even in the *Georgics.* The sort of allusion that we are investigating is mechanical in character; we have yet to consider why Virgil should want to allude to Callimachus in these places, but supposing that he had sufficient cause for doing so, it remains true that this is an essentially minor game, and not even particularly ingenious (the tribute for ingenuity should go to Scodel and Thomas for spotting the thing). Any poet can plant words in symmetrical positions within his work—nothing easier. A good poet, though, will not wantonly intrude proper names into places where they do not naturally belong for the sake of a fundamentally trivial end; and in the passages in question we are dealing with very good poetry indeed. There must be a reason independent of Callimachus why the name Euphrates should thrice seem fitting near the close of a great peroration; it must serve some larger purpose than an allusion to the Greek poet, which can be at the most a sort of incidental bonus.

(3) If we take the two passages from the *Georgics* on their own, we can see in them what might be called an internal allusion. The name Euphrates is deployed symmetrically at the end of the first and the last book, and the most obvious "allusion" in such a symmetry is self-referential: the last book appears to echo the first.

Out of these considerations four questions arise:

1. What is the significance of the allusion to Callimachus?
2. What is the significance of the allusion back to the end of the first book of the *Georgics* at the end of the fourth?
3. What is the significance of the allusion to the *Georgics* at the end of *Aeneid* 8?
4. What deeper purpose is served by Virgil's references to the Euphrates?

Let us now attempt some answers to these questions.

(1) Modern scholars tend to suppose that any allusion to Callimachus is an assertion of a particular aesthetic attitude. But the ancients will also have remembered that Callimachus was a praise poet. Virgil has the habit of allusion to Callimachus in panegyric passages; we have recently learnt that the opening of *Georgics* 3 contains echoes of the *Victoria Berenices* from the *Aetia* (cf. Thomas, "Callimachus"). All three of Virgil's references to the Euphrates come in the context of praise of Caesar Augustus; that can hardly be pure coincidence.

(2) The ending of *Georgics* 1 is fearful, on the edge of panic: Rome herself is close to catastrophe; Euphrates and Germany threaten war. The book ends abruptly, without any word of conclusion. In the course of the poem Virgil will resolve these dissonances, and complete what he has left uncompleted. When the name of Rome next appears, at *Georgics* 2.148, she is seen as serenely victorious, in the context of the *laudes Italiae,* the finest panegyric ever written. When the panegyric comes on to Caesar, the name of Rome returns, and he is seen keeping the peoples of the East away from the city:

> . . . et te, maxime Caesar,
> qui nunc extremis Asiae iam victor in oris
> imbellem avertis Romanis arcibus Indum. (*G.* 2.170–72)

The situation has been reversed: in *Georgics* 1 the East threatens Rome, and the poet prays that Caesar may be her saviour; in *Georgics* 2 Caesar keeps the East from Rome, victorious.

The recurrence of the name Euphrates carries the same message. At the end of *Georgics* 1 Rome is under threat from the East; at the end of *Georgics* 4 Caesar is again seen victorious in the East. At the end of the poem we feel the vast distance that we have traversed since the first

book. We have emerged from the nightmare of civil war and political collapse into the calm of the poet's leisure, secured by Caesar's successes at the edge of the world. Euphrates insurgent, Euphrates tamed—the symmetry and the contrast are expressive.

(3) The significance of the allusion to the *Georgics* in the eighth book of the *Aeneid* should now be plain enough. Taken together, the references to Euphrates in the earlier poem show a threat to Rome from the East, overcome by the agency of Caesar. Now the battle of Actium, in Virgil's account, is seen in similar terms: Caesar triumphs with easy serenity over an eastern menace. At the end of his longest panegyric of Augustus, Virgil looks back to the panegyric element in his earlier work.

(4) None of these considerations has taken us much above the foothills of Parnassus, but there is another line of approach that may bring us to the heart of Virgil's imagination. Here the enquiry could become very large, and a terse summary must suffice. It is Virgil's habit to view his own time and country self-consciously, from both the inside and the outside; he also likes to expand the range of his vision, both spatially and temporally, in climactic passages. In the *laudes Italiae* of *Georgics* 2 Virgil praises his own country with passionate enthusiasm, but not before he has viewed it from beyond its borders, setting it against the wonders of eastern and southern lands (114–35). In Elysium Aeneas will be shown the future, but not before he has seen further back into the past than ever before. The first men whom he sees in the blessed state are his most distant ancestors:

> hic genus antiquum Teucri, pulcherrima proles,
> magnanimi heroes nati melioribus annis,
> Ilusque Assaracusque et Troiae Dardanus auctor. (*Aen.* 6.648–50)

And thus in the later part of *Aeneid* 6 Virgil extends his vision in both directions, forward into the future, but back into the past as well. In the proem to *Georgics* 3 he envisages himself writing a poem in Caesar's praise that will press back into the past, beyond Rome, beyond the Trojan War, to the first beginnings of Troy:

> Assaraci proles demissaeque ab Iove gentis
> nomina, Trosque parens et Troiae Cynthius auctor. (*G.* 3.35–36)

We notice similarities to the passage in *Aeneid* 6: the use of a Trojan eponym (Tros in the *Georgics,* Dardanus in the *Aeneid*), the talismanic

name of Assaracus, the sentence coming to rest upon the word *auctor*—all devices to convey the thrust back to a vastly distant past. Then at the proem's end, Virgil looks into the future, again immensely far: his poem will carry Caesar's fame as far into the future as Caesar himself is distant from the birth of Tithonus (*G.* 3.46–48). Once more Virgil brings out the gigantic scale of his temporal vision, and once more he thrusts in both directions, future and past.

Nowhere is this pattern of thought more poignant or profound than at the close of *Georgics* 1, with its strange blend of passion and detachment. Hysteria seems to threaten, and yet the poet suddenly projects himself into a time so far in the future that the human race will be smaller and marvel at what big bones men had in Virgil's own day; it may be implied, too, that the farmer who digs up the remains of the dead of Philippi will not know their significance, so great is the expanse of time between (*G.* 1.493–97). Then, having looked at the present from a very remote future, Virgil returns to the present, from where he views the very remote past: with another abrupt leap of thought he traces the woes of his own day not, as we might expect, to the late republic or to the growth of empire, nor even to Romulus, but right back to Laomedon's treachery, at the first origins of Troy:

> satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
> Laomedonteae luimus periuria Troiae; . . . (*G.* 1.501–2)

Next, having enlarged his range of vision in terms of time, he enlarges it in terms of space. Hitherto his emotion has been concentrated upon Rome and Italy, with a battery of proper names evocative of the ancestral, sacred heart of things:

> di patrii Indigetes et Romule Vestaque mater,
> quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia servas, . . . (*G.* 1.498–99)

But now the poet's eye moves outward: there is war all over the world (1.505, 511). We look north and east: Euphrates stirs war on one side, Germany on another. Then Italy having been seen in relation to the world as a whole, our gaze contracts again, and having studied distance, we study closeness: towns near to one another, *vicinae . . . urbes*, take up arms amongst themselves (1.510). Thus Euphrates, representative of an exotic orient vaguely imagined, finds its natural place in a distinctively Virgilian way of realising time, locality, and the processes of history.

Conquest in far-flung lands was romantic and prestigious. The poets declare that Augustus will subdue the Britons and the Persians; they are less interested in the nearer places where warfare was a serious prospect—Spain, Germany, Illyria, or the Alps. The princeps himself was not immune to the spell of the exotic: his own *Res Gestae* (26) echo this note. Armies under his authority, he declares, have penetrated to Nabata near Meroë, in Ethiopia, to Mariba in Arabia, among the Sabaeans. Hopes and boasts of this kind are raw material for Virgil's poetry at the end of *Georgics* 4 and *Aeneid* 8, but he makes of it something distinctively his own. The close of the *Georgics* repays a close analysis; here, however, it must be enough to note that part of its quality comes from that self-conscious mode of imagination which we have seen at the end of the first book and elsewhere. Virgil ends with himself, but he sets himself against Caesar, the private against the public, peace against war, Naples against Euphrates. The poem's close is both modest and proud; at the same time it is both intimate and immensely spacious. Once more the proper names, Euphrates among them, play their part in creating this emotional complexity.

By way of postscript we may add a small puzzle. The search for symmetries can take us beyond Virgil. In Ovid's *Ars Amatoria,* a work longer than the *Georgics,* there is a single mention of the Euphrates (1.223). At *Ars Amatoria* 1.177–228 the poet inserts an extended propempticon on the subject of Gaius Caesar's Parthian campaign and anticipated triumph. It is obviously a later addition, stuffed into the poem without subtlety and standing all too plainly on its own (cf. Syme, *History* 13–14, and Pohlenz, "Abfassungszeit" 3). As in Virgil, Euphrates comes exactly six lines from the end, and the context, just as in the *Aeneid,* is the triumphal procession of one of the Caesars. What shall we say? Is there a conscious allusion to the precise placing of the word in Virgil, offered to any contemporary who had studied recent poetry with enough nicety and scholarship? Is Ovid indicating that Gaius Caesar will emulate his grandfather's achievement in crushing an eastern power? It is possible, but there is some difficulty in believing it, as one may doubt whether Ovid would wish to draw attention to the awkwardness with which he has spatchcocked Gaius Caesar's expected glories into the text. More likely is an imaginative process less fully conscious: a sense that the names of exotic places come well in the celebration of military glory, an awareness that Virgil especially widens the range of his vision in passages of climax, perhaps the more particular remembrance that Virgil likes to use this very name near the end of

passages in praise of his master. There can be no sure answer, but this teasing little question may remind us how puzzling may be the assessment of symmetries and allusions, even when they appear exact.

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

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THE STARS OF IOPAS AND PALINURUS

In a recent article in this journal Robert Brown examined the question of Vergilian imitation of Homer with reference to *Aeneid* 1.742–46 (the song of Iopas), and 3.513–17 (the stargazing of Palinurus). He wished to show that these two Vergilian passages depend more or less directly on two Homeric passages—*Odyssey* 5.271–75 and *Iliad* 18.483–89—for their vocabulary and function. Approaching the issue from the standpoint of one interested in the use made by the Greeks and Romans of astronomical lore, I think there are grounds for suggesting that somewhat different influences bore on Vergil in the composition of these two passages from the *Aeneid*. Admittedly my conclusions raise other questions which have long been the subject of debate among Vergilian scholars—for instance, the priority of book 3 over book 1, or the meaning of the song of Iopas as a whole. These are literary issues far too wide in scope to be dealt with in full here, or beyond my own competence to attempt to resolve. Instead I hope to offer here food for thought for those better able to deal with these further issues.

Iopas' song and Palinurus' stargazing agree with each other on one line:

> Arcturum pluviasque Hyadas geminosque Triones (*Aen.* 1.744 = 3.516)

Aen. 1.744 represents the sum of the stars enumerated by Iopas, whereas 3.516 is followed by another line in which a further constellation, Orion, is added to the list of stars scanned by Palinurus:

> armatumque auro circumspicit Oriona. (*Aen.* 3.517)

Brown argues that this latter passage from *Aeneid* 3 was based upon Homer's description of Odysseus' navigation from Kalypso's island:

> . . . οὐδέ οἱ ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἔπιπτε
> Πληϊάδας τ' ἐσορῶντι καὶ ὀψὲ δύοντα Βοώτην
> Ἄρκτον θ', ἣν καὶ ἅμαξαν ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν,
> ἥ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται καί τ' Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει,
> οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο· (*Od.* 5.271–75)

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The idea that the two passages are linked is an old one—we find it in Macrobius, for instance, who assumes (*Sat.* 5.11.10–13) that Odysseus and Palinurus are engaged in the same activity of navigating by the stars. But when we look carefully at the lines in question, we find, as Brown notes, that Palinurus actually "steers" by somewhat different stars in a different order from Odysseus. If Vergil is imitating Homer, he is doing some curious things to his model. Of significance, I think, are the following points of difference:

1. Homer's Pleiades have been replaced in *Aeneid* 3.516 by the Hyades.
2. His Boötes has been replaced by that constellation's brightest star, Arcturus.
3. Homer's single Bear, or Wagon, becomes Vergil's twin *Triones,* the two Oxen, as the Romans called Ursa Major and Ursa Minor.

Only Vergil's inclusion of the Hyades at the expense of Homer's Pleiades is treated by Brown as the main difference between the two passages which demands explanation. This explanation is discovered in the influence of the cosmological section of the description of the shield of Achilles in *Iliad* 18.483–89. Here we find the Pleiades, the Hyades, Orion, and the Bear (Wagon) catalogued:

> Ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ', ἐν δ' οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν,
> ἠέλιόν τ' ακάμαντα σελήνην τε πλήθουσαν,
> ἐν δὲ τὰ τείρεα πάντα, τά τ' οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται,
> Πληϊάδας θ' Ὑάδας τε τό τε σθένος Ὠρίωνος
> Ἄρκτον θ', ἣν καὶ Ἅμαξαν ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν,
> ἥ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται καί τ' Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει,
> οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο.

From here, it is proposed, Vergil has lifted the Hyades, linked already to Orion and the Bear, and carried them, rearranged, into Palinurus' list at the expense of the Pleiades. The loss of the Pleiades from the original phrase Πληϊάδας θ' Ὑάδας, it is suggested, may be compensated for by the sound of the replacement phrase *pluviasque Hyadas,* while the replacement of the single Bear by twins is regarded as "a 'correction' of Homer based upon Alexandrian science."[1]

[1] Brown, "Homeric Background" 183–84. As a matter of interest, an inferior manuscript reading for *Aen.* 1.744 and 3.516 (used by Macrobius) preserves rather better

But if we return to the comparison of *Aeneid* 3.516 and *Odyssey* 5.271–75, we are surely justified in asking whether there is not also some significance in the replacement of the constellation of Boötes by its brightest member, Arcturus, and rather more significance in Vergil's preferring two "Bears" to Homer's one beyond the influence of Hellenistic science.

The same passage from the *Iliad,* 18.483–89, is seen by Brown as the primary model for our other Vergilian astronomical catalogue at *Aeneid* 1.744 (the Song of Iopas). For him they both describe works of art, and they share the same cosmological emphasis. Yet the stars again differ in certain respects: in Vergil, the Pleiades and Orion disappear, while Arcturus appears.

It seems to me, in the end, that it is worth reconsidering the two passages from Vergil. Do they really represent creative amalgams of Homeric models? Or do the differences between them—between the two Vergilian passages themselves, as well as the differences with the Homeric lines—actually signify not only different purposes, but different sources of influence?

Let us start by reexamining the repetition of *Aeneid* 1.744 and 3.516. Conington noted that in both places "the enumeration is meant as a poetical equivalent for the stars generally. Comp. *Il.* 18.484" (*Vergili Opera* 83). But unlike 3.516, *Aeneid* 1.744 is a discrete unit in astronomical terms; no stars are added to it on either side of the line. Its repetition at 3.516 leaves one with the impression that 1.744 is a formula, to which more information can be tacked on, as it is in 3.516–17, as occasion demands. Ultimately we need to find out why occasion demanded the tacking on of Orion to the line in book 3.

But to stay with 1.744 for the time being, what appears to have been missed in ancient and modern scholarly analyses of the line is that we have here two pairs of celestial bodies which are both similar and yet dissimilar within their pairing. The similarities have been previously observed, but not, as far as I can determine, the oppositions. Arcturus may be read in conjunction with the rainy Hyades, and yet also in opposition to them; while the twin *Triones,* the Great and Little Bears, are joined by their twin relationship, and yet also are opposed to each other.

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the "original" Homeric phrase: *Arcturum Plidiasque Hyadas geminosque Triones.* The reading has generally been rejected on metrical grounds; cf. Heyne and Wagner, *Virgilius* II 208 and 519; Forbiger, *Vergili Opera* II 164 and 390.

Let us examine this in more detail. In the prologue to Plautus' *Rudens* Arcturus himself appears and explains how he is a sign for foul weather whether he is rising or setting:

> nam Arcturus signum sum omnium acerrimum:
> vehemens sum exoriens, cum occido vehementior. (*Rudens* 70)

The Hyades too with their epithet *pluvias* clearly signify damp conditions. Their very name, it has been argued since antiquity (although not without dispute), also indicates wet weather.[2] Not surprisingly, then, both Arcturus and the Hyades are to be found in those ancient weather-forecasting almanacs, the *parapēgmata*, as signs of bad weather. Thus Geminos in the first century B.C.:[3] when the sun is in Pisces,

> . . . Ἐν δὲ τῇ δ^{η} [sc. ἡμέρᾳ] . . . Εὐδόξῳ δὲ Ἀρκτοῦρος ἀκρόνυχος ἐπιτέλλει· καὶ ὑετὸς γίνεται· . . .
> Ἐν δὲ τῇ ιβ^{η} Εὐκτήμονι Ἀρκτοῦρος ἑσπέριος ἐπιτέλλει . . . · ἐπιπνεῖ βορέας ψυχρός.

And in the following month when the sun is in Aries:

> . . . Ἐν δὲ τῇ κα^{η} Εὐδόξῳ Ὑάδες ἀκρόνυχοι δύνουσιν.
> Ἐν δὲ τῇ κγ^{η} Εὐκτήμονι Ὑάδες κρύπτονται· καὶ χάλαζα ἐπιγίνεται, καὶ ζέφυρος πνεῖ.

So the fifth-century B.C. Greek observers Eudoxos and Euktemon noted the coincident appearance of rain and cold north winds with the evening rising of Arcturus. For the evening setting of the Hyades more than a month later, Euktemon observed the arrival of hail showers and the nor'west wind.

This association of Arcturus and the Hyades with inclement weather continues throughout the *parapēgma* of Geminos.[4] It also appears in the agricultural calendar of Pliny the Elder, which, although

[2] See the discussion in Austin, *Aeneidos Liber Primus* 224 on line 744. For a contrary view on the origin of the Hyades' name see Le Bonniec, *Pline l'Ancienne* 278–79 and n. 5 to section 247.

[3] The calendar attributed to Geminos is generally accepted as a work of the first century B.C. but is based on observations recorded by previous writers from the fifth to the third. On its attribution and date see Aujac, *Geminos* 157–58.

[4] See under the months in which the sun occupies the signs of Virgo, Libra, Scorpio, Taurus, and Gemini.

later than Vergil's time, still contains a great many traditional observations derived from earlier Greek and Roman sources. Two examples may suffice to make the point:

> XIIII kal. Mai. Aegypto Suculae [sc. Hyades] occidunt vesperi, sidus vehemens et terra marique turbidum. . . . V id. Sept. Caesari Capella oritur vesperi, Arcturus vero medius prid. id. vehementissimo significatu terra marique per dies quinque. (*HN* 18.247, 310)

While Arcturus here must stand for the whole constellation of Boötes, it is significant, I think, that the poor forecast is attached to the name of the major star in the constellation: "Arcturus," not "Boötes," meant bad weather. There should be no doubting, therefore, the link between Arcturus and the Hyades in *Aeneid* 1.744, and indeed it has been seen before.[5] What is not so immediately obvious, however, is the opposition that exists between the two celestial bodies, an opposition not of character but of placement and visibility. There is perhaps a hint of an awareness of this dissimilarity in the note given by Servius (*ad Aen.* 1.744) to the phrase *pluviasque Hyadas,* in which he explains why some commentators have preferred to read *Arcturum vel pluvias Hyadas*: *quia non utraque uno tempore oriuntur.* But I think that there is more to it than this.

Let us take another look at the *parapēgma* of Geminos. When the sun occupied the zodiacal sign of Taurus, we are informed:

> . . . Ἐν δὲ τῇ λβη [sc. ἡμέρᾳ] Εὐκτήμονι Ἀρκτοῦρος ἑῷος δύνει· ἐπισημαίνει. . . . Εὐκτήμονι Ὑάδες ἑῷαι ἐπιτέλλουσιν· ἐπισημαίνει.

And in the following month, in which the sun occupied Gemini, we are given alternative observations by Eudoxos:

> . . . Ἐν δὲ τῇ εη Εὐδόξῳ Ὑάδες ἑῷαι ἐπιτέλλουσιν.
> . . . Ἐν δὲ τῇ ιγη Εὐδόξῳ Ἀρκτοῦρος ἑῷος δύνει.

In other words, Arcturus and the Hyades were observed not just as not rising at the same time (as Servius pointed out), but in fact as alternately rising and setting at about the same time. This is not exactly the

[5] E.g., by Austin, *Aeneidos Liber Primus* ad loc., who notes the capacity for both Arcturus and the Hyades to signal the onset of bad weather. However, Austin ties all stars in 1.744 together as significant for navigation and farming. Neither function seems especially relevant in the context of Iopas' song.

case on each of the noted occasions when the stars rise and set—there may in fact be a month between the phenomena in Geminos, and in reality at these times as much as two months.[6] But what happened in reality and what the Greeks and Romans chose to believe happened are at times two quite different things when it is a matter of astronomy. Given the testimony of *parapēgmata* such as that of Geminos, it would appear that the Greeks and Romans accepted a near simultaneity or reasonably close proximity in the risings and settings of Arcturus and the Hyades. What this means in effect is not only that as one body appeared the other was on its way to disappearing, but also that they occupied opposite sectors of the sky. Even in reality this is the case, although not as strongly as the ancient literature would suggest. Hence there is both similarity (in prognostication) and dissimilarity (in position) between Arcturus and the Hyades.

This is also the case with the two "Bears," the *Triones*. Their close relationship in Vergil's line is made clear by the use of the word *geminos*.[7] What is again not so obvious is the dissimilarity between the two constellations. Nowadays viewers in the northern hemisphere see the prominent star Polaris in the Little Bear practically occupying the position of the North Celestial Pole. In the course of a clear night one may see the rest of the Little Bear and the whole of the Great Bear wheeling centrifugally around the North Pole and so almost around Polaris (although it too in fact wheels). For Vergil, however, the situation was markedly different. In his time the Little and Great Bears stood on completely opposite sides of an invisible North Pole, which was unmarked by any prominent star.[8] The phenomenon known as the precession of the equinoxes has meant that the Pole has shifted position since then, until now Polaris almost exactly stands in its place. In antiquity, what would have been observed in the course of a night was a slow

[6]Compare the readings under Pisces and Aries cited above. For actual dates of rising and setting, at dawn and dusk, see the calculations by Hoffman for ca. 45 B.C. in Rome in Boll, "Fixsterne" 2429–30.

[7]The Bears themselves are called the *Triones*; elsewhere we find the term *Septemtriones* used to refer solely to the Great Bear (e.g., Plautus *Am.* 273). See Austin's note to *Triones* in *Aeneidos Liber Primus* ad loc., and Brown, "Homeric Background" 184 n. 4, for some explanation and further references.

[8]In Arat. 26–27 the Bears surround and wheel around the Pole, the Little Bear on a smaller, inner circle; Cicero follows this both in his translation of Aratus and in the reference to the passage *Nat. D.* 2.105.

semicircular revolution by the Bears around the Pole, diametrically opposite each other.[9]

So once more, as with Arcturus and the Hyades, we have similarity and opposition. Arcturus and the Hyades were linked in Graeco–Roman consciousness as signs of bad weather; yet they stood at more or less opposite ends of the horizon, the one rising as the other set. The two Bears were also linked by their very zoomorphic identities (whether it be as bears or oxen) and yet wheeled around the North Celestial Pole diametrically opposed to each other. This theme of similarity and opposition may be seen to exist elsewhere in the song of Iopas: in the groupings of sun and moon, mankind and animals, water and fire, winter suns and late (summer) nights, Carthaginians and Trojans, perhaps even Aeneas and Dido.[10] So *Aeneid* 1.744 need not be treated simply as a case of synecdoche, in which the stars listed stand for the whole sky's array of constellations (as Conington suggested), but may be seen to be a carefully chosen catalogue of similar yet dissimilar stars which fits significantly within the broader context of the song of Iopas.

What is more important for our present purposes, though, is that it can now be argued that the choice of stars made by Vergil in this particular passage owed more to traditional meteorological associations of the stellar groups (of which the *parapēgmata* are a useful but not the only illustration) and to a contemporary awareness of their actual positions. This could be why he opted for Arcturus as opposed to the whole constellation of Boötes, and chose the Hyades instead of the Pleiades. Indeed, if he were actually looking for the linkages that I have demonstrated above—of weather forecasting and of opposition in position—Boötes and Pleiades need not even have entered his mind. In which case the search for Homeric influence from *Odyssey* 5.271–75 and *Iliad* 18.483–89 therefore becomes a red herring.

If this is granted for 1.744, what then of the situation at 3.516, where Palinurus gazes at the sky prior to rousing the Trojans to the next

[9]The position of the Bears for this period is well illustrated diagrammatically in Manilius (tr. Goold, star chart I, in which they are labeled Helice and Cynosura; alpha within Cynosura stands for Polaris).

[10]The foregoing arguments are the fruit of discussions with my colleagues Douglas Little and John Garthwaite, following a departmental seminar on the song of Iopas by the former (now published as "The Song of Iopas"; see esp. 33 n. 52 on the theme of oppositions).

stage of their journey from Troy, the voyage across the Adriatic? *Aeneid* 1.744 is repeated at 3.516, but the astronomical observation is embellished by the addition of Orion. What difference might this make?

The lines at *Aeneid* 3.513–17 look to be based on Homer's description of Odysseus steering his raft by the stars from Kalypso's island, as indeed Macrobius in antiquity and others more recently have indicated.[11] In Macrobius the lines in the *Aeneid* are presented as one of the examples in which it is possible to show how Vergil improved on his literary model, and there is no doubt in that commentator's mind that Palinurus is performing some act of navigation similar to, but more realistic than, that of Odysseus.[12] But Palinurus cannot be using these stars for navigation. For one thing, Vergil does not say he is doing so. For another, it would not have made much sense if Palinurus were trying to navigate, for he is not yet sailing—that is to be done from dawn. And, finally, by using essentially the same stars (the swapping of the Pleiades for the Hyades and of Boötes for Arcturus makes no practical difference) Odysseus had set a course generally towards the east. But that is the last direction that Palinurus would have wished to go, since it was the direction from which he and the other Trojans had come on their journey from Troy.[13] One must conclude, therefore, that although he is using practically the same stars, or at least stars from the same sectors of the sky, as Odysseus did, Palinurus must be doing something other than navigating. Once again, are the slight differences between Vergil's catalogue of stars and Homer's significant? Is Vergil adapting a Homeric model (or more than one) to a different purpose, or was he influenced by some other source?

That we are dealing with more than just the use by the poet of a handy formula is suggested by the very addition of Orion to the list of

[11] Macr. *Sat.* 5.11.10–13; cf. Brown, "Homeric Background" 183.

[12] Whether Odysseus *is* navigating by the stars is currently the subject of debate; see Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth, *Commentary* 277 on lines 272–77.

[13] Cf. Stanford, *Odyssey* 302, and Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth on 277 for the easterly direction of Odysseus' sailing. Severin, *Voyage* 217, suggests east–northeast. This direction is not explicitly stated by Homer; its importance in the poem lies in the fact that it indicated that Odysseus is uncharacteristically a very long way from land and probably off in the southwest, away from the normal sailing routes of the Greeks. Severin's comments (*Voyage* 217–18) on the practical aspects of Odysseus' voyage by raft are interesting. It is, of course, possible in an imaginative work like the *Aeneid* that reality is of less relevance to the poet than, say, the desire to bring to readers' minds the Homeric model for this particular passage. In this case it is much more important to realise that Vergil does *not* say that Palinurus is looking at the stars for navigational purposes.

stars over what is presented in Iopas' song. So what other avenues are available to us?

Some commentators have taken the helmsman's activity to be that of a weather forecaster. R. D. Williams, for instance, cites line 518 in support of this view:

> postquam cuncta videt caelo constare sereno

which he translates as:

> when he saw that all the signs were favourable in the cloudless sky . . .[14]

This sounds initially convincing, picking up as it does the idea expressed earlier in lines 513–14:

> . . . et omnis
> explorat ventos atque auribus aëra captat;

But this interpretation appears to me to falter on the fact that of all the stars observed by Palinurus only the twin *Triones* were not regularly regarded as harbingers of bad weather as they rose or set.[15] Admittedly, Vergil does not refer specifically to the rising or setting of the relevant stars here. Yet if it is the weather alone which Palinurus is testing, it is curious that Vergil should choose to have him observe those very stars which in the ancient world, as we have seen, were practically synonymous with bad weather. What Palinurus sees should have forecast foul weather conditions. Yet it does not immediately do so. So do the stars serve some other purpose in this part of the poem?

Some act of divination of the future might be a possibility, as Palinurus scans the sky in all directions according to a system perhaps similar to that noted by Varro for augurs marking out the *templum* of the sky:

> eius templi partes quattuor dicuntur, sinistra ab oriente, dextra ab occasu, antica ad meridiem, postica ad septemtrionem. (*De Lingua Latina* 7.7)

[14] Williams, *Aeneidos Liber Tertius* 164 on line 518. Cf., e.g., Sidgwick, *Vergili Opera* 215; Henry, *Aeneidea* II 484; and, I think, Conington, *Vergili Opera* 226.

[15] In addition to the evidence presented here for Arcturus and the Hyades see Austin's note on *Aen.* 1.535 for Orion in this role.

Macrobius thought that Palinurus was scanning the sky from north (Arcturus) to south (the Hyades), then back to north (*Triones*) and south again (Orion).[16] He praised this description by Vergil as being more convincing for a navigator than Homer's account of Odysseus, because of the repetition in Palinurus' observation technique.[17] Sidgwick, by way of contrast (*Vergili Opera* 215), counted all but the constellation of Orion in Palinurus' observation to be stars occupying the northern part of the sky; Orion for him was more to the south, and so needed to be turned round towards (*circumspicit*) to be observed after the other stars. This is a bit precious, I think, given the relative proximity of the Hyades and Orion. Heyne, just to confuse the issue for us further, noted that the stars seen by the helmsman are not visible all at the same time.[18] This thought was already expressed by Servius in his commentary on *Aeneid* 1.744, which I quoted earlier. While this is strictly true for a given moment, it is still possible to show that for the length of time during which Palinurus was gazing at the sky, all these stars would have become visible.

Assuming that the stars are being observed over a period of time from before midnight to just before dawn (*Aen.* 3.512, 521) as they appear to move through the sky (515, *sidera cuncta . . . labentia*), I would be inclined to read Palinurus' gaze as shifting from west (Arcturus setting) to east (the Hyades rising) at about the same time, then to north overhead (the *Triones* moving across the meridian, with the Great Bear actually skirting the north horizon) and from there southwards (Orion, as he rises about an hour later). Such would have been the case with these stars in Vergil's own time around late July to early August.[19] This proposed observation almost fits with a specific ritual scanning such as an augur would perform—the directions are correct, but the order of noting them differs. But it is more important to note that if my reconstruction of the observation is correct, Palinurus' action gives him the

[16] *Sat.* 5.11.10–13. Arcturus was north of both the ecliptic and the celestial equator. The Hyades are south of the latitude of Arcturus and just south of the ecliptic but were north of the celestial equator in Vergil's time. The Bears are northern stars by any point of reference. Orion is south of the Bears and south of the ecliptic but straddled the equator.

[17] Adopting Macrobius' viewpoint, Odysseus looks south, then north, north again, and finally south.

[18] Heyne and Wagner, *Virgilius* II 519, *Posuit autem poeta uno loco sidera, non quae uno tempore conspicua sint, oriantur et occidant.*

[19] This is readily ascertainable via a computerised or manual planispherical projection.

opportunity to scan the *whole* sky, and thus indeed to do just what line 515 claims he does, before the poet appends his star catalogue: *sidera cuncta notat. . . .*

The result of the helmsman's observations is given in line 518:

postquam cuncta videt caelo constare sereno.

Certainly the sky is clear (*sereno*), but that is a "given," it is not what Palinurus was seeking in the end: he was not ultimately just weather forecasting, although that was certainly part of his task. The crucial word is *constare*. It has connotations of settled affairs, of things being as they should be, with nothing untoward being present. Palinurus' activity, then, would indeed seem to be related to that of an augur: a clear sky has given him the opportunity to check that there is no sign of disorder or danger on the eve of the Trojan departure across the Adriatic.[20]

Odysseus too, at *Odyssey* 5.271–75, can thus be seen to be scanning the whole sky in the course of a night. His gaze extends from the Pleiades to Boötes (from east to west, given the epithet ὀψὲ δύοντα for Boötes?),[21] then to the Bear (north) and finally to Orion (southwards). But what distinguishes this passage from Vergil's description of Palinurus' activity is that Odysseus is actually sailing, whereas Palinurus is not yet. To argue that Vergil was not influenced by Homer at this point in the *Aeneid* would be counter to the *opinio communis* which has been accepted since antiquity, and I do not intend to argue so. Undoubtedly, through such a specific Homeric quotation Vergil could hint at both sea travel and even travail in the offing for the Trojans, because eventually both Odysseus and the Trojans, in their respective stories, encounter a storm that forces them on to an unexpected landfall.[22] But it does seem

[20] Cf. Heyne and Wagner, *Virgilius* II 519–20, *composita et tranquilla esse; nihil, quod inconstantiam et varietatem caeli ominetur, occurrere*. This, I think, goes further than Servius' comment on this line: *omnia videt habere caelum quae significent serenitatem. Constare autem "suppetere."*

[21] But see the various meanings ascribed to this epithet and the (overcautious?) warning against too factual an interpretation in Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth, *Commentary* 277–78.

[22] Given this possibility of a link with the passage from the *Odyssey*, Vergil's readers could have had a foreboding of something ominous in the description of Palinurus' stargazing, a foreboding that would be confirmed later in the poem when the Trojans do in fact hit a violent storm, which sends them across the sea to the coast of Africa and the court of Dido, and when Palinurus himself dies. So perhaps the storm-warning stars did

to me possible to argue that Vergil had only *Odyssey* 5.271–75 before him as far as Homeric influence is concerned at *Aeneid* 3.516–17. There is no need to consider *Iliad* 18.483–89 as a further source of influence, to explain the change from the *Odyssey*'s Pleiades to Vergil's Hyades. We have seen already in our discussion of *Aeneid* 1.744 how the use of "Hyades" instead of "Pleiades," and of "Arcturus" instead of "Boötes" could actually signify a totally different source of influence, namely meteorological lore to be found in *parapēgmata* or agricultural calendars. In the end two explanations for the appearance of *Aeneid* 3.516–17 occur to me: either book 1 of the *Aeneid* really was composed before book 3, and 1.744 is the source of influence for 3.516, with *Odyssey* 5.274 suggesting to Vergil the addition of Orion to his list, so as to allow his helmsman to scan the four quarters of the sky; or *Aeneid* 1.744 and 3.516 represent a formula brought in from elsewhere by Vergil, and embellished, again under the influence of *Odyssey* 5.[23]

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signify poor weather in the long run, but Palinurus is made to ignore them and to trust instead in the clearness of the sky. Such a reaction by the helmsman would be entirely in character, to judge from what he himself and then Aeneas say at the time of his drowning in book 5: Palinurus tries unsuccessfully to ward off Sleep by pointing out that he has been deceived too often before by a clear sky (5.851, *deceptus fraude sereni*); and when Aeneas laments the loss of his companion, he characterises him as trusting too much in a clear sky and sea (5.870, *o nimium caelo et pelago confise sereno*). So the words *sereni* and *sereno* here could well subtly bring back a memory of the earlier passage in book 3 where a clear sky (518, *caelo . . . sereno*) led Palinurus and the Trojans to an unhappy and fateful stage of their journey, the encounter with Dido.

For a recent view of Palinurus' stargazing which differs from mine, see Little, "Song of Iopas" 27. My hypothesis admittedly rests on two propositions: (1) that by his mention of certain stars Vergil *is* expecting his readers to understand their risings and settings, and hence their associated poor meteorological forecasts (for other positions for these stars were either ignored or rarely noted in ancient literature); and (2) that Palinurus' trust in a clear sky at 3.518 was misplaced and indicates a weakness in the navigator's skill which is noted elsewhere in the poem.

[23] Cf. the quotation in Brown, "Homeric Background" 182, from Sparrow, *Half-lines* 95, on the possibility that *Aen.* 1.744 may be a fixed formula, although I do not see it as necessarily enumerating all the stars.

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

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PERSIUS' REFRACTORY MUSE: HORATIAN ECHOES IN THE SIXTH SATIRE

In recent years dominant themes in analysis of Persius 6 have been various aspects of its relation to the *Epistles* of Horace.[1] More than any other of Persius' *Satires,* this poem is seen to be bound to its Horatian antecedents, locked in a tight pattern of references that constitutes the central key to the poem's meaning and purpose. Most find the major model to be *Epp.* 2.2, Horace's letter to Florus, which he concludes (lines 190ff.), as does Persius his poem, with a treatment of the distinction between avarice and moderate living.[2] Other commentators, particularly Mark Morford, recognize resemblances to *Epp.* 1.4, Horace's brief missive to Tibullus, in which the poet depicts himself in conspicuous comfort (*epicuri de grege porcum*), and *Epp.* 1.5,[3] which offers the passage (12–15) that becomes a possible paradigm, as Morford has it (*Persius* 66), for "Persius's diatribe on the proper use of one's material goods." Both claims have merit and together describe what is probably a complementary relation of sources,[4] but regardless of the literary model(s) seen to be primarily influential, there remains a nag-

[1] The fullest listing of secondary literature on *Sat.* 6 can be found in Beikircher, *Kommentar* 131–33. Further bibliography as well as reconsideration in light of newer words can be found in Kissel's recent full commentary (*Satiren* 863–84). See also my Bibliography.

[2] Dessen, *Iunctura* 78–92, was the first to set out a full-scale interpretation along these lines; her useful analysis traces echoes of Horatian themes and corresponding patterns of imagery that lead, finally, to Persius' overriding concern (in Dessen's view) with placing Roman simplicity in radical juxtaposition to Greek decadence. She concludes (95) that the Horatian tenor generated by the poem's dependence on *Epp.* 2.2, along with the habit of placing images in opposition that is seen in the evidently early *Sat.* 2, is evidence that this too is an early work. Recent commentators have developed elements of this reading: e.g., Grimes, "Structure."

[3] These correspondences are at the heart of Morford's analysis, *Persius* 64–72. Beikircher too marks the similarity with Hor. *Epp.* 1.4 and goes on to itemize formal parallels: "Hier wie dort steht am Beginn eine Angabe über den Aufenthaltsort des Empfängers; daran schliesst sich in beiden Briefen die Frage, ob der Freund im Augenblick dichterisch tätig ist; es folgt eine kurze Charakteristik des Freundes" (*Kommentar* 17).

[4] Morford's is a plausible diagnosis with respect to general thematic outlines, while it seems clear that the verbal texture of the poem, specific reminiscences to crucial points in that thematic development, indicates that systematic recurrences to *Epp.* 2.2 generate the significant infrastructure.

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ging difficulty. Reading Horatian influence, critics read also Horatian tone and theme in this satire. And that has given us an exceedingly docile Persius. His apparent endorsement of Horace's cheerful Epicurean exhortation to "live moderately but well" indicates a philosophical tenor dramatically at odds with Persius' characteristic Stoic urgency. One might, as many have done, construe this quietism as either "early experiment" or "mellowed maturity"; but in fact neither construal, nor the poetry viewed under their lights, has quite satisfied readers—the verdict usually being that Persius has not adequately managed what he set out to do in this work. Or the price paid for Horatian openness and gentility was too costly to his own genius. At very least, an artist of caustic philosophical integrity seems, for some reason, to have let his keen ferocity slip away, and with the biting edge of his criticism seems to have gone the startling intelligence that is his idiom. Thus we may lose track, particularly in the opening of this satire, of the tense emotional and intellectual engagement, the crabbed density, and, as Marston has it, the "jerkes . . . duskie," which, beyond the stern and static messages of a glowering Stoicism, constitute the crucial essence of Persius' art.

But there do exist counterindications to the general impression of uncharacteristic Horatian geniality in this satire, notably in the long closing section (33–80), which—after the epistolary introduction (1–11) and a transitional passage (12–33) conspicuous in its allusions to Horace *Epp.* 2.2—is devoted to a merciless lampooning of an avaricious "heir." This is far more a satirical critique of cupidity in the abrasive old style than a positive representation of the moderate indulgence Persius is widely supposed to be advocating. How is a reader, then, to understand the inconcinnity between such incisive acerbity and the poem's apparently gentle epistolary opening? Yet more crucial, what in terms of intent and artistic effect does the pattern of Persius' invocations of Horace in this work indicate? As Kenneth Reckford has suggested, a reconsideration is in order.[5]

Clearly any such reconsideration of this poem's tone and subtle designs, because raised explicitly by its relation to Horatian models,

[5] In his recent review of Morford's *Persius* Reckford has confessed dissatisfaction with all readings of *Sat.* 6 to date, while averring that "if one emerges, it will show Persius intimately engaged in dialogue—that is, in literary and spiritual combat—with his sometime mentor, the Horace of *Epistles* 2.2." Reckford's diagnosis, as often, seems on the mark.

must be worked out in that murky area commonly described as imitation studies or the poetics of allusion. Recent work in the area, both with respect to theoretical developments and applications in interpretation, has been of substantial importance and must play a role, however indirectly, in any discussion of literary influence. But it will be salutary to acknowledge as well that allusion-hunting can be a chancy sort of game, the more so when informed by an ambitious poetics that necessarily conditions, not to say skews, the way in which allusions are read.[6] In a limited, practical analysis such as this, some caution is called for, and an approach that focuses on conspicuous and evident allusions rather than possibly inadvertent intertextual coincidences, as well as on the elements of imitative artistry conceived chiefly as classical poets understood it.[7] But one important consequence of recent attention to literary imitation cannot be overlooked—its assertion that the manner of an artist's incorporation of literary sources, the implicit "attitude" of address, is a more vital indicator of poetic signification than the kinds of objective enumerations we associate with *Quellenforschung* or categorical decisions about "majority" of influence. It is this question of how Persius has used his Horace that I wish to develop here. Without disputing, then, the general thematic influence of the three Horatian epistles I've noted, among a number of other poems of diverse impacts, I propose to examine, as a concentrated example of a

[6]Some of the most prominent such readings (much of the work that has lately emerged from Pisa) are based on assumptions about a semiotic "grammar" of literature qua system ("intertext") that sees a text as the multilayered conjunction of other texts, each suggesting their individual and systematic meanings while conspiring to more complex meaning in their new, altered, collectivity that is the work of art. One may say that this is promising, while noting that the outcomes of analysis along these lines can be to a degree speculative. Weaknesses are traceable to an imprecise semiological analogy between the systematicity of language models and the less systematic mimetic intertextuality of the classical literary corpus. The "grammar" of intertextuality, in its attempt to skirt the thorny issue of intentionality, suggests itself as an autonomous, virtually authorless system, and a highly structured interpretive apparatus stands in for the reader's scrutiny of text, intent, and effect. This amounts to a collapsing of separate aspects of the literary process, writing and reading, and leads to the compensatory development of a good deal of artificial critical discourse. Yet classical poets, and most especially Persius, were almost obsessively imitative, and our interest in that aspect of their art cannot, in its root impulse, be frivolous. There is, indubitably, much critical insight in the work of Conte, *Memoria* and *Il genere*; see also, for a diversity of approaches, Barchiesi, *La traccia*; Farrell, *Vergil's Georgics*; Giangrande, "Arte allusiva"; Pasquali, "Arte allusiva"; and Thomas, "Virgil's *Georgics*."

[7]See Hooley, "Imitation Theory."

larger, more complexly implicated process, some particular effects of the ways in which Persius has involved *Epp.* 2.2, the source that, at least at the level of specific and evident verbal reminiscence, is more conspicuous and guides the development of the poem's opening sections where the prevailing Horatian tone is said to be established. Are there signs there, it needs to be asked, of Persius doing more than simply echoing Horatian language and thoughts? An answer will not suffice for a full exegesis of the satire, something beyond the scope of this brief essay in any case, but tracing the emerging significance of Persius' use of *Epp.* 2.2 should contribute to larger understandings of the poet's purpose and attainment.

Persius opens by addressing the poet Caesius Bassus, most notable, as Quintilian tells us, for his Horatian lyrics,[8] and begins with friendly questions and general praise: has the winter's cold moved Bassus near to his Sabine hearth? has he begun there to compose his marvelous lyric verse? The satirist himself claims to be enjoying a rural holiday in the manner of Horace, and speaks of his own landscape in warm terms. But at lines 4–6 Persius alludes to Horace *Epp.* 2.2.141ff. in praise of Bassus' striking the "manly tone of the Latin lyre; old but excellent singer of the (loves and) games of youth":

> atque marem strepitum *fidis* intendisse *Latinae,*
> mox *iuvenes* agitare *iocos* et pollice honesto
> egregius lusisse senex.

The allusion involves a passage in Horace's letter to Florus that concludes a lengthy discussion of his failure or unwillingness to write more lyric poems. After mentioning a number of less important impediments, Horace declares that it is now time to grow into a deeper wisdom than poetry allows:

> nimirum sapere est abiectis utile nugis,
> et tempestivum *pueris* concedere *ludum,*
> ac non verba sequi *fidibus* modulanda *Latinis,*
> sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae. (140–44)

Verbal resemblances make the imitation unmistakable: a number of further references to the same poem—including lines 12–36, drawing upon Horace 190–204, and the theme of the just use of material goods

[8]Quint. 10.1.96; cf. F. Skutsch, "Caesius Bassus"; for Bassus as *senex* see Beucheler, "Text."

adumbrated there—confirm Persius' sustained attention to *Epp.* 2.2 while constructing his satire. But the adaptation is subtle enough at this early point to be unremarkable until the larger pattern of dependencies between this and *Epp.* 2.2 has been established. Persius' ostensible reader, Bassus, and all his implied readers, will, at the outset, accept these opening lines as straightforward tribute. Indeed this is an impression he will want part of our minds to hold to; he loads the passage with positively valorized words, in their stalwart anti–Callimacheanism: *tetrico . . . pectine*; *mire opifex numeris veterum primordia vocum*; *marem strepitum.*

But once the frequency and thematic weight of Persius' recurrences in 12–36 to Horace *Epp.* 2.2 have been recognized, the probing traces of irony imbedded in the opening become more conspicuous. It is a not entirely simple irony that tracks Horace's own apparent revision of literary priorities in *Epp.* 2.2. There Horace does not renounce lyric—in fact, most of his poem is devoted to an extended discussion of the qualities and habits of mind that make for good lyric. But in the poem's major thematic declaration (*sapere est . . . utile,* (141) Horace claims to be turning to things more important than well–crafted verse. Persius will not have been oblivious to the force of the lines from which he draws his language at the very outset of his poem, nor of the force, underpinning it, of *Epp.* 1.1, passim. Bassus, however respected as friend and poet, represents a kind of literary endeavor that Persius elsewhere, conspicuously in the choliambics and the First Satire, dismisses outright and here "places," via Horace, at some distance from the legitimate concerns of mature men. After invoking the Horatian *fidibus . . . Latinis* with his own *fidis . . . Latinae* in virtually the same position in the line, he follows with *mox iuvenes agitare iocos,* explicitly echoing and drawing in as commentary Horace's *et tempestivum pueris concedere ludum.* The point is clear. Excelling in what Horace sees the need to abandon, Bassus has not *listened* to his master—at least in the artificial rhetorical situation that the satirist has contrived through allusions here. Persius brings the matter home with palpable force, again invoking Horace's *ludum,* in the taut incongruity of *egregius lusisse senex.*[9] The irony so often implicit in *egregius* likely plays a supporting

[9]These lines involve a number of textual and interpretive difficulties; cf. Gildersleeve, *Satires*; Beikircher, *Kommentar*; and *Kissel, Satiren* ad loc. Verses 5–6 seem best to be taken as referring to Bassus' treatment of love themes (*iuvenes iocos* and *lusisse*), and Persius' lines as registering some oddity in that: "old fellow, but most excellent composer of the love songs of youth."

role here (see *OLD*). As perhaps does *mox* at the outset of line 5—in its pivotal position between the separate phrases of the allusion, articulating its elements—which Peter White, correcting Beikircher's construal of the word as a kind of coordinating conjunction ("keine zeitliche, sondern aneinanderreihende Bedeutung") is surely right in seeing as marking a chronological or, here, logical distinction, almost an adversative (White, review of Beikircher, 61). With this word, Persius subtly notes the dissonance, as White puts it, "between Bassus's robust, archaic diction and the erotic subjects of which he sang." These introductory lines, then, rather than suggesting Persius in unaccustomed tolerance and ease, show him on the acute edge of irony. Rather than blandly quoting Horace in praise of Bassus, he employs allusions to Horace's epistle in delicate dispraise—effecting thus a subtle ambivalence through which both graciousness and point are given due force.[10]

To precisely the same ends Persius has wrought his only apparently "atmospheric" geographical settings early in the poem. The Horatian Bassus is set firmly in a Horatian landscape (*foco . . . Sabino*), and Persius' mention of this setting partakes of Horace's own *scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbem* in *Epp.* 2.2.77. Persius, however, locates himself in a more distant isolation, the coastal town of

[10]The point should not be pushed too far. Persius' words to Bassus are, as I have noted, explicitly flattering, and there is appeal in the notion (suggested by an anonymous reader) that Persius points out the disparity of age and poetic activity in order to highlight the exceptional creativity of Bassus, a creativity that happily outlasts its accustomed season. Such a view is not far from that of Kissel, *Satiren* 772–73, who, echoing Beikircher, avers that in *iocos agitare* (line 5) Persius is alluding to a broad poetic sprightliness in Bassus rather than a narrow preoccupation with love themes. Moreover, even while Bassus is composing love lyric, his doing so *tetrico . . . pectine* (line 2) accords him a certain dignity. Kissel quotes Beikircher (*Kommentar* 29) in summary: "Bassus ist ja schon ein älterer Herr, dichtet aber trotzdem Lieder, die eher einem jüngeren anstehen. . . . Der damit verbundenen Gefahr, sich als 'ewiger Jüngling' lächerlich zu machen, begegnet Bassus dadurch, dass er bei diesem Treiben doch stets seine Ehre zu wahren weiss; er macht zwar bei den Scherzen seiner jungen Freunde mit, aber ohne sich dabei etwas zu vergeben."

However persuasive, such views do not quite register the force of the contrasts Persius builds into this opening passage: lyric songs, almost certainly love lyrics, played with, of all things, *tetrico . . . pectine*; Bassus' making the Latin lyre grate out a *marem strepitum*; this most excellent old man with "respectable thumb" strumming out juvenile frolics. One is tempted to see caricature in this, an impression countered, however, by an evident respect for the elder poet's anti–Callimacheanism. What can be said is that Persius openly and through indirection brings inconcinnity to the fore, which makes a precisely ambiguous reading plausible: he here, as often, sees things in more than one way.

Luna, well away to the northwest, and the sheer physical separation between this and a "Sabine farm," proximate to Rome, signals something more than topographical—indeed surely an emblematic—difference. Thus his subtly ambiguous portrait of a man engaged in things out of his season, *egregius lusisse senex,* is followed by a strongly adversative *mihi* at the caesura[11] and a description of his own nearby landscape: *nunc Ligus ora. . . .* While Bassus settles into a conspicuously Horatian locale,[12] Persius commands a distant seascape whose local literary genius is Ennius:

> "Lunai portum, est operae, cognoscite, cives."
> cor iubet hoc Enni, postquam destertuit esse
> Maeonides Quintus pavone ex Pythagoreo. (9–11)

We may, with Skutsch, follow Housman's attribution of the quoted line (*Lunai portum . . .*) to Ennius' *Satires,*[13] with the result that Persius may be seen to be making a simple generic declaration. As Bassus is to the lyric Horace, so Persius to the satiric Ennius. But more important, I think, is Persius' remarking the change of mind in Ennius after he has left off dreaming (ridiculously, to Persius' eye, as the parodying language here as well as line 2 of the choliambics confirms) of himself as Homer reborn and has moved on from his epic *Annales* to his miscellaneous *Satires* and later works.[14] *Lunai portum . . .* shows strong old Ennius having emerged from his illusory dream, *postquam liberatus,* as Jahn has it, *nimio poetico furore,* and that is just the bracing invocation Persius needs to counter his Bassus, who lives in the aftershadow of the lyric Horace, yet unawakened, as a second Horace. Further to the matter, the example of Ennius as described by Persius prefigures exactly Horace's bracing *sapere est utile* from *Epp.* 2.2, and the satirist's point is brought to penetrating, yet savingly witty, resolution.

The burden of this orchestrated interplay of views emerges with a plainness that is nonetheless impressive: the strong poet will follow Horace not in the appealing, sequacious imitation of the literary disci-

[11] Cf. Morford, *Persius* 67.

[12] Sil. 3.596 also employs *Sabinus ager* to indicate a pastoral setting.

[13] O. Skutsch, *Studia* 25–29; *Annals* 750–51; cf. Housman, *Classical Papers* III 1233.

[14] Cf. Housman, *Classical Papers* III 1233: "*postquam destertuit,* etc., is well enough rendered by Jahn, 'postquam nimio poetico furore liberatus est,' more precisely, 'when he had left behind his epic mood and its illusions. . . .'"

ple but in his pursuit of wisdom—and the kind of poetry that attends that pursuit. The poem, thus, in the very texture of its imitations is somehow *about* the place and limits of mimesis. Persius' next line (12) restates the theme: *hic ego securus volgi . . .*, while explicitly declaring the poet's immunity from material envy, also follows Horace's *odi profanum vulgus* in endorsing its claim of artistic independence. In the isolated security of his retreat at Luna he may assert a poetic individuality that his friend Bassus, in his landscape, cannot. The satirist will do so by exercising his art in a way that makes apparent his debt to his major predecessor Horace while marking crucial differences. More than an assertion, this constitutes a demonstration of individual poetic identity. Such is the root burden of the aesthetic discussion of the opening eleven lines as well as, in broader ethical terms, of the following extended homily (12–80). *Hic ego securus volgi* is both summarizing transition and assertion of thematic continuity.

What gives this statement of Persius' its particular authority is its acknowledgment that the shadow of Horace extends just as prepossessingly over the satirist as over his lyricizing old friend. The humility implicit in this recognition conditions the manner of Persius' response—as well as our reading of his poem. Persius will work through Horace in fashioning the lineaments of his own voice, a process readers have too often seen as passive imitation. In the opening twelve lines of this poem, Persius demonstrates how he can turn imitation into an effective polyphony that complicates and enriches our first impressions. As in the Fifth Satire, he opens his poem with a personal tribute through which he marks out his own artistic independence and broaches themes that will remain important throughout the work. Crucially, Persius has used Horace to mark his own distance from the simpler, more directly mimetic Horatianism of Caesius Bassus.

A similar kind of rhetorical gesture underpins the remainder of the satire and can be highlighted, once again, where Persius seems most derivative—again drawing upon *Epp.* 2.2. After its introduction, the poem is, on its surface, occupied with a discussion of the proper use of (or attitude toward) one's goods. The theme is signaled by a striking allusion:

> utar ego, utar,
> nec rhombos ideo libertis ponere lautus
> nec tenuis sollers turdarum nosse salivas. (6.22–24)

Horace *Epp.* 2.2.190ff.:

> utar et ex modico quantum res poscet acervo
> tollam, nec metuam quid de me iudicet heres. . . :

The verbal invocation at *utar* is of course conspicuous, as is the force of Horace's *nec metuam quid de me iudicet heres* as the thematic center of the entire latter section of Persius' satire. Other dependencies in the vicinity have long been noted by commentators (among them, P. 12, H. 202; P. 17, H. 133f.; P. 18ff., H. 183ff.; P. 33f., H. 191f.),[15] echoes that together make it clear that Persius was working closely with the epistle in making his own poem.

Through these allusions Persius is usually seen to be adopting a surprisingly broad and flexible Horatian tone. Like Horace, he is satisfied with what he presently has (13–17) and defends its reasonable use. What to make of this? Most often it is read as a straightforward imitation of Horace: "Persius tries . . . to reproduce Horace's persona by echoing several of his statements in a light, ironic tone (Dessen, *Iunctura* 84). The result, however, is variously interpreted as either a reasonably successful harmonizing of voices and gentling of the acerbic Persian spirit or a failure to quite do the Horatian thing: "the poet retreats from the uncompromising Stoic austerity of the earlier satires and speaks to a friend through a more relaxed persona" (Morford, *Persius* 65). "He manages to sound like Horace but the latter's persona is too painstakingly developed, with a wealth of minute detail, to be recreated in a single poem" (Dessen, *Iunctura* 84).[16] These estimates are valid enough if one accepts an implicit circularity: assuming elementary mimesis, one evaluates only how nearly the poem recreates the spirit or details of the Horatian model. But if we allow that thematic and verbal similarity might not mean simple pastiche or endorsement, we may in the end find more interesting, perhaps more complicated, results. Here the kinds and manner(s) of literary incorporation become pivotal: how

[15]The shipwrecked friend Persius purports to help in 6.27ff. may have been suggested by the boat imagery in Hor. *Epp.* 2.2.200–201.

[16]Cf. Marmorale, *Persio* 315: "Fra le satire di Persio la sesta è la più oraziana; e non già perché, leggendola, si ha l'impressione che essa svolga nel suo complesso un motivo oraziano, ma perché in essa il tono è più blando, più familiare, senza raggiungere per questo—non era, d'altra parte, nella natura di Persio—il pacato e sorridente umorismo oraziano delle *Epistole*."

smoothly a phrase, word, or idea melds with its new context; whether it participates in harmony with developing themes or enters into some sort of conflict with either its new or original poetic setting; whether or not the imitation is seen to be an author's attempt to subserve, praise, develop, or eclipse his model—these questions stand as limited but critical portals into the creative heart of the poem.

At a simple rhetorical level, the "attitude" of Persius' invocation at line 22 is surely significant. *Utar ego, utar*: the reiteration is pointed, a good deal more so than Horace's unemphatic use of the verb, which comes near the end of a long, fairly complex discussion of *usus*: what one "uses" is one's own whether it be a vast estate or the bit of breakfast one's had that morning. Horace's whole discussion stands as a specimen of the wisdom one must grow into (*sapere est utile*), a wisdom here evident in the avoidance of a grasping acquisitiveness. But the point is less blunt than merely largesse countering avarice: Horace's clever discussion makes a significant, even fundamental, observation about the nature of ownership, the relation and value of one's goods to one's life or identity. In spite of *ex modico acervo,* the burden of his declaration is not only simple moderation, but a clear control over the material stuff with which we clutter our living.[17] The qualification *nec metuam de me iudicet heres* is important in its setting up a distinction between poet and heir, between what is one's "own" (what one employs in the business of getting along) and accumulated goods to be passed on. It is clear from the development of his satire that Persius has not missed the point. His reiteration of the verb both echoes Horace's *utar . . . tollam* and dramatizes Horace's burden about the relation of identity and "use" in placing his (otherwise unnecessary) pronoun as he does: *utar, ego utar.*

But there is more than perceptive affirmation in the allusion. For such a sentiment, as Persius surely knew, sounds, to the rest of us, a bit odd coming from a principled Stoic. Moreover, he has made his dramatic declaration in the context of extremes (erring both ways) on this general issue:

[17] Cf. Macleod, *Horace* 82: "Here, as always, Horace's middle way, described in lines 190ff., is much more than a flaccid compromise; and it renews the Platonic ideal of self-unification (*Republ.* 443d–e, 621c, etc.), which is also behind *Epistles* 1.3.29 and 1.18.101."

> solis natalibus est qui
> tinguat holus siccum muria vafer in calice empta,
> ipse sacrum inrorans patinae piper; hic bona dente
> grandia magnanimus peragit puer. utar ego, utar . . . (19–22)

Even with the qualifications that follow,

> nec rhombos ideo libertis ponere lautus
> nec tenuis solers turdarum nosse salivas, (22–24)

Persius makes himself sound just a little provocative. Why?

One answer is that such provocation draws attention, as compellingly as Horace has but in a different way, to the proper relation between one's goods and one's sense of self. Surprisingly perhaps, Persius in his dramatic declaration and in the harvest metaphor that follows, *messe tenus propria vive,* is proposing nothing contrary to principles emerging from the Stoa. The notion, in the form he derives it from Horace, harmonizes exceptionally well with the Stoic conception of life in accordance with natural law. Chrysippus on human nature, natural impulse, and "pleasure" offers a general gloss on the essential principles:

> πρῶτον οἰκεῖον [ὁ Χρύσιππος] λέγων εἶναι παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν· . . . οὕτω γὰρ τά τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται. ὃ δὲ λέγουσι τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῴοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβῃ, ὃν τρόπον ἀφιλαρύνεται τὰ ζῷα καὶ θάλλει τὰ φυτά. (Diog. Laert. 7.85–86)[18]

Such views have not much to do with Stoically conceived "virtue" (except insofar as they exclude pleasure as instinctive urge) but do represent the natural bases for considering that virtue. And the crucial point here, in claiming that self-preservation (earlier, Diogenes summarizes: τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτό) and awareness of one's nature underlie any creature's relation to things, is the character of the fit between the needs of the individual and the resources of nature.

[18] Von Arnim, *SVF* 3.178; Long and Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers* II 343.

Such thinking leads naturally enough to the particular question of private goods or property and their suitable disposition. Cicero, following Chrysippus in neat metaphoric illustration, develops the principle into an explicit defense of the notion of private property, reconciling this with the notion of goods, of nature and society, held in common:

> sed quem ad modum, theatrum cum commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse eum locum, quem quisque occuparat, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque cuiusque sit. (*Fin.* 67)[19]

And in another passage, this derived from Panaetius, Cicero declares plainly:

> Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis. (*Off.* 1.20)

All of which is not to raise in any detail the somewhat complicated issue of the philosophical status of property and its disposition in Stoic thought, but only to note that it is wrong to expect in a Stoic caricatured antimaterialism (goods, in general, were held to be merely "indifferent") and that the just "use" of one's goods is somehow bound up with awareness of self and its needs. Moreover, it is clear that even in the early Stoa, where the notion of private property violated the assumption that all goods were to be held in common, in contradistinction to Cicero's modifying redaction (consistent with thinking in the later Stoa), the conception of *usus* as Horace describes it in *Epp.* 2.2 and Persius invokes it here is perfectly orthodox. The idea is not far from the simple root sense of Persius' reiterated verb *utar,* which derives, through its older form *oitor,* from an Indo–European root meaning simply "to get along, to make one's way (by means of something)," the same which gives us the Greek οἶτος, "path."[20] In that light, Persius' advocacy seems to be for the use of that which is one's "own," that is, is intended by reason and nature to be employed or consumed, and does

[19]Cf. Annas, "Cicero" 151–73; Erskine, *Stoa* 103–22, argues that the theater analogy in Cicero's *De Finibus* does not derive from Chrysippus.

[20]Conway, *Latin* 56.

not strictly become an end unto itself (in contrast to the Epicurean ἡδοναί, caricatured in the *rhombos,* etc. of lines 23–24).[21]

Most critically, the natural impulse to self-preservation and the use of those goods to which a creature is "oriented," that is, which are appropriate (οἰκεῖον) to oneself, turns largely on self-awareness, what Chrysippus calls συνείδησις and Cicero, elsewhere, *sensus sui.*[22] The Sixth Satire, as its opening section makes evident, is largely a poem of such self-definition and awareness, of conscience, perhaps, in the literal sense. Along such lines, *Epp.* 2.2 offers more than thematic suggestion: it provides a structure for the later poet's response. Persius' development of his satire, after invoking the epistle so conspicuously in lines 22ff., makes this clear. Horace had declared that in using what is his to use, he was not afraid of his heir's reaction—which response, however, remained unexplored in his epistle. Persius' *utar* launches an extended satirical treatment, continuing to the end of the poem, of just such a reaction. The provocative nature of the poet's reiteration of the verb, which has wrongly led readers into believing this Stoic has lost his grip, assumes rhetorical importance with respect to the implied interlocutor who appears at 33f. (*sed cenam funeris heres / negleget iratus quod rem curtaveris*) and the heir himself, invoked in line 41, who assumes just such an "irritated" posture. Both reader and heir are thus put into the similar position of (at least potentially) misprizing the poet's words, a rhetorical play not uncharacteristic of an artist who can manage the subtle shadings of implication suggested by his opening lines.

So why, again, does Persius adopt the tone he does? Precisely to evoke the "reaction," within the dialogue of the poem, of self-interested greed he will so carefully delineate in 41–80. His heir is something of a caricature embodying an amalgam of related vices and pettinesses, whom, in the poem's dramatic situation, Persius immensely enjoys taunting.[23]

Evidently so, for the gesture is repeated: in his resolution to come to the financial aid of a ruined friend at 27–33 (*at vocat officium . . .*

[21] Cf. Hor. *Sat.* 2.4, and the vulgar Epicureanism satirized there; see also *Sat.* 1.2.115.

[22] Diog. Laert. 7.85 and Cic. *Fin* 3.16; see the discussion in Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* 43.

[23] On the frequently condemned figure of the heir see also Hor. *C.* 2.14.25–28 and 4.7.17–20.

largire inopi); in his threat to run to the ridiculous expense[24] of exhibiting a hundred pair of gladiators in honor of Caligula's "victory" over the Germans at 43–49; in his taunting challenge at 51 (*largior. an prohibes? dic clare*);[25] in his resolution, at 52–60, to find another heir ("some Manius") if the present heir should find his situation unbearable; in his loudly proclaimed resolve to have a decent meal[26] in despite of a legatee who has by now become the very image of greedy decadence:

> nunc nunc inpensius ungue,
> ungue, puer, caules. mihi festa luce coquatur
> urtica et fissa fumosum sinciput aure,
> ut tuus iste nepos olim satur anseris extis,
> cum morosa vago singultiet inguine vena,
> patriciae inmeiat volvae? mihi trama figurae
> sit reliqua, ast illi tremat omento popa venter? (68–74)

The entire passage holds for the reader sheer delight in its perfect presentation of the weakness and silliness that attends concern about legacies and their magnitude. Thus, after Persius' Horatian exhortation to "live up to the limits of your harvest, what have you to fear?" (25–26), he spends most of the remaining lines of his poem sketching out not another version of a moderate Horatian ideal but the very image of that fear, in the fullness of its perversity: Persius' treatment inverts the focus of Horace's germinal idea. Persius will, in the root sense of his borrowed word, "make his way" from the Horatian paradigm, not in obtundent critique, but subtly and alive to nuance—rendering his Horatian words with a difference.

Persius makes a firm ethical point through such a mimetic process: one's responsibility to another becomes a degraded perversion at the point that materialist preoccupation begins to play a role. Further, the pathetic dependency of the heir is a function of that preoccupation and of his failure to muster an adequate sense of self, and of what is "his own"—precisely those concerns highlighted by Persius' speaker:

[24] Cf. Hor. *Sat.* 2.3.85ff.

[25] See Hooley, "Vexed Passage."

[26] But see White's review of Beikircher, 61, which makes the point put well by Harvey, *Commentary* ad loc.: "*caules* is plain fare." For the reference to *caules* cf. also Hor. *Sat.* 2.3.125 and Harvey's notes.

> "dest aliquid summae," minui mihi, sed tibi totum est
> quidquid id est. ubi sit, fuge quaerere, quod mihi quondam
> legarat Tadius. . . . (64–66)

The heir is a clear antitype to Stoic self-sufficiency, and his portrayal is the satiric heart of the poem, as well as its spirited conclusion.

Mark Morford offers insightful comment on the last correspondence between Horace's *Epp.* 2.2 and this satire—*acervo* in 2.2.190 and *acervi* in Persius 6.80: "Persius's use of the *acervus* ("heap") to end his satire is brilliant, linking the Stoic paradox [of Chrysippus][27] to the theme of Epicurean moderation with which the diatribe has begun" (*Persius* 71). But it has been my contention that Epicurean moderation has never been seriously advocated by Persius, and that the satirist has used quotations on the theme in Horace to define his own very different concerns. So that when the poem comes to its famously puzzling conclusion (75–80),[28]

> vende animam lucro, mercare atque excute sollers
> omne latus mundi, ne sit praestantior alter
> Cappadocas rigida pinguis plausisse catasta,
> rem duplica. "feci; iam triplex, iam mihi quarto,
> iam decies redit in rugam. depunge ubi sistam,
> inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi,"

one hears nothing of the virtues of Horatian restraint and much about the corresponding vices described so vividly by Persius throughout: the heir's desperate fascination with his material prospects, and the impossibility of bringing such cupidity to reasonable closure as pointed out by Chrysippus' paradox—autonomy, again, defined in the wrong terms. In this light, the final word of the poem, *acervi,* in its invocation of Horace once again, must be intended to indicate the logical and hence ethical difficulty in defining what Horace from the beginning assumes to be his,

[27] See the discussion in Beikircher, *Kommentar,* and Barr, *Satires,* ad loc., of the role of the famous *sorites* paradox in this poem; cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2.92–94.

[28] All commentators wonder about the connection of these lines to the previous. Is Persius still addressing the heir? The heir Persius? Or is this a more general, summarizing attack on cupidity? The last is preferable; the apparent inconsequence in lines 74–75 is not troubling and need not lead us to conjecture, as have many following the scholiast, a posthumously patched-up ending. Persius has reached a grand rhetorical climax at 74, and 75ff. naturally follow as commentary and summary.

a *modicus acervus*. All along, the terms of Persius' theme have not been balance versus excess, but are found in the tight contrast, unusual in a classical context, of *vende animam lucro* (75).[29] In *animam*, whether we call it "life" or "soul,"[30] one locates the intrinsically identifying thing, the self that is only one's own. It is what matters, in the context of this poem, as opposed to what does not. In satirizing his heir's preoccupation with lucre, more particularly in defining himself in contradistinction to that preoccupation, as he had earlier to the literary program of Caesius Bassus and, throughout, to the Horace of *Epp*. 2.2, Persius has given us more than a faint suggestion, in both literary and ethical terms, of the *anima* which informs this subtle and intriguing poem.[31]

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[29] Cf. Barr, *Satires* ad loc.: "The relative infrequency in classical antiquity of the idea of selling one's soul, which later . . . was to become such a commonplace, is doubtless to be explained by the different conceptions of the soul prevailing in pre-Christian thought. Cf., however, Heraclitus (end of the 6th century B.C.) *ap. Plut., Cor.* 22.2 *psychēs ōneitei*."

[30] Beikircher, *Kommentar* ad loc., quotes Casaubon: *redime omnes lucri faciendi occasiones vel iactura animae id est vitae*.

[31] A version of this paper was delivered at the meeting of the American Philological Association in 1990. I owe particular thanks to an anonymous reader for *AJP* who made several valuable suggestions, most of which I have incorporated.

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BOOK REVIEWS

HUGH LLOYD-JONES and N. G. WILSON. Sophoclis Fabulae. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. xix + 431 pp. $24.95. Sophoclea: Studies on the Text of Sophocles. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 282 pp. Cloth, $65.00.

MALCOLM DAVIES. Sophocles: *Trachiniae*, with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. xl + 289 pp. Cloth, $98.00.

The new Oxford Classical Text (OCT) of Sophocles and its companion volume, *Sophoclea* (*Soph.*), make important contributions to scholarship by the editors' handling of traditional scholarly problems, their lively response to recent work, especially that of R. D. Dawe, and their many original suggestions.

The text of Sophocles is difficult and corrupt. To distinguish between the two situations takes a keen and sagacious mind and excellent knowledge of tragic Greek. The editors often print what the manuscripts report, but show in the apparatus that there is room for doubt. In other places they print conjectures. This is the right procedure. Reading any text is an active and critical activity, and an editor does readers little good by hiding difficulties or the possibility of corruption. The editors rarely disturb a text that is above suspicion, and their suggestions are thoughtful. It is late in the day for many new and true corrections of Sophocles' text, but the work of Page, West, Dawe, and Lloyd-Jones shows how much can still be achieved.

Sophoclea contains much food for thought. *El.* 1050–51 may well be an interpolation from Sophocles' *Phaedra*, not noticed by Radt or Barrett. The editors bracket 1052–54 as well (p. 62). In *Ant.* 368 παρείρων, which Pearson (*CQ* 13 [1919] 124) thought a *vox nihili*, turns out to be a good Greek word with a clear meaning—but one inappropriate for the passage, as is shown by the editors' interpretation: "the man who would be high in the city will find it difficult to insert into the unbroken stream of events the narrow implement that is human law together with divine justice" (p. 124). At *El.* 1087 the editors print Lloyd-Jones's ἄκος, supposedly ousted by the gloss τομήν, which then became τὸ μή. The meaning will be "arming a cutting remedy" (pp. 64–65). I doubt that ἄκος has the requisite meaning, without an adjective or verb meaning "cutting," as in all Lloyd-Jones's parallels. I know of no example of ἄκος glossed τομή. Michael Stokes defended the manuscript reading (*Arktouros* [Berlin 1979] 134–43), but I think Lloyd-Jones has shown the right way. If we read τομὴν καλήν, we have a good Sophoclean word (*Tr.* 700, 887) with the meaning "arming a glorious cutting blow."

New conjectures include some strikingly good ones, e.g., *Aj.* 636, *Ant.* 1080–81. On occasion, the editors' small changes create more problems than they solve. At *Aj.* 799 Blaydes's conjecture is rejected because it "scarcely

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explains the corruption." The editors suggest the gentler medicine of ⟨τὴν⟩ ὀλεθρίαν (sc. ψῆφον): "'He believes that this going out condemns Ajax to death.' This makes good sense, and the conjecture has the advantage of allowing the second syllable of ὀλεθρίαν to be short, though the virtual personification of ἔξοδον is unusual" (*Soph.* p. 27). Jackson (*Marginalia Scaenica,* 32) showed that Blaydes's conjecture was palaeographically excellent. There is nothing in the context to suggest voting, so no Athenian audience could have caught the reference, especially with "exit" as subject of the infinitive and "vote" understood, not with "all" or "equal," but with "fatal." Another example of the poisonous quality of gentler medicines is *Ant.* 3. The passage is comprehensible but peculiar and has provoked many conjectures. The editors ignore most of the difficulties and print ἅ, ποῖον for ὁποῖον: "This has the best chance of being right, and it alters only one letter" (*Soph.* p. 115). The parallels cited are passages where ἅ is "followed by a prohibition with μὴ . . . or by some equivalent injunction or remonstrance" (Barrett ad *Hipp.* 503–4); that is, no parallels at all. If the relative is offensive, we might read τὸ ποῖον, suggested by Vollgraff (*Mnemosyne,* n.s. 46 [1918] 73; cf. *OC* 1415).

The editors have simplified the apparatus of Dawe's Teubner, by using one siglum for consistent families, e.g., Roman (**r**), Laurentian (**l**), and Paris (**a**). A reader will not think that there are three or five witnesses when there is only one. The siglum **p** is used to represent the agreement of two or more late medieval manuscripts from a group of eleven which have little in common; **r** and **a** similarly may represent the agreement of two members of their families so that **a** or, frequently, **p** appears more than once after the same lemma. The reader must then turn to Dawe for the details. At *OT* 1401 the correct reading is reported from **a** though **a** also appears as agreeing with most manuscripts in a variant. Readers will find it of interest that the first **a** = a subscript reading in Naples D and a *graphetai* variant in Vienna Xs.

Wilson and West in their reviews noted that Dawe's extensive collations had whetted our appetite for more. It is therefore disappointing that the editors have done little collating. I tested S (Vaticanus Urbinas graecus 141), whose readings the OCT correctly prints at *Ant.* 567, 848, and 851. *Aj.* 310: χερροῖν S, *fortasse recte,* as Nauck noted. *Aj.* 1117: the OCT prints Bonitz's ἕως for the MSS' ὡς; ἕως is a gloss in many manuscripts and the necessary synezesis is doubtfully attested. Reiske's superior ἔστ' is in S. *Aj.* 1205: S has Blaydes's excellent ἀπέπαυσέ μ'. *El.* 1239: I take Arndt's ἀεὶ to be in S. *El.* 279: S has Blaydes's ⟨τὸν⟩ πατέρα. *OT* 1401: S reads the correct ἔτι. *Ant.* 108: S's ὀξυπόρῳ is passed over without discussion (*Soph.* p. 119). In his edition (Warminster 1987, ad 109, p. 143; and see now *CQ* 41 [1991] 326) Andrew Brown objected to Lloyd-Jones's arguments for the Laurentian and Paris reading and printed a conjecture of Blaydes's; but "a fast-moving bridle," i.e., one which drives the horses into swift flight, is what we want, as Musgrave saw.

S shares good readings with other manuscripts. *Ant.* 76: Elmsley's conjecture, printed by Nauck and OCT, is found in SZh. (At *Ant.* 1147, however, Zh

has καὶ with all other manuscripts.) *El.* 1394: S's χεροῖν is almost L^{ac}. *OT* 258: S and Laur. conv. soppr. 66 have Burton's ἐπεὶ κυρῶ. *OT* 290: S has μάταν', known to the editors from WaZg. *Pace* Wilson, *RHT* 17 (1987) 9, this is an intrusive gloss; see Thoman scholia 290b in Longo's *Scholia Byzantina* (Padua 1971) 191. *OT* 557: S has the reading found in F and L's margin. S gives the correct form at *El.* 730 with P; *El.* 760 with J; *El.* 1091 with V and Eustathius; *OT* 1011 with UY; *OT* 1113 with C and Triclinius; *OT* 1182 with GXr; *OT* 1212 with N^{pc}; *OT* 1240 with Xs. *OT* 1311: Hermann's conjecture is given by CS. *OT* 1350: S shares V's interesting reading. *Aj.* 476: A^{sl} is in S.

At several places the OCT gives collations by Lewis Campbell and Jebb. At *OT* 1474 Zn's reading is present in Venice, Marc. gr. 472 (= Turyn's Z), as Jebb says. Campbell correctly reports Zo at *Ant.* 789 and V at *Ant.* 356. At *El.* 484 Jebb's report that Vat. gr. 45 shares J's reading is mistaken. It has the majority reading.

The editors sometimes report *non liquet* of L, where Pearson has a plausible description. (For examples, see M. L. West's review, *CR* 41 [1991] 299–301. I have not mentioned West's other corrections.) *OC* 1450: τυγχάνῃ is the lemma of the scholion ad loc. *Aj.* 455: οὐχ ἔχοντος Σνε οὐ κιχόντος Naber. *Aj.* 715: The reading attributed to $L^{ac}F^{ac}$ is φατίζαιμ' (also in S). *El.* 215: "sic interpunxit Kaibel (in hac re codicum auctoritas nihil valet)" the OCT says, so you may be surprised to learn that Kaibel's punctuation is found in LZcXa and the Paris family (and Bergk's edition). The editors report the manuscript punctuation at *Ant.* 1062, *Ph.* 1240, and, of course, follow it in many places. *OT* 696: for a plausible account of L, see Pearson or Dawe. The seriously defective report of the manuscripts in the OCT renders the conjectures cited incomprehensible. *OT* 1104–6: ⟨σ'⟩ was added in 1104 by West and in 1106 by Dindorf (OCT). *El.* 206: L's ἀϊκεῖς is not mentioned, although West in his Teubner Aeschylus (Stuttgart 1990, xlv) argued that this is the correct spelling.

There are other slips in the apparatus. *OC* 1720: the editors omit γ' after ὀλβίως. *Ph.* 468: πατρός and μητρός are interchanged by Suda (IV.229.22 Adler). *Ph.* 782: see Pearson's apparatus for T's reading. *Aj.* 50: H's reading was conjectured by Nauck. *Aj.* 199: The form attributed to Nauck is found in LRVXa, among other manuscripts. *Aj.* 1329: **c** should be **a**. *Aj.* 1342: γ' om. **Kzt**. *El.* 226: ἄν om. LZcS^{ac} et Suda. In four places the editors report the manuscript spelling οἰκτείρω (*Ph.* 169, *Tr.* 1070, *OC* 109) and ἐποικτείρειν (*Ph.* 318), falsely implying that the manuscripts give the correct spelling in the other places (twelve and eight, respectively) where they appear. The OCT mistakenly contradicts the collations of Graham Speake (Durham, N.C., 1978) and Dawe at *OC* 228, 655 (wrong lemma), 744. (Zo, however, has the same reading as its twin Zn at 13 and 736.)

Zc (Vat. gr. 1333), an important representative of the Laurentian family for *Ant.*, is a good source for Thomas Magister's commentary and its *texte de base*. The OCT prints Zc's readings at *Aj.* 1051 and 1379. *Aj.* 622: Nauck's conjecture is a red gloss in Zc. "In the triad [Zc] seems to be close to Triclinius"

(OCT xi). Triclinius based his commentary on a corrupt witness to Zc's text. *Aj.* 1124: Triclinius' reading (shared with ZgZh) is an intrusive gloss. It is a red gloss in Zc. See Fr. Heimsoeth, *Die indirecte Ueberlieferung des aeschyleischen Textes* (Bonn 1862) 32–33. The Triclinian reading at *Ant.* 604 is a red gloss in Zc, as is the Paris and Triclinian reading at *El.* 433. *Ant.* 646: The word reported as "gl. in Zc" is a *graphetai* variant as in LS. The OCT reports Triclinius' deletions as manuscript readings at *Aj.* 888; cf. *El.* 838 and 855, all places where the Triclinian scholia say explicitly that the words "were expelled by me."

The editors had access to an unpublished repertory of Sophoclean conjectures by Dr. L. van Paassen (Amsterdam). *OC* 780: for "Nauck" (OCT) read "Hartung, v. del. Nauck." *El.* 363: Erfurdt's conjecture, misreported in the OCT, is given correctly, *Soph.* 49. *Ant.* 452: "del. Wunder" (OCT); but Wunder and Wecklein's fifth edition (1878) ad 450 (p. 47) describes the verse as "delendus ex G. Dindorfii conjectura" and Bergk (lvi) agrees. *Tr.* 189: the first to accent κλυὼν on the ultima was not West (*BICS* 31 [1984] 175) but Lloyd–Jones (*CQ*, n.s. 4 [1954] 93 and n. 2 = *Academic Papers* 364 and n. 3). *Ph.* 1383: a widely accepted change is credited to Buttmann, who wrote, "Atqui hoc plane est ac si dixisset Neoptolemus: πῶς γάρ τις αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν ὠφελῶν φίλους; Eo tamen audaciae, ut in hunc sensum verba corrigat, neminem umquam processurum spero." Schubert first accepted the change.

Aj. 1054: "ζητοῦντες is just the word which a careless scribe might write after ἐξηύρομεν" (*Soph.* p. 33). The idiom is defended by Nauck ad *Ph.* 452 with *OT* 68, *Ph.* 282, Pi. *Ol.* 13.113, Hdt. 1.139, 3.41. The editors are skeptical of Haslam's deletion of *El.* 1 (*Soph.* p. 42). Haslam showed that the scholium to Eur. *Ph.* 1 (I 245 Schwarz) implies the absence of S. *El.* 1 in some texts. Omission of a first line is hard to parallel, and addresses are often interpolated in Homer; cf. M. J. Apthorp, *Acta Classica* 17 (1974) 11–34, esp. 12; *Antichthon* 15 (1981) 1–7. *OT* 162: Pindar fr. 75.5 is cited to defend the paradosis (*Soph.* p. 83); cf. Wilamowitz, *Aus Kydathen* (Berlin 1880) 151, Anm. 70: "denn dass jetzt, trotz des scholions und trotz Brunck, das alberne und einen stilfehler involvierende εὐκλέα gelesen wird, ist nur für die Sterilität der angeblich blühenden Sophoklesexegese bezeichnend."

The editors' logic is sometimes hard to follow. The word "surely" supplements or replaces arguments some eighty times. *OT* 873: the editors say, "the sense cannot be that a king or tyrant is a product of hybris and this rules out what Dawe believes to be Blaydes's 'correction'. . . . Lloyd–Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, . . . took the meaning to be 'the child of Hybris is a tyrant.'" (*Soph.* p. 100). Lloyd–Jones's translation of the paradosis gives us what the editors say the sense cannot be. Blaydes's conjecture makes excellent sense and is supported by Dionysius Tragicus 4 (I 244 *TrGF*): ἡ γὰρ τυραννὶς ἀδικίας μήτηρ ἔφυ. *OT* 957: the variants are σημήνας and σημάντωρ. The editors quote Ernst Fraenkel (with the wrong citation of p. 207 n. 1 instead of p. 217 n. 3) for the idea that the noun is a conjecture of the scribe of A. The noun is found in K, dated by

Wilson to the late twelfth century, a century before the formation of the Paris family. They conclude that "the participle is likelier to have been corrupted than the noun which Dawe prefers" (*Soph.* p. 102). If a verb common in verse and scholiastic prose is more likely to suffer corruption than a tragic *hapax legomenon,* we may bid a fond farewell to the concept of *lectio facilior. Ph.* 421: "Dawe, usually hospitable to Page's conjectures, does not mention his insertion of ⟨φεῦ⟩ at the beginning of this line . . ." (*Soph.* p. 188), which is printed in the OCT. Dawe (*PCPS* NS 14 [1968] 15) made mincemeat of Page's suggestion. *Ant.* 57: "ἐπαλλήλοιν must mean 'against each other'; Jebb well compares Aes. *Sept.* 930 ἀλλαλοφόνοις χερσὶν" (*Soph.* p. 117). The word Hermann conjectured is never found in classical Greek and, when it does appear, always means "successive" *vel sim.*, never "against each other." Hermann himself ad loc. (p. 27) cited the parallel formation from Aeschylus, and Jebb's paste and scissors are no more relevant here than Housman's at *OT* 795, where Nauck's correction is quite rightly put in the text. But the editors comment, "Nauck and Kamerbeek offer many parallels . . . , but Housman . . . quoted the decisive one, Libanius v. 540" (*Soph.* p. 98). The Libanius passage is not a parallel, but a testimonium showing that Nauck's reading was in Antiochean texts in the fourth century A.D. Housman was reporting Nauck's critical note ad loc.: "Noch Libanios las." We are told that Eduard Fraenkel used five arguments against the authenticity of *OC* 299–307 (*Soph.* p. 226). All but the first come from Wecklein and Nauck. *Ph.* 686: A conjecture correctly attributed to Wunder in the OCT is given to Hermann (*Soph.* p. 197). *El.* 1403: J's ἡμᾶς is "doubtless a conjecture" (*Soph.* p. 74); the OCT correctly calls it a gloss.

Quotation from other scholars' work is sometimes faulty. The quote from Wolff–Bellermann *ad Aj.* 52 (*Soph.* p. 10) has five mistakes, one rather confusing. Stinton is given words he never wrote *ad El.* 466–67 (*Soph.* p. 51). Bergk's conjecture at *OC* 948 is put on p. lxxii of his edition (*Soph.* p. 245), instead of lii, which Lloyd–Jones got right at *CR* 36 (1986) 305. Reeve is given an unmetrical article (*Soph.* p. 112) and is otherwise misquoted (p. 81). *Aj.* 689: West's conjecture is made incomprehensible by two serious misprints (*Soph.* p. 22). *OC* 367: Pearson did not keep the "insufferable" manuscript reading credited to him (*Soph.* p. 227); see his text and *CQ* 24 (1930) 160–61.

The two volumes under review mark real progress in the study and understanding of Sophocles. Filled with original ideas and the humane assimilation of earlier work, they challenge the contemporary scholar to absorb their contributions and to go on, by means of further collation and rethinking, to understand the text of Sophocles, the process of its survival, and what he might mean to our day.

When Malcolm Davies reviewed P. E. Easterling's *Trachiniae* (Cambridge 1982) in *CR* 34 (1984) 7–9 (*pace* the Preface, vi), he questioned the wisdom of "segregating literary from 'textual and syntactical matters'" since "general

questions of literary interpretation can involve detailed questions of syntax." So he set out to write a commentary that would not slight the philological based on the text of Lloyd–Jones and Wilson's new OCT (1990).

Davies's introduction is devoted to a discussion of the play's meaning and a critical analysis of the possible literary and artistic sources. He finds it hard to accept that even a Zeus who lets his son die in horrible agony would deny him apotheosis. He is correctly impressed by Stinton's "The Scope and Limits of Allusion in Greek Tragedy," *Greek Tragedy and Its Legacy* (Calgary 1986) 67–102 = *Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1990) 454–92, which shows that there is no clear reference to apotheosis in the play. Davies counters by mentioning Agamemnon's denunciation of Calchas in *Iliad* 1.105ff. He believes that the scholia supply "evidence that some ancient critics" interpreted these lines as a reference to Iphigenia's sacrifice. (The scholia tell us that "the poet does not even know the name of Iphigenia" [ad A106b (I.40.27–28 Erbse)] and that Homer "does not know of the sacrifice of Iphigenia that appears in later writers" [ad I145a (II.428.60–61 Erbse)]. Iphigenia appears first in *Cypria* F 17, p. 41 Davies = scholia ad S. *El.* 157, p. 110 Papageorgius. No known ancient critic introduced Iphigenia here. That was left to G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary* I [Cambridge 1985] ad A108, p. 65.)

> Dogmatism either way is undesirable: but it is hard to see how such an allusion could be totally denied now; still less how the poet could originally have precluded any such mental appeal to this legend lying outside the poem's scope by, say, one or two members of the audience. So too for Sophocles: Apollo and the curse on the house of Labdacus with *Antigone* and the *OT*; the pursuit of Orestes by the Erinyes with the *Electra*; and the final catastrophe that overwhelms Antigone with the *OC*. Could Sophocles have prevented recourse by some of his audience to some or any of these sequels and explanations? (xxi)

Such language betrays a fundamental misunderstanding. Plays and works such as the Homeric epics that are meant for public performance differ *toto caelo* from modern "lyric poetry" or Hellenistic and Augustan poetry meant to be savored over and over again in full enjoyment of Pasquali's "l'arte allusiva." Plays are aimed at audiences, not at random individuals. Their meaning is public and explicit. Anyone who has taught large lecture courses and then graded the examinations knows the range of an audience's understanding and perception. Some will appreciate throwaway jokes and allusions while others will miss the whole point. A large majority will understand the main thrust. A well–constructed play works its magic on most of the audience. This effect is what the critic seeks, not the vagaries of one or two people. Anyone in a theater who lets his mind wander to notions not explicit in the play is not paying attention.

The examples cited by Davies are a hotch–potch, as Stinton showed. Polynices is a major figure in *OC*, his presence striking and unforgettable. The Labdacid curse in *OT*, the Furies in *Electra*, the apotheosis in *Trachiniae* have

no clear presence in performance. In the end Davies cannot muster Jennifer March's straightforward confidence that "to Sophocles' audience Heracles must have been seen as approaching his apotheosis, since his becoming a god was the familiar and fully accepted ending of the legend of his life on earth" (*The Creative Poet* [London 1987] 72). Listen to Davies's final decision:

> The contrast between divine knowledge and mortal ignorance is a central Sophoclean preoccupation: most conspicuously exploited in the *OT*, it undoubtedly permeates the *Trachiniae* too. In seeking to exclude allusion to Heracles' apotheosis as a possible justification for some of the seemingly inexplicable human suffering presented in the play, we are also defining, perhaps too rigidly, the limits of mortal ignorance and knowledge. Sophocles may have preferred to keep the question open in this play and elsewhere. (xxi–xxii)

This is an echo of T. J. Hoey (*Arethusa* 10 [1977] 272–73), who wants "to leave the question open, as though the play had weighed both options and felt itself unable to decide." Theater gives us amusing pictures of bores, coherent pictures of confusion, clear and comprehensible pictures of the limits of human knowledge and understanding. Sophocles does not present his characters as *never* learning but as learning *too late,* as Easterling notes: "Deianira discovers that the supposed love charm is a poison that will kill Heracles, Hyllus that he has wrongly accused his mother" (3).

Many of Davies's notes are simple references to Fraenkel's *Agamemnon,* Johansen and Whittle's *Supplices,* Moorhead's *Syntax of Sophocles,* and other standard works. Easterling's commentary is not cited, by design: the "increase in size and polemical content could not be justified" (vi). There is no mention of Oddone Longo's *Commento linguistico alle Trachinie di Sofocle* (Padua 1968), although Longo's careful attention to the nuances of Sophocles' vocabulary would seem to merit attention. There is no systematic attempt to root a carefully thought-out interpretation of the whole in a line-by-line analysis of grammatical, metrical, and other textual matters.

The discussion of individual passages is often excellent, especially when disagreeing with Lloyd-Jones, Stinton, or Dawe. On 905 a careful examination of prodelision bars a widely accepted conjecture of Nauck's. Since the rhetoric of the passage is changed, we need more analysis from Davies and fewer quotations from Jebb. On 647 more than a page is devoted to πάντα ~ σταίη (655). In order to avoid *brevis in longo* and period end at the end of the first line of strophe and antistrophe, Davies is led to translate, in the first sentence, "waiting for Heracles, staring everywhere out to sea for him" (174). There is no word for "staring" in the line. It "would have to be explained as a development by analogy from the Homeric παντῆι παπταίνων." I have heard of "understanding" the object from the verb, but never the verb from the adverb. Easterling (ad loc.) prefers Dawe's βάντα, *recte.*

There is no period end here: πάντα and σταίη begin the next verse in most

scholars' colometry (e.g., Wilamowitz, Kraus, Pohlsander, Pearson, nineteenth-century editions, even Stinton, *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar* 5 [1985] 403 = *Collected Papers* 402). This is the colometry of the manuscripts, which, as Zuntz and Barrett have shown, goes back to Alexandria. In the worst-case scenario, the Alexandrians made the division into cola of tragic lyrics with ten times the material we possess for the surviving poets and an even greater amount from lost poets. In the best case, they, or whoever divided the lyrics into cola, had access to musical texts of the tragedians to guide their work, as Thomas Fleming and I argued at the FIEC Congress at Pisa in 1989. A colometry created by modern editorial intervention has trapped scholars of distinction between an impossible translation and a metrical anomaly.

Davies analyzes 218 as ⏑ – – – ⏑ – – = iambic dimeter syncopated (iamb followed by spondee). In the Addenda (274–75) Diggle pointed out to him that this analysis violates Dale's prohibition (*Lyric Meters* 73) against resolution preceding syncopation in lyric iambics and refers him to *Studies in the Text of Euripides* (Oxford 1981) 18–21, 119. There can be few living Greek scholars who know the tragic iambic better than Diggle, because he knows the manuscripts. In lyrics he has thrown the manuscript evidence overboard. (*The Textual Tradition of Euripides' Orestes* [Oxford 1991] 131–51 shows that Diggle has come to a juster appreciation of the issues.) Of Diggle's "certain or very probable" examples of resolution preceding syncopation, not one is Sophoclean and only one is Aeschylean, *Septem* 565~628. The importance of Dale's observation for the colometry of this passage was pointed out by T. J. Fleming, *GRBS* 16 (1975) 141–48, followed creatively by Hutchinson *ad Septem* 565–67 and 627–30. Diggle's Sophoclean examples are all corrupt (*Tr.* 654~662) or have plausible alternative colometries (*El.* 1265~1245; *Tr.* 846~857). All are cretics, none iambs. "I do not see what theoretical justification there could be for making such a distinction," says Diggle (119). No more did Porson understand the theoretical justification for his law of the final cretic. M. L. West in his fine new Teubner text of Aeschylus (Stuttgart 1990) tries to avoid the problem by analyzing *Septem* 565~628 as cretic + ithyphallic, but since he knows that "the ithyphallic is . . . a catalectic iambic [colon]" (*Greek Metre* [Oxford 1982] 103), he does not avoid a metrical solecism. Even without these considerations, it might seem wiser to have metron end in *Tr.* 218 after the preposition than in the middle of the verb.

Davies rejects Lloyd-Jones's introduction of ἆ into *Tr.* 650 (*in ap. crit.*) and *Ant.* 5 (*in textu*) by commenting that "the pathetic exclamation of ἆ does not feature in tragedy." He may be right, but he ought to cite and discuss the mysterious cry at Eur. *Ba.* 810. On line 677 Davies defends the existence of "polar errors" uncovered by Herwerden here, Schenkl at *El.* 382 (not in the OCT, but see R. Seaford, *JHS* 110 [1990] 79–80), and Dindorf at *Tr.* 368 with reference to Housman (*ad Man.* 5.463) and *AJP* 96 (1975) 117–20 and 104 (1983) 268–77, by myself and Ward Briggs. Another good example is *OT* 566. For some delicious modern examples see Sebastiano Timpanaro, *Il lapsus Freudiano* (Florence 1974) 127–32, perhaps that great scholar's most purely delightful book.

Davies's impressive grasp of bibliography makes this book a valuable reference work. One might wish that more conjectures and variants had been discussed, as promised on page vii. There is little appreciation of the value of what Paul Maas called "diagnostic" conjectures. Disagreement with other scholars, explicit and argued, would have added meat to many notes, which often end without conclusion. The interaction of interpretation and philology which makes Schneidewin and Nauck still essential is attained only intermittently. No reader of the *Trachiniae*, however, will leave this work without gratitude for its broad reading and deep scholarship.

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JUSTINA GREGORY. Euripides and the Instruction of the Athenians. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991. 208 pp.

Gregory's Euripides is not the radical atheist or iconoclast responding to a crisis in values but a poet of the Athenian democracy, concerned with reinterpreting and appropriating the heroic past for the *demos* and "more in tune with . . . his society than has been generally acknowledged" (187). She follows a recent trend toward a more conservative Euripides, a view in which tragedy's function is to reaffirm rather than question the status quo. She tries to show how five plays, *Alcestis, Hippolytus, Hecuba, Heracles,* and *Trojan Women,* each of which she discusses in a separate chapter, reshape aristocratic values in a way that reaffirms democratic attitudes. There is much of value in this admirably clear and concise study. No one will question that Euripides democratized tragedy by mixing the heroic with the commonplace: his *Electra* is the best example. Gregory's interpretation of this democratization, however, seems to me one-sided; and I have to confess that her thesis did not convince.

Gregory's starting point is Aristophanes' emphasis on the didactic, socially improving role of the tragic poet in the *Frogs*. Yet if we are to credit Aristophanes' (or the Aristophanic Aeschylus') view of the tragic poet's redeeming social values, we also have to credit his criticisms of Euripides as a widespread perception among his contemporaries, however much exaggerated for comic effect. Euripides, Aeschylus charges, instead of making his fellow citizens "decent and noble" (*chrestoi kai gennaioi, Frogs* 1010–11), has made them "most villainous, . . . shirkers, hangers-out in the marketplace, rogues, and tricksters," not fighters (1014–17). The spectator of the *Frogs* will not have come away with the view of Euripides that Gregory reaffirms in her conclusion: "Although his [Euripides'] plays differ in tone from those of Aeschylus and Sophocles, they do not differ in intent" (187).

Only on *Heracles* does Gregory seem to me to prove her thesis, namely that the hero's independence and individuality change to an acceptance of de-

pendency and the need for friendship and community as he leaves Thebes for Athens with Theseus. Even here, however, the new type of heroism that she (with many other critics) recognizes in Heracles is not necessarily a specifically democratic heroism. Why should Heracles at his first appearance seem "aristocratic"? He carries a bow, after all, the token of the non-hoplite, non-noble warrior in the *Ajax*. And what is so democratic about his acknowledgment of the need for *philia*? There is a lot about the needs and uses of friends in adversity in aristocratic poets like Pindar (cf. *Nem.* 10.78–79). The theme of a hero who resigns divinity for the endurance of mortality and suffering (187) is not necessarily democratic material, as we know from the *Gilgamesh*, the *Iliad*, and the *Odyssey*.

Gregory's chapter on *Alcestis*, based on her 1979 article in *Hermes*, makes the good point that the play returns Admetus and Alcestis to normal mortality and so to the status quo of ordinary humanity. Less successful is her attempt to claim this ending for a democratizing, egalitarian view of death (44), despite the exchange between Apollo and Thanatos in the prologue. This play, after all, rewards a Thessalian grandee, mythical prototype of those munificent patrons of Simonides and Pindar, for a typically aristocratic gesture of guest-friendship. One could apply Gregory's method in reverse and come up with a play that validates aristocratic magnanimity. She pays too little attention to the play's transformation of folktale and too lightly dismisses the pro-satyric interpretation, which, despite controversy, has weathered well from antiquity to the present (she does not cite Seidensticker's *Palintonos Harmonia*). As a result, she reads *Alcestis* with little sympathy for its paradoxes and ironies.

Gregory has better success in trying to make *Hippolytus* "reconfigure for the benefit of the democracy the traditional values clustering around the concept of moderation" (55). Now, one can certainly make a case for the play as an attack on the "aristocratic quietism" of the horse-loving Hippolytus and the *jeunesse dorée* like him, but is this the center of the play? If the Nurse is a representative of democratic attitudes (68), she is hardly a good advertisement for them. Gregory focuses on the class associations of *sophrosyne* and *aidos* and so says almost nothing about Theseus, little about Phaedra's recourse to the false accusation, and little about the gods in the background. She also pays little attention to one of the play's main themes, the universality of *eros* (439–97, 1268–82), save to suggest that this is somehow a democratic touch because Aphrodite, especially with the cult title Pandemos, "is the most indiscriminate or, to put it another way, the most democratic of goddesses" (57). Even granting that this were so, which I doubt, the Aphrodite of this play, like the Nurse, would be a poor advertisement for democratic values. Gregory also neglects parts of the play that would bear closely on her thesis: Phaedra's speech on the *parrhasia* of her sons in 420ff., the vindication of a slave's advice to reluctant masters both in the prologue and in 1249ff., Artemis' reproach of the "eupatrid child of Aegeus" in 1283–84, and the class issues involved in the bastard son emerging as *gennaios* at the end (1452–55).

Hecuba, according to Gregory, is not just a study of the protagonist's moral degeneration, as it is often read, but a warning to Athens about its "imperialistic mentality," the *polis tyrannos* that emerges in Thucydides' history, especially, of course, in the Melian dialogue. This is a cogent interpretation, but Gregory's insistence on a didactic Euripides is not always fair to the whole text. While it is possible to view Polyxena's choice of death as a reflection of a specifically aristocratic "sense of self . . . vested in ancestry and position" (96) made accessible to a democratic audience, Gregory does not mention the antidemocratic note in the chorus's account of the Greek assembly in the parode, with its bloodthirsty Athenians (122ff.) and demagogic Odysseus (130ff.). She also pays little attention to the prologue, to Polydorus and his role in the play's structure, or to the problems of the gods. She considers "Odysseus rather than some higher power" to be "the prime mover of the sacrifice" of Polyxena (p. 97), completely ignoring the command that comes from Achilles' ghost in the prologue and parodos. On the other hand, she argues that in the exodos Hecuba's revenge succeeds in "restoring cosmic order." But what kind of order? At best, it combines the eventual punishment of some of the wrongdoers with the brutal "necessity" that dooms Hecuba's companions to the life of slavery that her daughter escaped by voluntary death. The ending, Gregory suggests, may show that the gods had helped Hecuba's revenge on Polymestor by their timing of the winds (109); yet this is not substantiated in the text: cf. 900–901 and 1289–91, and see *MD* 22 (1989) 17ff. As often in Euripides, the appearance (or, as here, nonappearance) of gods at the end is a problem rather than a solution.

The chapter on *Heracles,* as I remarked above, is probably Gregory's most successful analysis. But in softening the play's critique of the gods, she does not do full justice to the horror of the madness or to its contrast with Heracles' apology for the gods at the end (pp. 137, 146, 148). Heracles' holding to his bow here is not just a sign that "he must be a slave to destiny" (147), whatever that means, but also an indication that in his new, transformed heroism he still maintains continuity with and responsibility for his violent past. Gregory oddly omits the much-discussed metaphor of Heracles' following Theseus like a boat in tow (1424), which recalls his protective concern for his children before the madness (631–32; cf. 1094–95) and so deepens the poignancy of his dependence on *philia* now.

In *Trojan Women,* as in *Hecuba,* Gregory makes a valiant attempt to find an optimistic message. True, moments of shared commiseration bear out her point about the achievement of community in suffering (156–57); but there is also an increasing isolation as Hecuba is stripped of her children one by one and finally left only with the mangled body of Astyanax. Gregory has good remarks on the problem of causation in the debate between Helen and Hecuba (171ff.) but too little on the bitter irony of Helen's success. She finds traces of "an aristocratic viewpoint" in Andromache (166); but here, as in the case of Polyxena in *Hecuba,* one would like some clear proof that it is "aristocratic" to prefer death to enslavement. As in *Hecuba,* Gregory finds in the play "a kind of

warranty of cosmic order" (175), in this case in the prologue; but Euripides has gone out of his way to show us how captious these gods can be, even in their justice, and the play's intense concentration on human misery at the end hardly leaves a final impression of a morally upbeat Euripides. Here, in the total collapse of her world, Hecuba bitterly incriminates the gods and Zeus (1240–42, 1287–93); and it is telling that Gregory entirely skips over these passages and mentions only the sad reflection on the compensation of immortal fame in 1242–45 (p. 177).

Gregory's method of scene-by-scene commentary produces many fine observations but means that she discusses each play in isolation from other works. There is a half-page comparing *Hecuba* and *Trojan Women* (86) and a good discussion of the latter and Gorgias (159–60); but *Ajax*, for example, would certainly illuminate and perhaps support her reading of *Heracles*; and comparing *Heracles* with *Medea* on the role of Athens as refuge could introduce some fruitful qualifications of the main thesis. One would also have welcomed more attention to the "political" plays of the 420s (see 10 and 99–100) and to changes in Euripides' views at different periods of his career. A brief conclusion summarizes the book's main arguments. The bibliography is helpful but rather thin on works of the last decade.

Taken as a whole, the book is a lucid presentation of the positive side of Euripidean tragedy and a thoughtful reminder of the political implications of Greek tragedy. It is important to recognize the less radical and less critical strands in Euripidean tragedy. At the same time, Gregory's interpretations seem to me too selective to carry full conviction. Those who want to believe in a conservative, tradition-minded, conformist Euripides will find gentle comfort here. It will take more than this book to convert the others.

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CHARLES SEGAL. Lucretius on Death and Anxiety: Poetry and Philosophy in *De Rerum Natura*. Princeton University Press, 1990. xii + 279 pp. $29.95.

As his title and subtitle indicate, Segal has chosen to focus in this important book on the ways in which Lucretius deals with human death and the painful anxiety that mortals experience at the prospect of their death and in the deaths of their own friends and loved ones; and he rightly sees this issue as one of several in which he should try to integrate what have often been considered by literary and philosophic critics as polar oppositions: poetry and philosophy in Lucretius' extraordinary Epicurean poem. For readers in the nineteenth century there lurked in the Latin text an "anti-Lucretius," ready at any moment to sabotage the philosophic doctrines of Lucretius' committed Epicureanism with passionate appeals to ordinary feelings, thus destroying the basic goal of peace

of mind that Epicurus preached and Lucretius announced as his major theme. For the Romantic imagination, the conflict lay in the tormented soul of Lucretius himself, with his warped notions about love and his wild terrors of death—all of which could be dramatized, as Tennyson did, by having the desperately unintegrated poet–philosopher turn from the depressing unfinished lines on death in book 6 and kill himself in utter despair. Although today most scholars have abandoned the flagrant labels of the nineteenth century, many still cannot refrain from shaking their heads over portions of the poem, from wondering about the sanity of Lucretius, and from concluding that we have the Latin text of an unfinished work. Thus Segal has every scholarly reason to address these questions. In the dedication to the book he also reveals that the premature death of a friend and scholar has given him a very personal reason for this compelling meditation on our mortality.

Well over half the book concentrates on the text of Lucretius' book 3, not so much on the satiric diatribe in which the poet engages after 830ff., when he proclaims that death is nothing at all to us, as on the prolonged series of arguments and vivid descriptions earlier, where he works intensely to demonstrate that we are totally mortal, both body and soul. In these passages, where others have detected Lucretius' intrinsic inconsistency and self–questioning, Segal finds precisely what he needs to rehabilitate the philosopher and poet as a well–integrated unity. There is no question about Lucretius' grasp of and thorough commitment to the doctrines of Epicurus. When, however, he decided to proclaim the teachings about the nature of things in poetry, he engaged himself with his material and his audience in a way that involved changes in Epicurus' cool didactic manner. Epicurus liked to discuss with friends his ideas in an informal, dialogue manner, and he wrote a number of doctrinal letters to friends outlining his ideas. Lucretius has an imaginary interlocutor, Memmius, who never says a word; and so Lucretius creates in his poetic descriptions the contexts where the feelings and anxieties of his audience confront the difficult doctrine that could lead to their salvation. As Segal repeatedly emphasizes, the poet uses his vivid and affective imagery to show his awareness of the emotional issues for the untrained reader, especially as he or she faces the powerful "reality" of death. Lucretius thus projects into his verse an engaging sympathy with ordinary human responses, but there is no reason to attribute to him, with that ungenerous superiority to which scholars and critics are all too prone, any personal inconsistency or betrayal of the Master Epicurus. The poet moves humanely toward his audience and its difficulties, but he knows where he stands, serene, unafraid and unanxious in the face of his own and others' death. Each time he allows his verse to engage the feelings of the untrained by telling systems of imagery, he brings his reader confidently back to the sound Epicurean viewpoint that takes the terror from the images or dismisses them, like the terrors of darkness, from the imagination.

Thus Segal defines a coherent technique of presentation by Lucretius, philosopher and poet, precisely where others have thought that they detected

anti–Lucretius or demented Lucretius (in either case, a highly inconsistent Lucretius, they believed). As Segal argues, the grotesquely vivid scenes of cutting around the eye (3.408ff.), of an epileptic fit (487ff.), of limbs and head severed by scythe–bearing chariots and still in convulsive movement (642ff.), all fix our attention and emotions on the physical and psychological disruptions of death and dying. But even as Lucretius uses his poetic power to evoke these scenes, which we can briefly study with fascinated horror, he is using them primarily to illustrate the constantly reiterated point: that the soul is equally mortal with the body. And from that it follows that death is final and the feelings we have about death have no rational validity. Each of those striking illustrations takes up the untrained auditor's anxiety about death and distances him (or her) from the fear, as the poet–philosopher himself moves back to his calm assertion about our total mortality, from which he began.

Even if our natural anxiety about dying responds more to the vivid illustrations than to the logical argumentation that controls them, and we feel ourselves connected to dying while alive, the diatribe of 3.830ff. works to dissociate us in life from others who are dead and from our imagination of ourselves dead. Epicurus should be our model: he calmly accepted death when he had run the course of life's light (3.1042), and his life as teacher, by showing us how to escape the anxieties of death, symbolically conquered death and surpassed all the heroic and martial achievements of conventional "great men." The immortality which we vainly pursue, in our terror of dying, turns out to be death that alone is eternal.

Segal goes on to treat the famous sequence in book 5, where Lucretius interrupts his story of human development to dwell morbidly (it seems) on the mad way that human beings utilized the techniques that made productive agriculture possible, namely the application of metals to effective tools of plowing, and perverted those same metals into weapons of war. Not content with such devilish inventions, men regressed to using animals for warfare (1297ff.), first the tamable beasts, then the increasingly wild and untamable ones, with the inevitable result that these animals simply went wild and attacked the human fighters indiscriminately. Again Segal effectively combats the common reaction to this passage (that Lucretius is crazy or disturbed as he strays from his argument) and shows that the same creative process of poet and philosopher operates here too: the poet lets us see how men lacking the Epicurean perception pursued suicidal goals, thinking that conquest and material advantages were valid ends; the philosopher halts the development (5.1341ff.), questioning its very factuality, and brings us back to rationality from ghoulish fantasy.

Finally, Segal takes on the most striking of Lucretius' supposedly morbid digressions: the description of the Athenian Plague at the end of book 6. Here he hopes to apply all that he has said about Lucretius' integrated techniques of using imagery and illustrations of death in book 3. I must agree that much of his argument is persuasive: I can see how the plague provides an extraordinarily vivid illustration of death for our contemplation, that it simultaneously repre-

sents the worst horrors of death and dying according to conventional anxiety and also describes a concrete historical event in pre–Epicurean Athens before the Master appeared to offer liberation from that and other misconceptions to "sick mortals" (6.1). But in this case alone, the poet seems to have had the last word, indulging his own as well as the readers' imagination, and the philosopher has failed to reassert his serene rational confidence and distancing comments. There is no justification in theorizing that Lucretius killed himself, unable to carry on as a true Epicurean after line 1286; but it does seem to me that our text, regardless of how Lucretius left it, is incomplete and untrue to the very techniques that Segal has so ably defined elsewhere in the poem. That reservation, however, should not be my final comment: I find this an important and sensitive reading of Lucretius and of the meaning of death to him and to us all.

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KNUD P. ALMAR. Inscriptiones Latinae: Eine illustrierte Einführung in die lateinische Epigraphik. Odense University Press, 1990. 569 pp. 261 ills. 1 table. DM 85. (Odense University Classical Studies, 14)

An ambitious but flawed work, Knud Paasch Almar's introduction to Latin epigraphy follows in the footsteps of the standard earlier handbooks of Cagnat (4th ed. 1914), Sandys (2d ed. 1927), and others. Sections on the alphabet and Roman names (the latter sixty pages long) are followed by chapters devoted to most of the major classes of inscriptions—sepulchral, honorary, etc. (109–211)—and then by chapters in which Almar treats people who appear on inscriptions, among them emperors, imperial slaves and freedmen, senators, equestrians, soldiers, and members of *collegia* (212–381). He includes lists of the emperors and of abbreviations found on inscriptions, both of which are usual in such handbooks, and a very useful section on ways to date an inscription (385–90), which is not.

Despite its debt to earlier handbooks, this work differs from them in important ways. Almar rightly agrees with A. E. Gordon that it is essential to have photographs of all inscriptions treated; thus each chapter consists of two parts, a main text in large type, and a series of photographs of inscriptions accompanied by comments in small type. In his comments Almar explains the peculiarities of each inscription, noting the meanings of titles, odd grammar, and palaeographical features. Sometimes his remarks grow into short essays (as on the Egyptian cults, 155–57). In both text and comments he often takes advantage of twentieth–century scholarship: slaves, freedmen, and equestrians, for example, are all treated in a far more satisfactory way than in earlier handbooks.

If we think of such a book as a sort of "user's guide," this one will

generally serve well, despite a format that is confusing at first, and for some topics it is better than earlier handbooks. The level of accuracy is high, and Almar's comments are sensible and useful. Students who read the comments on the individual inscriptions will learn a great deal about how to handle and interpret inscriptions that deal with individuals. Nevertheless there are some caveats, and they are not trivial.

The book's strength—its inclusion of only those inscriptions which could be photographed—is also its main weakness, for it means that Almar includes no long inscriptions at all. The reader will find here no text, not even a part of a text, of any law, *senatus consultum,* municipal charter, or imperial edict or letter. The *Res Gestae* is never defined, only mentioned in passing. Diocletian's price edict and the (so-called) *laudatio Turiae* do not appear. No *carmen,* no inscription with a narrative, not even a sepulchral inscription such as that of Plautius Aelianus (*ILS* 986), is included. Instead, in his chapter on *acta et leges* (193–211), Almar concentrates on *kalendaria,* while for official documents he refers the reader to P. F. Girard's *Textes de droit romain* (1937). This is not helpful, since that is a rare book on this side of the Atlantic.

There are other distressing omissions. Almar never discusses inscriptions on portable objects, so students will read these 569 pages without ever knowing that such things as brick stamps, amphora stamps, slave collars, and curse tablets even exist, much less why they might be of interest. He also omits graffiti, except for three (nos. 13, 14, and 15) that he cites for their letter forms. Virtually all of the inscriptions discussed in detail come from Italy or the western provinces (there is only one from all of Africa), and very few recent discoveries are included: of the 261 items, not more than seven were first published after 1950. Thus these inscriptions, while they adequately illustrate the points made in the text, will hardly introduce the reader to all the varieties of epigraphical information available.

Beyond such obvious matters this book raises a broader question. Traditionally, introductions to Latin epigraphy have tried to help the reader make sense of inscriptions by classifying them and explaining how one should handle their peculiar conventions. Almar's work, for all its greater length and inclusion of photographs, falls squarely within this tradition. The student, however, now needs more than this. Computers have made it possible to assemble and exploit large data bases, and the computer-generated index to *CIL* 6 (not noted by Almar) is an invaluable tool. The rapid development of underwater archaeology and studies in Rome's Monte Testaccio have produced new amphora stamps with important implications for the nature of Rome's commercial life. As they have become more interested in social problems, historians have begun to exploit inscriptions in a great variety of contexts, among them informal marriages, literacy, and benefactions (the theme of the 1992 Epigraphical Congress). Any introduction to Roman epigraphy written now needs to alert students to these developments and help them understand how best to use the new tools and methodologies. Just such an approach to inscriptions was taken by G. C. Susini

in his 1982 volume, *Epigrafia romana* (not in Almar's bibliography), and by L. Keppie in a recent semipopular treatment (*Understanding Roman Inscriptions,* 1991); but Susini consciously avoided the topics traditional in introductory works, and Keppie's work is intended for a general audience, so that neither of these books can serve as a complete guide to Roman inscriptions either. We still lack the ideal "user's guide," a work that will teach students how to read all the various kinds of inscriptions, and then to use, in a responsible and creative way, what they have read.

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JOHN K. EVANS. War, Women and Children in Ancient Rome. New York: Routledge, 1991. xvi + 263 pp. 10 pls. Cloth, $45 (U.S.), $55 (Can.).

Evans's aim is to repair what he sees as a "failure to integrate women's history into the broader fabric of ancient history at large," and his thesis is well designed to achieve that goal: "[The book's] thesis may be briefly stated: so rigidly patriarchal a society as Rome of the Twelve Tables could not send hundreds of thousands of men abroad to prosecute wars of conquest that went on virtually without interruption for the last two hundred years of the Republic's existence without inviting severe erosion of the institutions that kept women and children in thrall" (x). First a discussion of the goal and then of the thesis:

Evans's predecessors have not failed as badly as he suggests. One can cite Pomeroy's observation (*Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves,* 1975, 180) that "the absence of men, which was an abiding feature of history as Rome conquered and governed distant territories, encouraged independence among women and unstable marriages," as well as discussion to the same end throughout her chapter "The Roman Matron" (e.g., 181), which also largely anticipates Evans's chronological reconstruction of the social changes resulting from continuous campaigning. Evans praises Pomeroy effusively in the preface, but the rest of the book does not give appropriate credit to predecessors. Since Pomeroy's discussion of Rome even receives nitpicking criticism at the level of a note pointing out that she referred to magistrates who exiled women during the Hannibalic War as tribunes although they were actually aediles (46 n. 125), one might have expected Evans to mention her anticipation of his thesis.

Other scholars come in for similar treatment. One example comes from an important discussion in which Evans does enhance our understanding of the *Lex Voconia.* Previous accounts are described as "unrewarding reading" offering "mono-causal explanations" which are "seriously flawed" and "cannot be defended." Recent scholars have supposedly reflected the "popular" position that the Romans were "antifeminist, or misogynist" (73) and have abused the evidence in a fragment of Cato. Of the Anglophone scholars lumped together in

the notes to this discussion (nn. 106–8), only Crook comes close to using the word "antifeminist," when he says that those who used it were "probably right" (*Family in Ancient Rome,* ed. Rawson, 1985, 66). If one looks at the works and pages Evans cites in this discussion of the *Lex Voconia,* one finds that Crook has anticipated one of Evans's arguments about the Voconia, that Dixon's argument is not "mono-causal," that Rawson explicitly argues against the "misogynist" or "antifeminist" view, that Hallett argues that elite Roman men often valued women highly and never suggests that they were misogynistic or antifeminist, and that Pomeroy does not mention the fragment of Cato on the pages cited in Evans's notes. Similar examples of the treatment of other scholars can be found in every major subchapter. These assertions that others have interpreted the evidence in an unsubtle fashion while engaging in "mono-causal" analysis sit oddly within an account which tries to ascribe so many diverse social phenomena to the effects of warfare.

In other cases Evans omits rather than distorts. One chapter offers a lengthy discussion of the *Lex Oppia* and women's *luxuria* which concludes that the Senate's rejection of Cato's policy was "due in large part if not exclusively to the political capital that individual senators might accrue from such display" (69). One may compare my conclusion ("Lex Oppia," *Latomus* 41 [1982] 792) that "the display of wealth by women reflected upon the importance of their men," and my subsequent discussion of the greater benefits in conducting male competition indirectly through female relatives. One could also refer to my "Again What Meaning Lies in Colour!" (*ZPE* 64 [1986] 235–45), which has a more detailed discussion of the political potency of a reputation for *sophrosynē* and *kalokagathia* displayed through wealth lavished on female relatives. Both of these essays anticipate much of Evans's third chapter, using much of the same evidence to the same basic end. Evans cannot have been unaware of these articles, since I sent him offprints. They are neither cited nor listed in the bibliography.

This is not plagiarism, nor is it plagiarism when Evans criticizes Pomeroy caustically on comparatively minor points while failing to cite the instances in which she anticipated his conclusions on constant warfare's effect on women's inheritances, assumption of public roles (see also my essays cited above), and gradual escape from the most onerous aspects of *tutela*. This approach seems to reflect the deeply held conviction that his predecessors' arguments are so lacking in significance compared to his own that he hardly needs to keep any real track of them. Evans cannot be said to have met his goal of bridging the gap between political history and women's history, since he has not demonstrated that scholarship to date has left any chasm between them. Nor can he expect that a discussion couched in such terms can participate in any healthy way in "broadening the current debate about Roman women and children" (x).

That brings us to the thesis. As just noted, Evans's treatment of the consequences of constant warfare on women's legal status and on wealth available to elite women mainly differs from that in Pomeroy's survey text in length

and detail. Its novelties are not always improvements. In one case, Evans firmly rejects Pomeroy's suggestion that *sine manu* marriage contributed to the greater freedom accorded Roman women in the mid–Republic; he calls it "largely illusory" and "scarcely to be credited" (19, 20). His grounds for rejecting Pomeroy's account are (1) anecdotal material which Livy and others ascribe to the archaic period and (2) a possible, alternative household structure attested in Plutarch and Valerius Maximus (who apparently found it remarkable, not typical) and in the fourth century A.D. in Euboea!

Such treatment of material from Livy and others is a serious, systemic problem. Evans dutifully mentions the "legendary" nature of the stories but goes on to use them as a completely accurate reflection of political, social, and economic conditions in the "primitive" Republic. His text shows no awareness that Livy may well reflect his own era's debate on women's status. This is another failure to see the mote in one's own eye, since Evans has a note criticizing Förtsch, Balsdon, Hermann, Carp, and Dixon as "heavily dependent on anecdotal evidence" (5 n. 16). Similarly, his treatment of the archaic period is vitiated by his strange idea that *veteres* in Gaius means the authors (Evans's term) of "the law of the Twelve Tables" (24 et al.). It is no wonder that the more critical Dixon, Rawson, and Pomeroy have not reconstructed the archaic period in such detail.

Given Evans's previous publications, it is not surprising that he makes useful contributions on patterns of displacement of peasants in the chapter on working women. He tries to tie this chapter to his thesis by labeling it an exploration of what happened to the women who were dispossessed or enslaved. He reconstructs quite plausibly a picture of "familial organization" (120) in which small producers lived, made goods, and sold them all within the household, although he believes that involving women in production would have violated a cultural precept that women should work at home. Then shouldn't there have been a cultural preference for having them back in the *familia*'s area making something rather than out front behind a counter dealing with the public? Evans's approach to this issue seems to be related to his examination of the evidence for women's employment, in which he establishes that it is hard to tell from titles who was in production and who was in sales and that the evidence is unclear. He ends that discussion by claiming that his demonstration that the evidence is inadequate to prove that women were engaged in production somehow establishes that they were in sales.

The discussion of prostitutes is odd in that it veers from the assertion that "loose morals were a prerequisite" (133) to the recognition that "for many women there were only two choices—privation or prostitution" (141). It seems obvious to Evans that graffito *CIL* IV 2310b represents a "boast" by a prostitute named Euplia and was drafted "with evident pride" (135), an interpretation that seems to owe more to Della Corte and D'Avino than to the cryptic evidence: *Euplia hic / cum hominibus bellis / m[vacat]m*. This might have been written in the way of advertising by the owner of the brothel. It might be a comment by

one of the *homines belli* upon leaving the brothel. It might even, given the line division, be a joke, a pun on an understood *cubat*—a parody of a commemorative inscription. If Euplia was the author, that sits oddly with Evans's picture of women of the lower classes as completely uneducated. I pick on this one minor, obscure epigraphic problem because I think that it exemplifies Evans's approach to much of his project. He believes that the evidence lends itself clearly and unambiguously to his end and that scholars who have not reached the same result have erred or have been ideologically driven.

As the introduction concedes, the final derivative chapter on relations between parents and children is not firmly tied to the thesis on warfare and its consequences. The argument finally comes down to the dubious proposition that ethnically Greek, enslaved *nutrices* loved their Roman wards who then grew up believing that one should love small children. The treatment of homosexuality is even weaker, as it assumes that homosexuality and pederasty are inextricably associated, at least to the extent that homosexual sex was unlikely to be mutually desired and was usually to be obtained by the use of power if not force.

Finally, some significant areas in which other scholars have posited causal connections between women's history and war are neglected, e.g., Pomeroy on marital relationships and Culham on women's participation in religion. The volume as a whole is marred by the use of double standards in assessing evidence for various positions, some unclear writing, misleading treatment of the "state of" various questions, and naïveté in taking the narrative sources at face value. These last two are exemplified by the only case in evidence of an Anglophone scholar concerned with misogyny as an issue, namely Evans's own belief that large dowries were, factually, producing "shrewish" behavior and that one notorious fragment of Metellus Numidicus on the intrinsic discomfort of living with women was not "simply a misogynous comment, but rather an accurate reflection of a troubled social environment" (66). One wonders whether Evans would have found Metellus' wife's comments on life with Metellus as transparently and simply true, if her construction of Roman social fact had survived.

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RICHARD DUNCAN-JONES. Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. xvi + 245 pp. 6 appendices. 29 figures. 51 tables. Cloth, $59.50.

This volume is described as a sequel to the author's *Economy of the Roman Empire: Quantitative Studies* (1974). The thirteen chapters, however, are

discrete studies and hardly constitute an integrated work; some topics are only tangentially related to the economy. An effort to systematize the book and give it a degree of unity by organizing its content into five parts does little to keep it from reading much like a festschrift. Five of the chapters have been previously published (here "reworked"), and eight are new.

This book, like its predecessor, attempts at times to do what is really impossible: to quantify data so sparse as to be unquantifiable in any significant sense. The occasional use of esoteric terminology and models of the social scientists does not change this one whit. Still, the author has often dug out data not previously published, and it is useful to bring the material together.

The question, then—whether the book repays the reading—is certainly yes, but with qualifications and a caveat. The danger is that some who use the volume will view the material as if it represents total truth. What it really presents is anecdotal and other scant information which, though presented in tables or graphs and thus quickly apprehended visually, cannot be accepted as objective truth, because it is based on small sampling. The point should not be overstressed; after all, almost all our information from antiquity is sadly fragmentary. We have to use what is there, and any addition to our information is valuable. Besides, any uncritical use of the data will be the fault of the users more than of the author, for he often warns—usually in his conclusions—that the indicated inferences may have limited significance or even be wrong. Yet the warnings often are separated from the basic presentations by several pages.

The first chapter, "Communication–Speed and Contact by Sea in the Roman Empire," provides new, statistical documentation from Egypt on the passage of time between the deaths of emperors and the first known official references to their successors in surviving documents, and similarly, from Africa, on the lapse of time between the issuance of dated edicts (in the late Empire) and the identifiable times of arrival. The intervals are long, sometimes inexplicably so: an Oxyrhynchus papyrus is dated to the reign of Septimius Severus almost nine months after the emperor's death. Even excluding such anomalies, the transit times are lengthy, several times as long as the record journeys Pliny records. As explanation, Duncan–Jones points to bureaucratic delays and weather; one might suggest also, in the case of the deaths of emperors, that the Egyptian documents reflect dates after which official notice was received from the new emperor rather than the actual first news of the death. If true, the data do not provide very useful information about the actual speed of communications. Sometimes the author labors the obvious: sea travel was faster in summer than in winter.

Chapter 2, "Trade, Taxes and Money," quite properly casts doubt on the Finley–Hopkins argument that, under pressure from certain imperial policies from Augustus on, taxes tended to be collected in money and not in kind. Duncan–Jones notes that there seems to have been little regional exchange of coinages; the government depended on new metal to pay the troops, who in any

case received only part of their pay in specie. One might suggest in support that the military need for grain in large quantity might have led to collection of taxes in kind in some areas.

Chapter 4, "Stability and Change," presents some interesting graphs on volume of documentation, for example, from building dedications in Italy and provincial sites where information is available. Total documentation in Egypt is graphed as well, with some warning that variations may relate to how much was recorded in a given time. A very large coin hoard of the late second century is graphed to indicate variations in volume of coinage during the century. One quibble: such a large hoard does not "reflect the volume of coins being produced" (73); it does pretty accurately reflect the *relative* volume of the coinage.

Chapter 5, "Age-awareness in the Roman World," demonstrates, interestingly, that many Romans had only an approximate idea of how old they were. In the surviving documents there is much rounding-off of ages. Instances are cited in which persons gave different ages at different times. This fact may reflect illiteracy; yet as the author notes, most of the evidence comes from the class of people who could afford tombstones. Chapter 6, "Roman Life-expectancy," brings in some data not previously published; altogether, the study indicates a lower life-expectancy than is usually postulated. Information from Ulpian as to survival rates at various ages seems meaningful; unfortunately, his figures are for persons aged twenty and older. Better to have data about survival rates for children at about age ten who had managed to survive the usual childhood diseases.

In chapter 7, on pay and numbers in Diocletian's army, Duncan-Jones concludes that soldiers then were paid only about six times more than in the time of Domitian; this seems very low in view of the rampant inflation of the third century and surely is understated. He notes that the decline in real pay was not made up by considerable donatives. One point seems dubious: that donatives were paid at a flat rate to all soldiers, regardless of rank (116). Even though no mention is made in the documents of any graduation in amounts paid, is it not much more likely that there were differences by rank, but that these were so standard and so well-known that they did not need to be stipulated?

Chapter 8 contains a statement on land and landed wealth that triggered my usual skepticism: "Rome normally expropriated the land of conquered peoples, at any rate in theory" (121). Is it not time to discard this notion of an obscure grammarian? In Italy and in the provinces, during both Republic and Empire, inhabitants of previously subdued areas (or cities) *who rebelled against Rome,* once reconquered, were indeed considered *dediticii* and their land confiscated. But is there any evidence at all that Rome routinely so behaved after initial conquest?

Chapter 8 also presents statistics on land-holding in some areas which, unsurprisingly, indicate that a small percentage of people at the top held a large percentage of the land, and a large percentage at the bottom held little. After

interpreting the data in an Italian town in terms of the Gini coefficient of differentiation, Duncan–Jones says—nine pages later—that "the contrasts thrown up by the Gini coefficient have limited significance" (138). Exactly.

Chapter 9, "The Price of Wheat in Roman Egypt," has some helpful data, but some conclusions are unsurprising: prices fluctuated both within a given year and year–to–year. The material in the following chapter, "The Social Cost of Urbanisation," dealing with *munera* in the cities and exemptions as well as changes over time, is quite interesting. Still, the conclusions only underline what is already well known: the *munera* could be onerous; many persons, including intellectuals, could be given exemptions (which had to be limited even in the high Empire), and the situation in the cities grew more difficult as time went by, so that compulsion became usual in the late Empire. Duncan–Jones seems a bit too sanguine here: "It is . . . difficult to show that any generic or qualitative change took place in the functioning of the municipal system before the later third century" (172). Not in the chaotic middle third century?

Chapter 11, on who paid for public buildings, has quite useful information. It is surprising to see so much variation in towns within the same area and, for that matter, variation in the town budgets themselves. Benefactors provided most public buildings in some towns; in others, income from *summae honorariae,* sums paid for the privilege of holding office, which were an important part of local budgets, had to provide funds even for construction of public buildings. Also important was the status of the (provincial) towns: favored communities were exempt from some or even all taxes.

The last two chapters, constituting Part V, discuss taxation. One strong impression: it is useful to be reminded that the evidence for taxation is scrappy, sometimes puzzling, and not reflective of a neat system. Some reports are hard to believe. For example, Hyginus says that some land was taxed at rates as high as 20 percent. With the methods and tools then in use, no person could regularly hope to produce that great a surplus; would not such a tax have been confiscatory? Duncan–Jones does call it "high" (190–91). The last chapter, dealing especially with the implications of Diocletian's *iugum,* presents new (at least to me) and convincing information on the origins of the term and its history. One conclusion: "Since by this date [the time of Diocletian], the *iugum* had already entered customary and official use as a measure of area in parts of the Roman world, its utilisation for tax–purposes is not an obvious anomaly" (201). The appendices are brief but thoughtful contributions.

In sum, this is a book which has unavoidable weaknesses but belongs on the shelf of every scholar interested in the Roman Empire.

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MARIO CAPASSO. Manuale di papirologia ercolanese. Lecce, Congedo Editore, 1991. 339 pp. 16 color pls. 75 figs. Paper, price not stated. (Università degli Studi di Lecce, Dipartimento di Filologia Classica e Medioevale, Testi e Studi, 3)

The activities surrounding the Herculanean papyri range from the study of the villa in which they were found to the edition of the texts, with translation and commentary. In the past twenty–four years these activities have proceeded at an accelerated pace, thanks chiefly to the Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi, founded in 1969, and to the initiative and encouragement of its founder, Marcello Gigante. Capasso's *Manuale* provides a well–rounded report of the different fronts on which the *studiosi* have pursued programs of research and publication.

The first three chapters are on the villa. The eighteenth–century exploration was made by means of shafts and tunnels, and a drawing made by Karl Weber, one of the excavators, is still the authoritative source for the design of the villa. The accuracy of his drawing has been confirmed by modern explorers who reentered the tunnels for the first time in 1986. Weber's drawing has been published many times, more or less complete. A detailed and annotated copy, published by Comparetti and De Petra, *La villa ercolanese dei Pisoni* (Turin 1885), was reproduced in Waldstein and Shoobridge, *Herculaneum Past and Present* (London 1908). It is still useful, although recent studies have corrected some of Comparetti's comments. Capasso provides a simplified version, showing only the arrangement of rooms and open spaces, but he supplements it with an ideal reconstruction of the external appearance of the villa and a sketch showing where the papyri were found.

The plan, the records of the eighteenth–century excavation, and the statues that were brought out along with the papyri have given rise to much theorizing about the architectural history of the villa, the placement and significance of the statues, and the use of the different areas. The papyrus rolls were found in five different places. Capasso estimates that the total uncovered, including an estimated thirty to fifty destroyed by the excavators, was about eleven hundred. (Parts of some that survive have become separated, with the result that the current inventory lists a total of 1,837 papyri.) Some rolls appeared to be in temporary locations, perhaps because the villa was being remodeled at the time of the eruption. The great majority are in Greek. Since one would expect the villa to have a sizable collection of Latin papyri as well, it is conjectured that the Latin rolls may be in the parts of the villa that have not yet been explored. A renewal of the excavation is Gigante's top priority.

The relation of the Epicurean Philodemus to Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus and of both to the villa has been a matter of continuing speculation and controversy. Capasso summarizes several conflicting views. He himself accepts the widely held view that Piso owned the villa, that Philodemus, Piso's house philosopher, frequented it, and that the collection of papyri incorporates Philo-

demus' own library, including rolls that he brought with him from Athens. Capasso also reports the suggestion put forward by Dimitrios Pandermalis, and welcomed by Gigante, that Philodemus even influenced the adornment of the villa, including the choice and placement of the statues. Gigante goes even further. He identifies the meeting place of Philodemus' Epicurean group, as portrayed in one of Philodemus' epigrams, as the circular raised area at the extreme end of the walk that extends beyond the rectangular peristyle. This raised area, Gigante says, would have afforded the view of the sea that Lucretius describes at the beginning of *De Rerum Natura* 2.

This charming picture of Philodemus and his Epicurean friends enjoying their simple pleasures in Piso's beautiful villa is attractive enough, but it rests on a shaky foundation. The only ancient authority for the view that Philodemus was Piso's house philosopher is Cicero's *In Pisonem,* as interpreted by Asconius. Among other charges, Cicero addresses Piso as *Epicure noster ex hara producte,* and he accuses Piso of practicing all the vices that were imputed to the Epicureans by their detractors. (See my "Cicero's Invective against Piso," *TAPA* 72 [1941] 49–58.) To reinforce this charge of degraded Epicureanism Cicero provides Piso with a live–in Epicurean companion, a compliant Graeculus, who almost never leaves his side and who celebrates his orgies in elegant poems. Asconius identifies the Graeculus as Philodemus, and no doubt he is correct. But no one believes that Philodemus was "defiled by Piso's filth," and the only extant poem that is addressed to a Piso (perhaps Lucius, possibly Gaius or Gnaeus; Philodemus addressed treatises to a Piso, a Gaius, and a Gnaeus, all three thought by some to be Pisos) does not place Philodemus in Piso's dining room; on the contrary, Philodemus is inviting Piso to dinner. How much of Cicero's invective, then, can we believe? But if we don't believe Cicero, we lose the only evidence we have for placing Philodemus in Piso's villa, and indeed for identifying the villa as Piso's.

The case for placing Piso and Philodemus in the villa is further weakened by Guglielmo Cavallo's dating of the papyri. Cavallo concluded on paleographical grounds that some of the Epicurean works in the collection must be dated to the late first century B.C. or the early first century A.D. (see Capasso 192–98). This means that after the death of both Philodemus and Piso the proprietor of the villa acquired newly copied works of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Colotes, Polystratus, probably even Philodemus. But why stop there? Could he not have collected some or all of the other items? He could even have obtained from Philodemus' literary executor the papyri that have been identified as first drafts. But if the collection was made after Philodemus' death, and I see no clear evidence that it was not, it does not place Philodemus, much less Piso, in the villa.

There is a difficulty also with the supposition that the villa contained Philodemus' library. The collection is far too limited. Philodemus' writings indicate that he was reasonably well acquainted with Greek literature and philosophy, and yet of the Greek papyri so far identified none contains a work of Greek

literature, not even Homer, and the only non–Epicurean philosopher represented in the collection is Chrysippus. Even other Epicureans are not well represented. Papyri containing two works of Epicurus (one being his Περὶ φύσεως), one each of Carneiscus and Polystratus, four of Demetrius Lacon, and possibly one of Metrodorus are dated by Cavallo before Philodemus' death. The great majority are writings of Philodemus, in some cases more than one copy of the same work. Such a collection would more appropriately be the library of an admirer of Philodemus than of Philodemus himself.

The rest of the book is less controversial. Chapter 4, "Lo svolgimento," gives the history of the opening of the carbonized rolls, along with pictures of some of the devices used. This work is still going on, most recently by a team led by Knut Kleve. With the help of a computer they have recovered fragments of Latin papyri that appear to be from Lucretius and Ennius; see *Cron. Erc.* 19 (1989) 5–27 and 20 (1990) 5–16.

In chapter 5, "La documentazione," Capasso reviews the history of the copying of the papyri, the publication of copies, the editions, based primarily on copies, that were published in Germany between 1863 and 1939, and finally the revival of interest in the papyri in Italy, culminating in the extensive program of research and publication sponsored by the Centro Internazionale.

Chapter 6, "La biblioteca della villa: formazione, contenuti, manufatti," is by far the longest. First it gives a chronology of the papyri and brief summaries of their subject matter. Then it takes up the manufacture of the rolls, the spacing of lines, columns and titles, abbreviations, diacritical marks, orthography, errors and corrections, ink and writing instruments.

The final chapter, "Il papirologo ercolanese a lavoro," tells a would–be editor of Herculanean papyri how to go about it.

The illustrations are noteworthy. Twenty–five are of papyrus texts. Others are of unrolled papyri, instruments used for unrolling, and cabinets for holding papyrus rolls. There are pictures also of persons, places, statues, and inscriptions. The book has in addition a select bibliography, chronological tables, and indexes of passages cited, papyri, and names ancient and modern.

Some of the many topics covered by Capasso in this relatively short book (the seven chapters occupy only 208 pages) are treated rather sketchily. Nevertheless it can be useful as an introduction to the diverse lines of inquiry that emanate from the villa and its contents.

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CORRIGENDUM

The Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, publisher of Christoph Ulf, *Die homerischen Gesellschaft* (Vestigia, 43), has advised us that the price of the book, reviewed in *AJP* 113.4, pp. 624–27, was erroneously cited. The correct price should be DM 114.

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THE TRAGIC AND THE COMIC TEREUS

Fred Bishop in memoriam

The Tereus of Aristophanes' *Birds* is a remarkable character whose dramatic function as a self-professed refugee from the tragic stage and mediator continues to engage students of the play.[1] Much work on *Birds* implicitly addresses the questions "Why has Aristophanes chosen Tereus as his intermediary between men and birds?" and "What connection might exist between the legends of Tereus, their literary treatments, and the design of *Birds*?"[2] Though a Thracian,[3] Tereus in the comedy speaks a colloquial Attic as well as an exalted, mock-tragic Greek. He is at times pathetic, at times genial, and always funny. He lives, moreover, in perfect harmony with Prokne (who in

[1] He enters at line 92 and exits at line 675. The traditional assignment of lines in the prologue (e.g., in Coulon, *Aristophane*) seems improved in Sommerstein's *Birds*, the text of which I use here. Peisetairos' role as protagonist is thereby made more coherent, as he is in control from the very beginning. Sommerstein's text is based for the most part on Marzullo, "L'interlocuzione" 181–91 (also Fraenkel, *Beobachtungen* 61–65). Translations given are also Sommerstein's (with minor changes), unless otherwise noted.

[2] Recently Zannini-Quirini, *Nephelokokkygia* 41, who notes that "molte delle componenti del personaggio mitico vengono funzionalmente utilizzate nella commedia." He points out, in particular, Tereus' warlike character, skill in various crafts (cf. the Boio[s] version of the myth featuring a Polytekhnos = Tereus), the Hoopoe's characteristic song, and his "savage (barbarian)" context. Zannini-Quirini seeks the broadest possible thematic implications of the Tereus *myth*. See also Hofmann, *Mythos und Komödie* 72–78, and Alink, *De Vogels* 50–65.

[3] So in the better-known literary treatments of the legend (e.g., Sophokles and Ovid). Important secondary literature on this myth includes Hiller von Gärtingen, *De Graecorum Fabulis* 35–56; Mayer, "Mythistorica"; Robert, *Griechische Heldensage* 154–62; Halliday, *Indo-European Folk-tales* 85–112; Chandler, "Nightingale"; Cazzaniga, *La saga di Itis*; Mihailov, "La légende de Térée"; Fontenrose, "The Sorrows of Ino and Procne"; Schroeder, "ΠΡΟΚΝΗ"; Zaganiaris, "Le mythe de Térée"; and Segal, "Philomela's Web."

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Birds has no speaking part) and behaves in a manner that would have been comically familiar to spectators at the City Dionysia. Virtually all distinctive features of the violent legend—the rape and imprisonment of Philomela, the glossectomy, the sacrifice of Itys, and the Dionysian cult context of the Athenian sisters' revenge—are banished from the comic stage. Finally, and what seems most significant, Aristophanes has made Tereus a benevolent bridge between the Athenians and the comic Beyond, between the "here" of the polis and theater and an avian "nowhere" in which Peisetairos invents Nephelokokkygia. Tereus' primary function, in fact, is to have taught and disseminated language among "barbarians" in order to prepare a theatrical and linguistic context for Peisetairos' creative activities. Thus, beyond his transformation from man into bird, Tereus undergoes further and extensive metamorphosis from a tragic character into a comic character at the hands of Aristophanes. Rather than accept this metamorphosis as routine burlesque of traditional material, I argue that the comic Tereus, as a pointed and devious comment on Sophoklean innovation (in *Tereus,* ca. 432), is an Aristophanic masterstroke that furnishes the complex thematic foundation of the comedy.

At once innovative and familiar, the paratragic aspect of *Birds* is a striking example of how Aristophanes uses tragic forms to express comic ideas: by transplanting Tereus from the context which Sophokles had charged with a strong Atheno–barbarian tension, and by subjecting him to a comic transformation, Aristophanes engages the "boundless optimism" which we must suppose was the governing mood in the demos in the spring of 414.[4] At the same time, the character's tragic provenance as well as the surprising results of his catalytic role in *Birds* have ominous overtones, a dark lining, as it were, which continues to attract attention.[5] Nephelokokkygia is thus located between a present world in which the tragic past may be forgotten and a future world in

[4] Sommerstein, *Birds* 5, who notes that "it is symptomatic of this [optimism] that every time an allusion is made in the play to current, recent, or projected military operations, the tone adopted is one of almost cheerful bellicosity." For a recent discussion of paratragedy see Foley, "Tragedy and Politics."

[5] Whitman, *Comic Hero* 167–200; Arrowsmith, "Fantasy Politics of Eros"; and Zannini-Quirini, *Nephelokokkygia,* highlight different aspects of the terrors and dangers implicit in the play. The latter, for example, speaks of the "monstrous and ambiguous" inhabitants of Nephelokokkygia (*Nephelokokkygia* 86), whose rejection of the present entails a "dangerous" return to mythical origins (p. 150). For a wide-ranging analysis of Nephelokokkygia see Pozzi and Wickersham, *Myth and the Polis* (especially Pozzi's "The Polis in Crisis," 126–63).

which past terrors must be reinscribed. The paratragic usurpation of *Tereus* exemplifies a thoroughgoing "poetics of transformation," a programmatic concern in *Birds* with the usurpation, assimilation, and transformation of genre, history, myth, and texts.

Since the early nineteenth century,[6] scholars have puzzled over Peisetairos' statement of purpose (esp. 39–48), which unlike similar passages in earlier plays (*Knights* 36–72, *Wasps* 54–73) seems to have little explicit relevance to the subsequent action:

> οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὖν τέττιγες ἕνα μῆν' ἢ δύο
> ἐπὶ τῶν κραδῶν ᾄδουσ', Ἀθηναῖοι δ' ἀεὶ
> ἐπὶ τῶν δικῶν ᾄδουσι πάντα τὸν βίον.
> διὰ ταῦτα τόνδε τὸν βάδον βαδίζομεν·
> κανοῦν δ' ἔχοντε καὶ χύτραν καὶ μυρρίνας
> πλανώμεθα ζητοῦντε τόπον ἀπράγμονα,
> ὅποι καθιδρυθέντε διαγενοίμεθ' ἄν.
> ὁ δὲ στόλος νῷν ἐστι παρὰ τὸν Τηρέα,
> τὸν ἔποπα, παρ' ἐκείνου πυθέσθαι δεομένω,
> εἴ που τοιαύτην εἶδε πόλιν ᾗ 'πέπτατο.
>
> That's the thing: the cicadas chirp on the branches
> for a month or two, the Athenians chirp away
> at lawsuits continually all their lives long.
> That's why we're trekking this trek;
> with a basket, a pot and some myrtle-wreaths,
> we're wandering in search of a trouble-free place,
> where we can settle and pass our lives.
> Our journey now is to see Tereus the hoopoe,
> wanting to find out from him if he's seen
> a city of that kind anywhere he's flown over.

The apparent irrelevance of these opening claims, along with the general indeterminacy of the Athenians' quest, suggests that the design of *Birds* departs from the linear sequence (problem/conflict–*sōtēria*–consequences) characteristic of the *engagé* comedies produced in the

[6] In his twelfth lecture, for example, A. W. Schlegel (*Lectures* 166) dismisses the possibility that *Birds* is somehow *engagé* and suggests that the play is "a harmless display of merry pranks, which hit alike at gods and men without any particular object in view." That the problem was recognized in antiquity is clear from Hypothesis II (to *Birds*). Hofmann, *Mythos und Komödie* 79, notes of the latter that "Sie berichten von einer Kontroverse unter antiken Philologen (ohne dass wir die Beteiligten genauer eingrenzen können) über die Methoden aristophanischer Handlungsgestaltung." See the discussion of this problem in Dobrov, "Metaphor of Deferral" 209–17.

420s, that is, before the seven-year hiatus in the extant corpus. Furthermore, as one critic recently put it, "*Birds* differs from all the other fifth-century plays of Aristophanes that survive in having no strong and obvious connection with a topical question of public interest, whether political . . . , literary-theatrical . . . , or intellectual-educational."[7] I submit, however, that the prologue, in its references to Tereus (lines 15 and 46) along with the ensuing dialogue (lines 92–208), far from being irrelevant, points to a neglected and central motive developed through the parabasis and fully realized in Nephelokokkygia (the epeisodia): the reshaping of the themes and situations of a poignant political tragedy (Sophokles' *Tereus*) into a comic polity arising from a series of paratragic transformations. Peisetairos combines the rhetorical prowess of a sophist with the comic playwright's creativity as he supervises the many entrances and exits of characters from his polis-as-comedy named Trap (νεφέλη) for Chattering Fools (κόκκυγες). Nephelokokkygia thus unfolds as a play written and directed by the protagonist![8] The process by which a drama derives much of its meaning from its context within the polis (its festivals, laws, language, and customs) appears to be reversed: Aristophanes builds an insubstantial city "made of drama" subject to the rules of performance for which the transformed tragic model serves as a living blueprint. *Birds* is indeed "the artistic culmination of Aristophanes' earlier technique"[9] in its unusually balanced synthesis of political, literary-theatrical, and intellectual themes.

FLIGHT FROM TRAGIC ΛΥΜΑΙ TO COMIC ΣΚΩΜΜΑΤΑ

Entering the theatrical space holding a jackdaw and a crow, respectively, Peisetairos and Euelpides announce that they have been sent on their journey by a certain (otherwise unknown) trader:

[7] Sommerstein, *Birds* 1. Similar observations are made by Henderson (*Maculate Muse* 83) and many other students of the play. The difference between *Birds* and the earlier extant comedies certainly suggests a process of gradual evolution. For a play produced between *Peace* and *Birds* see Geissler, *Chronologie* 50.

[8] Many specifically theatrical aspects of the comic polis were discussed in papers by Niall Slater and Gregory Dobrov at the 1990 A.P.A. program on the *Birds*, to be published in Dobrov, *The City as Comedy*.

[9] Henderson, *Maculate Muse* 82. The maturity and complexity of *Birds* has been often noted and is well analyzed by Newiger, "Die *Vögel* und ihre Stellung"; and Gelzer, "Aristophanes' Dramatic Art."

οὐκ τῶν ὀρνέων,
ὁ πινακοπώλης Φιλοκράτης μελαγχολῶν,
ὃς τώδ' ἔφασκε νῷν φράσειν τὸν Τηρέα,
τὸν ἔποφ', ὃς ὄρνις ἐγένετ' †ἐκ τῶν ὀρνέων.†[10] (13–16)

that man from the bird market,
that loony tray–vendor Philokrates, who told us
that these two birds would show us where to find Tereus,
the hoopoe, who was turned ⟨ ⟩ into a bird.

After wandering aimlessly about the orchestra for some time, the men finally stumble upon Tereus' dwelling, where they confront a slave who has followed his master through metamorphosis. The slave–bird's costume and apologetic description of Tereus' behavior (especially the curious mixture of avian and Athenian diets) prepare the spectators for the hoopoe's bombastic entrance at line 92: ἄνοιγε τὴν ὕλην ἵν' ἐξέλθω ποτέ, "throw wide the wood, that I might enter at last." This mock–tragic "open sesame" (cf. the pun *hylēn* ~ *pylēn*), along with other exotic elements deriving from the Near Eastern lore of the hoopoe,[11] are emblematic of the uniqueness and comic strangeness of Aristophanes' Tereus. The unexpected appearance, speech, and behavior of the bird–man elicit laughter from his visitors: "You look as though the Twelve Gods had blasted you!" jeers Euelpides. Tereus responds defensively:

[10]The crux (line 16, ἐκ τῶν ὀρνέων) no doubt conceals a phrase which anticipates Peisetairos' explanation (46–48) of his interest in Tereus. A compelling solution is offered by Koenen, "Tereus in den *Vögeln*," who emends to ἐκ τῶν ὀργίων, restoring an allusion to the Dionysian cult context of Tereus' metamorphosis. We should then translate "Tereus, the hoopoe, who became a bird from the rites (of Dionysos)." In this case ἐκ + genitive would denote both a causal and a temporal connection between the Dionysian Trieterika and Tereus' metamorphosis.

[11]Thompson, *Greek Birds* 95–100. Sacred in Egypt and in Islamic tradition (as one of the four creatures it is forbidden to kill), the hoopoe is associated with the sun by virtue of its rayed crest. The lore of this bird involves odd behavior and magic. It was believed, for example, to use the herb ἀδίαντον to liberate its imprisoned young (cf. the magic root introduced at lines 654–55 to transform men into birds). Thompson notes (98) that this "is a version of the well–known Samir legend (the 'open Sesame' of the Forty Thieves), and is told also of the Hoopoe in connexion with Solomon. . . . Hence used in magic to reveal secrets or discover treasure." See also Kanellis, *Catalogus Faunae Graeciae*, and Lamberton and Rotroff, *Birds of the Athenian Agora*, and (for bibliography especially) Arnott, "Some Bird Notes." For the hoopoe in particular see Oder, "Der Widehopf"; Dawson, "The Lore of the Hoopoe"; and Griffith, "The Hoopoe's Name."

Τη. μῶν με σκώπτετον
ὁρῶντε τὴν πτέρωσιν; ἦ γάρ, ὦ ξένοι,
ἄνθρωπος.
Πε. οὐ σοῦ καταγελῶμεν.
Τη. ἀλλὰ τοῦ;
Πε. τὸ ῥάμφος ἡμῖν σου γελοῖον φαίνεται.
Τη. τοιαῦτα μέντοι Σοφοκλέης λυμαίνεται
ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαισιν ἐμὲ τὸν Τηρέα.
Πε. Τηρεὺς γὰρ εἶ σύ; πότερον ὄρνις ἢ ταὼς; (96–102)

Te. You're not making fun of me, are you,
just because you see this plumage? I was once a man, you know,
gentlemen.
Pe. It's not you we're laughing at.
Te. What is it, then?
Pe. It's your beak we think looks funny.
Te. This is the injury Sophokles inflicts on me,
Tereus, in his tragedy.
Pe. You're Tereus, are you? Are you a bird or a peacock?

From this exchange it emerges that Aristophanes' Tereus claims the Sophoklean stage as his place of origin. "The Hoopoe of Aristophanes' play is a literary bird," notes Drew Griffith. "He makes it explicit that he is not merely the Tereus familiar from the broad field of myth but, much more precisely, he is *the very same character* that Sophocles staged."[12] This connection is clarified by the entrance of a character whom Kock calls "der zweite Tereus–Wiedehopf"—the third of the much-discussed "four dancers of the parodos (268–293)."[13] His appearance at line 279 surprises Euelpides, who thought Tereus to be the only representative of the species:

Ευ. τί τὸ τέρας τουτί ποτ' ἐστίν; οὐ σὺ μόνος ἄρ' ἦσθ' ἔποψ,
ἀλλὰ χοὗτος ἕτερος;
Τε. οὑτοσί μέν ἐστι Φιλοκλέους
ἐξ ἔποπος, ἐγὼ δὲ τούτου πάππος, ὥσπερ εἰ λέγοις
"Ἱππόνικος Καλλίου κἀξ Ἱππονίκου Καλλίας."
Ευ. Καλλίας ἄρ' οὗτος οὔρνις ἐστίν. ὡς πτεροῤῥυεῖ.
Τε. ἅτε γὰρ ὢν γενναῖος ὑπό τε συκοφαντῶν τίλλεται,
αἵ τε θήλειαι πρὸς ἐκτίλλουσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ πτερά. (280–86)

[12] Griffith, "The Hoopoe's Name" 60 (emphasis added).

[13] Kock, *Die Vögel* 36. On the four dancers see Lawler, "Four Dancers"; Carrière, "La choréographie des *Oiseaux*"; and Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* 145.

EU. What extraordinary sight is this? So you're not the only hoopoe—there's also this other one?
TE. He's the son of Philokles' hoopoe [or "Philokles the hoopoe"] and I'm his grandfather—just as you might say "Hipponikos was the son of Kallias and Kallias [Jr.] the son of Hipponikos."
EU. So this bird is Kallias. What a lot of feathers he's lost!
TE. Yes; being a pedigree bird, he gets plucked by prosecutors, and in addition to that the females pull out his feathers.

This oblique joke seeks to express the relationship between the two hoopoes in terms of the Athenian custom of alternating male names for successive generations. A grandfather–father–son sequence in one branch of the Kērykes family is correlated with a comically contrived hoopoe succession:[14]

Kallias (*PA* 7825)	Tereus: deuteragonist of Sophokles' *Tereus*
Hipponikos (*PA* 7658)	Philokles, i.e., the hoopoe in his tetralogy *Pandionis*; or Philokles himself (satirized as *aiskhros*, "ugly")
Kallias Jr. (*PA* 7826)	Tereus: the second hoopoe, i.e., the third of four dancers in *Birds* 279–84.

Thus the first hoopoe of *Birds* is Sophokles' Tereus and he is the "grandfather" of the dancer (hoopoe no. 2 of *Birds*). The intervening "generation" is represented by a hoopoe associated with Philokles, the minor tragedian satirized elsewhere by the comic poets.[15] This sets up a multileveled joke in which Aristophanes simultaneously mocks (1) Philokles'

[14] See Sommerstein, *Birds* 216.

[15] Schol. 281 informs us that Philokles, the son of Philopeithes and Aeschylus' sister, was known as Ἀλμίωνος, "son of Briny," for his harsh style. See, e.g., *Wasps* 461–62 and *Thesm.* 168 with scholia. Sommerstein, *Birds* 215–16, points out that the phrase Φιλοκλέους ἐξ ἔποπος could also mean "Philokles the hoopoe," in which case the allusion would be to Philokles' personal appearance (so in *Thesm.*). It is best to let the ambiguity stand, since the reading "from Philokles' hoopoe (i.e., his Tereus)" is suggested by the lineage: the Philokles–hoopoe is the "son" of Sophokles' Tereus. The reading "from Philokles the hoopoe," on the other hand, supplies the necessary intermediate name, giving the sequence Tereus–Philokles–Tereus necessary for the parallelism to work (i.e., to match Kallias–Hipponikos–Kallias). Merkelbach, *Beiträge* 26–27, emends the text in a way that makes Aristophanes' dancer identical with Philokles' tragic character, yielding parallelism between the Sophoklean Tereus and the "Philoklean Hoopoe." The text makes sense, however, without emendation.

work (the tetralogy *Pandionis*) as derivative of Sophokles, (2) Philokles' appearance: his pointed head suggests the crest of a hoopoe or lark (cf. line 1295), (3) the profligate lifestyle of Kallias Jr., and, finally, (4) his own work, in that the dancer, who is properly *Aristophanes'* hoopoe, corresponds to the degenerate younger Kallias, a popular target of comic ridicule (cf. Eupolis *Kolakes,* ca. 421). Ludwig Koenen may be correct in placing line 287 before 280 to make the phrase βαπτὸς ὄρνις, "dipped/gaudy bird," apply to the second hoopoe, thus restoring another aspect of the joke: the connection between the profligate Kallias–bird and his brother–in–law Alkibiades, who was himself lampooned a year earlier by Eupolis in *Baptai,* a comedy featuring a chorus of female votaries of the Thracian Kottyto.[16]

Although the hoopoe whom Peisetairos and Euelpides first encounter is, therefore, Sophokles' Tereus, he speaks as a refugee from the tragic stage and complains of ill treatment by the tragedian: "λυμαίνεται ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαισιν ἐμὲ τὸν Τηρέα," "This is the injury Sophokles inflicts on me, Tereus, in his tragedy." It is most natural to conclude from this response that Aristophanes is here satirizing the Sophoklean *costume* of the transformed Tereus. "In his *Tereus,*" notes the scholiast, "Sophokles enacted the metamorphoses of Tereus (ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ἀπωρνιθωμένον) and Prokne into birds, which is the basis for the many jokes at Tereus' expense [in *Birds*]."[17] While one may

[16]Koenen, "Tereus in den *Vögeln*" 86–87. (The unfortunate typographical error at this point in Koenen's argument is corrected in Merkelbach, *Beiträge* 26.) Regarding the Βάπται see (with caution) Edmonds, *FAC* I 330–31 and Kassel and Austin *PCG* V 331–43, frr. 76–98. The indirectness of this reference to Alkibiades (cf. a similar strategy at *Birds* lines 145–47) would seem to support Sommerstein, "Decree of Syrakosios," in his revival of J. Droysen's hypothesis that the so–called Decree of Syrakosios forbade ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν, "explicit lampoons (involving the name)" of the hermokopid *atimoi.* Many studies of *Birds* spanning the century and a half from Süvern's *Essay* to Katz's "The *Birds* and Politics" detect satire of Alkibiades of one sort or another. Few will be convinced, however, by the more recent attempt in Vickers, "Alcibiades on Stage."

[17]Schol. 100, ἐν γὰρ τῷ Τηρεῖ Σοφοκλῆς ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ἀπωρνιθωμένον καὶ τὴν Πρόκνην· ἐν ᾧ [i.e., quam ob causam] ἔσκωψε [ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης] πολλὰ τὸν Τηρέα (White, *Scholia* 32). Sommerstein, *Birds* 205, and others have built upon the dismissal of this scholion by Welcker, *Griechischen Tragödien* 386, to reject the possibility of there having been physical representation of the metamorphosis in Sophokles' play. The dubious authority of Horace (*A.P.* 187) is usually invoked in this connection. The tragic λύμη referred to by the comic Tereus is assumed to be merely verbal (i.e., the contents of a messenger speech). Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 144 n. 74, reports the interesting suggestion by E. K. Borthwick, no doubt inspired by the Arkhilokhean epithet, that the tragic Tereus was "costumed in the Thracian manner of hair–style (*akrokomoi*) and headgear," so that

wonder about the extent of this "enactment," it is clear that the results of the transformation were somehow emphasized on the tragic stage. First of all, these words, along with the attribution of his sparse plumage to the "winter moulting of all birds" (105–6) are meant as an apology for Tereus' appearance. Secondly, the imperfective aspect of λυμαίνεσθαι, primarily a verb of *physical* outrage[18] used to account for the funny beak, suggests that the innovation involved visible and permanent changes. Thus it is interesting that Tereus' entrance in *Birds* is immediately marked by an association with Sophokles' tragedy and, more specifically, with Sophoklean invention in the form of an unusually pathetic spectacle. From a comic perspective the tragic pathos is characterized as λυμαίνεσθαι and elicits laughter at Tereus' beak and plumage, in anticipation of later jokes about the second hoopoe plucked bare by sycophants and rapacious women. This particular translation from tragic pathos (viewed as λύμαι, "maltreatment") into comic σκώμματα, "jesting," may be regarded as programmatic of Aristophanes' technique in *Birds* with respect to Tereus (as well as other literary "targets" such as the *Prometheia*) and leads us to examine in greater detail the original being parodied. A review of *Tereus* is also necessary at this point, since neither the fragments of Sophokles' play nor the various attempts at reconstruction have figured prominently in the literature on *Birds*. If Aristophanes' Tereus is indeed a literary bird, the dramatic origins of this tragic model deserve careful consideration.

TEREUS TRAGICUS: THE NEGLECTED SOURCE

Tereus, of which fifty–seven or so lines survive, is one of the better–attested lost tragedies of Sophokles. In the century and a half since F. G. Welcker's fundamental work,[19] as much as may be reason-

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his metamorphosis into a hoopoe would seem more appropriate. See Peisetairos' suggestion (lines 1363–66) that the young Patroloias forsake father–beating and go fight instead on the Thracian coast. The appropriate equipment for this involves a spur and *cock's comb,* items which invoke the imagery of a cockfight in a distinctly Thracian context.

[18]The semantics of λυμαίνεσθαι are those of *physical* outrage (cf. LSJ: 1. outrage, maltreat, harm, injure, spoil, ruin; 2. inflict indignities or outrages upon, cause damage, etc.). Tereus' use of the verb to defend his funny beak suggests that the outrage inflicted on him by Sophokles involved being brought onstage in a striking bird–costume. So Kock, *Die Vögel*: "Und eben die als ein λυμαίνεσθαι (100) empfundene 'Befiederung,' die ἀπωρνέωσις überhaupt, hat ihm Sophokles angetan, der sie in seiner Tragödie (fr. 523 ff N²) . . . auf die Bühne gebracht hat."

[19]Welcker, *Griechischen Tragödien* 374–88.

ably expected in the way of reconstruction and thematic analysis has been done.[20] The only new light to be shed on the subject in recent years has been the publication of P.Oxy. 42.3013, which may derive from the controversial *Tales* (hypotheses) of Dikaiarkhos.[21] My purpose in surveying the evidence for the lost play is to enable the reader to appreciate the element of Sophoklean innovation, that is, both the extensive reshaping of the traditional material ("the myth") and certain unusual and striking features of the performance as well. I argue, moreover, that it is precisely to these aspects of the tragic model that Aristophanes has responded in re-presenting Tereus.

The papyrus hypothesis is remarkably similar to the several other summaries of the Sophoklean Tereus story.[22] The lost play can be said to have involved (in narrative or action) at least the following events and situations:[23]

[20] In addition to Welcker, *Griechischen Tragödien*, see Pearson, *Fragments of Sophocles* II 221–38 (frr. 581–95); Buchwald, *Studien zur Chronologie* 33–42; Bacon, *Barbarians* 86–88; Johansen, "Sophocles" 286–87; Webster, *Introduction to Sophocles* 4, 176–77; Calder, "Sophocles' *Tereus*"; Radt, *TGF* IV 435–45 (frr. 581–95); Sutton, *The Lost Sophocles* 127–32; Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 51–86; and Hourmouziades, "Sophocles' *Tereus*."

[21] Parsons, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* XLII 46–50. Gelzer, "Sophokles' *Tereus*" 183–92, believes the hypothesis to derive from a Dikaiarkhan original, in which he and others follow Haslam, "Authenticity." "A slightly mauled Sophoclean [hypothesis] we now have, almost certainly," he notes, "in P.Oxy. XLII 3013." See also Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 57–58. Rusten, "Tales from Euripides," argues against Dikaiarkhan authorship. On this question see also Kassel, "Hypothesis"; Luppe, "Dikaiarchos' *hypotheseis*"; and Sutton, "Evidence."

[22] Tzetzes on Hesiod, *Works and Days* 566 (Radt, *TGF* 435), and a scholion on Aristophanes' *Birds* 212; see Mihailov, "La légende de Térée" 94–95, and Mayer, "Mythistorica" 490. I give Parsons's translation: "Tereus, the *hypothesis*: Pandion, the ruler of the Athenians, having (two) daughters, Procne and Philomela, united the elder, Procne, in marriage with Tereus the king of the Thracians, who had by her a son whom he named Itys. As time passed, and Procne wished to see her sister, she asked Tereus to travel to Athens to bring (her back). He, after reaching Athens and receiving the girl from Pandion and making half the return journey, fell in love with the girl. And he disregarded his trust from Pandion and violated her. But, as a precaution in case she should tell her sister, he cut out the girl's tongue. On arriving in Thrace, and Philomela being unable to speak her misfortune, she revealed it by means of a piece of weaving. When Procne realized the truth, driven mad by jealousy . . . she took Itys and killed him and after cooking him served him up to Tereus. He ate the meal without realizing. The women took flight and became, one of them a nightingale, one a swallow, and Tereus a hoopoe."

[23] Adapted from Hourmouziades, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 135.

1. Arrival of Tereus and Philomela from Athens
2. Revelation of Tereus' crime by the "voice of the shuttle"
3. Prokne's reaction
4. The slaughter of Itys
5. Tereus' meal
6. Flights of Prokne and Philomela
7. Metamorphosis of Tereus, Prokne, and Philomela into birds.

Pre–Sophoklean and contemporary primary testimonia are few.[24] Of the many later passages attesting various versions of the legend ("Theban," "Megaro–Athenian," "Asiatic," etc.), the most useful and most likely to reflect knowledge of Sophokles' play are the nine fragments of Accius' *Tereus* and the well–known passage in the sixth book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.[25] There can be little doubt that here, as in many other instances, a famous tragedy was an influential model for the Roman poet.[26] Besides ordering and assigning the fragments, the main points of contention in reconstructing the play have been (1) the identity and role of the chorus, (2) the distribution of elements 1–7 above among actors' scenes (epeisodia), (3) the extent of the Dionysian theme (e.g., in the choral odes), (4) the nature of the final divine epiphany, and (5) the character and role of Tereus, especially in connection with the question of the Dryas episode.

A conservative review of the dramatis personae would include Prokne (played by the protagonist), Tereus and Hermes (deuteragonist), Nurse, Servant, Messenger (tritagonist), Philomela, Itys (silent characters), and a chorus of Thracian men, most likely Tereus' atten-

[24] *Od.* 19.518–23; Hes. *Op.* 564–70 and fr. 125; Sapph. fr. 135 Page; Aes. *Ag.* 1140–49, *Supp.* 60–67; Eur. fr. 773 Nauck, *Rh.* 550; Philokles *Pandionis* (Radt, *TGF* V 139–41). See also Soph. *El.* 107, 148–49. "The legend," observes Kiso (*The Lost Sophocles* 57), "must have included both the husband's crime and the wife's vengeance when Sophocles found dramatic material in it. No other great tragedian except Sophocles seems to have dramatized it." Mihailov, "La légende de Térée" 88, points out that the passage in the *Agamemnon* suggests that the story of Prokne and Tereus must have been quite familiar to the Athenian audience for the allusion to be effective.

[25] Accius frr. 639–55 in Warmington, *Remains* II 543–49. The fragments of Livius' *Tereus* seem less dependent on Sophokles (so Warmington, *Remains* 10 and 542).

[26] Welcker, *Griechischen Tragödien* 376. So Warmington, *Remains* II 543, who says concerning Accius that "the model was, it seems, chiefly Sophocles." For a contrary view see Bömer, *Metamorphosen* III 115–19. Mihailov, "La légende de Térée" 88, emphasizes the fundamental place of Sophokles' play in the literary tradition of the Tereus story.

dants.[27] Controversial in this list are the identities of the god and the chorus. In light of the reassignment of the "Aiskhylean" fragment, preserved by Aristotle, to Sophokles (now fragment 581 Radt; see note 51 below), it seems reasonable to assume that the *rhēsis* relating the metamorphosis of Tereus, Prokne, and Philomela is spoken by a messenger–god, not the pro–Thracian Ares.[28] The action takes place before the palace of Tereus in Thrace, a major feature of Sophokles' design being to associate Tereus with *historical* Thrace (e.g., Haimos, Rhodope) rather than the "prehistoric" Thracian–occupied Phokis (Daulis), and to place him and Prokne at a considerable remove from Athens. The play is set on a day of the triennial Thracian feast in honor of Dionysos, on which local custom may have specified a sacrifice followed by a private royal meal (Ovid *Met.* 6.647–49 has Prokne invent this feature). Sophokles innovatively exploited the festival context to mitigate the horror of the events and to provide the women an opportunity for revenge.[29] In the absence of explicit structural data, the design of the play

[27] Prokne's isolation (fr. 583 Radt), the suppression of her grief (Ov. *Met.* 6.581–86 and Accius frr. 643–44 Warmington), and the deceit involved in the recognition and revenge suggest that Prokne had to contend with a hostile chorus. The choral fragments seem more appropriate to a male chorus, as Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 61, points out (see frr. 590–93 Radt). Hourmouziades, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 137, extends the potential similarities between the *Tereus* and Sophokles' *Trakhiniae* (a connection made by Webster, Welcker, and others) and argues for a *female* chorus.

[28] Dissenting from Welcker, *Griechischen Tragödien* 383–84, who suggests Hermes as the *deus*, Calder, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 88, nominates "the father of the belligerent, reigning monarch, the Thracian Ares." Since the status of fr. 581 Radt is vital for identifying the deus ex machina in the play, it seems more sensible to shy away from assigning this fragment, with its neutral tone of admonition and σωφροσύνη, "soundness of mind," "discretion," to so partisan and violent a god as Ares.

[29] Welcker, *Griechischen Tragödien* 376, on the basis of Ovid *Met.* 6.587, Accius fr. 647 Warmington, and Libanius *Narr.* 18, makes much of the festival element in the play. Since Hiller von Gärtingen, *De Graecorum Fabulis* 41, first made the connection, the striking parallels between the Tereus myth and Plutarch's account (*Quaest. Gr.* 38) of the Dionysian Agrionia (Orkhomenos) have been much discussed. See, e.g., Mihailov, "La légende de Térée" 100–103. A Campanian fragment of Caivano Painter (Dresden PV 2891, ca. 350–320) seems to show Tereus armed with a πέλεκυς, apparently a pre–Hellenic Thraco–Phrygian cult implement (see Apollodorus 3.14.8). The much–discussed ἐν δὲ ποικίλῳ φάρει, "in an embroidered cloak," of fr. 586 Radt may refer to maenad dress, Philomela's *textum*, or both. Koenen, "Tereus in den *Vögeln*" 84, cites M. Bieber's identification of a Paestan potsherd depicting Tereus: "hängen von dem Gürtel des Tereus, der die Schwestern verfolgt, die dionysischen Wollfäden herab." The specifics of the cult as represented by Sophokles, however, are irretrievable. What seems certain, how-

is best regarded as involving four sequences of actors' scenes typically articulated by choral songs (parodos, stasima, and exodos lyrics).[30] The similarity in language and technique between *Trakhiniai* and *Tereus* suggests that the latter "had the diptych form. The first part dealt with the loneliness of Procne . . . and the return of Tereus. . . . The second part dealt with the vengeance taken by Procne and the transformations."[31]

The most important issues relating the plot with actors' scenes are (1) whether Tereus' return from Athens is narrated as a past event or incorporated into the action of the play and (2) whether the Dryas episode related by Hyginus (*Fab.* 45) constituted part of Sophokles' design. The time which elapses between Tereus' return and the final crisis (a year in Ovid *Met.* 6.571) would seem to preclude both events' being incorporated directly into the action.[32] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the most we should assume is that the first part of the play developed the theme of how Prokne's long-standing despair and isolation in Thrace had been renewed and deepened by Philomela's relatively recent "death." An account of the expedition to Athens and its tragic conclusion fits quite naturally in the context of Prokne's famous lament (fr. 583 Radt), which most likely belongs to an expository prologue.

Hyginus relates a version of the myth in which Tereus, warned by portents of Itys' imminent murder *a propinqua manu,* kills his brother, Dryas, in a misguided attempt to save the boy.[33] Including this episode

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ever, is that the play was set on the day of a Dionysian festival, that the festival involved a sacrificial meal, and that Prokne and Philomela exploited their freedom as maenads to get revenge on Tereus.

[30] So Welcker, Calder, and most. Hourmouziades, in order to incorporate the Dryas episode, posits five "epeisodia." In light of the scant remains of the choral element of the play, it seems futile to try to determine the precise number of epeisodia.

[31] Webster, *Introduction to Sophocles* 177. Hourmouziades, "Sophocles' *Tereus,*" makes even more of the similarity between the *Trakhiniai* and the *Tereus,* positing a friendly female chorus, a "Likhas and Iole scene," etc.

[32] Gelzer, "Sophokles' *Tereus*" 191. Calder, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 89, for example, suggests that during the first stasimon "one year of dramatic time passes (Ov. M. 6.571)." While this is not impossible, it is safer to assume that the action of the Tereus takes place within the typical Sophoklean dramatic day. "Was vor diesem Tag geschehen war," says Gelzer, "muss irgendwann im Verlauf des Stücks erzählt worden sein."

[33] Hyg. *Fab.* 45, *Procne cognita sorore et Terei impium facinus, pari consilio machinari coeperunt regi talem gratiam referre. interim Tereo ostendebatur in prodigiis Ity filio eius mortem a propinqua manu adesse. quo responso audito, cum arbitraretur Dryantem fratrem suum filio suo mortem machinari, fratrem Dryantem insontem occidit.*

in a reconstruction, it has been argued, would both "humanize" Tereus and justify the traditional title.[34] The absence of Dryas from all major sources, however, is a strong indication that he did not figure in Sophokles' play. Consequently, of the plot features listed above, items 4 and 5 are reported by a messenger (or a similar character), while the metamorphosis receives somewhat special treatment in a divine epiphany and *rhēsis*. It is also possible that Sophokles marked the symbolic death of Tereus, Prokne, and Philomela visually on the *ekkyklēma* in a tableau involving subtle tokens of the metamorphosis. The arrival of Tereus from Athens and the report of Philomela's "death," on the other hand, must be recounted in the prologue by Prokne as an event of the recent past.

The best-known fragment of the *Tereus* (583 Radt), which in all likelihood inspired Medeia's lament (*Medeia* 230–51), suggests that the play opens with an expository monologue in which Prokne bewails her misfortunes, perhaps in the presence of a trustworthy character (nurse?):

> νῦν δ' οὐδέν εἰμι χωρίς. ἀλλὰ πολλάκις
> ἔβλεψα ταύτῃ τὴν γυναικείαν φύσιν,
> ὡς οὐδέν ἐσμεν. αἱ νέαι μὲν ἐν πατρὸς
> ἥδιστον, οἶμαι, ζῶμεν ἀνθρώπων βίον·
> τερπνῶς γὰρ ἀεὶ παῖδας ἀνοία τρέφει.
> ὅταν δ' ἐς ἥβην ἐξικώμεθ' ἔμφρονες,
> ὠθούμεθ' ἔξω καὶ διεμπολώμεθα
> θεῶν πατρῴων τῶν τε φυσάντων ἄπο,
> αἱ μὲν ξένους πρὸς ἄνδρας, αἱ δὲ βαρβάρους,
> αἱ δ' εἰς ἀγηθῆ δώμαθ', αἱ δ' ἐπίρροθα.

[34] In response to Gelzer, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 191: "Von entscheidender Bedeutung muss die Rolle der Prokne gewesen sein. Schon Welcker hat sich die Frage vorgelegt, warum das Stück nicht nach ihr benannt wurde." Hourmouziades, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 138, argues that Tereus, as a victim of misinterpreted omens, becomes "a tragic figure in the Sophoclean sense of the term, a hero, in fact, not very different from Heracles or even Oedipus." In light of the fact, however, that no source except Hyginus (not even Ovid!) mentions Dryas, it is highly unlikely that this striking episode was represented by Sophokles only to be subsequently forgotten or suppressed. The tragic Tereus, moreover, clearly impressed posterity as an unusually savage character. The very "problem" with which Hourmouziades begins his argument—that Tereus redundantly sequesters Philomela *and* cuts out her tongue—suggests that Sophokles made his Tereus *more* violent than he had been traditionally, innovating the "preventive" glossectomy (a feature otherwise unknown in Greek legend) in order to set up the recognition by means of a written message. It is this aspect of dramatic innovation which Aristotle reacts to at *Poetics* 1454b30–37.

καὶ ταῦτ', ἐπειδὰν εὐφρόνη ζεύξῃ μία,
χρεὼν ἐπαινεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν καλῶς ἔχειν

But now, separated from home, I am undone. Often indeed,
have I observed how miserable my sex is in this respect.
When we are girls, our life in our father's house
is the sweetest, I think, that can fall to mortals;
for the days of thoughtless childhood are ever glad.
But when we come to years of discretion,
we are thrust out and sold in marriage
far away from our ancestral gods and from our parents:
some of us to other parts of Hellas, some to barbarians,
some to joyless households, some into places of reproach.
And in this, when once the nuptial night is past,
we must acquiesce, and deem that it is well. (tr. Jebb, adapted)

Noteworthy here is the correlation of the general helplessness and isolation of women "sold in marriage" (cf. *ekdōsis*) with the misery of an Athenian princess among barbarians. Her recollection of life at home in Pandion's palace is sharply offset by the phrase *nun d'*, which introduces the present lament: "*now, however,* among Thracians and far from Athens (*khōris*), I am nothing!" The *anoia* of a carefree childhood anticipates the phrase spoken by the god after the final crisis (fr. 589 Radt): ἄνους ἐκεῖνος· αἱ δ' ἀνουστέρως ἔτι ἐκεῖνον ἠμύναντο, "[Tereus] is a fool, but [Prokne and Philomela] exhibited even greater folly in punishing him." Accius echoes these words (frr. 639–42 Warmington) in characterizing Tereus as a savage *amore vecors flammeo,* "mad with burning desire," who committed a heinous crime *ex dementia* (cf. Ovid *Met.* 6.456–60). Sophokles thus makes a full circle of the Homeric phrase in which the "Daughter of Pandareos, the greenwood nightingale" is said to kill her son Itylos δι' ἀφραδίας (*Od.* 19.518–23): the Athenian women are forced to pass from the blissful folly of childhood to the madness of revenge in which they assimilate to Tereus' senseless barbarism. To this context also belongs fragment 584 Radt, in which Prokne says she envies the woman "who has not experienced a foreign land."[35]

The entrance of the chorus, consisting of Thracian men, would do

[35] Since I am assuming that Tereus has already returned from Athens, the words πολλά σε ζηλῶ βίου, "I am much envious of your life," cannot be addressed to Philomela, whom Prokne already believes to be dead. Prokne seems to be speaking in general of the woman fortunate enough to marry close to home. The fragments of Accius which may belong here (645–46, 655 Warmington) are less informative.

little to comfort the grieving queen. "Their constant presence on the stage," suggests Kiso, "helps to emphasize the loneliness of Procne."[36] There follows a scene involving dialogue between Prokne and Tereus in which the latter offers words of consolation:

> ἀλγεινά, Πρόκνη, δῆλον· ἀλλ' ὅμως χρεὼν
> τὰ θεῖα θνητοὺς ὄντας εὐπετῶς φέρειν . (fr. 585 Radt)
>
> Clearly, [your loss/this situation] is painful. Yet,
> as mortals, we must graciously accept what the gods send.

By encouraging Prokne to accept her sister's "death" Tereus clearly hopes to discourage any further inquiries into his recent journey and crimes. His efforts are thwarted, however, in a subsequent episode when an embroidered *peplos* is brought to Prokne—a gift which at least one source identifies as traditionally offered to the queen on the occasion of the Dionysian festival.[37]

It is clear that a closely following scene involved the delivery of Philomela's *textum* and the subsequent recognition. Placing the journey to Athens and Philomela's "death" in the recent past avoids an awkward lapse of dramatic time in order to bring the action to its dénouement. Prokne, moreover, is not required to pass abruptly from the initial shock of grief to controlled deception as she receives the gift and reads her sister's message. The courier—most likely one of Philomela's attendants (a man; fr. 588 Radt)—is ignorant of the real purpose of his assignment, as are the other Thracian slaves and retainers of Tereus. The passage in the sixteenth chapter of *Poetics* referring to this moment in Sophokles' *Tereus* is reinforced by other evidence in making clear that Philomela's weaving involved a *written* message, a feature invented by Sophokles for his dramatic purposes—in Aristotle's words, a recognition strategy πεποιημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, "invented by the poet."[38]

[36] Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 65.

[37] Cf. Libanius *Narr.* 18: "Taking advantage of a feast during which it was the custom for Thracian women to send gifts to the queen, Philomela sent [Prokne] a robe embroidered with writing describing the violence which she had experienced."

[38] Such an epistle is not unique in tragedy: In *Trakhiniai*, for example, Herakles leaves behind an inscribed tablet (δέλτον ἐγγεγραμμένην ξυνθήμαθ', 157–58) while Iphigeneia's letter (*IT* 725–94) and "dictation" are well-known features of Euripidean invention which Aristotle implicitly equates with Philomela's epistle in the *Tereus*. In his classification of εἴδη ἀναγνωρίσεως, "types of recognition," Aristotle ranks such dra-

It seems quite clear that the glossectomy was an auxiliary feature introduced to set up the recognition by means of writing and reading. The language of Tzetzes' "hypothesis" (Radt, *TGF* 435)—τὴν αὐτῆς γλῶτταν θερίζει, "he shears her tongue"—is distinctly tragic and is most likely a quotation from our play relating to this moment.

Shaken by what she has read, Prokne carefully solicits details of Philomela's whereabouts from the servant who brought the *peplos*, encouraging him to tell the truth (fr. 588 Radt). Ovid's account (*Met.* 6.583–86) as well as several fragments of Accius' play point to this moment of outrage checked by great self-control: "you practice, woman, the way of many wives," say the chorus disapprovingly, "in that you strain your might against your husband's dignity" (frr. 643–44 Warmington). A painting by the Dolon Painter on a Lucanian bell krater (see note 47 below) suggests that Tereus was present at least during the delivery of the *peplos*. Prokne is forced to conceal her grief and must plot silently (Accius, frr. 645–46 Warmington) to take advantage of the festival occasion. Once she leaves the palace, she gives free rein to her rage:

> Concita per silvas turba comitante suarum
> Terribilis Procne furiisque agitata doloris,
> Bacche, tuas *simulat*; (Ovid *Met.* 6.594–96)
>
> Surrounded by her (female) attendants
> Prokne rushes through the forest
> frightful in her frenzied rage of pain,
> *feigning* your fury, Bakkhos.

Our evidence strongly suggests that this Dionysian element, like "the voice of the shuttle," is yet another feature "invented by the poet" to serve a specific and complex dramatic purpose. Sophokles has Prokne and Philomela use the revelry, maenad dress, and ritual as a versatile disguise for the several stages of their reunion and vengeance—a point in *Tereus* that seems to anticipate (perhaps even serve as the model for)

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matic devices next to last in terms of intellectual and technical skill. See Cazzaniga, *La saga di Itis* I 50, with most scholars, on the following evidence: Ovid *Met.* 6.577–81, *purpureasque notas filis intexuit albis . . . carmen miserabile legit*; Apollodorus 3.14.8, ἡ δὲ ὑφήνασα ἐν πέπλῳ γράμματα, "having embroidered the robe with letters"; schol. *Birds* 212, ὑφαίνουσα διὰ γραμμάτων ἐδήλωσε, "made manifest by embroidering with letters." Similar language is found in other accounts (Lib. *Narr.* 18, and Achill. Tat. 5.5).

the much-discussed metatheatrical strategies of Euripides' *Bakkhai*.[39] As the master of illusion and disguise, Dionysos is a natural choice to preside over the Athenian sisters' grim theater of revenge. Prokne is made strange by the Bacchic transformation which prepares the spectators for the final, violent episode. It is hardly surprising that this powerful combination of sacrificial irony and Dionysian metatheater also impressed Euripides enough for him to draw upon Sophokles' Prokne for his *Medeia*.[40]

Although the Thracian and Dionysian elements are complementary innovations on the part of the poet, "it is precisely in this play where the action swirls along the edge of sobriety that Bacchism is to be brought in, and not merely as a dramatic expedient."[41] Prokne leaves the palace to fetch her sister "in great haste, dressed in a maenad's attire" (fr. 586 Radt). The exhortation to address a prayer to Dionysus belongs here as well: *deum Cadmogena natum Semela adfare et famulanter pete*, "entreat in servile fashion the god, son of Kadmos' daughter Semele" (fr. 647 Warmington). There follows another choral song for which Calder suggests "a Dionysiac theme."[42] That such a theme was present in one or more of the odes is clear from a choral fragment (591 Radt) which Welcker, Jebb, and others have seen as reflecting a basic principle of Dionysian cult:

> ἓν φῦλον ἀνθρώπων, μί' ἔδειξε πατρὸς
> καὶ ματρὸς ἡμᾶς ἁμέρα τοὺς πάντας· οὐδεὶς
> ἔξοχος ἄλλος ἔβλαστεν ἄλλου.
> βόσκει δὲ τοὺς μὲν μοῖρα δυσαμερίας,
> τοὺς δ' ὄλβος ἡμῶν, τοὺς δὲ δουλεί-
> ας ζυγὸν ἔσχεν ἀνάγκας.
>
> The human race is one; a single day brought forth all
> of us from our father [Ouranos] and mother [Gaia].

[39] See, e.g., Segal, *Dionysiac Poetics*, esp. ch. 7, "Metatragedy: Art, Illusion, Imitation," 215–71; and Foley, *Ritual Irony* 205–57. Cultic disguise as a metatheatrical strategy seems to have played a part also in Euripides' *Peliades* (where Medea was disguised as a priestess) and *Ino* (in which the heroine participates in a bacchic ceremony on Parnassus). See Mihailov, "La légende de Térée" 101.

[40] McDermott, *Euripides'* Medea 47. Cf. also the cryptic description of Itys' death as φόνον θυόμενον Μούσαις, "murder, sacrifice to the Muses" (*Herakles* 1021–23).

[41] Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 80. Mihailov's unconvincing conclusions, "La légende de Térée" 103, detract somewhat from his interesting discussion, 98–103.

[42] Calder, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 89.

No one is born more exalted than another.
Yet some of us are fed the doom of evil days,
others are nourished by prosperity, while others still
are caught in the ineluctable yoke of slavery.

The glancing cosmogonic reference here may also point to an Orphic theme naturally suggested by the Thracian setting. This may be the sole trace of the dramatic source of Aristophanes' famous parody of Orphic cosmogony in the parabasis of *Birds*. The themes of titanomachy and, by assimilation, gigantomachy are also suggested and may be relevant to the revolt against the gods in the latter half of the comedy.[43] This song of a Thracian chorus celebrating the equality of all men on the occasion of the Dionysian Trieterika, moreover, is unmistakably ironic as it marks the dramatic time during which the two high-bred Athenian women plot their unspeakable crime. The willful assimilation of the Athenian princesses to the "barbarism" of their surroundings is thus rendered all the more horrific. The natural savagery and senseless violence (cf. ἄνους, fr. 589 Radt) of Sophokles' Tereus is echoed by Accius (frr. 639–42 Warmington):

Tereus indomito more atque animo barbaro
conspexit in eam; amore vecors flammeo,
depositus, facinus pessimum ex dementia
confingit.

Tereus, a man of ways untameable
and savage heart, did turn his gaze upon her;
senseless with flaming love, a man laid low,
the foullest deed he fashioned from his madness. (tr. Warmington)

Prokne's and Philomela's revenge, on the other hand, elicits the severe judgment (fr. 589 Radt) cited above: an impetuous erotomaniac, Tereus is "senseless," to be sure, but the slaughter of Itys and macabre feast are acts of vengeance and, as such, are even more senseless and inex-

[43] A parallel passage (*Orphic Hymns* 37.1) cited by Pearson ad loc. is instructive in this connection: Τιτῆνες, Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, ἡμετέρων πρόγονοι πατέρων, "Titans, illustrious children of Gaia and Ouranos, our parents' forebears." Peisetairos refers jokingly to this Titan lineage in his speech promoting the priority of the birds over the gods (*Birds* 468–69). The many references to cosmogony and the titanomachy/gigantomachy are discussed in considerable detail by Hofmann, *Mythos und Komödie* 177–96.

cusable. The other choral fragments (592 and 593 Radt, nine verses in all), though metrically interesting,[44] are harder to place, since their commentary on the dangers of presumption and the mutability of human fortune does not mention specific people or events and can be applied only to the final crisis of the play. It is worth noting, however, that the chorus is not blindly loyal to Tereus and, as we would expect, comments on the events with some degree of detachment.

In the following scene Prokne returns with her sister disguised as a maenad and relates Tereus' crimes to the chorus (frr. 648–49, 639–42 Warmington).[45] *Non est lacrimis hoc agendum,* Ovid has Prokne exhort her sister, *sed ferro, sed siquid habes, quod vincere ferrum possit!* "Now is not the time for tears but for the sword; for something indeed, if you have it, even more powerful than the sword!" (*Met.* 6.611–13). As the women plan their revenge, Itys appears, suggesting himself quite naturally as their victim. At this point someone (a nurse?) contemplates rescuing the boy from the queen in such a way as to elude Tereus at the same time (frr. 652–53 Warmington). The sacrifice and cooking take place during the following choral song (third stasimon), which, if Welcker is correct, was a poignant lament for Itys.

The fourth episode involved an attempt on the part of the chorus to dissuade Prokne from carrying out the final act of her revenge. Her answer may have been the hubristic exclamation of scorn: *Alia hic sanctitudo est, aliud nomen et numen Iovis,* "Here holiness is different, different here the name and nod of Jupiter" (fr. 650 Warmington). Realizing that their words have had no effect, the chorus observe: *Struunt sorores Atticae dirum nefas,* "The Athenian sisters are plotting dire wickedness" (fr. 651 Warmington). Tereus, who must have entered by this point, speaks with Prokne, who, in Kiso's words, "seduces him into the palace with the pretext that she has prepared a sacred ancestral meal which he must consume alone. . . . One recalls the carpet scene in Aeschylus, *Agamemnon.*"[46] The chorus sings another song.

As the final stasimon comes to its conclusion, we hear Tereus' cry

[44] Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 73, cites Buchwald's *Studien zur Chronologie* on the strong similarity between these verses and the dactylo–epitrites at *Oidipous Tyrannos* 1086 and *Aias* 172. Although this observation has potential value for dating the play, it is less useful in reconstruction.

[45] See Welcker, *Griechischen Tragödien* 380–81, and Radt, *TGF* 437, for discussion of other fragments relating to the glossectomy which, for various reasons, have not been generally accepted.

[46] Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 70.

of horror (offstage) as he realizes what he has been eating: Ἥλιε, φιλίπποις Θρῃξὶ πρέσβιστον σέλας, "Sun, most august light for horse-loving Thracians" (fr. 582 Radt). The exodos must have unfolded in at least three stages: confrontation and pursuit, metamorphosis, and epiphany. First, Tereus armed with an ἀκόντιον or some similar weapon confronts the two sisters and pursues them across the stage. This moment is recalled by Aristophanes in *Lysistrata* (563): ἕτερος δ' αὖ Θρᾷξ πέλτην σείων κἀκοντιον, ὥσπερ ὁ Τηρεύς, ἐδεδίττετο τὴν ἰσχαδόπωλιν, "and another, a Thracian, brandishing a light shield and a javelin, just like Tereus, frightened the fig vendor," an allusion suggesting that the original performance (as, subsequently, the script and iconography) of *Tereus* was impressive enough to be remembered and quoted decades after its production. All three exit by one of the *eisodoi*.

Iconographic evidence for Sophokles' play attests several scenes which must have been especially memorable.[47] The general impression conveyed by these images is that *Tereus* was not only a rather unusual and thorough reworking of traditional material, as a script, but deeply impressed its spectators as a violent and original spectacle. Memory of the latter, possibly the pursuit and final tableau, quite obviously moti-

[47] Most interesting are several Italian examples dating from the late fifth to the middle fourth centuries: there is the well-known Apulian fragment by the Painter of the (Berlin) Dancing Girl depicting the Thracian king with the inscription ΤΗΡΕΥΣ (Bibliothèque Nationale, ca. 430/420), a picture by the Dolon Painter on a Lucanian bell krater (CA 2193, Louvre; ca. 400–370/60) of the *peplos* scene in which Prokne receives her sister's *textum* in the presence of the king, and a Campanian fragment by the Caivano Painter (PV 2891, Dresden; ca. 330/310) depicting the flight of Prokne and Philomela: Tereus rushes from the palace holding what appears to be a πέλεκυς and (if Margaret Bieber is correct) a child's bone. This painting, which certainly illustrates Sophokles' play, is a visual correlate to the Aristophanic allusion cited above (*Lys.* 563). Finally, Simon, "Tereus," associates with Sophokles' *Tereus* the striking polychrome Tarantine fragment (Gnathia krater, Würzburg 832; ca. 340) depicting an actor holding his mask. For discussions of the iconographic evidence and bibliography see Webster, *Monuments* 152; Mihailov, "La légende de Térée" 98–103; Gelzer, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 188–92; Radt, *TGF* 473; and Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 144 n. 73. Scholarly opinion seems nearly unanimous (Simon, Schmidt, Bieber, and others) in identifying the painting on the Lucanian bell krater (Dolon Painter) as illustrating Sophokles' *Tereus*. Trendall and Webster's view that this painting illustrates a scene from Euripides' *Medeia* is less convincing because there are no children present. Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 75, notes that the Prokne statue in the Akropolis Museum "(dated to 430–20 B.C. by H. Knell) may have been a dedication on the occasion of a victory in dramatic competition, possibly of Sophocles' *Tereus*." For plates see Cambitoglou and Trendall, *Apulian Red-figured Vase-painters*, and Trendall, *The Red-figured Vases of Lucania*.

vated Aristophanes' hoopoe character in *Birds*. Another striking feature of the several representations of the tragic Tereus is the wealth and detail of the tragic costumes. It is almost certain that *Birds* contained further imitation or parody of this aspect of the Sophoklean performance.

It is conceivable that the moment of metamorphosis was illustrated by the display of Tereus, Prokne, and Philomela on the *ekkyklēma* in a superimposition of the death tableau of the *Khoephoroi* exodos and the familiar Euripidean deus ex machina. The rapid succession of events would seem to preclude a full costume change.[48] I suggest that we imagine this moment marking the conclusion of the tragedy as an arrangement of three characters (Tereus in pursuit?) in which their metamorphosis is marked symbolically by certain prominent signs—a token change of clothing or headdress, perhaps. The death wish implicit in the desiderative metaphor of lyric and tragic poetry "Would that I were a bird" (that is, the desire to flee from life and the human condition) is well known[49] and would make quite natural the association of this desperate tableau of metamorphosis-in-crisis with the scenes of death which had already been presented on the *ekkyklēma*. Thus Sophokles would achieve a counterpoint of sorts between this final image of the unfortunate "birds" and his audience's expectation of a death scene. Such a visual representation of the lyric metaphor would certainly have been an innovative and powerful moment of theatrical symbolism. The compelling suggestion (see note 17) that Tereus was "costumed in the Thracian manner of hair-style (*akrokomoi*) and headgear" would contribute to the effectiveness of the final tableau and constitute

[48] On the question of mask and costume-change in tragedy see Foley, *Ritual Irony* 252 with n. 66.

[49] The yearning to become a bird is a common lyric topos, Alkman fr. 26 being perhaps the most famous (βάλε δὴ βάλε κηρύλος εἴην ὅς τ' ἐπὶ κύματος ἄνθος ἁμ' ἁλκυόνεσσι ποτῆται, etc.). See Goosen, "Die Tiere." More or less contemporary tragic examples are numerous: E. *Hipp.* 732–51, *Hel.* 1478–94, *Andr.* 861–62; S. *OC* 1080–84, fr. 476 [*Oinomaos*], etc. This desiderative metaphor often expresses an implicit death wish. See, e.g., E. *Ion* 1238–45, *HF* 1157–62, *Hec.* 1096–1106. The song from Sophokles' *Oinomaos* is transplanted into a comic context when quoted by the young man (second sequence of intruders) at *Birds* 1337–39. For laments with implicit or explicit death wish see Führer, *Formproblem-Untersuchungen* 130–35. For a good discussion of bird metamorphoses see Forbes-Irving, *Metamorphosis* 96–127, 248–49. Of specific interest is tragic Prokne, concerning whom Ludwig Koenen reminds me of Wilamowitz on *HF* 1022, Fraenkel on Aeschylus' *Ag.* 1144, Easterling on Sophokles' *Tr.* 963. Prokne figures in a papyrus fragment of Euripides' *Kresphontes* (P. Mich. Inv. 6973), which Koenen is preparing to publish.

part of the "outrage" (λυμαίνεται) which the comic Tereus says has been inflicted on him by Sophokles. The final stage of the exodos involved the appearance of a *deus*, perhaps Hermes, who reproaches the Athenian women as foolish and their revenge as a "remedy worse than the illness" applied by a foolish doctor (fr. 589 Radt).[50] To this final *rhēsis* belongs the famous fragment (581 Radt) which has been attributed to Sophokles' *Tereus* since Welcker's time:[51]

τοῦτον δ' ἐπόπτην ἔποπα τῶν αὑτοῦ κακῶν
πεποικίλωκε κἀποδηλώσας ἐχει
θρασὺν πετραῖον ὄρνιν ἐν παντευχίᾳ·
ὃς ἦρι μὲν φανέντι διαπαλεῖ πτερὸν
κίρκου λεπάργου· δύο γὰρ οὖν μορφὰς φανεῖ
παιδός τε χαὐτοῦ νηδύος μιᾶς ἄπο·
νέας δ' ὀπώρας ἡνίκ' ἂν ξανθῇ στάχυς,
στικτή νιν αὖθις ἀμφινωμήσει πτέρυξ·
ἀεὶ δὲ μίσει τῶνδ' †ἄπ' ἄλλον† εἰς τόπον
δρυμοὺς ἐρήμους καὶ πάγους ἀποικιεῖ

And this hoopoe, an initiate into his own misfortunes,
he (Zeus) has embroidered, having manifested him
as a bold bird, living among rocks, in full armor.
When spring comes, he will ply the wing of a hawk
with white feathers, as he will display two forms
from a single womb, both the fledgling's and his own.
Whenever the stalks of grain grow yellow in early July,
a spotted wing will guide him anew.
But, driven by hatred for these [women], he will always fly
to another place, inhabiting lonely thickets and crags.

(tr. Kisò, adapted)

[50] Fr. 589 Radt: ἄνους ἐκεῖνος· αἱ δ' ἀνουστέρως ἔτι / ἐκεῖνον ἠμύναντο ⟨πρὸς τὸ⟩ καρτερόν. / ὅστις γὰρ ἐν κακοῖσι θυμωθεὶς βροτῶν / μεῖζον προσάπτει τῆς νόσου τὸ φάρμακον, / ἰατρός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐπιστήμων κακῶν. "[Tereus] is foolish, to be sure; but [Prokne and Philomela] showed even greater folly in vindictively punishing him. A mortal who, in anger at adverse circumstances, applies a remedy worse than the disease, is a doctor ignorant of ills."

[51] Having noted a few "mistakes" of quotation in Plato and Aristotle, Welcker (*Griechischen Tragödien* 384–85) attributes this fragment (cited from "Aiskhylos" in *H.A.* 9.49b, 633a17) to Sophokles. The main arguments supporting Welcker and those who follow him (Oder, Pearson, Robert, Mihailov, Calder, and Radt, to name a few) are (1) that there is no evidence of a *Tereus* by Aiskhylos and (2) that the periphrasis with ἔχειν + participle as well as the adverb ἡνίκα, while attested in Sophoklean verse, are absent from Aiskhylos.

This passage suggests that the tragic poet innovated Tereus' metamorphosis into a crested hoopoe, choosing the supposedly strange and harsh-tempered bird to represent the alien, warlike Thracian. The similarity of ἔποψ and ἐπόπτης along with the apparent uncertainty about the hoopoe's appearance and behavior no doubt conspired to encourage this innovation.[52] Sophokles, moreover, seems to be at pains to reconcile an older version of the myth, in which Tereus becomes a common hawk, with his dramatic metamorphosis of a barbarian into a correspondingly strange bird. Motivation for this epiphany must be sought in the unusual resolution of the final crisis: the metamorphoses, unlike suicide or murder, have a supernatural cause and, as such, must be reported by a messenger, most likely Hermes, capable of revealing the will of Zeus. This *rhēsis* no doubt prompts the sententious strophe (fr. 590 Radt) which resembles the closing words of the chorus in several other Sophoklean plays (e.g., *Aias* and *Trakhiniae*):

> θνητὴν δὲ φύσιν χρὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν,
> τοῦτο κατειδότας ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
> πλὴν Διὸς οὐδεὶς τῶν μελλόντων
> ταμίας ὅ τι χρὴ τετελέσθαι.
>
> Men of mortal race must think mortal thoughts.
> Knowing this full well, that there is none
> but Zeus to dispose of what is to come
> in the way that it must be accomplished.

It is hard not to detect an anti-Thracian sentiment in Sophokles' spectacle of two high-bred Athenian women driven to commit crimes which exceed their barbarian hosts' "natural" savagery. The very fact,

[52] The rather odd picture presented in this fragment of a perennial bird which, in effect, changes species from season to season suggests that the hoopoe's natural history was less than familiar to Sophokles and his contemporaries. The strangeness of the hoopoe is comically exaggerated throughout *Birds*. The similarity between the folk etymologies of Tereus (from τηρέω) and *epops* (ἐποπτεύω) may have influenced Sophokles' design. Sophokles' play with words here, moreover, seems to have inspired further wordplay in the comedy. "The derivation of ἔποψ from ἐφοράω," writes Griffith ("The Hoopoe's Name" 60–61), "as though it were an apocope of ἔποψις ('panorama') is underscored by two things. The first is the close resemblance of Τηρεύς to τηρέω, a synonym for ἐφοράω. This resemblance was remarked already in antiquity, when the folk-etymology deriving Τηρεύς from τηρέω was current. The second factor is the association of the Hoopoe with two overseeing divinities, Helios and Zeus." He goes on (61) to document the folk etymology in some detail.

however, that Prokne and Philomela are said to have become "even more senseless" than Tereus suggests that the foreign context and xenophobic rhetoric coupled with the cheerful occasion of the Dionysian festival only serve to highlight the depravity of the two sisters. The Atheno–Thracian antithesis thus contributes to the ironic undermining of Athenian superiority (cf. *Andromakhe* 168–77) in the spectacle of Pandion's daughters outdoing their host and ally in savagery.[53] This complex interplay of "natural" and willful savagery is quite clearly the product of Sophokles' dramatic design, which imparted to the "myth" of Tereus and Prokne its definitive shape. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that after the production of this tragedy, mention of Tereus et al. was made, more often than not, in reference to Sophokles' play.

Although dating the play on the basis of the anti–Thracian theme cannot be precise, it is reasonable to follow Webster, Calder, and many other scholars in regarding the *Medeia* (431) as the *terminus ante quem*.[54] The context of the first years of the Peloponnesian War calls to mind Thoukydides' polemic (2.29.3) in which the historian asserts vehemently that Teres (father of the Athenians' Thracian ally Sitalkes) has nothing to do with the Tereus who married Pandion's daughter Prokne.[55] Marcel Detienne has recently argued that the anti–Thracian

[53] In pointing out this irony I cannot follow Kiso and Hourmouziades in their attempts to "humanize" Sophokles' Tereus and to represent him as a "tragic hero" and "loving father." Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 81, suggests that in Sophokles' play "the presupposed distinction between civilization and barbarism turned out to be fallacious." For different reasons Hourmouziades, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 138, argues that the Thracian "becomes the loving father, who does not refrain from committing a purposeless murder [i.e., killing Dryas] in order to protect his child."

[54] Calder, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 91, argues that "Medeia slays her children to spite the faithless Jason. Ovid already drew the parallel at *Amores* 2.14.29 sq. Medea's infanticides were an Euripidean innovation. Before him she merely absconded with the children. The Tereus story contrarily was an aetiological legend to explain the nightingale's plaintive cry *Ityn, Ityn*. The infanticide was central and indispensable. I should not hesitate to place *Tereus* before *Medea*, dated by its hypothesis to 431 B.C. The plot motivation, the destructive effects of excessive sibling affection, recalls *Antigone* of March 443 B.C. I should be prepared to accept a date in the early 430s roughly contemporary with *Trachiniae*." See also Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* 74–76.

[55] In describing the three-way conflict between Athens, Macedon, and Thrace characterized by a series of unstable agreements in the late 430s, Thoukydides defends Sitalkes as a trustworthy middleman. M. Mayer and others have argued that this passage (as well as the other mythological digressions, e.g., 2.99.3, 2.102.5–6) is a response to contemporary tragedy (see Halliday, *Indo–European Folk–tales* 105; Cazzaniga, *La saga di Itis* 61–62; Gernet, *Mélanges* 202–7; Rusten, *Thucydides* 19). The historian's polemic at

feeling on the part of the Athenians was informed by an especially acute hostility of a developed literary culture towards barbarians who were hostile to the art of writing and to education.[56] Sophokles' *Tereus* would seem to be a striking example of the "war" between Thracians and writing. The tragedy was especially powerful since it involved the double spectacle of a Thracian attempting to suppress communication by means of mutilation and the cunning victory of (Athenian) writing over Thracian violence. The subversion of this theme lies at the heart of Aristophanes' comic Tereus in *Birds*.

TEREUS COMICUS

It is hardly controversial to assert that "the canonical form of the [Tereus] myth was clearly fixed by Sophocles" and that the influence of

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this point would be especially understandable if the Athenians had been impressed by a powerful anti-Thracian play just before the outbreak of the war. "The use of Thracian allies and troops was not popular in Athens (Ar. *Ach.* 141–71)," notes Rusten, "and they were eventually responsible for one of the worst atrocities of the war (7.29). It would have been easy to believe that Sitalces was descended from the savage king whose story had been dramatized in Sophocles' *Tereus*." Mayer, *Mythistorica* 491, says, "Es scheint mir ganz unverkennbar, dass es der Tereus des Sophokles sein muss, gegen den er [Thoukydides] polemisiert." For the Thracian element in Euripides' *Hekabe* see Segal, "Violence and the Other" 127–28 (with bibliography, 109 n. 1). See also Delebecque, *Euripide* 154–64, and Danov, *Altthrakien* 163, 289.

[56]Detienne, "Orpheus" 2–3: "The inhabitants of Thrace, Orpheus' native country, are illiterate people; even more, they are so illiterate that they consider the knowledge of writing indecent. Consequently, the works going about under Orpheus' name are, as Androtion says, 'myths,' *mûthoi*, fictions. One should see in them the work of a forger. The charge is serious, since, at that time, Thracians had the reputation of being the most bloodthirsty and wild of all barbarians. Everyone knows, as Xenophon testifies, that on the shores of the Black Sea, they will even kill each other to get hold of the effects of shipwrecked Greeks but they leave on the shore, as valueless goods, boxes full of written papyrus rolls. Even more, during an incident of the Peloponnesian War, which Thucydides (who should know) labels one of the most horrible atrocities of the war, they slaughtered with the short sword—which is not a regular weapon of the Greeks—all of the children of the city of Mykalessos gathered in the school, helpless children learning how to read and write. Obviously, the role of the Thracians, full of scorn for writing, was to destroy in fury everything which concerned the intellectual sphere: books, tools, and men. Androtion goes straight to the point: when a Thracian hears the word book, he draws his sword." This passage is published in a modified form in Detienne, *L'écriture* 110.

the tragic performance was deep and long-lasting.[57] Even from the incomplete picture that we have of the lost play it is obvious that the tragedian's contribution was extensive. *Birds,* produced in March 414, stands as an elaborate testament to the profound impression made by Sophokles' *Tereus*. We may marvel at the power of memory required of both the comic poet and his spectators for the explicit parody of a tragedy produced well over a decade before to be intelligible and effective.[58] It is nevertheless not unusual for a comedy and a "target" tragedy (tragic model) to be separated by a number of years. Euripides' *Telephos,* for example, was produced in 438, thirteen years before its extended parody as "the old play" in *Acharnians* (line 415). There can be little doubt, moreover, that memorable tragedies (or excerpts thereof) were kept alive and circulated as texts for private use. Aristophanes himself makes this clear in passages such as *Clouds* 1371 (a *rhēsis* from Euripides) and *Frogs* 52–54 (Dionysos as reader of Euripides' *Andromeda*). The comic Tereus of *Birds* identifies Sophokles' play as his place of origin, thereby inviting us to investigate how Aristophanes has transformed the tragic character into a central player in his comedy.

I argue elsewhere that a major thematic moment of *Birds* is the comic subversion of the desiderative lyric metaphor "Would that I were a bird!"[59] The unusual climax of Sophokles' *Tereus* was unquestionably the most elaborate and memorable tragic enactment of this metaphor: the oblique death-in-metamorphosis served as an innovative conclusion to a series of equally innovative dramatic events. In designing the literary synthesis that is *Birds* Aristophanes quite obviously fastened on

[57] Halliday, *Indo-European Folk-tales* 98–100. Hourmouziades, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 134, distinguishes Sophokles' contribution from the older legend: "no matter how decisive the Sophoclean influence may have been for the final shaping of the myth, its later accounts, with the exception of Ovid's elaborate narrative . . . invariably fall back on some initial trend, which seems to have been that of explaining, in the form of an αἴτιον, the idiosyncratic habits of the nightingale and the swallow." Gelzer, "Sophocles' *Tereus*" 188, discusses the breadth of the influence of Sophokles' play, especially in art. For a Middle Comic *Tereus* (Anaxandrides) see Athenaios *Deipn.* 9.373, and Nesselrath, *Mittlere Komödie,* 216–18.

[58] On this subject see Schlesinger, "Indications of Parody" 309–13. Slater, *Reading Petronius* 19–20, makes the point that knowledge of the model being parodied may not always be necessary for sincere enjoyment of a comic work.

[59] Dobrov, "Metaphor of Deferral."

Sophokles' dramatic intersection of language and spectacle: the poetic flight from the human condition in a crisis (possible only in language) becomes a comic flight from the Athenian condition, with the ultimate "flight" of Athenians in droves from their city to the bird-polis. While the tragic trio of Tereus, Prokne, and Philomela pass, in metamorphosis, out of an explicitly horrible past into an indeterminate animal state which preserves old hostilities, Peisetairos and Euelpides flee from rather vague social "problems" into what turns out to be a complex and harmonious avian future in Nephelokokkygia. Tereus, himself a refugee from tragedy, undergoes an important secondary role-transformation before our very eyes: first an active guide whom the Athenians approach as suppliants, he assumes a passive role in which he serves as the living blueprint for Peisetairos' Great Idea. From the moment of Peisetairos' inspiration with the bird life, Tereus becomes the Athenian's assistant, taking instructions and learning from him. Tereus' catalytic role connects the various thematic strands of the comedy in a flexible and dynamic fashion that derives much of its force from Aristophanes' systematic parody of the Sophoklean invention that had so impressed the spectators of *Tereus*. In this respect Aristophanes succeeds in matching the creativity of his older contemporary by producing an innovative comic countercharacter. Thus, point by point:

(1a) *Thrace in the tragedy.* The setting of *Tereus* has been removed from Phokis to Thrace with attendant emphasis on an Atheno-Thracian antithesis: Prokne and Philomela reunite far from home among barbarians with whom they can have nothing in common. From nearby Daulis, the women have been exiled to the quintessentially barbaric Thrace.[60] Sophokles thus sets up a stark polarity between literate Athenians and the antiliterate Thracians, across which the spark of Philomela's epistle flashes to ignite the final crisis. The violent effort to suppress language by means of mutilation, a feature invented by Sophokles for his play, fits quite naturally in the context of this polarity.

(1b) *Thrace in the comedy.* Tereus' behavior in *Birds* is far from that of a violent Thracian erotomaniac. The tragic Tereus was made especially strange by being placed far from Athens in an entirely foreign and barbaric country. Contradicting Sophokles' removal of the king from Daulis to Thrace, Aristophanes makes his character comically

[60] For a detailed discussion of the Daulis question see Mayer, *Mythistorica* 489–94, and Halliday, *Indo-European Folk-tales* 104–6, who argues that Tereus was originally a Megarian hero.

familiar, as we have seen. He speaks a colloquial Attic (of course), has a servant, and, much like an Athenian, eats Phalerum whitebait and pea soup using a bowl, pot, and stirring-spoon. The name of Tereus seems to have occurred naturally to Philokrates, the Athenian vendor who recommended him to Peisetairos and Euelpides. Throughout the scenes featuring the hybrid Epops, his Thracian past and ethnic character are rejected. At *Birds* 1363–69, for example, Peisetairos says to the young *patraloias* who wishes to settle in Nephelokokkygia:

> σὺ γὰρ
> τὸν μὲν πατέρα μὴ τύπτε· ταυτηνδὶ λαβὼν
> τὴν πτέρυγα καὶ τουτὶ τὸ πλῆκτρον θἀτέρᾳ,
> νομίσας ἀλεκτρυόνος ἔχειν τονδὶ λόφον,
> φρούρει, στρατεύου, μισθοφορῶν σαυτὸν τρέφε,
> τὸν πατέρ' ἔα ζῆν· ἀλλ', ἐπειδὴ μάχιμος εἶ,
> εἰς τἀπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀποπέτου κἀκεῖ μάχου.
>
> Don't hit your father; just take this wing
> and this spur in your other hand,
> imagine that this comb you've got is a cock's,
> and do garrison duty, serve on expeditions, maintain yourself
> by earning pay. Let your father live. In fact, as you're a fighting type,
> fly off to the Thracian Coast and fight there.

Far from being ignorant, threatening, or strange, Tereus is a widely traveled bird (118) who inspires laughter and sympathy. The most striking aspect of Aristophanes' neutralization of the tragic Atheno–Thracian antithesis is his promotion of Tereus to the forefront as an articulate intermediary coupled with the virtual banishment of Sophokles' Athenian protagonist: Prokne has no speaking part in the comedy and, as Frank Romer has pointed out, does not even appear onstage as a bird![61] It is hard not to be impressed by this ironic spectacle: the Athenian princess, famous as the eloquent protagonist who laments the lot of women and punishes her husband for his erotic crimes, is trotted out by Tereus as a silent character (more accurately, a flute-girl) to be the butt of Peisetairos' and Euelpides' lusty jokes (665–74). Peisetairos finds her "a lovely birdie . . . fair, and tender," while Euelpides says

[61] Romer, "When Is a Bird not a Bird?" 136–38. For a discussion of the relationship between writing and violence against women in the post-Sophoklean tradition, especially Ovid, see Joplin, "Voice of the Shuttle" 43–53.

that he would have "great pleasure in spreading her legs" and "peeling her like an egg."

In *Birds* Prokne's exile amidst violent foreigners is translated into a political allotopia[62] (Nephelokokkygia), an important aspect of which is its gradual familiarization: the city in the air, which is located essentially "nowhere," comes to look and sound more and more like Athens. Although Tereus explicitly identifies the birds as having been barbarians (199–200) whom he had to teach Greek (!), the hostility of the bird mob is short-lived and is mollified by Peisetairos' *rhēsis* and concluding treaty. Unlike Thracians, the "natural" community of birds lacks a strong and ancient tradition and submits easily to the creative *didaskalia* (teaching, choreography) of Peisetairos. This comic portrayal of the persuasion of the Athenian demos by members of the sociopolitical elite influenced by the activist sophists (e.g., Alkibiades)[63] is a far cry from an encounter between Athenians and Thracians. If we consider the result of Peisetairos' city-planning activities (Athenians flock to the bird city), it is clear that the relationship between Athens and Nephelokokkygia is the polar opposite of the Sophoklean hostility between Athens and the royal house of Tereus. The fact that Peisetairos and Euelpides *voluntarily* flee from Athens to establish a successful colony by manipulating a natural community of bird-barbarians insures a pointed reversal of Sophokles' ethnic schema at every moment of the comedy. Tereus' prominent role in *Birds* serves to keep this reversal in the dramatic foreground. In this respect *Birds* represents the culmination of an evolving comic idea: the Eldorado scenarios of early comedy (cf. Telekleides' *Amphiktyones, PCG* fr. 1) involved refugees from culture passing their time blissfully in a natural paradise. Pherekrates' *Agrioi* (*PCG* frr. 5–20) challenged this topos by showing how two such refugees would come to grief, sharing the hardships of cultureless savages in the wilderness. *Birds,* however, presents the spectacle of inevitable civilization: frustrated by what they find in "nature," the refugees from city and culture proceed to organize, civilize, and build. "Nature" and "barbarians" yield as Athens comically reproduces itself in the air!

(2a) *Metamorphosis in the tragedy.* That Sophokles innovatively transformed his Tereus into a hoopoe (instead of a hawk) "rests on unimpeachable evidence."[64] The *rhēsis,* with its suggestive play on the

[62] See Konstan, "City in the Air."

[63] Henderson, "Peisetairos and the Athenian Elite."

[64] Pearson, *Fragments of Sophocles* 224.

word ἔποψ and an odd representation of the bird's natural history (fr. 581 Radt), is an addition to the earlier form of the legend attested, for example, by Aiskhylos (*Hiketides* 63), who mentions the nightingale "pursued by a hawk," κιρκηλάτου τ' ἀηδόνος. Exhibiting behavior and an appearance that were popularly seen as strange and even repugnant (e.g., hostile to women, smearing its nest with human excrement), the hoopoe suits the tragedian's barbarized king, a point emphasized at line 280 when Euelpides expresses surprise that Tereus is not the *only* representative of his species.[65] The visual connection between the hoopoe's crest and the Thracian hairstyle (*akrokomos*) was most likely exploited in the final tableau. Sophokles enacted the lyric topos "I wish I were a bird" as a visual metaphor for death on the *ekkyklēma*. The metamorphosis of Tereus into a crested hoopoe was thus both thematically and visually motivated. Hofmann is certainly correct in pointing out that whereas in the pre–Sophoklean version of the legend metamorphosis was a simple punishment, in Tereus "die Metamorphose . . . erst von Sophokles als Erlösung umgedeutet wurde. Dieser positive Schluss ist es, den Aristophanes als Grundgedanken für sein Spiel übernommen, ja noch weiter ausgebaut hat."[66]

(2b) *Metamorphosis in the comedy.* Griffith's "The Hoopoe's Name" explores Aristophanes' play on the name ἔποψ, "hoopoe." Since Old Comedy thrives on exuberant wordplay, it is natural that Sophokles' choice of species (and play therewith) would have been cheerfully exploited and greatly extended by Aristophanes in *Birds*. Griffith discerns a variety of puns from the obvious "pooping" cries (ἐποποῖ, 58 and 227) to a subtle play on ἐπί, ὀπ– (εἶδον), and πετ– at line 48: Peisetairos says that he is seeking Tereus the Hoopoe to find out from him "if he's seen a city of that [trouble–free, ἀπρᾱ́γμων] kind anywhere he's flown over," εἴ που τοιαύτην εἶδε πόλιν ᾗ 'πέπτατο. Since this bird "is the very same character that Sophokles staged in his *Tereus*," Griffith notes, it is "singularly appropriate that the pun which Aristophanes makes on the Hoopoe's name had almost certainly been made by Sophokles in this very play, the *Tereus*."[67] This is a comic

[65] Aelian *NA* 3.26, οἱ ἔποπές εἰσιν ὀρνίθων ἀπηνέστατοι . . . etc. See Thompson, *Greek Birds* 97–98, on the behavior, nest, and habitat of the hoopoe as understood by various cultures. It is important to avoid the pitfall of circularity, however, by noting that Aelian may have been influenced by the myth, at least as regards the misogyny.

[66] Hofmann, *Mythos und Komödie* 74.

[67] Griffith, "The Hoopoe's Name" 60.

extension of the wordplay in fragment 581 Radt: from Sophokles' allusion to Eleusinian ἐποπτεία, "initiation" (and perhaps to Zeus Epopetes/Epopeus), Aristophanes has created a rich network of jokes that collectively characterize the comic Tereus' function as initiator of Athenians into birdhood (we might say ὀρνιθαγωγός), with an implicit "parody of religious worship in which the birds cast themselves in the role of those gods who could best be called παν(τ)όπται, that is to say Zeus (cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 1045) and Helios (cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 91)."[68]

In addition to the punning strategies mentioned above, Aristophanes has undermined Sophokles' dramatic point. Whereas the metamorphosis into a hoopoe in tragedy represents the Thracian king's strange and savage nature, the peculiar appearance of the comic Epops is made the object of several aggressive jokes. "Are you a bird or a peacock?" asks a bewildered Peisetairos in line 102. Failing to identify Tereus' species, he reaches for the most alien and exotic ornithoid he can think of, the ταῶς (peacock), a name which in *Birds* is used to denote a marginal or entirely unfamiliar species (cf. 269).[69] This use of ταῶς to comically extend the hoopoe's strangeness illustrates well how Aristophanes abuses and distorts what one might call "popular ornithology" to suit his purposes (indeed, the serious ornithologist will be frustrated at times by Aristophanes' text). The metamorphosis of the comic Epops, moreover, appears to be incomplete and elicits Euelpides' com-

[68] Griffith, "The Hoopoe's Name" 61. "Finally," he concludes (63), "the words of the tragedian which line 48 calls to mind would have been resonant for an Athenian audience, for the ἐπόπτης denotes him who in the mysteries of Demeter had passed from being 'one who keeps his eyes closed' (μύστης) to the stage of 'beholding' (ἐποπτεία), and so has reached the furthest limit of vision and knowledge. Such a man by virtue of the power of flight imparted to him by his metamorphosis is Tereus, and by the application of his little root (*Av.* 654f.) he provides the men with wings and leads them to the knowledge which they seek."

[69] "Probably most Athenians had heard a good deal of talk about peacocks," notes Sommerstein (*Birds* 206), "but had never seen one; they were such a rarity that the aviary of Demos son of Pyrilampes, who exhibited his peacocks to the public once a month (charging an admission fee, according to Aelian *NA* 5.21), attracted visitors from as far afield as Sparta and Thessaly." In an article titled "Fowl Play" (*Nomos* 41–63) Cartledge discusses the prosopography behind Antiphon's speech *Against Erasistratos concerning (the) Peafowl* (frr. 57–59). He reconstructs the lawsuit of one Erasistratos against Demos son of Pyrilampes with the suggestion that this suit inspired Aristophanes' *Birds*. In connection with the Athenian spelling and pronunciation of ταῶς (Athenaios *Deipn.* IX.397c–d) he remarks (*Nomos* 52) that "there could be no more graphic illustration of the peacock's irremediable foreignness, and more specifically its orientalism . . . to Athenian eyes and ears."

ment that he looks "as though the Twelve Gods had blasted" him (95–96). Tereus' attempt to excuse his funny appearance ("all birds shed their feathers in winter") suggests that the Aristophanic costume exceeded the "Sophoklean indignities" (100) to make the Epops perfectly ridiculous. The dangerously sparse coat of the second hoopoe is given an even more hilarious explanation (285–86): the poor fellow, like Kallias son of Hipponikos, has been plucked bare by prosecutors and females! Thus Aristophanes marks his comic commentary on the strangeness of the Sophoklean hoopoe innovation by extending the tragic wordplay (ἔποψ ~ ἐπόπτης, "hoopoe" ~ "initiate") and distorting the tragic costume so as to adapt Tereus to his new role as guide and catalyst in *Birds*. This transformation of the hoopoe's dramatic effect is linked with Aristophanes' neutralization of the Atheno–Thracian antithesis: fragment 581 Radt describes the result of Tereus' metamorphosis in terms of a bitter *apoikia* of a solitary bird in a rocky terrain. This exile connected with hatred for Prokne and Philomela contrasts with the happy life of Tereus and his wife in *Birds*: *apoikia* becomes an Athenian desideratum, a place which attracts *apragmones* (cf. 44) to a new involvement in public life in comic contradiction to Perikles' famous criticism of such men.[70]

(3a) *The name "Tereus" in the tragedy.* There can be little doubt that Sophokles established the Thracian king's name as Τηρεύς (as opposed to Zethos, Polytekhnos, etc.), perhaps as an allusion to Teres, the king who united the kingdom of the Odrysians in the first half of the fifth century.[71] The *redende Name* of Prokne's grim "custodian" (cf. τηρέω) thus expresses a general anti–Thracian feeling as well as specific disapproval of the Athenians' alliance with Teres' son Sitalkes (reigned 440–424) at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

(3b) *The name "Tereus" in the comedy.* Aristophanes' choice of Tereus, it has been argued, was inspired by Sophokles' innovative treatment of metamorphosis as a *solution* (as opposed to a punishment; see note 66). Birdhood does, indeed, turn out to be a practical solution

[70] Thoukydides 2.63: "Men like these [*apragmones*] would soon ruin a state, either here, if they should persuade others, or if they should settle in some other land founding an independent state all to themselves; for retiring and unambitious men are not secure unless flanked by men of action" (tr. Rex Warner).

[71] Robert, *Griechische Heldensage* 156. Although conclusive proof is lacking, the indirect evidence, especially Thoukydides' polemic (2.29.3), suggests that the name "Tereus" was established for the Thracian king by Sophokles.

for Peisetairos and Euelpides, but Tereus' mock-tragic entrance (92) surely involves some play with Sophokles' significant name suggestive of vigilance and guarding: "this understanding of the name [i.e., from τηρέω] is consonant with Tereus' unexpected appearance: having heard of a human dining with ladle and pot (76–79), we meet a bird battened on myrtles and gnats (82); having searched for the 'Watcher,' we find him asleep (82)."[72]

(4a) *Language, recognition, and metatheater in the tragedy.* In addition to the incarceration of Philomela, Sophokles has Tereus cut out her tongue in order to set up the recognition by means of the "voice of the shuttle." The passage in *Poetics* mentioned above (16.1454b30–37), set alongside the peculiar, doubly determined suppression of Philomela (incarceration *and* mutilation), strongly suggests that Sophokles invented the tongue-cutting to set up another dramatic innovation: the destruction of Tereus by an act of writing (the recognition scene involving Philomela's *textum*). Occurring nowhere else in Greek legend as a means of preventing communication, this "lingual castration" is highly marked and serves to emphasize Tereus' singular savagery. His role as violent suppressor of language is thereby also specified.[73]

The revelation of Tereus' crimes by means of a *written message* woven and sent by the mutilated Philomela is a remarkable device designed specifically for the tragic stage by Sophokles, as Aristotle makes clear (see note 38). The immediate result is the victory of the Athenian women's literate cunning over their oppressive and crude Thracian environment. An irony implicit in the sophisticated strategy surfaces: Philomela becomes a swallow capable only of χελιδονίζειν; she is deprived of intelligible (Greek) speech, and her song becomes proverbial

[72] Griffith, "The Hoopoe's Name" 61 n. 11.

[73] Aiskhylean drama attests a simpler pre-Sophoklean tradition: as in the case of the passage in *Hiketides* mentioned above (line 62, hawk instead of hoopoe), *Agamemnon* 1050–51 attests an earlier version of the legend which makes no mention of shearing Philomela's tongue. Klytaimnestra says she will "persuade Kassandra (in Greek)" provided that she is not a monolingual barbarian who can only chatter like a swallow: ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐστὶ μὴ χελιδόνος δίκην / ἀγνῶτα φωνὴν βάρβαρον κεκτημένη. This is the familiar association of swallow-song and foreign languages (see below) which, if anything, foreshadows Kassandra's mantic loquacity, *not* her inability to speak. The implication here is that a talkative Philomela was transformed into an equally "talkative" bird. For a different view see Ahl, "The Art of Safe Criticism" 182–84, whose argument depends on allusion by Aiskhylos to the glossectomy.

for unintelligible foreign chatter.[74] The spectacle of Tereus exposed and destroyed by means of writing seems to have been especially memorable (cf. note 47, on the Lucanian bell krater).

Sophokles has Prokne and Philomela use the occasion of the Trieterika to carry out their revenge. The vivid Dionysian element in Ovid (*Met.* 6.587–600) most likely reflects Sophokles' *Tereus,* an inference based both on Ovid's frequent use of tragedy (especially here) and on the absence of this element in other versions of the Tereus myth. Particularly important is the tragedian's metatheatrical deployment of this element: the Dionysian cult context provides the costume and setting for the Athenian sisters' play within the play. The maenad disguise, the sacred meal, and the gift of a special ὕφος, as well as the elements of violence and sacrifice, are nicely integrated, dramatically and thematically, in the Dionysian context.

(4b) *Language, recognition, and metatheater in the comedy.* Tereus is first engaged by the Athenian refugees as a natural bridge between their past and a desired, if uncertain, future. Peisetairos appeals to him in a passive mode, employing the language of supplication as he asks for guidance:

ὅτι πρῶτα μὲν ἦσθ' ἄνθρωπος ὥσπερ νώ ποτε,
κἀργύριον ὠφείλησας ὥσπερ νώ ποτε,
κοὐκ ἀποδιδοὺς ἔχαιρες ὥσπερ νώ ποτε·
εἶτ' αὖθις ὀρνίθων μεταλλάξας φύσιν
καὶ γῆν ἐπέπτου καὶ θάλατταν ἐν κύκλῳ,
καὶ πάνθ' ὅσαπερ ἄνθρωπος ὅσα τ' ὄρνις φρονεῖς.
ταῦτ' οὖν ἱκέται νὼ πρὸς σὲ δεῦρ' ἀφίγμεθα,
εἴ τινα πόλιν φράσειας ἡμῖν εὔερον,
ὥσπερ σισύραν ἐγκατακλινῆναι μαλθακήν. (114–22)

[74] For the swallow's chatter as a metaphor for babble see A. *Ag.* 1050; Ar. *Birds* 1680–81, *Frogs* 93, 679–81; E. fr. 88 Nauck; Ion (the tragedian) fr. 33 Nauck. See also Thompson, *Greek Birds* 320. "Les anciens comparaient une langue barbare (étrangère) au cri de l'hirondelle," writes Zaganiaris ("Le mythe de Térée" 222). "De là le mot ὁ χελιδὼν (au masculin) a pris le sens de barbare et le verbe χελιδονίζω = βαρβαρίζω. Du même sens provient le proverbe χελιδόνων μουσεῖα qui désigne des mots barbares et inconcevables. Ce dicton convient aux hommes bavards et ennuyeux. L'expression est une parodie de ἀηδόνων μουσεῖα d'Euripide qui désigne des choeurs des rossignols. De même l'expression d'Aristophane χείλεσιν ἀμφιλάλοις δεινὸν ἐπιβρέμεται θρηκία χελιδὼν désigne son cri barbare en faisant allusion au mythe de la métamorphose qui a eu lieu en Thrace."

It is because you were originally a man, once upon a time, like us;
and you owed people money, once upon a time, like us;
and you liked to avoid paying them, once upon a time, like us.
Then later you changed to the shape of a bird,
and you've flown over land and sea in every direction;
and you have all the knowledge that a man has and that a bird has.
That's why we've come here to you [as suppliants],
to beseech you if you could tell us of some city that's nice and fleecy,
soft as a wooly mantle to go to sleep in.

The wisdom of the feathered guru, however, amounts to little more than a series of weak puns on proper names (Aristokrates, Melanthios, Opuntios) surrounding Peisetairos' and Euelpides' lusty scenarios of the good ἀπράγμων life (128–42). The chief suppliant, disappointed, begins to study Tereus himself. "What's this life here with the birds like?" he asks (155). "You'll know all about it." As Peisetairos "reads" Tereus—his living blueprint for the future—he is suddenly struck by the Great Idea which clarifies his own *redende Name*:

Πε. φεῦ φεῦ·
ἦ μέγ' ἐνορῶ βούλευμ' ἐν ὀρνίθων γένει
καὶ δύναμιν, ἢ γένοιτ' ἄν, εἰ πίθοισθέ μοι.
Τη. τί σοι πιθώμεσθ';
Πε. ὅ τι πίθησθε; πρῶτα μὲν . . . (162–64)

PE. Yow!
I see in the race of birds what could be a grand design
and a mighty power, were you to be *persuaded* by me.
TE. What do you want us to be *persuaded* of?
PE. What should you be *persuaded* of [you ask]? Well, first of all . . .

Aristophanes marks this important moment etymologically by a triple repetition of the morpheme πιθ–, which anticipates the comic name of the as yet unnamed protagonist (see 644): Peisetairos now assumes leadership as "persuader of friends" and fellow members of ἑταιρίαι, "clubs."[75] His plan for a bird rebellion and boycott unfolds so rapidly that Tereus, now his student, has difficulty following it. When the meaning of Peisetairos' vigorous speech (180–83), the kernel of which is the

[75] Hubbard, *Mask of Comedy* 160, suggests that *Birds* (like Amepsias' *Revellers*, which won the comic competition of 414) was directed against the ἑταιρίαι "thought to be responsible for the sacriliges [of 415]."

pun πόλος ~ πόλις ("firmament" ~ "state"), finally dawns on Tereus, he unwittingly hints at the significant name of the future city (Νεφελοκοκκυγία) as Peisetairos' "trap" (νεφέλη) for "fools" (κόκκυγες):

Τη. ἰοὺ ἰού.
μὰ γῆν, μὰ παγίδας, μὰ νεφέλας, μὰ δίκτυα,
μὴ 'γὼ νόημα κομψότερον ἤκουσά πω·
ὥστ' ἂν κατοικίζοιμι μετὰ σοῦ τὴν πόλιν,
εἰ ξυνδοκοίη τοῖσιν ἄλλοις ὀρνέοις.
Πε. τίς ἂν οὖν τὸ πρᾶγμ' αὐτοῖς διηγήσαιτο;
Τη. σύ.
ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτούς, βαρβάρους ὄντας πρὸ τοῦ,
ἐδίδαξα τὴν φωνὴν ξυνὼν πολὺν χρόνον.
Πε. πῶς δῆτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ξυγκαλέσειας;
Τη. ῥᾳδίως.
δευρὶ γὰρ εἰσβὰς αὐτίκα μάλ' εἰς τὴν λόχμην,
ἔπειτ' ἀνεγείρας τὴν ἐμὴν ἀηδόνα,
καλοῦμεν αὐτούς· (194–204)

Te. Wowee!
Holy Earth! Holy snares, gins and nets,
but I've never heard a cleverer idea!
So much so that I'll found this city with you,
should the other birds agree.
Pe. Then who's going to explain the idea to them?
Te. You. They used to be inarticulate [barbarians],
but I've lived with them a long time and I've taught them language.
Pe. So how are you going to call them together?
Te. Easily. I'll go into my thicket here right away,
and wake up my nightingale,
and we'll summon them.

The reversal of Sophokles' *Tereus* is complete: in the tragedy the Atheno–Thracian antithesis provides the context for Tereus' efforts to suppress communication by means of the incarceration and "lingual castration" of Philomela. When the latter's *textum* defeats these efforts, Prokne avenges her sister in the most horrible way possible. Connecting two salient innovations, Sophokles has Tereus' suppression of language trigger the Athenian sisters' Dionysian theater of revenge. In Sophokles' play within the play, Tereus, a Thracian "full of scorn for writing" (see note 56), seeking "to destroy in fury everything which concerned the intellectual sphere," is himself destroyed by writing and

the superior intellectual abilities of the Athenians. Tragedy reacts, as it were, to the Thracian's war on language by complicating its own discourse and imbedding one performance (Prokne and Philomela disguised as maenads simulate Trieteric ritual) in another. I have suggested that the bloody conclusion of Sophokles' play may have presented to the audience a symbolic tableau in which Tereus, Prokne, and Philomela were represented as having passed out of the human condition following a series of unspeakable crimes. Even in this metaphorical death–as–solution the hoopoe shuns all women, nurturing an eternal hatred for them (fr. 581 Radt).

Aristophanes makes his Tereus a benevolent teacher and disseminator of language, and not any language, at that, but Greek! The comic counterinnovation provides Peisetairos with a linguistic context for his city–planning activities. The fact that this "Thracian" has taught his fellow barbarians Greek unleashes a new wave of Athenian cunning and creativity that surfaces as a comedy within a comedy. I argue elsewhere[76] that the persuasive speeches of the agon (451–638) represent a unique metatheatric moment in Aristophanic drama in which Peisetairos as *khorodidaskalos* trains a hostile bird *taxis* for their solemn "parodos" as a new chorus in the parabasis. Assimilating the Athenian's clever "lessons," the birds assume a new identity to deliver an authoritative comic cosmogony. Peisetairos, representing the comic poet, stands aside, as the birds perform with an impressive air of autonomy. The comic polis, Nephelokokkygia, emerges as a play written and directed by Peisetairos, who supervises the many entrances and exits of various (often quite literate) characters in his comedy. Tereus' activities of disseminating language are catalytic for this metacomedy, allowing Peisetairos' political career to mirror, among other things, the improvisational creativity of a comic poet.

CONCLUSION, ΛΕΓΩΝ ΠΤΕΡΩ ΣΕ: FROM TONGUE TO WING

Whereas the tragic Tereus' war on language precipitated a crisis which forced the participants to escape an intolerable human condition into birdhood (symbolic of death), the comic Tereus' linguistic pedagogy opens for the Athenians a political future marked by wings which Aristophanes uses as signs of rhetorical prowess and comic freedom.

[76] Dobrov, *The City as Comedy.*

The multidirectional governing metaphor of *Birds,* in which men assimilate to birds and birds to men, etc., springs directly from the presence onstage of Tereus, the incarnate comic "metaform." "The apotheosis of Peisetairos is only the climax of a persistent pattern," writes Sommerstein,[77]

> running through the play from start to finish, of subversion (both in word and in deed) of the established hierarchy of the universe with its unbridgeable gulfs between immortals and mortals, and between man and the lower animals. Over and over again, men are spoken of as birds, gods as birds or as men, birds as men or as gods. Tereus, his wife, and his servant, are birds who were once human; Peisetairus and Euelpides acquire wings and feathers during the play; while before himself becoming the new supreme god, Peisetairus has offered to make a god (Heracles) "sovereign of the birds." All boundaries and categories seem to be obliterated, just as Cloudcuckooville itself defies logic and nature, this walled and gated city which somehow floats in mid-air, which Iris can fly through without realizing it exists, which visitor after visitor from earth can reach *before* being equipped with wings. . . . Nowhere, even in Aristophanes, are the laws of the universe so utterly set aside for the hero's benefit. He has but to will, and it is so. His power is total.

This essentially linguistic power (cf. the central pun in line 184) drives the series of theatrical innovations which produce Nephelokokkygia. The comic Tereus has restored the severed tongue, and Aristophanes celebrates a bizarre possible future.[78] Metamorphosis into birds represents a comic solution of a very different kind. Wings signify rhetorical prowess coupled with the freedom to escape "tragedy" in precisely the same way as Tereus, bird-man par excellence, escaped from Sophokles' play to *Birds*. The chorus invite the spectators to join them in their bird comedy:

> οὐδέν ἐστ' ἄμεινον οὐδ' ἥδιον ἢ φῦσαι πτερά.
> αὐτίχ' ὑμῶν τῶν θεατῶν εἴ τις ἦν ὑπόπτερος,
> εἶτα πεινῶν τοῖς χοροῖσι τῶν τραγῳδῶν ἤχθετο,
> ἐκπτόμενος ἂν οὗτος ἠρίστησεν ἐλθὼν οἴκαδε,
> κᾆτ' ἂν ἐμπλησθεὶς ἐφ' ἡμᾶς αὖθις αὖ κατέπτατο. (785–89)

[77] Sommerstein, *Birds* 3–4.

[78] In all discussions of the power of language in Aristophanes, *Birds* in particular, it is necessary to acknowledge Whitman's fundamental work *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero.*

> There's nothing more advantageous or more agreeable than to grow wings.
> For instance, if one of you spectators were winged,
> and if he were hungry and bored with the tragic performances,
> he could have flown out of here, gone home, had lunch,
> and when he'd filled himself up, flown back here to see us.

The spectators are invited to fly, with the birds, from the annoyances of tragedy and the constraints of the theater to enjoy the usual carnal pleasures celebrated in Old Comedy: food, sex, and the relief of defecation. As Peisetairos disburses wings to newcomers the creative power of speech is expressed in a number of metaphors of "taking wing," ἀναπτερῶ/ἀνεπτερῶσθαι (1437–39, 1445, 1449), the most vivid of which is λέγων πτερῶ σε, "I render you winged through speech." This brave new world of birds is not one of undifferentiated bliss, however. Peisetairos' apotheosis and tyrannical rule suggest that latent in the total subversion of the barbaric and tragic (i.e., Sophokles' *Tereus*) is the potential for a return to the same: the outrageous success of Peisetairos' aggressive attack on the established order appears, in the end, to be a return to a terrifying pre–Olympian monarchy in which Peisetairos, like Kronos (and like the tragic Tereus), eats his own "children."

I submit that at the heart of Aristophanes' complex design in *Birds* is the systematic usurpation of Sophoklean innovation. *Birds* is not merely a concatenation of general mythical travesties (as Hofmann, for example, and Zannini–Quirini argue) but a sophisticated synthesis of reactions to specific people, events, dramatic performances, and texts. As in the case of the Prometheus scene, which Herington has shown to involve parody of the *Prometheia,*[79] so the first half of *Birds* arises from an exuberant improvisation on the themes and situations of one of the most memorable tragedies of the fifth century. This improvisation, moreover, engages the powerful mechanism of metamorphosis which works throughout *Birds* as a poetic program, a comic poetics of transformation. Characters, situations, dramatic *Bauformen,* and themes are subjected to an exuberant and relentless series of metamorphoses the sum of which is the conversion of the indeterminate world of the prologue into Nephelokokkygia, a fantastic polis occupying a strategic position between gods and men. Each of the manifold transformations catalyzed by Tereus is interesting in itself and deserves much fuller

[79] Herington, "*Birds* and *Prometheia*."

treatment than can be given here. The metamorphosis of the chorus, for example, from a natural community of birds into a self-aware *politeia* of Nephelokokkygians has important metatheatrical implications for the enactment of the polis after the parabasis. An equally significant metamorphosis is that of Peisetairos from a disaffected exile seeking a τόπος ἀπράγμων, first into an energetic and opinionated sophist-choreographer, and then into the supreme tyrant and anti-Zeus. Sophokles' *Tereus*, refracted through the prism of paratragedy, informs the design of *Birds* on many levels from the governing metaphor of transformation to the definition of "Athenian" and "polis" against a barbarian other. In creating his own masterpiece incorporating and transforming a product of Sophokles' dramatic genius, Aristophanes was, quite clearly, honoring his older contemporary with the highest praise.[80]

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[80] For helpful criticism on earlier versions I am grateful to audiences at Cornell University, the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and the seminar on *Birds* at the 122nd Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association (1990). I owe special thanks to Anthony Edwards, the commentator at the seminar, for his detailed and penetrating critique.

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THE *TETRALOGIES* AND ATHENIAN HOMICIDE TRIALS

The *Tetralogies* attributed to Antiphon are documents of singular importance for the evolution of rhetoric at Athens: they give an artful demonstration of opposing arguments in three hypothetical cases of homicide; their methods are not unlike those of the showpieces of Gorgias or the paired speeches in Thucydides' *History*.[1] Basic questions of authorship and date remain unresolved, but it now appears to be the majority view that the *Tetralogies* can be at least identified as a product of Antiphon's era, if not his own work. The author's aims, however, remain uncertain: his work is often treated as a practical demonstration of model arguments for aspiring advocates to imitate (it is thus considered typical of early *technai*); but it may also be read as abstract speculation on prominent issues of the fifth-century Enlightenment. By either interpretation the artificial scenarios and theoretical aims account for the discrepancies of language and legal background that separate the *Tetralogies* from the other Antiphontian speeches which represent the actual arguments in homicide trials.[2] In response to this emerging consensus, it seems warranted to undertake a more thorough comparison of the common topics and techniques found in the *Tetralogies* and the relevant court speeches. Commentators have generally been content to remark certain similarities of theme, to acknowledge

[1] For general reference see Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit* 149–74; Lipsius, *Attische Recht* 602, 615; Gernet, *Antiphon* 6–16; Dover, "Chronology" 56–59; MacDowell, *Homicide Law* 80; Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion* 130–31; Decleva Caizzi, *Tetralogiae*; Gagarin, "Prohibition of Homicide" and "Proofs in Antiphon"; Sealey, "Tetralogies." See also Cole's valuable study, *Origins of Rhetoric* 73–82, treating the *Tetralogies* as an early "proto-rhetorical practice and demonstration test."

[2] In favor of period authenticity and discounting discrepancies see Dover, "Chronology" 58; Decleva Caizzi, *Tetralogiae* 21–44; Gagarin, "Prohibition of Homicide" 303; Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric* 73–78. An intriguing solution to both linguistic and legal discrepancies has now been offered by Innes, "Sophistopolis," arguing that the rhetorical setting is not Athens but a broader sophistic construct; for the view that the law of the *Tetralogies* is fictitious or universal cf. Thiel, *Erste Tetralogie* 13–15. Against authenticity: on legal and ideological grounds, see most recently Sealey, "Tetralogies." The dispute goes back to Dittenberger, "Tetralogien," of 1896–97 and 1905 (responding to Lipsius, "Tetralogien," 1904). Against Antiphon's authorship on linguistic grounds see Gernet, *Antiphon* 15–16 (answered by Dover, "Chronology" 58–59); cf. von der Mühll, "Unechtheit" 1–5. The related problem of whether Antiphon the Sophist and the speechwriter are one and the same is beyond the scope of this paper, but see note 28 below.

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that the *Tetralogies* offer a condensed version and a different perspective on topics also found in the court speeches, and not to analyze the parallels and discrepancies systematically.[3] Such is the chief purpose of this study. If we are to draw any valid conclusions about the author's aims and his place in early rhetoric, we should arrive at a better understanding of how his work compares with the one body of material that offers the clearest parallels in subject matter and method: the speeches for homicide trials. To this end we shall first consider the "questions at issue" in the *Tetralogies* alongside the court cases (with their peculiar mechanism for defining the dispute); second, the ethical argument that is premised upon *miasma* doctrine; and third, the problematic legal argument regarding "the law that prohibits (even) justifiable killing."

I. INVENTION IN THE *TETRALOGIES*

A preoccupation with defining the question at issue is evident in each of the three *Tetralogies*; the second (in a case of accidental slaying in javelin practice) poses this problem most directly. Some matters, decided by the laws and decrees, are beyond dispute: "what is agreed upon as to the facts of the case, the laws and the voters have judged . . . ; if there is an issue in dispute (*amphisbētēsimon*), this is assigned to you [as judges] to decide"(2.2.1). The clear implication of this opening statement is (1) that the defense will have no basis to dispute the facts which are agreed upon (τὰ ὁμολογούμενα τῶν πραγμάτων) and (2) that the legal basis of the charge, "which the laws and the voters have judged," is not an "issue in dispute . . . for [the judges] to decide." The plaintiff has agreed that the act was unintentional, but he claims that defendant is nonetheless liable. "The facts of the case" are not disputed; neither the letter nor the intent of the law is at issue. The author thus suggests to his audience a basic division of issues as questions of fact, law, or definition.

Although the systematic division of issues—what would later be the province of *stasis* theory and what this author and Aristotle call

[3]Thus Zuntz, "Earliest Prose Style," treats Tetralogy 2 as an earlier model than the court speeches; again, in "Tetralogies" 102, on the treatment of "judicial murder" in Ant. 5.91 and *Tetr.* 3.2.8, he reasons: "The [earlier] parallel in the third Tetralogy is wholly dominated by the idea of the avenging spirit . . . [which] fails to reappear in extant speeches. The abandonment of this traditional motif is characteristic evidence of a changed 'Zeitgeist.'"

"issue in dispute" (ἀμφισβητησιμόν, ἀμφισβήτησις)—appears to be largely a product of fourth-century rhetorical analysis (Aristotle *Rhet.* 1374a, 1417b), the author of the *Tetralogies* seems to assume that the rudiments of this classification are familiar to his audience.[4] He may well have chosen *dikē phonou* as his format because it readily lends itself to experimentation on "issues in dispute." In other procedures it remains doubtful how much of the case was decided in *anakrisis*; but in *dikai phonou* the pretrial hearings (over the course of three months) would ordinarily have given every opportunity to decide such basic questions as the facts of the case and the relevant law, and thus to define the "issue in dispute" before trial. In the court speeches this aspect of the proceedings is generally reflected in an *apodeixis,* or exposition of the opposing claims, at the outset of the proof.

In the opening speech of Tetralogy 2 the author seems to declare, in essence, that the procedural mechanism for defining the question at issue and the conventional *apodeixis* of courtroom argument are utterly ineffectual and irrelevant in this case. In the plaintiff's second speech, moreover, it is clear that the author intends to disregard or defy the ordinary rules and assumptions that governed the special courts for homicide. Once his opponent has spoken, the plaintiff reacts: "he has shown to what extremes dire necessity can drive anyone . . . *I would not have supposed that he would (even) answer the charge"* (2.3.2). The prosecutor contends that he has lost half of his allotted time by dispensing with the first speech when he thought that the trial was a mere formality.

This tactic corresponds to a familiar device in the court speeches ("surely my opponent will not have the audacity to dispute," *vel sim.*).[5] But in the court speeches this tactic draws upon what has been discovered in the pretrial hearings. Thus in Antiphon 6, where the *apodeixis* (6.15–17) seems clearly intended to make nonsense of the charges—as though the plaintiffs have no case—the defendant builds upon the preliminaries: he knows precisely the wording of the charge and how the key terms will be interpreted, and he is confident that the plaintiffs cannot dispute the testimony of his witnesses. In Tetralogy 2, however,

[4]The manuscript hypotheses identify the issues as στοχασμός, question of fact (Tetralogy 1), or μετάστασις/ἀντέγκλημα, transferred blame (Tetralogies 2 and 3). The hypotheses of course do not go back to the author of the *Tetralogies* himself, but cf. Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric* 97–98.

[5]Cf. Ant. 1 (*Stepmother*) 5–7, 28–30.

there is the clear implication that the prosecution do not know how the defense will argue their case or even the wording of their plea. If this were an actual case for trial, the issues would have been clearly defined in the three preliminary hearings. The statements on both sides would have been attested under the solemnest of oaths (Dem. 23.67–68). Antiphon 1.2 refers to a written indictment; Antiphon 6.14–17 shows that the sworn statements were read out and affirmed at the beginning of the trial and that each side knew the content of the other's affidavit.

The author of the *Tetralogies* seems purposely to distort or defy this aspect of the proceedings. He treats the case as though the two parties have gone to trial without defining the real issue; the plaintiff pretends to have no knowledge of how the defense will plead—indeed he had supposed that his opponent would abandon the case in desperation and send his son into exile in the midst of the trial. In alluding to the provision that allows voluntary exile before the final speech the author is again treating the conventions in a provocative way. The provision for escape before the final speech is properly exploited in Tetralogies 1 and 3, where intentional killing is alleged and the death penalty looms. But this provision is irrelevant in cases of *un*intentional homicide such as this, where the defendant is guaranteed a safe path of exile *after* the final verdict. There was nothing to be gained by forgoing the trial.[6] Unless we are to suppose that the author was wholly ignorant of this aspect of his chosen format, it is reasonable to conclude that he has intentionally seized upon a case in which the ordinary mechanism for defining the question at issue would prove inadequate.

The concise, elliptical approach to the scenario also suggests that the author has taken up a familiar paradox, one in which the "issue in dispute" might well seem elusive. The sole narrative, which must suffice for the four speeches, is the one brief sentence: "My son was struck by the javelin thrown by this youth in the gymnasium and immediately died." The author evidently assumes that his audience will recognize the case—much as Gorgias could assume that his audience knew the stories of Helen and Palamedes. In this case Plutarch reports that such an incident was indeed publicized (*Per.* 36): we are told that Pericles and

[6] For the guarantee of safe passage to those convicted for unintentional killing see Dem. 23.72. The author's confusion about the penalty has been often observed—defense refers to the prospect of a verdict against him as though the boy's life were at stake (διαφθορά, 3.2.10); cf. Sealey, "Tetralogies" 77.

Protagoras debated whether the weapon itself or the officials were culpable.

If we assume that this case was well known to the audience of the *Tetralogies,* the initial formulation regarding the "issue in dispute" ("what is agreed upon as to the facts of the case, the law and the voters have judged; . . . if there is an issue in dispute it is [for the judges] to decide") suggests that the author intended to discount the familiar solutions. Later in the tetralogy (3.7) the prosecution expressly discounts the view that Pericles supposedly debated, that the officials were culpable; the author sees no need to explore it. It was probably also a common assumption that the defendant in such a case might well attempt to plead that the killing was "justifiable" by the law of the Delphinium court. By the Delphinium law, however, the defendant may admit to the killing but claim legal justification only if he can invoke a specific provision of statute; among such instances were death in athletic competition (ἐν ἄθλοις)—not, as our author has construed the case, in training.

In the treatment of "issues in dispute" with which he begins this case, the author seems rather pointedly to reject a plea of legal justification. What "the law and the voters have judged" (issues which are not for the judges to decide) evidently refers to statutory rules, which, upon strict construction, would render a plea of legal justification invalid.

In all three tetralogies we find a similar allusiveness; the succinct, abbreviated narrative seems to presuppose a certain audience awareness of the issues in the famous or typical case. Tetralogy 2 is again the clearest instance, and what we learn of the controversy surrounding this case tells us something about the author's inspiration.

If we accept the historicity of the anecdote and assume that indeed Pericles and Protagoras debated this very theme, it is possible that the incident occurred in the 440s (or very soon after)—probably the era of Antiphon's earliest involvement as legal counsel. But if the debate between Pericles and Protagoras was first publicized or fabricated by Stesimbrotus, the *terminus post quem* must be rather later. Plutarch's account clearly suggests that Stesimbrotus was the ultimate source for the tale of Pericles' quarrel with his son Xanthippus; and it is in this context that we are told how Xanthippus exposed the debate with Protagoras.[7] Plutarch himself is skeptical of Stesimbrotus' account, and if,

[7] Stesimbrotus, *FGrHist* 107 F 11; Plut. *Per.* 36.4–6. Xanthippus reportedly told the tale to discredit his father as an effete intellectual. The whole anecdote (36.2–5) probably

as seems likely, the tale is a rank fabrication by Stesimbrotus, the story was current no earlier than the late 420s, probably later.[8] On this assumption the *Tetralogies* would belong to the same period as Antiphon 5 and 6, with which they are so much at odds stylistically. They may yet be a work of the same author, utilizing the literary dialect and departing widely from his court practice; or it may perhaps be the work of a contemporary or "student" of Antiphon but, if so, not necessarily written before his death.[9] And a third possibility is not out of the question, that the tale told by Stesimbrotus was elaborated by a later author, and it was this later publication that prompted the author of the *Tetralogies* to write an adaptation. In any case the tetralogy was clearly inspired by the *cause célèbre*.

In subject matter the other two tetralogies are similarly artificial *controversiae*: both may be linked to common topics in the rhetorical handbooks, and both seem to anticipate audience interest in certain sensational themes. Tetralogy 1—in which the defendant must argue that he is not likely to have killed the victim precisely because he is the most likely suspect—parallels a famous topic posed by Tisias; it may also recall a famous incident or a recent precedent.[10] There are obvious parallels between the issue in Tetralogy 3—in which the defendant must plead that he was not the initiator of a brawl with an older man—and various common topics of the later rhetorical literature. The topic owes something to the fact that such brawls were undoubtedly commonplace in all periods; the scenario in Tetralogy 3 is also remarkably similar to a case reported by Demosthenes.[11]

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derives from Stesimbrotus; he is cited by name at 36.6, and a connection between the name-citation and the previous anecdote is indicated by the turn of phrase, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν περὶ τῆς γυναικὸς διαβολὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χανθίππου φησὶν ὁ Στησίμβροτος . . . διασπαρῆναι.

[8] Plutarch seems anxious to quash the slanders of Stesimbrotus (*Per.* 13–16). See my "Thucydides and Stesimbrotus."

[9] For the ancient tradition that Antiphon of Rhamnous was a teacher of rhetoric cf. *Menex.* 236a; Anon. *Vit. Thuc.* 1–2; Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores* B X.2–3, 5–9.

[10] Plato (*Phaedrus* 273b) attributes the technique to Tisias; cf. Aristotle *Rhet.* 2.1402a17–22. Gagarin, "Proofs in Antiphon" 30, aptly calls this method "reverse εἰκός." The hypothesis to Tetralogy 1 cites Lysias *Against Mikines* as a parallel. The author may also have had in mind the unsolved murder of Ephialtes, cited in Ant. 5.69; see below at note 23.

[11] With the ethical proof in Tetralogy 3, regarding youthful *akolasia*, cf. Aristotle *Rhet.* 1389a. On the case reported in Dem. 21.72–75 see below at note 45.

In his selection of material the author also reveals an interest in cases that involve fundamentally *legal* or juristic problems, areas where the rules and principles that shape the courtroom arguments prove inadequate or suggest problematic consequences. Thus in Tetralogy 2 the author has focused upon an incident where the accepted notions of causation and legal justification involve obvious contradictions or ambiguities which seem to defy the ordinary solutions and the very assumptions underlying *dikai phonou*. The hypothetical "who–done–it" in Tetralogy 1 has similar legalistic implications.

Now there has been a general tendency to emphasize the importance of argument from probability in the *Tetralogies* and to date them accordingly to the height of the sophistic era, when such tactics were new and intriguing. The author's method, however, is not such as to suggest that probabilities per se were among his chief interests; his use of *eikos* is in fact rather limited and narrowly focused. He uses probabilities only in the first and third tetralogies; and in the third, only in regard to the commonplace "The young are more prone to reckless violence." Tetralogy 1, to be sure, involves a tour de force in ethical reasoning on probable motive; but this exercise in probabilities is not by any means the whole of the argument. Whether it is sufficient to justify the usual assumption, that the author's chief aim was to give a demonstration in probabilities, seems to me questionable.

The use of probabilities in Tetralogy 1 is directed to the question of fact, whether the defendant is indeed the unknown agent who ambushed the victim. This line of argument is clearly a speculative exercise; but it is not without legal or juristic significance. From all available evidence, both the extant speeches for court cases and the record of statute law, the question whether the defendant or some other unknown assailant was in fact the culprit was rarely (if ever) the issue in *dikai phonou*. The homicide procedure that Dracon devised was intended primarily to facilitate private settlement, providing for exile and *aidesis* or for self–help; trial before the *ephetai* was invoked only where this primitive form of "judgment" was disputed by one party or the other.[12] The function of the Draconian trial was not to investigate or make a determination upon the facts, but to give judgment regarding *liability*, either for the plaintiffs or for the defendant. From these origins, the argumentation in homicide trials tends to focus *not* upon questions of

[12] For this model of homicide procedure cf. Thür, "Zum δικάζειν bei Homer" and "Urteil aus Mantineia." See also my "*Ephetai*" and "Phreatto."

fact or circumstance per se, but upon the formal instruments of proof—oath, witness, testimony under torture, and other documents. These instruments originally served as the decisive means of resolving the case and later became the focus of preliminary hearings where the issues of fact and law were decided, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, and the defendant made his plea.

More than sixty years ago Solmsen suggested that Antiphon stands at the transition from the earlier mode of reasoning from formal instruments of proof to the era when *eikos* and circumstantial evidence became prevalent; he observed that "rational argumentation" in Antiphon's court speeches tends to center upon the *atechnoi pisteis* (oath, witness, etc.), which thus seem to be still the decisive "barycenters" of the argument—"Gravitationszentren."[13] This model of Antiphon's argumentation has been recently challenged, and some useful clarifications have been made; the notion that Antiphon was somehow conceptually constrained by the older mode of argument is ultimately misleading, especially in regard to Antiphon 5.[14] But in the arrangement of Antiphon 1 and 6, the two court speeches for *dikai phonou,* Solmsen's observation is strikingly apt: the arguments are clearly structured around the validation of oaths, testimony, and challenges to torture. In Antiphon 1 the speaker's principal argument is directed against the defense oath—"How can he swear that he 'knows full well' the defendant is innocent," when he was neither witness to the events himself nor willing to torture the slaves who have knowledge of the events? (There are secondary arguments regarding challenge to torture.) Again in Antiphon 6 the speaker addresses himself to the wording of the *diōmosia* and the value of testimony; rather than argue directly on the factual issues and the crucial concept of indirect causation (*bouleusis*), he fixes upon the self-refuting claims and actions of the prosecution. Thus in the extant court speeches in *dikai phonou* Solmsen's finding largely holds true, that arguments from probability and circumstantial evidence tend to center upon the "nonartificial" or evidentiary proofs. This is true of Lysias 1, however, as well as Antiphon 1 and 6; whereas in Lysias 13, just as in Antiphon 5, in homicide cases prosecuted by "warrant and arrest" before ordinary dicastic juries, rather different meth-

[13] *Antiphonstudien*: on this transitional role see esp. 33–46; Solmsen doubted the authenticity of the *Tetralogies* and excluded them from his study (3 n. 1).

[14] Gagarin, "Proofs in Antiphon"; cf. Goebel, *Early Greek Rhetorical Theory,* esp. 49–55. The view that traditional modes of proof continued to prevail in *dikai phonou* will be argued in detail elsewhere.

ods prevail. The reason for this shift may not be as Solmsen supposed, that Antiphon's mode of argument was in transition, but that the traditional instruments of proof retained a special function in *dikai phonou,* and therefore circumstantial evidence and other artful tactics tended to focus upon oath and testimony, rather than directly upon questions of fact or motive.

The author of Tetralogy 1 is in fact remarkably attentive to this aspect of the proceedings. He seems to assume that the plaintiff must rely on some, at least minimal, evidentiary proof (in this case the dying testimony of a slave). Bear in mind that if he had not wished to be at all constrained by court practice, he might have ventured upon a purely circumstantial case (dispensing with the dying slave). Instead he adapts the conventional arguments on testimony under torture: where the prosecutor insists upon the validity of the slave's testimony, the defendant discredits it by invidious comparison to freemen's testimony, which is subject to penalties for perjury.[15] But the author has skewed his scenario in such a way as to subvert the ordinary rules of evidence. Ordinarily the plaintiff's oath would rely upon firsthand knowledge of the events or eyewitness testimony. In this case the sole basis for the plaintiff's oath is the *reported* testimony of the dying slave. Hearsay of living witnesses was not allowed, and the testimony of slaves was ordinarily admissible only if properly obtained under torture. Our author has, in effect, acknowledged but evaded both restrictions; his case is technically admissible, but he could not have contrived more tenuous grounds for the charge.

So far as we can judge, circumstantial evidence alone was not felt to be sufficient for bringing a case to trial (though once at trial the "probabilities" were often decisive). Where there were no qualified witnesses or other evidentiary proof upon which to base their charges, the accepted course of action for the victim's family would be to make their proclamation at the Prytaneion against the unknown killer.[16] That proclamation of the unknown killer was sometimes the only recourse is

[15] Cf. *Tetr.* 1.4.7, 10. Witnesses in *dikai phonou* took the same oath as the parties themselves (cf. Ant. 5.12). The earliest known perjury suit in *dikai phonou* is reported in Isoc. 18.52 (after 403), possibly given greater emphasis as a novel procedure. Ant. 5.95 (not long after 420) suggests there was as yet no remedy against perjury in such cases.

[16] For judgment against the unknown killer cf. *Ath. Pol.* 57.4; Dem. 23.76. The obstacle against prosecuting without evidentiary proof should not be construed as a *statutory* rule, barring the basileus by law from letting such a case go forward: in Dem. 23.70 the exegetes' response makes it clear that this was in the nature of a customary rule, whose violation would only tend to discredit the plaintiff.

shown by Dem. 47.69–70: the exegetes told the plaintiff, "since you yourself were not present, but only your wife and children, and there are no other witnesses, make proclamation against no one by name but against 'the perpetrators and killers.'" For trial before the ordinary homicide courts, prosecutors would have to swear, either on their own conviction or on the basis of other firsthand witnesses, that so–and–so was "the killer" (directly implicated in cause of death). Tetralogy 1 goes as far as the procedure will allow to dispense with these traditional rules of evidence.

The issue in Tetralogy 1 has, indeed, its parallels among the court speeches. In both Antiphon 1 and 5 the charges amount to premeditated murder. Antiphon 1, *Against the Stepmother,* is the only extant speech prosecuted on the same charge in the same jurisdiction as envisioned in Tetralogy 1, namely intentional homicide before the Areopagus.[17] The question of fact, however, whether the defendant was indeed implicated, does not appear to be the principal issue. It is evident from the argumentation that the *question of intent* was crucial to the defense, and here the prosecution has only dubious evidence.[18] The plaintiff is prosecuting in obedience to his father's dying charge, and he claims that his father had actually caught the woman attempting to give him drugs, though she claimed to have given them as love potions (1.9). The slaves' testimony under torture would supposedly have confirmed this incriminating fact.[19] Aristotle alludes to a similar case in *Magna Moralia* 1188b29–38—indeed it is very possibly the same case (perhaps as notorious as the scenario in Tetralogy 2). Here intent is clearly the issue, and we learn that the woman was acquitted on grounds that she acted from love rather than malice. In any event, in Antiphon 1 the question of fact, whether the stepmother was implicated, does not appear to be the issue.

Other than Tetralogy 1 we have no direct evidence that the ques-

[17] See Heitsch, *Antiphon* 21–32, following Wilamowitz ("Erste Rede") in the assumption that the concubine who administered the potion had implicated the stepmother. See also Gagarin, "*Bouleusis*": intentional murder by "planning" (*bouleusis*) would be tried at the Areopagus.

[18] A plea of innocence of intent is clearly anticipated in §§ 22–23: the defense will admit complicity in the killing but will plead that the killer acted rashly, "without design." For the manuscripts' ἀβούλως τὲ καὶ ἀθέως Gernet unnecessarily emended to ἐπιβούλως, κτλ.

[19] It is likely that the concubine (who administered the drug) had implicated the stepmother under torture; cf. Heitsch, *Antiphon* 25 with n. 57.

tion of fact, whether the defendant was or was not implicated, was ever at issue in *dikai phonou*. Antiphon 5 (*Herodes*) is indeed a case of "who-done-it" similar in some respects to that of the Tetralogy 1 but prosecuted by the procedure for "warrant" and summary arrest (*endeixis/apagōgē*). Here the prosecution rely upon the testimony of a slave under torture (evidently handled improperly and discredited by the slave's dying recantation). The defendant suggests that he should be tried by *dikē phonou*, presumably before the Areopagus;[20] but the treatment of the legal issue is highly argumentative and certainly not reliable evidence that such cases were regularly tried at the Areopagus. Indeed, it is a reasonable inference from the speaker's argument (and one his judges were clearly intended to make) that the plaintiff's case would be untenable before the high court.

The very problem of how to convict a murderer who plots to evade detection is, to be sure, a recognizable *topos* in the extant court speeches, but it serves a different function: by the very nature of the proceedings it was almost impossible to convict a murderer without witnesses; that fact became axiomatic. We find this topic developed in Antiphon 6 (*Choreutes*): "in cases where murder is planned and executed without witnesses, judgment must be rendered solely on the basis of such claims as the prosecution and the defendant put forward . . . rather upon conjecture (εἰκάζοντας) than sure knowledge of the facts" (6.18). In this case there are many witnesses and no dispute on the facts; therefore the judges should put little credence in the artful conjectures of the prosecutors. The chief function of the topic is to emphasize by contrast the certainty of the defendant's proofs. When we turn from this usage to the proem of Tetralogy 1, it looks as though the author has chosen his scenario precisely to demonstrate how the paradigmatic "insoluble case" may in fact be solved. He has reversed the ordinary assumptions: assume there are no reliable witnesses, the bare minimum of formal proof for admitting the charges. He extends the concept to its logical though unconventional conclusion—to try the case solely upon probable motive and prejudicial appeals. In this way the topic in the court speeches may have served as a model for Tetralogy 1.[21] The reversal of this argument such as we find in that tetralogy, on the other hand,

[20] On the legal issues in this case, see Heitsch, *Antiphon* 44–56; Gagarin, *Murder of Herodes* 17–29.

[21] Von der Mühll, "Unechtheit" 4–5, offered a similar hypothesis.

would not have been much use in the homicide courts; and it has, in fact, left no mark upon the extant court speeches.

In Tetralogy 1 we are told that crimes done on the spur of the moment are not difficult to prove; but where the perpetrators anticipate the danger and take every precaution to avoid suspicion, they are difficult even to discover, let alone convict (1.1.1–2). Upon this principle the author urges the judges to rely upon the probabilities; he proceeds to incriminate the defendant by showing that no chance assailant (for theft or other common motive) was likely to have done the killing. The device is not unlike what we find in Gorgias' *Palamedes* or, for that matter, in the extant fragment of Antiphon's defense: consider all possible motives and opportunities, and exclude the alternatives. In this technique Tetralogy 1 perhaps imitates the famous showpieces.[22] It also draws upon conventional arguments in the court speeches, such as we find in Lysias 1.43–46: the defendant eliminates the usual motives and then concludes, "If I intended to murder him, would I have involved (others as) witnesses, when it was possible for no one to know?"

In a case where the evidence is not so clearly stacked in his favor we might expect a resourceful logographer to reverse the argument, much as the author of the *Tetralogies* has done; but consider the parallel in Antiphon 5 (*Herodes*). In this case we have, indeed, other plausible suspects (fellow travelers on the fateful voyage); we might expect the prosecution to exclude them from suspicion, one by one, and the defendant in turn to raise a reasonable doubt by suggesting that some other assailant did the killing (as the defendant does in Tetralogy 1). But instead he simply cites examples to support the conventional topic, that murder without witnesses is impossible to prove outright (64–69). He reminds his judges of the murder of Ephialtes, for which no one was ever charged (though some were suspected for motive).[23] There was also the case of a slave boy who murdered his master and would have gone undetected had he not lost his nerve. Rather than answer circumstantial evidence with probable suspects (as in Tetralogy 1), Antiphon

[22] Tetralogy 1 is in some respects closer to the *Ulysses* attributed to Alcidamas than to Gorgias' *Palamedes*; see below note 57. The extant fragment of Antiphon's *Defense* presumably derives from a post-eventum publication. Von der Mühll, "Unechtheit" 3, even speculated that certain passages in the *Tetralogies* may directly imitate Antiphon's *Defense*. For comparison of this technique in the *Defense* and Ant. 5 see Solmsen, *Antiphonstudien* 59–62.

[23] Plutarch reports (*Per.* 10) that some suspicion attached even to Pericles.

tends to focus his argument upon the formal instruments of proof; his probabilities are addressed to the validity of the evidence, not the ultimate questions of motive and opportunity.[24]

Compare also the version of this argument in Antiphon 1.28, against the oath sworn by the defense: "How can anyone know what he was not present to witness? Those who plot murder . . . do not make their plans and preparations in the presence of witnesses, but with as much secrecy as they can manage, so that no one may know." The victim was taken unawares but survived long enough to call upon his son, the plaintiff, for retribution; otherwise no one would have suspected. In this passage once again the topic ("murder without witnesses, unproveable") is introduced not in regard to the facts of the crime but to the particular evidentiary or assertory proofs that constitute the basis of the case: it provides an argument against the defense oath and in favor of the plaintiff's. In all three court speeches, in fact, the topic is directed against artful conjecture, in favor of the speaker's oath and other formal instruments of proof. In Tetralogy 1, on the other hand, the topic serves as a justification for basing the case on circumstantial evidence, disregarding the customary validity of oaths and other documents.

In general the *Tetralogies* differ widely from the court speeches in their handling of evidentiary proof. The only treatment of witnesses is found in Tetralogy 3, where they are mentioned sporadically and the author seems to assume that witnesses can be found to substantiate any assertion. This feature is not surprising if we assume that the *Tetralogies* are a purely theoretical essay; but it may also indicate a cynical view of the traditional rules of evidence. The treatment of testimony under torture is particularly suggestive.

In all three of Antiphon's court speeches the speakers claim to have challenged their opponents to decide certain crucial questions by torture; the opponents, of course, refused.[25] In Antiphon 5 (*Herodes*) the slaves would presumably have established the defendant's alibi; in Antiphon 6 (*Choreutes*) they would have established that the defendant had no involvement in the events leading to the victim's death. Again, in Antiphon 1 the plaintiff challenged the defense to submit their slaves to torture: the slaves would presumably have established that the step-

[24] Thus in Ant. 5.43 the defendant attempts to discredit the slave's testimony under torture, by protesting "Would I have enlisted an accomplice to be a witness to the crime?"

[25] On challenge to torture see Thür, *Basanos*, esp. 11, 132–33, on Ant. 1.

mother once attempted to drug the victim. These challenges were lodged in preliminaries, and had they been accepted the procedure would have been administered before the trial, with the wording of the interrogation submitted in writing beforehand and the responses witnessed by both sides.

The author of Tetralogy 1 is obviously familiar with the rhetorical uses of such evidence but he is certainly not bound by the procedural rules. There is a good deal of argument devoted to the dying servant's testimony (as crucial or questionable without torture). But in the closing speech for the defense we meet with a direct challenge by the defendant to submit the question of his alibi to *his* slaves under torture. At this point in the proceedings there was no longer any practical opportunity for this procedure; the author of the court speeches never even suggests such a ploy. The author of the *Tetralogies* evidently ventured upon a surprise tactic, which would have been doubtful of success in court, in order to achieve a sensational effect with another audience.[26]

In all, the author of the *Tetralogies* seems reasonably attentive to the framework of Athenian law. He knows, for instance, that the attending physician cannot be charged in the death of his patient; he is also aware that the famous case in Tetralogy 2 was not technically within the jurisdiction of the Delphinium court; he is evidently familiar with the language of Dracon's law regarding the instigator (βούλευσας) and the initiator of a violent quarrel (ἄρξας χειρῶν ἀδικῶν). None of the details can be controverted by other evidence.[27] But in his handling of "issues in dispute," evidentiary proof, and probabilities the author of the *Tetralogies* contradicts the very principle of homicide proceedings. His subject matter suggests an interest in peculiarly legal or juristic problems, and his method seems to reflect a certain skepticism regarding the traditional homicide procedure: How can the case be limited to a

[26] Cf. Lämmli, *Prozessverfahren* 106; Thiel, *Erste Tetralogie* 14–15, taking this divergence from court practice as an indication against authenticity; Thür, *Basanos* 223–24, suggesting that Aeschines 2.126–27 imitates the device in Tetralogy 1. It remains uncertain whether the challenge to settle the case by this "ordeal" was *legally* binding. The author of the *Tetralogies* is perhaps misled by Ant. 6.23–24, where the challenge is decisive under exceptional circumstances, in a major political trial before the *heliaia*.

[27] A suggestive detail is the date of the crime, during the Dipoleia, which gives the defendant his alibi (*Tetr.* 1.4.8). The detail was probably chosen for literary interest (cf. *Clouds* 983) and as a legal curiosity: the ritual involved the slaying of a bull and search for the unknown killer, evidently parallel to the proclamation of impersonal and unknown killers at the Prytaneion; cf. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* 162.

foregone decision on the "issue in dispute"? How can a man be condemned on so flimsy a pretext as hearsay of a dead slave's accusation?

It is reasonably clear, in any event, that the author was chiefly concerned with creating provocative effects rather than illustrating practical technique. By the theoretical model, it is usually assumed that the author's aims are purely abstract or technical: the *Tetralogies* have little or no connection with actual court proceedings, though some social critique may be implied.[28] But it is also reasonable to suppose that an experimental adaptation of this kind—following a specific trial format and responding to certain modes of argument peculiar to that procedure—is likely to follow or parallel developments in court practice. The kind of critique implied in the *Tetralogies* is more likely in an era when the failings of the traditional procedure were all too apparent and trumped-up charges on perjured testimony became a notorious tool of litigation.[29] As we shall see in the following sections, the author's treatment of other conventional topics suggests a similarly critical perspective on the arguments that prevailed in the courts of the *ephetai*.

II. THE BURDEN OF BLOODGUILT

Regarding the consequences of defilement that a killer brings upon the community the *Tetralogies* adopt a prejudicial tactic that is very much at odds with the court speeches: the speakers repeatedly call upon the judges to realize the threat to themselves and to the polis, and to cleanse the city of this evil.[30] In the court speeches the threat of

[28] Decleva Caizzi, *Tetralogiae* 50, 69, suggests that certain arguments are in fact a conservative polemic against sophistic probabilities; cf. Gagarin, "Prohibition of Homicide" 303, regarding this line of argument as "a moral comment on the Athenian legal system." Those who believe that Antiphon the politician and the author *On Truth* are one and the same will perhaps see a connection between the sort of critique suggested in Tetralogy 1 and the treatment of oath-taking in the sophist's treatise; see most recently Gagarin, "Identity of Antiphon."

[29] The reference to perjury proceedings in *dikai phonou* (1.4.7, 10) is the only such reference in the extant homicide speeches. See above at note 15; on perjury in *dikai phonou* cf. Carawan, "Ephetai" 3–6.

[30] Cf. Sealey, "Tetralogies" 74, against Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* 100–106. For the religious sanctions as a parallel mechanism see Parker, *Miasma* 104–43; and, against the usual view that the Prytaneion and Phreatto courts were instituted to safeguard the community against pollution, see my "Phreatto" 61–67.

defilement and avenging spirits is raised solely in regard to the principals themselves: they risk pollution and the wrath of the victim's spirit if they fail to honor him or to abide by their oath; but there is no overt consideration of a threat to the judges or their responsibility to safeguard the community. The threat of defilement is invoked *only to prove credibility* of the speaker's assertions against those of his opponents. Thus the defendant in Antiphon 5 (11, 82) argues that his safe passage at sea, where a tainted killer would be likely to meet with misfortune, is proof of his innocence. In Antiphon 6.40 the speaker recalls that the prosecutor met with him publicly soon after the death, as proof that his accuser did not then believe him guilty. Again, in both 5 and 6, we find the commonplace that even a man who kills his own slave, with no one to avenge the death, will purify himself as religion requires, without any legal sanction to compel him (6.4 = 5.87). The killer cannot evade the consequences of his guilt by deceiving the judges, and therefore defendant's plea of innocence has the greater claim to credibility.

Such is the characteristic use of *miasma* doctrine as a source of arguments in the court speeches: the fear of defilement and avenging spirits is an assumed premise in proof of the speaker's credibility or his opponent's deceit. The *Tetralogies,* however, repeatedly invoke the fear of defilement to different effect: it is a matter for the judges to weigh directly as a threat to themselves and to the community they represent. Thus in Tetralogy 1 the prosecutors begin with a version of the standard argument—"the defilement falls entirely upon us" if the wrong man is convicted and the real killer goes free (1.3)—but they quickly proceed to the more ominous implications. In the conclusion to the opening speech we find the threat to the greater community now elaborated as the peculiar responsibility of the judges: "It is inexpedient *for you* to allow this man, tainted and unholy as he is, to enter the shrines of the gods and defile their sanctity; . . . for it is from just such desecrations as this that public disasters befall. . . . It is rather your personal obligation to effect vengeance, regarding his acts of impiety as your own disaster, thus to absolve the community of defilement" (1.10–11). In response (2.11) the defendant claims that it will not be he who pollutes the shrines of the gods, but the prosecutors, if they falsely convict him; they will be the cause of calamity for persuading the judges to offend the gods.

It is perhaps reasonable to assume that such beliefs were implicit in Antiphon's court speeches, but none of them expresses this ominous injunction to the jury. The closest parallel comes in the epilogue to

Lysias' speech *Against Eratosthenes* (12.99–100), but even this instance points up the difference between *miasma* arguments in Antiphon's court speeches and the more provocative version in the *Tetralogies*. Lysias does indeed refer to the defilement of temples and public places by the Thirty, and it is therefore all the more striking that he seems to avoid laying the responsibility directly upon the judges. He contends that his own ardor in prosecuting the case has left no stone unturned in defense of the temples that these men defiled. In keeping with the standard *miasma* argument, he defends his credibility against the obvious charge of vindictiveness. He is also acting, he contends, in defense of the dead: "I believe they are listening and will know how you vote, and they regard those who acquit these men as casting a verdict of death upon *them,* but those who exact punishment take vengeance in *their* behalf." Threatening as it seems, there is still a noteworthy contrast between this epilogue and the *miasma* argument characteristic of the *Tetralogies*: Lysias does not warn that the danger of defilement, as a threat to the community, must weigh upon the judges; he may suggest to the superstitious among his audience that *they* will be haunted by spirits of the dead, but he does not say so. He adheres to conventional reasoning on the problem of bloodguilt—the judges are not implicated. It is perhaps only in a speech such as this that Lysias could even insinuate such a threat.

This speech for publication follows, perhaps faithfully, the practice of the courts; but we should bear in mind the turn of events and the type of case which it represents. It could not be prosecuted by homicide procedures, which were severely restricted by the oath against vendetta, μὴ μνησικακεῖν, by the rule against charges of instigation (*bouleusis*) in *dikai phonou,* and by the rule disallowing "warrant and arrest" for crimes done in the recent civil conflict.[31] Eratosthenes' complicity in the killing of Polemarchus could only be addressed in the special accountings to which members of the oligarchic regime must submit. As a result, any allegations of homicide against such defendants became more a criminal matter—relevant to the interests of society—than simply a matter of private wrongs and personal liability (as *dikai phonou* were traditionally prosecuted). Even in that setting Lysias evidently did not yet feel he could claim outright that "these men bring damnation upon the community, and it is your duty to see that the polis is ab-

[31] *Ath. Pol.* 39.5; cf. Andoc. 1.91, 94.

solved." Instead he is largely faithful to the conventions of legal argument on these religious matters. It may have been the suggestion, however, of a superstitious threat to the jury in this famous speech, or others like it, which prompted the author of *Tetralogies* to elaborate the theme as he does. Consider the peculiar turn that this argument has taken in the tetralogy: "If the defendant is wrongly acquitted, the avenging spirit of the dead (*prostropaios*) will not trouble us but will haunt you. Realizing this threat, avenge the dead . . . cleanse the city. For thus . . . *you absolve yourselves of defilement* on his account" (1.3.10–11).

Again in the first speech of Tetralogy 2 the author appears at first to adopt the traditional *miasma* argument but then goes far beyond the practice of the court speeches. The plaintiff first observes that the vengeful spirit of the victim is only a threat to the willful murderer (and in this distinction he is faithful to traditional belief), but he then turns this principle into a surprising emotional appeal: the *un*intentional killer "has roused no rage of vengeance in the dead but in the living"; the judges should be as much concerned for the distraught family as for the deceased (2.1.2).[32] Following this appeal, the author warns of the threat of defilement to the city as a special concern of the judges: "Do not permit the whole community to be defiled by his guilt." And he returns to this theme in the epilogue of his second speech: "The mark of defilement . . . weighs upon you . . . : if you convict and bar him from the prohibited areas, you (yourselves) shall be free of any claims; but if you acquit him you become responsible. . . . Do not share in his defilement."[33]

This theme is finally formulated as a mythos in Tetralogy 3: a man's life is a gift of the god, and the spirit of the dead is roused to vengeance by the theft of what god has given; thus he bequeaths the wrath of avenging spirits as god's retribution, and his curse pursues those who wrongly bear witness for his killers *and those who wrongly judge against him* (3.1.1–4). The speaker invokes this specter as a guar-

[32]The sentence "He has roused no rage . . . in the dead but in the living" was bracketed by Gernet; but, for the older belief that the avenging spirit haunts the "intentional" killer, cf. Parker, *Miasma* 105–30.

[33]*Tetr.* 2.3.11–12. The "mark of defilement," *kelis*, is common in tragedy but is not found in Antiphon's court speeches or in Lysias. Cf. Parker, *Miasma* 107: "murder-pollution as a stain on the hands . . . is manifestly a symbol of something beyond itself, since the stain is invisible; the *Tetralogies* unabashedly substitute the thing symbolized for the symbol."

antee of his credibility but also as a threat to the judges.[34] The defendant takes up the argument (3.2.8), threatening the judges with avenging furies if they should convict him. In the epilogue to the final speech (3.4.10–11), the defense urges the judges to fear for themselves defilement and avenging furies.

By contrast, the standard injunction to the jury in Antiphon 6.3–6 emphasizes the judges' piety toward the gods and the laws, not the consequences of defilement.[35] Again in the parallel passage Antiphon 1.3–4, there is no reference whatever to *miasma* or avenging spirits as a concern of the judges; and in this speech, if anywhere, such an appeal would seem fitting, since the plaintiff calls upon the judges to act as his kinsmen (*anankaioi*), as his legal relations have forsaken him. Nonetheless, the implicit doom of defilement and wrath of the dead is conjured only as a guarantee of the speaker's conviction.

The more ominous turn of the argument, particularly the generalized threat of *miasma* in cases of *un*intentional homicide (Tetralogy 2) and the myth of haunting as the spirit's vendetta for the theft of what god has given (Tetralogy 3), has a suggestive parallel, however, in Plato's adaptation of the popular mythology in *Laws* 9.865d–e: "They say that the victim of a violent killing, . . . soon after death, overwhelmed with fear and dread at the violence done him, rages against his killer; and seeing his killer frequent his familiar haunts, the spirit is frightened and disturbed and himself endeavors to wreak havoc with every power he has, with guilty conscience as his ally, upon the perpetrator, both the man himself and all his affairs." This "ancient mythos" is introduced to justify the rules requiring exile and purification even in cases of "unintentional" killing. It must be given due reverence (Plato suggests) not because it conveys a literal truth but because it embodies and enforces a useful moral. We find, I think, a similar perspective on traditional belief in the *Tetralogies*. The author's archaizing piety is a formal posture; his evocative language—κηλίς, προστρόπαιος, κτλ.—is borrowed from the drama, not from the courts. His pronouncements on threat of haunting

[34] *Tetr.* 3.1.4–5, ἅπασαν τὴν πόλιν καθαρὰν τοῦ μιάσματος καταστήσετε. Cf. 3.3.7, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος ἐπισκήπτομεν ὑμῖν. τῷ τούτου φόνῳ τὸ μήνιμα τῶν ἀλιτηρίων ἀκεσαμένους πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν καθαρὰν τοῦ μιάσματος καταστῆσαι.

[35] Ant. 6.3: "Trials for homicide are of great importance for you, the judges, rightly to decide, most of all for the sake of piety to the gods, and also for your own sake"; cf. § 6, where a wrongful verdict is "a wrong and a sin against god and law." Ant. 1.31 makes a similar appeal to piety toward the gods and the laws.

and defilement are certainly no reliable indication that the *Tetralogies* belong to the era of Sophocles' *Antigone,* as they are sometimes taken to be.

The evidence on this issue is, of course, no proof against authenticity. It is at least reasonably clear, however, that the emphasis upon defilement as a threat to the polis is uncharacteristic of the court speeches; and it is a strong indication that the *Tetralogies* would have been of little value as a "practice and demonstration text" in the age of Antiphon. On balance, the evidence on evolution of procedure and argumentation should weigh against the views of Zuntz, Decleva Caizzi, and others, who see this feature of the *Tetralogies* as inspired by an authentic, presophistic religiosity. Considering this feature in isolation, we might simply conclude that it is yet another instance where the *Tetralogies* are purely theoretical in their aims and irrelevant to court practice. But the very notion that the trial is fundamentally concerned with this threat to the polis, and that the judges' verdict should be directed against this urgent danger, implies an immediate understanding of homicide as a public wrong, not merely a private offense to be settled by a decision regarding liability as in the traditional procedure. If, as all the evidence indicates, Dracon's law was strictly addressed to the issue of liability—religious concerns being parallel and independent of statute—then on this parameter we have a simple linear development from Dracon's trial procedure to the extant court speeches: *dikai phonou* remained quintessentially a form of settlement regarding private liability. In the *Tetralogies,* however, we find an emphatic declaration that homicide must be addressed as a public wrong.

III. THE LAW PROHIBITING JUSTIFIABLE KILLING

In Tetralogies 2 and 3 the author invokes "the law prohibiting just as well as unjust killing" as the basis for a puzzling sequence of argument. This prohibition is treated as a rule of statute law, yet it seems inconsistent with what we know of the wording of Athenian laws: in phrasing it lacks the conditional form characteristic of statute (e.g., "if a man kill . . . let him be exiled"), and in substance it seems to be flatly contradicted by considerable evidence that "justifiable homicide" was indeed sanctioned in a number of special circumstances. There is also an unlikely ambiguity in the meaning of "just" or "justifiable" killing itself: it seems to be synonymous with accidental or unintentional homi-

cide in Tetralogy 2, but equivalent to killing in self-defense in Tetralogy 3.

To account for these inconsistencies it is often supposed that "the law prohibiting just as well as unjust killing" is invoked as a principle of popular morality, in essence a rule of unwritten law rather than statute.[36] "Just as well as unjust" is a polar expression; the prohibition amounts to a moral absolute—all killing, right or wrong, is forbidden.[37] But this explanation does not account for the fact that the prohibition in question is treated as at least the substance of statute law: in both speeches it is the law upon which the plaintiffs base their case (2.2.9, 3.2.5). It has been suggested that the author intends to show how unwritten law might actually overturn statue law in the courts.[38] But there are no clear parallels for the legal validity of unwritten moral rules. We shall be better able to comprehend the author's purpose if we first determine more clearly what is meant by "justifiable" killing in each context. The more straightforward instance is found in Tetralogy 3.

In Tetralogy 3 the meaning of *phonos dikaios* seems at first equivalent to "killing in self-defense." The defendant claims that the victim struck the first blow, and he was justified in using equal force; indeed, he would have been justified in responding with greater force against the aggressor. He is evidently alluding to one of the provisions of Dracon's Law, of which enough of the wording remains for us to see that there was a specific rule regarding justifiable response against the initiator of a violent altercation, ὁ ἄρξας χειρῶν ἀδίκων.[39] But the defendant cannot simply rely upon the protection implied in the law: he must prove he is not the "killer," the agent causally responsible.

The defendant introduces "the law forbidding just as well as unjust killing" (3.2.3) as a form of dilemma: he is surely not guilty of unjust killing, since he responded justifiably to provocation; were he the killer, the killing would be justifiable (though culpable); but he is not, he insists, the causal agent—that responsibility lies elsewhere. In short: if he

[36] Cf. Gagarin, "Prohibition of Homicide," esp. 300–303; he concedes that there is no clear parallel in the most likely sources contemporary with Antiphon.

[37] The Pythagorean commandment, for which Aristotle cites Empedocles, μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον (*Rhet.* 1372b6 = DK 31 fr. 135), is a very dubious parallel, since it amounts to a prohibition against killing any animate creature. For the polar expression "right or wrong" cf. Aristophanes *Ach.* 373; Andoc. 1.1–2 and 135–36.

[38] Decleva Caizzi, *Tetralogiae* 32–44.

[39] With *Tetr.* 3.2.1, cf. *IG* I³ 104.33–36, and see Stroud, *Drakon's Law* 56.

were guilty, it must be for either just or unjust killing; his action was justifiable, not unjust; his justifiable response was not in fact the cause of death; therefore he is guilty of neither just nor unjust killing. The "law" prohibiting justifiable killing is a purely argumentative device, and we should be wary of reading a moral absolute into it.

From this argument it is reasonably clear, in any event, that "justifiable homicide" involves an act that the author himself regards as *retributive* or retaliatory violence: "Had the man died in immediate consequence of the beating, he would have died *justifiably* at my hands"—for those who start a fight *deserve to suffer* more harm than they do (3.2.3). There is no pretense that the defendant was in fact endangered by the victim or acted truly in self-defense; rather he claims to have acted justifiably in meeting injury with retribution.[40]

In the second defense speech (3.4.8) those who speak for the defendant return to this argument, but they now link the rule against justifiable killing with the concept of "culpable error" and "mischance" (ἁμάρτημα, ἀτύχημα). The law forbidding just as well as unjust killing has been answered, they say, inasmuch as the victim died from ill effects of medical treatment and not from the blows themselves. Such mischance is the aggressor's doing rather than the responsibility of one who responds to another's aggression. The defendant acted entirely unwillingly and suffered misfortune brought on by another's error, while the victim acted entirely voluntarily and brought on his own misfortune.

The argument in Tetralogy 3 is consistent with that in Tetralogy 2 to this extent, that both arguments for the defense ultimately attempt to reduce the issue to one of culpable error for which the victim himself is to blame. The homicide is "justifiable" in this sense, that it was brought on by the victim's culpable error. The so-called self-defense thus involves some of the same factors as the unintentional killing: it is the victim himself who set the sequence of events in motion; the "justifiable" killing is his doing, not the defendant's. "Justifiable homicide" is not, however, equivalent to unintentional killing, neither in Tetralogy 3 nor, as we shall see, in Tetralogy 2.

[40] *Tetr.* 3.2.3, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πληγῶν ὁ ἀνὴρ παραχρῆμα ἀπέθανεν. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μὲν δικαίως δ' ἂν ἐτεθνήκει—οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἀλλὰ μείζονα καὶ πλείονα οἱ ἄρξαντες δίκαιοι ἀντιπάσχειν εἰσί. Cf. *Tetr.* 1.2.10: "If I am the probable killer, I am justified (δίκαιός εἰμι); for clearly I would have acted in defense against injury (ἀδικούμενος ἠμυνάμην)."

The original meaning of "justifiable homicide" as retributive killing is clear in a number of fifth– and fourth–century references. In the fifth century vindictive killing would appear to be the usual, proper meaning of *phonos dikaios*; a certain moral repugnance is evident, but there is nothing parallel to the notion that it was prohibited by law, written or unwritten.[41] Indeed, the issue before the judges in *Eumenides* is whether the killing was justified or not (611–13).

The clearest parallel to the defendant's position in Tetralogy 3 is to be found in Lysias 1.37. The speaker argues that he would have been justified in luring the adulterer to his doom, in retaliation for earlier injustice: "I would have thought myself justified (δίκαιος) in apprehending by whatever means the man who had corrupted my wife." Such "justifiable," i.e., retributive, killing must be disavowed, however, and defendant must base his defense upon an argument from causation, that he did not entrap the victim and was not the initiator of the causal sequence. The argumentation in Lysias 1 will need more detailed treatment elsewhere; but there can be little serious dispute that the real issue is the question of entrapment and that the defendant cannot simply rely upon the statutory provision against adulterers caught in the act. He must show that he did not plot to bring about the fatal outcome, that it was caused by other factors (including the victim's actions). There is, in any event, a singular parallel to Tetralogy 3 in the turn of argument, whereby the defendant insists that retributive killing would have been justified but that he did not kill even justifiably.

Now it is reasonable to suppose that the special jurisdiction at the Delphinium court—where such cases as Lysias 1 would be tried—prompted legal controversy on such issues, perhaps as early as the era of Antiphon but surely by the early fourth century. The Delphinium was commonly regarded as the court of "justifiable" homicide; its jurisdiction included retributive killings, as in cases of sexual violation or violent theft or abduction, along with some cases of unintentional homicide, such as death in athletic competition or by mistaken identity in warfare. From the latter applications of the Delphinium law, however,

[41] Cf. Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1604, *Choephori* 988; Sophocles *Electra* 33–37; Euripides *Hecuba* 263, *Electra* 1094–96, 1189. Repugnance against this form of "just killing" is expressed in Eur. *El.* 1050–51, where Clytemnestra challenges, "Say that . . . your father did not die justly (ἐνδίκως); and the chorus answers, δίκαι' ἔλεξας· ἡ δίκη δ' αἰσχρῶς ἔχει. Cf. the fragment of Theodectes' *Orestes* in Ar. *Rhet.* 2.24.3, and see note 53 below.

we should not assume that the concept *phonos dikaios* was in any sense equivalent to unintentional killing. Though popular usage refers to the Delphinium as a court of *phonos dikaios,* it is clear from *Ath. Pol.* 57.3 that the jurisdiction was properly restricted to those cases where the defendant admitted to the killing but claimed *legal* justification by a specific statutory provision.[42]

Controversy over the ambiguities latent in the Delphinium jurisdiction is reflected in the often puzzling arguments of Demosthenes in defense of the traditional courts in *Against Aristocrates*; there it is evident that *phonos dikaios* retained a strong sense of retributive killing. In the section covering the Draconian laws Demosthenes deals with several statutes affecting the Delphinium jurisdiction. Nowhere does he suggest that "justifiable homicide" was a defined legal category, but it is clear that the speaker and his audience would readily interpret cases within this jurisdiction, *even unintentional killing* in athletic contest, as "justifiable homicide." In such instances justification lies in the victim's "culpable error." Thus in explicating the Draconian law (53–55) Demosthenes argues that one who kills (accidentally) in athletic competition is free of guilt, since the victim proved unequal to the contest: "[the lawgiver] considered the victim himself responsible for his own suffering, if he was too weak to endure the struggle for victory." This interpretation of the lawgiver's intent appears to be Demosthenes' own inference, but it is likely to reflect popular understanding of the law, and it is entirely consistent with the topic in the *Tetralogies*.[43] "Justifiable killing" includes those deaths that come as a consequence of the victim's culpable error.

Demosthenes devotes considerable attention to those killings that are "lawful and justifiable." Thus he reports the Draconian law allowing self-help against theft or abduction (60), where the defender may kill with impunity; that the killing is "justifiable" is implicit in the condition that the offender be caught in the act of "violent and unjust" theft or abduction. Aristocrates' illegal measure, by contrast, condemns anyone who might kill Charidemus "even if justifiably, even if according to law." Again, in regard to the Delphinium court itself (74–75), though there was apparently no preamble or other text defining "justifiable homicide" per se, the essence of the jurisdiction seems to be retributive

[42] *Ath. Pol.* 57.3, ἐὰν δ' ἀποκτεῖναι μέν τις ὁμολογῇ, φῇ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, κτλ.

[43] The laws protecting those implicated in accidental death on the playing field or the battlefield were probably dictated by public policy and not originally conformable to the principle of *dikaios phonos* in the provisions regarding retributive killings.

killing. From the example of Orestes' trial for vengeful killing, Demosthenes assumes, the ancient lawgivers once deduced that there are indeed some "justifiable" killings, "for the gods would not have given unjust verdicts." Aristocrates' bill has not exempted such cases but outlaws anyone who kills Charidemus "even if justifiably, even if according to law."[44]

The problematic concept of "justifiable homicide" appears to be a substantive issue in the case against Aristocrates. "Of all acts and speech," Demosthenes urges, "one of two epithets apply, 'just' or 'unjust'"; no one act or word could be both "just" *and* "unjust," "for how could the same things be both just and not [just]?" He concludes, "Every act is deemed to have one quality or the other and if it seems 'unjust,' it is judged despicable, but if 'just,' worthy or noble." Of course Aristocrates' bill makes no such distinction. It is perhaps conceivable that Demosthenes is simply elaborating upon an all too obvious commonplace, a distinction without a difference in the law. But it is more reasonable to assume that the argument has relevance to the legal issues of the day, and that it might be argued, in support of Aristocrates' bill, that even so–called justifiable killing was forbidden unless prescribed by law. Thus Demosthenes, in his defense of the traditional homicide courts, attempts to formulate the principle of "justifiable" killing, and in doing so he seems to be countering an argument based on the Delphinium jurisdiction: only where the law explicitly provides for a plea of "lawful homicide" is such a defense admissible; in all other cases even "justifiable homicide" is prohibited.

In the same period we find further evidence of an ongoing debate on legal justification and a suggestive parallel to the case in Tetralogy 3: the case reported in the speech *Against Meidias,* 21.72–75, against Euaion, convicted in the killing of Boiotos. Euaion struck back in anger against a drunken assailant, who was evidently the weaker of the two (just as in Tetralogy 3). He was convicted by one vote. The issue, Demosthenes supposes, was not whether the defendant was justified in striking back, but whether his action was the proximate cause of death.[45] Those who voted for acquittal (he observes) evidently judged that even lethal force, though "excessive retribution," was granted by

[44]The same phrase is used as earlier: 60–61, κἂν δικαίως, κἂν ὡς οἱ νόμοι διδόασιν.

[45]Dem. 21.75, καταγνόντας μὴ ὅτι ἠμύνατο . . . ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὥστε καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, τοὺς δ' ἀπογνόντας καὶ ταύτην τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τιμωρίας τῷ γε τὸ σῶμ' ὑβρισμένῳ δεδωκέναι.

law in the case of one who suffered violent insult: the action of his assailant was regarded as the direct cause of his justifiable response. Similarly in Tetralogy 3 the defendant asserts that it is *justifiable* to respond with equal and greater force against the aggressor.[46]

Demosthenes treats the case against Euaion as a famous precedent of an earlier era (though perhaps within living memory). It is not unlikely that this case or one like it served as a model for Tetralogy 3—just as the case that Pericles and Protagoras debated served as a model for Tetralogy 2. From the parallels alone it is reasonable to assume that "the law prohibiting just as well as unjust killing" is a formulation of the principle that simple retributive killing is in itself wrongful and illegal; only those instances which statutes prescribe are protected by the Delphinium jurisdiction. The legalistic controversy on this issue and the connected problem of culpable error may well go back to the era of Antiphon, but there our sources fail us. For a better understanding of the argument in Tetralogy 2 we must turn, again, to the fourth century.

The issue of "culpable error" appears as a conventional topic in the fourth century. Aristotle, in the fifth book of *Nicomachean Ethics* as in *Rhetoric,* gives a concise but revealing distinction of the key ethical terms, "wrong" or "injury" (ἀδίκημα), "error" (ἁμάρτημα), and "mishap" or mischance (ἀτύχημα). The report in *Ethics* 5.8 is especially revealing in regard to the reasoning of Tetralogy 2:

> Of three types of harm (or damage, βλαβή) . . . those done in ignorance are "errors" (ἁμαρτήματα), as when one fails to affect the (right) person, or effect the (right) outcome, by the means or for the reason intended; for [the agent] either thought he would not hit (the mark), or not with the weapon (that struck), or not the (right) person. . . . Now when the error is contrary to reasonable expectation it is a mischance; but when it is not (unforeseeable) yet without malice, it is an "error," for the agent "errs" [or "is at fault"] when the origin of causation is in him, but he suffers mischance when the cause is external.

The phrase "at fault" is perhaps the best English approximation to the sense of liability, contained here in ἁμαρτάνειν/ἁμάρτημα. "Error" is causal: it is thus related to "injury." We find a similar distinction in *Rhetoric* and yet a third version of the commonplace in Anaximenes'

[46] *Tetr.* 3.2.2, οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλὰ μείζονα καὶ πλείονα δίκαιοι οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀντιπάσχειν.

Ars Rhetorica.[47] There is also a similar conception of injury from error, as liable for compensation or retribution, in Plato's *Laws* (as we shall see). In all of these treatments, "error" is an unintended wrong, yet it is akin to "injury" and ordinarily involves liability.[48] Bear in mind that these are not sophisticated philosophical constructs but the philosopher's and the rhetorician's rendering of an ethical commonplace.

Such would seem to be the line of reasoning in Tetralogy 2.2.7–9, where it is usually assumed that "justifiable" killing is equivalent to unintentional. The defense first establishes that the boy who threw the fatal lance did not himself err but acted precisely as intended: the javelin was thrown on the right trajectory at the proper moment and would have struck the target. By Aristotle's model, he neither erred in regard to the act itself, the instrument, or the aim, nor in regard to the person affected. Rather the error lies in the action of the victim, who moved into the path of the javelin at the fatal moment. It is he then who erred, causing an unintended outcome, from which he himself suffered *just retribution*: "and for the error he has been avenged upon himself and has exacted punishment. . . . As the error redounds to him, the act belongs not to us but to the one guilty of error, and since suffering comes upon the agent himself, we are acquitted of blame. He has been *justly avenged* upon the agent of his wrong in the moment of his error" (2.2.8). It is at this point (2.2.9) that the defendant invokes "the law prohibiting just as well as unjust killing" as the basis for his acquittal: "for this boy is acquitted of unintentional killing by the error of the victim himself; and since he is not even charged with intentional killing he is acquitted on both counts."[49]

[47] Aristotle *Rhet.* 1374b: "'errors' and 'injuries' are not to be judged on the same scale, nor are 'mischances' (commensurate with) 'errors.' For mischances are contrary to reasonable expectation and not of malicious intent; while 'errors' are those outcomes not unforeseeable, though yet without malice." Cf. Anaximenes *Ars Rhet.* 4.7–9: "you regard a wrong done with intent as 'injustice' and say that such wrongs deserve the most serious retribution; but to do harm through ignorance must be called 'error'; and to fail to accomplish one's intent . . . because of others or by chance you regard as 'mischance.'"

[48] On ἁμάρτημα as both "error" and "fault" or blame (*errore e colpa*) cf. Decleva Caizzi, *Tetralogiae* 52–58. She emphasizes the connection between ἁμάρτημα and ἀσέβημα. Ἀτυχία/ἀτυχῆσαι is also extremely rare in fifth-century sources—nowhere found in the court speeches of Antiphon—but occurs fourteen times in the *Tetralogies*. Decleva Caizzi sees this as yet another instance of Antiphon's formative usage, "con valore pregnante" (63–69).

[49] Gagarin, "Prohibition of Homicide" 295–97, takes this passage as evidence that

The same kind of dilemma is utilized here as in Tetralogy 3: wrongful death is either just or unjust; the defendant is not even charged with an unjust act of malice; the justifiable killing is the victim's own doing; the defendant is therefore not guilty of the killing on either count. This passage should not be construed as a straightforward equation of "justifiable" with unintentional killing; one stands for the other only as a term in the dilemma. What renders the killing "justifiable" is that the victim's unintended but no less culpable error has been justly punished by his own hand. That this is the thrust of the argument is proven by the reply in the second prosecution speech: "I, too, assert that the law rightly demands killers be punished: for it is just that the unintentional killer met with unintended harm, and the one who has perished . . . would be wronged if he were not avenged" (2.3.7–9). The plaintiff accepts the notion that retribution for error is "justifiable," but he insists that it is the defendant and not the victim who committed the error.

Thus in both these tetralogies "the law prohibiting just as well as unjust killing" serves as the basis for a sophistic dilemma, and in both demonstrations *phonos dikaios* means essentially retributive killing, extended to retribution for culpable error. This device, I suggest, was inspired by controversy regarding the Delphinium jurisdiction. Properly interpreted, the Delphinium rule amounts to a restriction upon those cases where the defendant can plead legal justification. A plea of lawful homicide is admissible only where the killer can invoke a specific provision of statute (allowing self-help or absolving the athlete or combatant); otherwise even "justifiable" killing is prohibited. In Lysias 1 the killer of the adulterer must therefore prove that he did not plot the adulterer's murder even justifiably. The author of the *Tetralogies* has adapted this rule (in the terms in which it was popularly understood) as a device for transferring blame in cases where culpable error may be assigned to the victim: the law prohibits just and unjust killing; all killings are either just or unjust (as Demosthenes insists, 23.75); if the defendant's act is neither just nor unjust killing, he is not the killer. In each case the killing is clearly not unjust (as no malicious intent is

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"just and unjust" homicide is equivalent to "unintentional and intentional." He discounts the connection of thought that I have suggested here. It is clear in 2.2.9, in any event, that the assertion that "the law [prohibiting just and unjust killing] acquits us" comes as a conclusion or further implication from the preceding argument: "for [the defendant] is acquitted . . . by the error of the victim himself."

alleged); the justifiable killing is the victim's doing, since he has brought retribution upon himself for his culpable error. By this device for transferring blame (what later theory would call *metastasis*) the author has, in effect, reversed the conventional bearing of the rule that even justifiable killing is prohibited.

Thus in the reports of Aristotle and Demosthenes we discover the premises for the otherwise puzzling argument in Tetralogy 2 that treats an unintentional killing as retribution for culpable error—which, though "justifiable," is nonetheless prohibited.[50] There is also a suggestive parallel in Aeschines 2.87–88, though it is difficult to construe what precisely Aeschines means by "justifiable" killing. He contrasts Demosthenes' unscrupulous charges with the final oath in homicide proceedings where the victor must forswear a "just" but wrongful verdict. Whatever we are to make of Aeschines' argument, this passage at least confirms that it was meaningful in the fourth century to speak of law and procedural rules—not unwritten law—as prohibiting both just and unjust killing.[51]

There is further evidence of popular controversy on the concept of "justifiable killing" in the treatment of homicide in Plato's *Laws,* closely contemporary with Demosthenes' *Against Aristocrates*. The laws regarding bloodshed are easily the most detailed and systematic set of statutes in the whole of Plato's code, and perhaps more than any other part of the *Laws* they seem to be a calculated response to current fallacies of popular reasoning regarding ancient legal principles and institutions. The various preambles and statutes that have to do with what Athenians called "justifiable homicide" (for trial before the Delphinium court) constitute the outer frame of the homicide code, and in the general introduction we could ask for no clearer statement that this theoretical construct is intended to address popular misconceptions of "justifiable" retribution (cf. 859d–60c).

Plato's "Athenian" attempts to reconcile the popular distinction between willful and unintended wrongs with the principle that none do

[50] Cf. Gorgias *Helen* 122–23, εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομίστεον. However, ἁμάρτημα may have the sense of "wrongdoing," regardless of intent; cf. *Antigone* 914, 926–27; *Ajax* 1094–96. In Ant. 6 (*Choreutes*), which involves the defendant's liability for an arguably culpable error, the defendant never addresses the problem in these terms.

[51] See esp. Gagarin, "Prohibition of Homicide" 304–6, arguing that here "unintentional" equals "justifiable" homicide, as in Tetralogy 2 by his interpretation.

wrong willingly, that wrongdoing originates in a disorder of the soul (860d–e); he concludes that the two categories are indeed to be recognized but are based on a different, more meaningful distinction (861c–d). The lawgiver must recognize two separate criteria of judgment and their respective aims: the law is to redress both "injustice" (ἀδικία) and "damage" or harm (βλαβή); confusion of the two concerns has led to popular misconceptions of justice and justifiable acts. The character of an act as "justifiable" cannot, as commonly supposed, be determined purely according to the agent's conscious intent. Justice and injustice are matters of moral order; damage is a wholly separate concern (862b). Plato makes quite clear that certain acts proceeding from a righteous disposition and "just" (in the proper sense) are nonetheless liable to claims by an injured party: "The lawgiver must look to both concerns, injustice and harm, and by the laws make good what has been damaged, restore what was lost and set right what was overturned; killing or wounding he must endeavor to heal, by reconciling the suffering (family of the victim) to those responsible, by compensation for their injuries" (862b–c).

Following these principles of moral legislation, Plato amends the traditional divisions of jurisdiction; he dispenses with the category of "justifiable homicide" altogether. He begins with what the Athenians would have regarded as lawful or "justifiable" homicide, to be tried at the Delphinium court, but which he calls "violent though unintentional" (βίαια καὶ ἀκούσια). They include (1) accidental death in athletic competition and (2) accidental death in war or military training, *including practice with the javelin and other weapons*.[52] These cases are remedied by ritual purification. A similar remedy applies (3) in cases where a patient dies under a doctor's care. These cases all have obvious parallels in the *Tetralogies*.

Self-help killing with impunity (ἀνατί) is granted if an intentional killer returns from exile (871c). And in the final section of the homicide code, there are legal protections for self-help killing against (1) theft by night, (2) "mugging," (3–4) sexual violation of blood kin or wife, and (5) in defense of kin against lethal threat. These cases, and those described as "violent but involuntary," would all come under the jurisdiction of

[52] There is a problem with the text here (865a–b), all manuscripts reading "officers" (ἀρχόντων) where editors assume "javelin" (ἀκοντίων). Some reference to lethal weapons is in order, since the protection for lawful homicide is valid for training both with and without armor.

the Delphinium court at Athens if the killer pleaded legal justification. They are nowhere described as "justifiable" but rather as cases where the killer is "free of taint" (καθαρός) or "the wrongdoer be slain with impunity" (νηποινεί), or as "those cases where the law allows killing" (876c). In this regard Plato reflects the wording of Athenian law, but he is also following out the principles of moral legislation that he proclaimed in his preamble in answer to popular notions on such problematic concepts as "justifiable homicide."

Demosthenes in the speech *Against Aristocrates* takes up similar issues. There are also suggestive parallels in the fragments of fourth-century thinkers that Aristotle reports as indicative of common topics. The ancient problem of Orestes' guilt came to represent the fundamental paradox of "justifiable" killing.[53] The traditional procedure, which had evolved from customary rules of self-help as a mechanism of private settlement, was now regarded with a deeper comprehension of bloodshed as a public wrong. Popular controversy on such issues is perhaps indicated in Plato's *Euthyphro*; it is plainly a preoccupation of Lysias' speeches in the early restoration era, when he attacks Eratosthenes, his brother's killer, as a threat to society, and when the killer of the adulterer Eratosthenes must disavow even "justifiable" retribution.[54]

CONCLUSIONS

The positive findings of this study may be briefly summarized; the further implications may be more difficult to determine. In his treatment of the major topics of *dikai phonou,* where the *Tetralogies* are most clearly parallel to the court speeches, the author has methodically undertaken to confound or reverse the rules and assumptions that gov-

[53] With Dem. 23.74, cf. Theodectes' *Orestes* (F5): "'It is just for the woman who slays her husband' to die, and just for the son to avenge the father; but not for the son to take vengeance upon the mother" (*Rhet.* 2.24.3, 1401a); also in *Alcmaeon* (*Rhet.* 2.23.3), Theodectes posed the same problem, that retribution may be justified with regard to the offender, but those who presume to exact retribution may be nonetheless denied the right. Similarly Alcidamas in *Messeniacus* recast Empedocles' μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον as a principle contradicting conventional justifications: *Rhet.* 1.13.2, 1373b.

[54] *Ath. Pol.* 39.5; cf. Andoc. 1.91, 94. The council was to grant no "warrant" or arrest (*endeixis, apagōgē*) for wrongs under the Thirty. By the traditional procedure for *endeixis* against homicides (Dem. 23.51) plaintiffs had been protected from prosecution if the accused were killed in the arrest; cf. Hansen, *Apagōgē* 16.

erned the court proceedings. This pattern may conceivably be unintentional or incidental to some larger theoretical aim; but it is reasonable to suppose that the author follows the format of *dikai phonou* and deals with notorious cases and problematic concepts peculiar to that jurisdiction precisely because these legal issues are in themselves of some interest to him.

Whatever the author's aims, we can conclude with some confidence that his method involves a systematic *reversal* of topics and techniques found in the court speeches. Thus in Tetralogy 2 we find a virtual parody of the standard *apodeixis* that ordinarily set forth the sworn statements and the "issue in dispute" that preliminary hearings had defined. The extraordinary exercise in probabilities in Tetralogy 1 responds to the standard topic that a murder without witnesses cannot be proved beyond conjecture. The treatment of the religious issue, the threat of defilement and avenging spirits, may also be read as a reversal of the traditional court argument. In the court speeches the threat of *miasma* and avenging furies is mentioned only in regard to the *antidikoi*; the peril of bloodguilt is invoked as proof of the speaker's credibility (he would not knowingly defy religious sanctions). In the *Tetralogies* the religious consequences are invoked as a matter for the judges to weigh directly, as a threat to themselves and to the community, in a legal setting where the capacity for either side to fabricate evidentiary proof is taken for granted. Finally, in the treatment of "law prohibiting just as well as unjust killing," the author of the *Tetralogies* has extended a concept proper to the Delphinium court into an area where it was never intended to apply. It is properly a rule restricting retributive killing; the author of the *Tetralogies* has adapted this rule as a device for transferring blame to the victim: "the killing is either just or unjust; the defendant's action is clearly not unjust (i.e., malicious); the killing is the justifiable consequence of victim's culpable error, and it is therefore his own act and not the act of defendant." In demonstrating this device the author is responding not to the moral conflict of written and unwritten law but to a legalistic issue that seems inherent in the Delphinium jurisdiction and the popular conception of *phonos dikaios* as retributive killing.

Such in brief are the positive findings of this study. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to argue the question of authorship or period–authenticity in detail; but the further implications of this finding—that the method of the *Tetralogies* is in large part a reversal of the court arguments—should at least convey a caveat against the prevailing and often unquestioning assumption that the *Tetralogies* are Antiphon's

work or a product of his era. The legal or juristic focus of these exercises, together with the sum total of connections and discrepancies with other sources, would suggest a certain ideological context such as we more clearly discern in the age of rhetoric and legal reasoning after Antiphon, sometime in the half-century from Lysias 1 to Plato's *Laws*.

The author's preoccupation with "issues in dispute" (Tetralogy 2) and his ingenuity in devising the hypothetical "who-done-it" (Tetralogy 1) suggest an era in which the traditional procedure was subject to some skepticism. The ancient procedure that Dracon devised and that Antiphon treated with such reverence (6.2 = 5.14) was designed to facilitate private settlement; it is singularly unsuited to investigating and deciding such preliminary questions as whether the defendant is or is not implicated. By the very nature of the procedure, the issue was largely a matter of assigning liability in cases where the involvement of the defendant was admitted but his intent or culpability was in doubt. In my view, we are likely to find an exercise such as Tetralogy 1, which assumes that the evidentiary proof is virtually meaningless and the case should be decided solely on circumstantial evidence, only when the cynical abuses of the traditional procedure were notorious.

From the same perspective the treatment of *miasma* and avenging furies as a threat to the greater community seems out of place in the era of Antiphon's court speeches. It is an important topic in all three *Tetralogies* but nowhere clearly articulated in the extant speeches for *dikai phonou*. It is reasonable to suppose that these religious concerns were present to the minds of judges and *antidikoi* throughout the long development of *dikai phonou*. The religious sanctions and consequences so powerfully conveyed in drama appear to parallel the legal proceedings. But they are not issues for judges in the courts to weigh. Neither in Dracon's Law nor in Antiphon's court speeches do we have any clear sense of a "criminal" aspect to *dikai phonou*, that homicide should be remedied as a public wrong or danger, such as we find, indeed, in Lysias' treatment of the killing of Polemarchus—and in the *Tetralogies*.

The *Tetralogies* belong to an era in which rhetoric and the law that shaped it were undergoing fundamental change. They appeal to an audience who regard the laws with a new ideological consciousness, such as may well have been inspired by the restoration of democracy, recodification, and *nomothesia*. In Tetralogy 2 the plaintiff seems to acknowledge the new distinction of *nomoi* and *psēphismata*, and he addresses the people as lawmakers, "sovereign in the state." We find similar formulations in Andocides' *On the Mysteries*, where we also learn that traditional rules for prosecution and self-help against homicides were

restricted by the very settlement that restored democracy. In the new age of legalism the traditional procedures for homicide disputes, *dikai phonou* before the ancient courts of the *ephetai,* were increasingly regarded as antiquated and undemocratic. Demosthenes anticipates just such a reaction in his labored defense of the traditional courts in *Against Aristocrates.* Of all homicide cases known to us after Antiphon, barely half were still prosecuted by *dikai phonou*; and in those cases where the traditional procedure was followed, it appears to have become chiefly a tool of litigation. *Dikai phonou* were often superseded by the summary procedures for "warrant and arrest"; and those cases that were still prosecuted by *dikē phonou* were often decided without trial either by private settlement or by suits for false witness. Since homicide charges traditionally rested upon the oaths of plaintiffs and witnesses, it was sometimes possible to entangle an opponent in awkward and lengthy proceedings on largely groundless accusations. A special procedure for trial of perjury charges arising in *dikai phonou* was evidently instituted to remedy such abuses.[55] The *Tetralogies* in fact—alone among the extant homicide speeches—allude to this procedure against perjury in *dikai phonou*; and their very method seems to reflect an utter lack of faith in the traditional rules of evidence and liability. They are in some sense a "polemic" against the peculiar logic of *dikai phonou.*[56] They are, in all likelihood, the rough product of an era when the workings of law were subject to a new scrutiny and the tools of face-to-face debate were first fashioned into literary technique.[57]

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[55] Carawan, "Ephetai," esp. 3–6, 13–16.

[56] Decleva Caizzi, however, interprets the argumentation as a conservative "polemic" *against* argument from probability (*Tetralogiae* 50, 69).

[57] Cf. Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric* 113–38, esp. 120–23, on "writing out loud" and the adaptation of literary effects commensurate with those of oral performance. Among such effects, I suggest, was a somewhat more realistic representation of court proceedings, such as we find in Lysias 12 and in the treatments of Socrates' defense. As we turn from Gorgias' *Palamedes* to Alcidamas' *Ulysses* (Radermacher B VII.44; B XXII.16), in the latter demonstration one is struck by the use of witnesses, the mention of a tenfold penalty, and the intriguing description of lost documentary evidence—the arrow with hidden, winged words. This aspect of the *Tetralogies* will require further treatment elsewhere.

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HORACE'S SABINE TOPOGRAPHY IN LYRIC AND HEXAMETER VERSE

The property in the Sabine hills, commonly considered as Horace's gift from Maecenas, figures conspicuously in all the productions of the poet's middle career: *Satires* book 2, *Odes* 1–3, and *Epistles* book 1. No other Republican or Augustan poet so closely associates himself with a definition of place. Although Vergil mentions landmarks around Mantua, and Ovid on one occasion positions himself amidst the well-watered fields of Sulmo (*Am.* 2.16.1–10), only Catullus, in indicating the proximity of his paternal villa to the waters of Lake Garda (1.31.13–14), furnishes any semblance of topographical image for a location specifically called his own. Furthermore, the position occupied by Horace's farm differs greatly from that of other poets' far-off homelands; it furnishes an alternative residence to vary the normal routines of its owner's everyday life. By reason of this leisure-time status Horace's farm has long appealed to readers as a literary *locus* offering privileged insights into intimate personal experience. The approach to genius in shirtsleeves always seems open.[1]

This sense of familiar acquaintanceship extending across the centuries has understandably roused the curiosity of many readers concerning the actual location of the farm.[2] Unlike the largely unconvincing efforts to discover Vergil's Mantuan property on the basis of details in Eclogue 1 that may be fictive,[3] topographical and archaeological re-

[1] Ackerman, *Villa* 35–37, indicates the influential status of such readings.

[2] See Lugli, "Villa Sabina." Interest in the topic developed in coincidence with the sixteenth-century development of *villegiatura* in Tivoli. The general identification of the territory has been established over a period of three centuries through place names. The seventeenth-century Dutch scholar Holstenius identified Horace's Digentia (Epistle 1.18.104) as the river Licenza and the village of Vicovaro as his Varia (Epistle 1.14) and placed the *Fanum putre Vacunae* of Epistle 1.10 at Rocca Giovane, where an inscription commemorated Vespasian's restoration of an ancient shrine. The confirming argument was supplied by a lawyer, Sig. Petrocelli of Vicovarus, who in 1757 discovered an inscription in the convent of San Cosimato identifying Mandela (Epistle 1.18.105) as the ancient name for modern Bardella (subsequently altered to Massa Mandela to mark its ancient associations).

[3] For a precise discussion of correspondences see Wellesley, "Virgil's Home," but prevailing literary opinion that the topography comprises an ideal fiction is represented by Pöschl, *Hirtendichtung* 44–45.

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searches into the location of Horace's property have identified a site in the area of the River Licenza with characteristics corresponding plausibly to Horace's descriptions of a valley ringed by low hills, even a fountain on the slope above the house. In a typically sultry Roman August, the sheltered valley does indeed offer relief from the heat of the Dog Star. Giuseppe Lugli's report in *Monumenti Antiqui* (1926) of excavations on this site describes walls and pavements belonging to an amply proportioned villa renovated and expanded at three widely spaced periods. Reticulate masonry at the core block and remains of black-and-white geometric mosaics indicate occupancy during the Augustan period, at which date the villa would seem to have comprised twelve ground-floor rooms, a heated bath complex, and a terrace opening onto a garden with a *piscina* at its center and a surrounding porticus.[4]

To Lugli, as an archaeologist, the presence of Augustan masonry was persuasive evidence that the actual place had been found. For a literary scholar of his own generation, however, this masonry and the kind of establishment it betokened gave rise to further questions. In 1913 the Harvard philologist E. K. Rand visited the site in Lugli's company. Expecting the visit to increase his closeness to Horace, Rand justified his topographical curiosity in the face of anyone who might maintain the self-sufficiency of the text: "Readers of Horace's *Odes* sometimes do not care to know [just where the Sabine Farm was situated]; the imagination of the poet supplies material for a fairyland of their own constructing. . . . But to the traveller in Italy . . . no topographical minutiae seem irrelevant. The past is enlivened in an indescribable way, for the discovery of actual sites not only gratifies scientific curiosity, but supplies new food for the imagination."[5] While Rand thus defended the contribution of archaeological discovery to literary appreciation, his confrontation with architectural actualities disturbed his literary preconceptions in one particular. The unanticipated spaciousness of the villa and its properties seemed out of keeping with Horace's own protestations of a modest life style. "Such extrava-

[4]Lugli, "Villa Sabina" 530–59. He and his colleague Angelo Pasqui excavated the site in 1911 and 1920; they explained the Augustan features as improvements Horace made upon coming into ownership. Although the rooms are symmetrically disposed around their axis, the plan differs from the usual town-house arrangement of atrium and tablinum described by Vitruvius (*De Arch.* 7) and commonly found in Republican and Augustan houses at Pompeii, but it is not unlike Vitruvius' farmhouse pattern, where the principal entrance faced the countryside so that produce could easily be brought into the peristyle.

[5]Rand, *A Walk* 7.

gance," he mused, "does not befit the *aurea mediocritas* of our poet."[6] A shade of uncertainty clouded his confidence in Horace's candor as he considered that the poet might have misrepresented the material prosperity of the farm.

To what extent does this question concern the present-day literary scholar accustomed to separate literary interpretation from an author's biography? "Not at all," is the expected answer. At this point one should briefly note the particular difficulty that scholars have experienced in disentangling the monumental reality of the farm from biographical considerations. Because the farm is generally regarded as Horace's gift from Maecenas, his allusions to it have been, and continue to be, frequently scrutinized as successive watermarks in the history of his patron–client relationship.[7] Leaving aside, however, this category of analysis, which has little to do with visual representation, we find a case for literary autonomy in Richard Thomas's treatment of the farm as a landscape in Horace's *Epistles*. Thomas takes his point of departure from the observation that emphasis on biographical information in the *Epistles* has precluded deserved appreciation of their poetic attractions. Focusing on the details of the landscape in Epistle 1.16, he proposes that its poetic value derives from a coloring of utopian idealism. As he argues, Horace displaces reality by couching his descriptions within the formulas of an ethnographical tradition that signals their utopian quality. The resultant landscape, incorporating traces of the Golden Age into an ideal harmony between man and nature, is a product of poetic art.[8]

Since a view of this kind is theoretically better suited to the aesthetic nature of poetry than any concern with Horace's farm as a reality, one might be wise to let the issue rest here. All the same it is one thing to consider poetry as a source of biographical information, and another

[6]Rand, *A Walk* 40. He recalled how Horace in Ode 2.15 pronounced his disapproval of the "ten-foot porticoes" affected by contemporary villa architecture. Finally, he rationalized that the poet had probably assented reluctantly to improvements suggested by Maecenas. Material comforts seemed less compromising to Hallam, *Horace at Tibur* 15. He declared that the poet "had the moderation of the cultivated gentleman and practised the 'golden mean'."

[7]Bradshaw, "Horace," takes up the references chronologically, concluding that Maecenas did not give Horace the farm but only the means to purchase it. Degrees of independence are observed in a biographical way by Shackleton Bailey, *Profile* 37, 57, and in a more literary way (in *Odes*) by Santirocco, "Maecenas Odes" and *Unity* 153–68.

[8]Thomas, *Lands and Peoples* 8–34.

to interpret it within a historically and culturally informed context. In invoking ancient ethnographic writing as a model for Horace's description, Thomas pays tribute to cultural context, but the ultimate purpose of his observations is to illuminate Horace's poetic self-reflexivity. His conclusion that Horace wishes to display the farm as an ideal poetic environment differs from biographical criticism primarily in substituting an aesthetic frame of reference for a literal. Interpretation of this kind tends to pass over certain cultural considerations with a bearing on Horace's descriptive procedure.

The representation of spatial reality is a cultural issue that ought to concern us because it was of paramount importance to Horace's Roman contemporaries. As Claude Nicolet shows in discussing the implications of geographical awareness during the late Republic and Augustan Age, the Roman sense of national identity had by this time come to incorporate a consciousness of territorial possessions and the means both to control and to describe them.[9] This is, of course, the historical context to which one should refer Roman interest in ethnography with ramifications fully as practical as theoretical. Evidence for this large-scale geographical awareness is readily apparent in Horace's poems,[10] but the small-scale corollary to the poet's universal vision is the way in which he envisions the nature and position of his immediate world. This question involves not only the selection and ordering of descriptive details to convert topographical into literary space, but also the manner in which he, as speaker and possessor, administers this space and negotiates its boundaries.

The definition of boundaries involves context or the larger spaces within which Horace positions his descriptions. For the purpose of the literary and topographical interface I am discussing, contexts are of two kinds: poetic and cultural. The context to which our impressions of the Sabine Farm as literary space belong is not merely the immediate poem in which we read each description but also the genre of that poem as a component of the collection to which it belongs. The influence poetic genre exercises over the specifics of description is a factor to which scholars considering Horace's images of his property have given little attention. This is understandably true of Lugli, the topographer, for whose purposes in discussing the authenticity of the site evidence from *Satire, Odes,* and *Epistles* was equally pertinent, but it is also true of the

[9] Nicolet, *Space* 1–14.
[10] Luisi, "Significato politico."

modern critic, Thomas, who discovers similarly utopian characteristics in the landscapes of *Epistle* 1.16 and *Ode* 1.17.[11] By contrast, a reading that emphasizes the differences in conceptualization owed to genre will give us more clearly individualized views of the farm and its productivity as a source generating poetic texts. As a code of literary expectations that enables readers to understand a text within its appropriate discursive tradition, genre influences the postures a speaker adopts in presenting himself to his audience, the construction or identity of that audience, and also the selective focus he employs in creating a world. Which is to say that genre as a vehicle for territorial representation affects the two issues of administering property and defining boundaries I have mentioned. By viewing the farm from this vantage point we no longer need follow the dictates of a critical ideology that insists upon our choosing between a monolithic reality and an artistic fiction but can instead observe how a single reality interacting with diverse contexts yields diverse identities, each one a function of the specific text that it generates. These identities, as I shall show, are closer together in the hexameter discourse of *Satires* book 2 and *Epistles* book 1, despite the ten–year interval separating these collections, than in the intervening three books of *Odes*.

Insofar as the spatial image of Horace's farm located within a context of literary genre also comprises a descriptive topography positioned within a geographical context, the poetic space is simultaneously a cultural space. Administration and border definition constitute important facets of the cultural identity of Horace's property, because they affect its contingency upon its Roman social and political environment. Contemporary Roman culture is an area in which questions of misrepresentation, such as Rand asked, do figure significantly and should be addressed with reference to those customs or assumptions that Horace shared with his audience.

In this capacity it is important to know that Horace's Sabine property is a villa. Horace places it implicitly within that category by stressing both its extraurban location and its agricultural character. Therefore our understanding of the administration of the property and its contin-

[11] Thomas, *Lands and Peoples* 8–27, takes a progressive view of the image as a development marking Horace's career. He believes that the "poetically congenial environment" Horace creates in Ode 1.17 and Epistle 1.16 partakes of the same vision of an ideal harmony between man and nature that he had earlier ascribed to the mythical Islands of the Blest in Epode 16.

gency upon the world should take account of conditions of villa ownership during the late Republic. Since recent historical and archaeological investigations into the economic and ideological functions of villas have cast considerable new light on these conditions, it is worth pausing to review some points with a bearing on Horace's presentation of himself as proprietor.

Recent scholarship highlights the importance of the villa as an institution central to the personal and political interactions of senatorial society.[12] For this reason we should not think of these properties as a refuge from the complexities of urban life. From the rigors of Rome's summer climate villas did indeed provide refuge, but in this capacity villas functioned in the lives of Roman aristocrats as an extension rather than a denial of social and political activity. Visits and conversations that Cicero mentions in his letters show how aristocrats carried political concerns to their villas. Not without satisfaction he remarks to Atticus in May 51 B.C. that the large crowd gathered in the vicinity of his Cumanum is turning it into a *pusilla Roma*.[13] The Puteolan property he acquired a few years later was strategically even closer to the heart of commercial and political dealings in Campania.[14] In regarding villas from this socially oriented point of view, we must forget the post–Romantic notion that Romans sentimentalized nature in such a way as to oppose the worlds of city and country. Rather these spheres should be seen as intercommunicating with complementary functions. As we

[12]Revision of opinion is explicitly treated in the books D'Arms published at a twelve–year interval. While his *Romans on the Bay of Naples* tends to treat the issues of luxury and the employment of *otium* along the lines of our literary pattern, with emphasis on the recreational function of the Campanian villa, *Commerce and Social Standing* emphasizes a symbiosis between villa habitation of all kinds and the economic climate of the region. Also this more recent work (72–96) questions a fundamental tenet in the dialogue of luxury and frugality, the so–called nonproductivity of the luxury villa.

[13]*Ad Att.* 5.2. Hortensius was among the visitors; Cicero was never insensitive to the accolade of his attention, which he mentions here in criticism of C. Sempronius Rufus' failure to pay a call. The financial discomfort motivating Rufus' negligence, as explained by D'Arms (*Commerce* 48–50) is a good illustration of the practical functioning of the villa in senatorial life. Among the other visits Cicero mentions are those from Pompey at Cumae (*Ad Att.* 4.9, 10, 11; 7.4) and from Caesar (13.52), the latter more like a "billeting" than a visit.

[14]Crowds there are mentioned in *Ad Att.* 14.9, its advantageous natural situation in 1.13. A narrative of other social negotiations in Cicero's villas is provided by D'Arms, *Romans* 48–55.

shall see, it is this complementary role of the Sabine Farm that Horace develops in his writing.

The fact that Horace mentions agricultural activity at his villa does not set it apart from the aristocratic estates of Republican or Augustan Rome. This is a point on which revisionary scholarship is very important to our understanding. The celebrated *otium* associated with villas was by no means incompatible with economic self-sufficiency.[15] Even such a notoriously luxurious villa as that of L. Licinius Lucullus at Tusculum had a substantial agricultural component. As for the moral character of *otium,* when we divorce the general practice from censorious *invidia* directed towards individual proprietors,[16] we should see that it is less appropriately conceived as shameless self-indulgence than as a fostering of intellectual activity. If the Hellenistic world gave models for luxury, this very conceptualization of a life style implied cultural sophistication. Dramatizing such intellectual activity in his dialogues, Cicero pictures the way in which owners like Hortensius and Lucullus, not to mention himself, wanted their villa life to be seen. Implicit here is the Roman principle that houses furnish an enhancement of personal and political status identity.[17] Cicero explicitly codifies this principle in *De Officiis* 1.138–40, where he prescribes the decorum by which a house should suit the dignity of its owner. By this code, the plan and habilitation of the villa could reflect the owner's intellectual self-definition in the same manner that his Roman atrium house stood behind his political profile, with the important difference that villas, enjoying the more expansive opportunities of their extraurban location, arrogated a measure of spatial and architectural freedom not practically available in the

[15] Shatzman, "Senatorial Wealth," discusses the conduct and profitability of agriculture on senatorial properties. D'Arms (*Commerce* 78–86) suggests that the agricultural productivity of large-scale villas played a role in aristocratic finances from the first, but additionally that the pleasurable *villa maritima* was wholly capable of producing income. If this did not come from fishing or from productions on its own property, it was often associated with, and perhaps supported by, neighboring properties or land.

[16] As an example of such prejudicial talk one may consider Cicero's comments about Lucullus and Hortensius in letters (*Ad Att.* 1.18.6, 19.6, 20.3, 20.6; 2.1.7, 9.1). The particular acerbity comes from the fact that these retired statesmen are doing nothing for him.

[17] On patronage affiliations and obligations on the part of extraurban property owners see Rawson, "Ciceronian Aristocracy"; on the use of villas for enlarging clientage see D'Arms, *Romans* 48–53. On economic symbiosis between luxury villas and towns in Campania see D'Arms, *Commerce* 78–86.

town house.[18] When the villa furnishes a literary setting, this freedom of the extraurban environment fosters a corresponding intellectual expansiveness potentially relevant to the urban life.

Such cultural considerations, equally pertinent to Horace's lyric and hexameter presentations of the farm, provide a frame of reference within which specific differences have meaning. I introduce these differences by contrasting two descriptions, one in Ode 1.17, the other in Epistle 1.16. Substantially the two agree in their larger outlines. Each pictures a valley with such a degree of exactitude that the two are frequently invoked side by side to confirm identification of the site. We are fortunate in having a real Sabine property against which to evaluate the poet's technique, since the agreement of topography and description indicates that Horace wanted his reader to visualize the actual appearance of his place. In the *Odes,* however, he brings us to see this conformation through pictorial inference. The valley enjoys the divine patronage of Pan, exchanging Mount Lyceaus for Lucretilis and his native Greek guise for that of Italian Faunus. To this favor the poet attributes the protection of the flock from fiery summer heat and rainy winds:[19]

> Velox amoenum saepe Lucretilem
> mutat Lycaeo Faunus et igneam
> defendit aestatem capellis
> usque meis pluviosque ventos. (*O.* 1.17.1–4)

The poet shows us his flock wandering securely, untroubled by green snakes and Martian wolves whenever flute music fills the valley and the rocks of "reclining Ustica" resound. Immediately we see that Horace's lyric does not set itself apart by employing a poetically sanitized vocabulary. The poet depicts his animals with naturalistic language as wandering nannies, wives of the smelly he-goat, yet this earthy touch adds piquancy to the purely imaginative credence solicited by the poet's myth of divine guardianship through music. The unified coherence of this topography derives largely from the suffusion of its atmosphere by music:

[18] On the exercise of individuality in rebuilding and decorating villas to impose a "stamp of ownership" see Rawson, "Ciceronian Aristocracy," and LaFon, "Villae républicaines."

[19] All quotations from Horace follow the text of Shackleton Bailey, *Horatius.*

Hic in reducta valle Caniculae
vitabis aestus et fide Teia
dices laborantis in uno
Penelopen vitreamque Circen. (1.17.17–20)

In this situation we are given to see an interdependence of patronage. As Faunus protects the valley, so the owner of the farm himself offers sheltering patronage to Tyndaris, his invited guest and addressee. It is important to form a visual sense of the valley with its groves concealing arbutus and thyme, surrounded by the resonant rocks of *Ustica cubans,* since this combination of foreground and background details brings out the self-containment of the place. Even the place names, Lucretilis and Ustica, while no doubt informative to Horace's contemporaries, function as landscape features rather than geographical pointers.[20] The space in which Horace's valley exists is far less a geographically than an artistically conceived space, populated by figures drawn from the realm of literary allusion. Even the violence from which Tyndaris is promised protection belongs to a remote and indefinite sphere.[21]

This is Horace's introductory presentation of the farm in the *Odes* and very closely tied with the programmatic development of his poetic persona, yet his claims as an artist are understated. In his role as patron he honors the gods by *pietas* and cherishes the Muse. At the same time, the symposiast references and name of Tyndaris herself alert us to the active transformation of Greek lyric into Roman terms. Several readers have seen a bid for seduction as the primary motive for Horace's invitation,[22] but the erotic message is very artfully delivered through a subtle

[20] On difficulties in identifying Ustica and Lucretilis see Nisbet and Hubbard, *Commentary* 217–18, 221. No evidence exists to correlate these names with those currently attached to prominent features of the landscape, I can scarcely agree with N. and H. in terming these sonorous names "prosaic" on the grounds that their origins are Sabine.

[21] Nisbet and Hubbard, *Commentary* 226, cite precedents for Cyrus as a name in Hellenistic erotic verse.

[22] Thus Quinn, *Horace* 159: "The missing component in a complex ironical pattern now falls into place: Tyndaris has a husband (or regular lover) who corresponds to the *olens maritus* of line 7 and to Penelope in line 20. . . . Tyndaris' visit to the farm will make her *devia* like the *capellae* of line 6." This ingenious exposition differs from the idealized, art-centered interpretation of Fraenkel, *Horace* 205–7, which was further elaborated by Commager, *Odes* 348–52. Neither confronts Tyndaris as a genuine presence, but Nisbet and Hubbard (*Commentary* 216) emphasize literary allusiveness in the poem by assigning her a double identity: initially perceived as a "dream figure, belonging to the

integration of the speaker's literary and sexual propensities. Vitruvius mentions that Greek hosts issued dinner invitations by sending items of country produce to their guests, or else pictures of such items, called *xenia* (*De Arch.* 6.7.2). Horace's invitation includes a verbal *xenion* couched in suggestive double entendre:

> hic tibi copia
> manabit ad plenum benigno
> ruris honorum opulenta cornu. (1.17.14–16)

But whether this overflowing wealth is sexual or brought in from the garden, in this environment it seems like a magically spontaneous product bestowed by the tutelary gods and cherished Muse. As Ralph Johnson puts it, "artistic discipline" is matched by "moral discipline,"[23] yet both the restraint and the bounty are the apparent characteristics of a fortunate place.

Let us look at the same valley in Epistle 1.16. The speaker's first words are a move to forestall certain practical questions that Quinctius, the addressee, might conceivably ask:[24]

> Ne perconteris fundus meus, optime Quinti,
> arvo pascat erum an bacis opulentet olivae,
> pomisne an pratis an amicta vitibus ulmo . . . (*Ep.* 1.16.1–3)

What crops does the farm really produce? Having raised this question, Horace does not answer directly but only in a circumlocutory manner. First of all, he wants to tell Quinctius something about the shape and location of the place (*scribetur tibi forma loquaciter et situs agri,* 1.16.4). This language verges on technical geography, and is followed by one of Horace's most graphic visual sketches:

> Continui montes, ni dissocientur opaca
> valle, sed ut veniens dextrum latus aspiciat sol,
> laevum decedens curru fugiente vaporet. (1.16.5–7)

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world of Alexandrian pastoral," she becomes an urban *hetaira* in the two closing stanzas. Additional erotic readings appear in Pucci, "Horace's Banquet"; and Connor, *Force of Humour* 28–30.

[23] Johnson, *Idea* 140–41.

[24] Shackleton Bailey, *Horatius,* changes the spelling of Quinctius in Line 1 to the Quintius of the title.

Close attention to this passage forces the reader to construct a mental image, and thus to place the farm within an environmental structure by relating it both to its immediate surroundings and to a larger cosmological order represented by the daily course of the sun. A visitor, Horace goes on to say, will praise the moderate climate (*temperies*). The brambles bear cornel berries and wild plums. Oaks and ilex supply acorns for the flock, while the master enjoys their shade. Here is one difference from the *Odes,* where the goats cropped arbutus and thyme, the herbage of Vergilian pastoral. Given that goats will eat anything, we may attribute the difference to literary genre. This diet is the food of anthropological "hard primitivism."[25] We might expect to see the master's life from a similarly sociological point of view.[26]

The practical cast of Horace's hexameter topography in this passage is also enforced by his calling the property a *fundus*. The hypothetical questions he attributes to Quinctius locate his description within the discourse of agricultural self-sufficiency. All the products he has listed—crops, olives, orchards, pasturage, and vines—imply a major agricultural establishment, suggesting that the question being answered is really, "How large and how productive is the farm?"[27] If we were to answer this question on the basis of Horace's offerings in Ode 1.17 to Tyndaris, of *copia . . . ruris honorum opulenta,* we would have to say "very productive," but in the immediate situation Horace plays down productivity. Alert scholars have noticed the absence of any straightforward information on agricultural economy,[28] yet the humorously evasive allusion to primitivism is sufficient answer in itself. By this token Horace seems to say that his farm supplies fundamentals, with a metaphorical implication that a soundly balanced *modus vivendi* is the basis of its economic program.

Comparable intermingling of the practical and the allusive appears in Horace's description of the *fons* rising on his property: *ut nec / frigidior Thracam nec purior ambiat Hebrus* (1.16.12–13). Although this refer-

[25] Thomas, *Lands and Peoples* 13, citing L. Voit, calls this the food of the Golden Age, but one might notice that the animals, not their master, are eating the acorns.

[26] According to Vergil (*G.* 2.34) *corna* are *lapidosa,* so, presumably, not very appetizing.

[27] Kilpatrick, *Friendship* 97–98, cites Cato's hierarchy of profitable crops.

[28] McGann, *Studies* 73, suggests that Quinctius' questions estimate the farm simply as a source of wealth.

ence is instinct with literary implications,[29] Horace leaves the reader to interpolate these independently while he goes on to claim a practical value for his *fons*; its curative waters benefit both the weak head and the uneasy stomach. Orphic inspiration, as hinted by the encomiastic comparison with the Hebrus, scales down into practical magic upon an everyday plane. At the same time this designation of head and stomach as figurative references to the higher and lower man might well be seen as the preface to philosophical discourse, the chief product cultivated within Horace's particular economy.

The method of indirect description Horace employs in Epistle 1.16 provides for attribution of values by inviting the reader to construct his own hierarchy of tangible and intangible assets. I will return later to the specific importance of this ethical ranking for the entire poem, but for the moment let me elaborate its more general implications by a retrospective contrast with Ode 1.17. Proceeding in both cases from a recognizable reality, the healthful, shaded valley that contains his property, Horace has not only diversified the landscapes by elaborating their spatial relationships, but also made them house diversified visions of life. Ideas associated with enclosure—protection, resonance, patronage—develop an aesthetic of life in the ode, while the geographically positioned property in the epistle sustains an economy. The boundaries of the farm are drawn very closely in the ode, where the poet directs our gaze inward, but his own gaze in the epistle faces away from the farm. *Hae latebrae . . . tibi me praestant Septembribus horis,* he says to Quinctius in preface to the lesson he is about to extend.

The social outface is appropriate to the *Epistles* with their sequence of addressees, but it also suits the self-consciously conversational discourse that Horace develops in the *Satires*. The first literary mention of the Sabine property, in Satire 2.6, might be called the cornerstone on which subsequent images build. The opening lines of this poem give another picture so apparently explicit that it is frequently cited as topographical information about the farm:

> Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus
> hortus ubi et tecti vicinus iugis aquae fons

[29] Thomas, *Lands and Peoples* 15–19, notes two categories of literary association, observing on the one hand the importance of water in ethnographical studies, and on the other the inspirational stream of Callimachus. But he might have added the Orphic resonances of Hebrus.

et paulum silvae super his foret, auctius atque
di melius fecere . . . (*Sat.* 2.6.1–4)

Here also Horace is actually elliptical and indirect. The rural vignette shaped by these words does not convey straightforward information, but rather highlights an ambiguous difference between expectation and realization. Somewhere in the discrepant territory between the poet's modest prayer and his "more ample" possessions lies a latitude of definition which permits the introduction of such amenities as hot baths and garden colonnades into the actual Sabine property.

But the initial vignette, at the same time that it conveys the speaker's modest aspirations, also defines his wishes in a more technically explicit sense. If we consult Roman agronomic writing going back to Cato to discover the basic description of a working farm, we will find similar requirements specified: the best farms comprise a modest piece of land at the foot of a mountain with abundant water (*De Agri.* 1.3.7). Although Horace is not claiming that his initial formula constitutes the sum total of his possessions, he does, by this description, cast the discussion into a frame of rural economics. Furthermore he claims to be a sound, if cautious investor:

Nil amplius oro
Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis.
si neque maiorem feci ratione mala rem
nec sum facturus vitio culpave minorem. (2.6.4–7)

Scholars have speculated why Horace invokes Mercury in this context,[30] yet the choice seems quite logical in his capacity as a patron of commerce. In spite of the *vota* he has invoked, the speaker does not propose to base his fortunes upon miracles; he does not wish for additions to his property; he does not dream of stumbling upon hidden treasure (10–14), but merely nurtures hopes of reasonable prosperity. Appropriately he asks Mercury, as protector both of commerce and of speech, to fatten the flocks, but not their master's *ingenium*.

Like the Quinctius epistle, this description concerns valuations,

[30] Fraenkel, *Horace* 140, considers primarily the religious implications of the invocation, asking "Was Horace sincere?" Bond, "Dialectic" 70, 74–75, is still concerned with this dimension when he argues that Horace (although jocularly) means Mercury to be identified with Maecenas.

but its emphasis falls less on enjoyable assets than adjustment to circumstances. The master of the farm declares its adequacy to his needs. His assessment, nonetheless, plays its part in the framework of a diverse life where values are illumined by contrast. Even as the poet goes on to dramatize the perils of his days as a sought-after personage in the city, he betrays a mild satisfaction in his prestige. Without troublesome prestige his craving to creep away into rural solitude would have no justification. Few readers have failed to appreciate this point of ambivalence, but readers have less frequently observed how well-structured a literary program informs this professedly simple country world.

For one thing the Sabine farm is not solitary but enlivened by social intercommunication based upon identifiable literary models. Over the centuries readers have been captivated by the democratic perspective and the homely verisimilitude with which Horace casts himself as a member of a circle of rustic neighbors passing conversational evenings by the fire (2.6.65–75). Somehow this response has led to the surprising neglect of the kind of source recognition to which classicists are usually so alert. An initial clue is in the formula of drinking. Released from *insanes leges,* guests at their pleasure will drink from *inaequales calices,* either strong or weak as desired.[31] These are clear references to symposiastic conventions, even suggesting the opening passages of Plato's *Symposium,* where the assembling participants, still suffering the effects of the previous night's indulgence, agree to mix their wine at their individual discretion (*pinontas pros hēdonēn,* 176e). Within such a context it is quite suitable that the conversation should center about topics of ethical import:[32]

> sed quod magis ad nos
> pertinet et nescire malum est agitamus: utrumne
> divitiis homines an sint virtute beati;
> quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos;
> et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius. (2.6.73–76)

[31] Kiessling and Heinze, *Satiren* 310–11, observe the "Greek reference" without further comment. Horace's culturally self-conscious adaptation of sympotic conventions, primarily in lyric, is discussed by Murray, "Symposium." He makes an important distinction between the non-Roman symposium, appropriate to creating a sense of audience and performance in lyric, and the *convivium,* which is Roman.

[32] Fraenkel, *Horace* 143, compares *De Finibus,* but his intention is to deemphasize rather than to highlight the element of rural verisimilitude.

Beyond this allusive framework, however, Horace does not imply that his country symposia resemble Platonic dialogues in structure, but rather defines their procedures through a complex set of allusions to Greco–Roman literature and customs.[33] The primary reference, as Kiessling suggests, must surely be to Cicero's picture of Cato in his own Sabine preserve: *quae quidem etiam in Sabinis persequi soleo conviviumque vicinorum cotidie compleo, quod ad multam noctem quam maxime possumus vario sermone producimus* (*De Sen.* 14.46).[34]

But the original context for this vignette is scarcely rustic, since Cato is speaking with a degree of cultural sophistication of the *convivium* as a Greek social institution reshaped by Roman practices. He reflects on the fact that the Roman name *convivium* stresses the sociable intercourse of such gatherings in place of the Greek etymological association with comestibles (13.45, *compotationes, concenatio*). Nonetheless he praises the Greek custom of appointing a *magister bibendi* and alludes to Xenophon's *Symposium*. Whether these ideas about conversational gatherings belonged actually to Cato or only to Cicero's Hellenized recreation of Cato, certainly Cicero is the figure whom Horace's Sabine *cena* most readily calls to mind. Considered within this literary context, this scenario is an almost parodic reflection of images Cicero employs both in his letters and in his dialogues. The list of bread–and–butter topics—virtue and wealth, friendship and the *summum bonum*—suggests the need that Cicero underlines in the *De Finibus* for a Roman philosophical discourse dealing with fundamental issues (*quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum,* 1.4.12).

Into this context is woven the tale of the country and city mice. Horace attributes the story to his talkative rural neighbor, Cervius. Although the garrulous rustic is a familiar literary figure, a real–life counterpart might be seen in one Attius, Cicero's next–door neighbor in Formia (*Ad Att.* 2.14), whose persistent visits make him a virtual *contubernalis*. Since Cicero has taken up residence, this fellow is so happy to philosophize all day long that he sees no need for going to Rome. Thus he is turning the country house into a *basilica*. Likewise in Horace's poem, the picture of rural society is a transplanted, scaled–down version of Roman urban life. In making a fable the primary instrument of philosophical communication Horace may again take Plato's *Sympo-*

[33] On the Italic tradition of the Greek symposium see Rathje, "Homeric Banquet."
[34] Kiessling and Heinze, *Satiren* 310.

sium for his model, but whatever the case, the comparison can be useful in prompting us to interpret this fable, similarly to Plato's, as a dramatized speech act whose import is closely bound up with contextual circumstance.[35] Whenever some short-sighted person (*quis . . . ignarus*) happens to praise Arellius' troubled wealth, Cervius produces his folk wisdom (*fabella ex re*). By calling the decorum of the story countrified (*anilis fabella*), Horace directs us to understand its substance as an aspect of its socioeconomic context. The moral is explicitly economic: "*haud mihi vita / est opus hac,*" proclaims *rusticus* as he returns to his safe, familiar home:

> "vàleas. me silva cavusque
> tutus ab insidiis tenui solabitur ervo." (2.6.116–17)

This decisively stated moral concludes not only Cervius' fable but also Horace's satire, giving an effect both abrupt and open-ended. The absence of any interpretive intervention either by Cervius as teller or by Horace himself draws the reader into the dramatic audience for the fable. Like other immediate members of this audience, he is cast upon his own resources to put the story into place.

Many readers have accomplished this by understanding the story as a reprise of the satire with immediate relevance to Horace himself. Such readers argue that the style is remarkably polished for rustic narrative, while the dichotomous mice exhibit characteristics of the poet's rural and urban selves, even to the generally Epicurean idealism of the country mouse.[36] The conclusion thus frequently deduced is that Horace employs this literary embellishment in order to project his own internalization of Cervius' story.

Such a conclusion does, however, entail oversimplification, and I believe that the embedding of the story is more important to the reading than the notion of Cervius as Horace's surrogate spokesman would allow. In transmitting this tale, the poet does not characterize himself as a communal spokesman, but rather as a member of a community of listeners. Taking care to distance himself intellectually from the story by the designation *anilis fabella,* he relates what he has heard; this

[35] Such a reading of the *Symposium* was proposed by Bacon, "Socrates Crowned."

[36] Rudd, *Satires* 246, notes that "though told by a country neighbor, it shows the poet at his most urbane"; but we should keep in mind that Horace never specifies Cervius' actual background.

rhetorical premise gives us to understand a number of fortuitous circumstances in the interrelationship between story and context.

The content of the story makes far better sense if we consider Horace in the role of dramatic catalyst he specifies rather than as a thinly disguised teller. His presence convenes the symposium and inspires the well-turned form of the tale that he in turn reports to us. This very circumstance is a function of the itinerant role that carries the poet and public figure back and forth between places. Ostensibly the tale is about contentment and care. Should we think it accidental that its *mise en scène* involves country and city life, or does Cervius deliberately enfold Horace within the tale? If so, the poet should be identified with the city mouse and the moral might be taken to represent a lesson that Cervius has learned from watching his occasional neighbor come and go from the city. The resignation to available resources with which the tale concludes is a lesson of decorum perfectly appropriate to a rustic like Cervius whose secluded rural life style may limit him to taking a permanent spectator's view of the world of affairs. For Horace, a strict application of this moral would be more problematic.[37] Unlike the mice of the tale, who end by rejecting each other's values and presumably closing the route of communication between city and country, Horace's itinerant life style effects an exchange of perspectives capable of enhancing the values to be appreciated in each place. In this manner the farm takes its definite place within the purview of a larger Roman community.

Citations of local speakers or members of Horace's *familia* also figure in the *Epistles* as an important means of procuring a sense of communal participation for the Sabine property and its owner. This perspective enhances our image of the place as a territorial unit within the structure of a primarily agrarian region. Although Horace is insistent about his claims to membership in this world, his position can be subjected to an ironic double vision when skeptics question the single-mindedness of his commitment. The motif of adaptation to rural life figures prominently in Epistle 14, commonly cited for its evidence concerning the organization and economics of the farm.

Descriptions of real work are more extensive here than in any

[37] Rudd, *Satires* 252, sees this flaw in analogies between Horace's rural and urban characters and those of the mice, yet he labors to preserve the moral intact: "The fable does endorse Horace's original point." Bond, "Dialectic" 84–85, regards the two mice as representing the conflicting elements in Horace's personality.

other of Horace's Sabine poems, but the motif is employed to highlight contrasts. Nominally directed to the resident bailiff who manages the property, this epistle confronts the restrictions and deprivations of an isolated rural life as seen from a contentious point of view. Horace's monologue centers about the projected complaints of his bailiff, a former city slave whom he has humored by granting his "silent prayer" for a country life. In the absence of accustomed city diversions—baths and games, the brothel, cookshop, and nearby tavern—this naive desire has quickly faded at the same time that the new-made farmer discovers that the previously uncultivated state of his master's property demands unexpectedly hard work. This discontentment serves as a butt for Horace's own familiar complaints about the tedium of his urban responsibilities. For him the city offers no recreation; only in the country can he engage in non-serious activity, which is nothing other than those very field labors his bailiff detests. Just as Horace's epithets (*amoena* and *pulchra* opposing the bailiff's *deserta, tesqua, inhospita*) are a function of relative judgments, so also definitions of work and play become relative when the places of labor are seen reversed. Naturally all is spoken from a self-styled superior intellectual perspective. The realism of the pictures incorporates differences between the tastes and preferences of social classes. Such differences color the contrast with which Horace leads up to his philosophizing:

> certemus, spinas animone ego fortius an tu
> evellas agro et melior sit Horatius an res. (*Ep.* 1.14.4–5)

No democratic compunctions concerning the inequality of labor trouble Horace in posing this class distinction; nonetheless he drops certain hints to prevent us from an unqualified acceptance of his words. Since the bailiff is himself a reluctant thorn-grubber, the balance between master and slave remains uneasy. The epistle advocates maintaining decorum, yet we cannot fully appreciate this principle unless we see how Horace shows himself, in seemingly unselfconscious ways, transgressing the very doctrines he preaches.[38] By transplanting a city slave to the country, he himself has violated social economy, and the

[38] E.g., Rudd, *Themes* 133; he observes these inconsistencies, remarking, "Nevertheless we are left with the feeling that Horace has been not quite fair. . . . The poet is no philosopher. . . . The form in which [he] makes his rustic friends talk about the things which they hold most precious is . . . lent to them by the poet."

bailiff's disgruntled complaints are a predictable consequence. When Horace attempts to prove his own adaptability to rural life by attacking clods and stones in his fields, his ineptitude provokes the merriment of experienced neighbors (1.14.39). Because Horace employs the language of fieldwork metaphorically and invokes his intangible sense of values to define physical labor as play, he stands outside the real economy of the country. This position does not, however, negate the value he receives from the association. As Horace first describes it, the economic function of the farm is that of repaying the master to himself (*mihi me reddentis agelli,* 1.14.1). To the realization of this function, the poet's self-mockery is as important as his philosophizing, since both engage self-knowledge. His larger message has to do with the economy of practicing an art—whatever art is appropriate for the stage and condition of life. While treating the bailiff's discontentment as the opportunity for his own recreational thorn-grubbing, Horace subtly suggests that discontentment presents the sagacious individual with an occasion for studying how well his abilities are matched with his chosen art (*quam scit uterque, libens censebo exerceat artem,* 1.14.44).

Human discontentment is a recurrent Horatian theme, which the *Odes* also tap on occasion. Often Horace treats this theme by exploiting his personal foibles among the characteristic *exempla* of human conduct. While criticizing the ways of humanity, Horace also studies his own role within the contemporary social fabric and examines those aspects of his individuality built upon responses to other men. Within this complex, we can see why he gives particular emphasis to the farm as his ostensible sign of privacy and interior self-sufficiency, which nonetheless reveals the intensity of his social bonds. These are always complicated by paradox. Looking once more at the specific descriptions of Horace's urban life in Satire 2.6, we can see that it is not the mere fact of being sought-after that provokes his exasperation, but rather being sought on unwelcome premises, as a source of information or influence. As presented here, his friendship with Maecenas is a kind of recreational simplification that allows the statesman to escape from his weighty concerns by prattling about gladiators and the weather. More than one scholar has expressed disbelief in the accuracy of the picture. As Bradshaw explains this passage,[39] Horace demonstrates his discretion by stonewalling. He plays down the political significance of

[39] Bradshaw, "Horace" 164.

his friendship in order to illustrate his confidentiality and the skills by which he defends it. This ingenious inference makes good sense on a practical level, but within the structure of the poem there is more to the picture than diplomatic strategy. The role that Horace pictures himself playing with Maecenas, like William Empson's inverted pastorals, is a species of rustic life brought into the city; he is himself a living *posto di ristauro*. Thus Horace's self-portraiture does not so much display his heartfelt preference for the country as his exploitation of the rural affiliation to create the role I have earlier mentioned of a mediator traveling between two worlds. Even the often-cited outcry of exasperation *O rus quando ego te aspiciam*? (2.6.60) is embedded as a dramatic utterance in context. These words are not situated in the discursive present, but rather quoted from the characteristic speech of an observed self whose thoughts in the midst of urban activity are revolving about wasted time (*Deperit haec inter misero lux*). Like the initial wish for the farm, this utterance is typified by the word *votis* and reinforces the value of the farm as the resource that sets Horace apart from fellow actors in the urban milieu.

At the same time, the positive self-characterization with which Horace solicits the reader's sympathy for his rural inclinations in this satire must be weighed against the self-mocking reprise in the following poem. Here the city slave Davus shows us an urban Horace once again craving the country, but turns up the opposite face of the coin in portraying the poet's divided attention to city and country as a real division of loyalties:

> Romae rus optas, absentem rusticus urbem
> tollis ad astra levis, si nusquam es forte vocatus
> ad cenam, laudas securum holus. (*Sat.* 2.7.28–30)

Davus' unsparing interpretation reveals a status-seeking Horace, whose conduct is inconsistent and whose moralizing is no more than pure expediency. To the perceptive reader, all the same, Davus' revelations should pose no surprise since Horace himself has already implied something of this sort between the lines in Satire 2.6.[40] Likewise in the

[40] Armstrong, "Horace," discusses the interaction of the two poems with particular reference to Horace's development of persona. The "shattering transition," as he puts it (282–83), from Horace's discourse to Davus' scurrilous revelations is all part of an "elaborate literary and philosophical joke."

Epistles, the "simplicity" of the farm is a relative situation foregrounded by contrast. Manifestly clear in Epistle 1.14 is the impossibility that Horace himself could change roles with his bailiff without similarly regretting the loss of urban complexity. Horace's freedom to move in and out of the country marks the critical difference between the two men.

One may wonder why Horace so often reveals himself caught in inconsistencies.[41] Like discontentment, inconsistency figures as a literary theme, but one that functions in a larger capacity than discontentment as an underlying principle of the literary program. In Roman rhetorical practice inconsistency from one to another situation is no defect but a virtue, providing that it enables the orator to argue his case successfully. Cicero articulates the principle of expedient expression in *Pro Cluentio* 50.139. Horace in his introductory epistle shows himself employing the principle in a most eclectic way with reference to his declared intentions of writing philosophically, and therefore seriously:

> condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.
> ac ne forte roges quo me duce, quo Lare tuter,
> nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri,
> quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.
> nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis
> virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles;
> nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor
> et mihi res, non me rebus, subiungere conor. (*Ep.* 1.1.12–19)

Here the statement has partially the function of a credo, or apologia, bridging Horace's turn from lyric to hexameter, but in the course of the *Epistles* Horace dramatizes his shifting perspectives as one of the ways that his personal perceptions can at one and the same time possess the freedom of detachment and also relate to the world of everyday men.

Both his *Satires* and *Epistles* are social in their focus, and their view of society presents an economy of interchanges and balances. Given this common ground, the *Epistles* differ, I think, from the *Satires* in creating a somewhat wider-reaching but also more categorically conceived panorama of persons and roles. Where the *Satires* often present

[41] McGann, *Studies* 12–13, attributes the emphasis primarily to the importance of consistency in Panaetius' philosophy, which may well be the case, yet the Roman overlay should not be ignored.

personalities in characteristic actions, the *Epistles* make use of personal identities as a grounding for characteristic social situations. So, for one reason or another, Epistle 1.18, addressed to Lollius Maximus, becomes a disquisition on the proper behavior of a *scurra*. Epistle 1.7, concerning the demands that a patron can legitimately make upon a beneficiary, also addresses this topic. To a certain extent this emphasis can be linked with the social typologies developed in certain of the *Odes*, but here the situations and tones are frequently hortatory. McGann, Kilpatrick, and others are correct, I believe, in proposing that Cicero's Roman philosophy of *De Officiis* figures as a major source of inspiration for the *Epistles*, with the effect that many of their situations are studies in decorum.[42] However, this concept of decorum does not focus as steadily as Kilpatrick indicates on the proprieties and amenities of friendship,[43] but has a subsurface ideological dimension. Cicero professes to be writing the *De Officiis* in a mood of constructive disillusionment, using philosophy and the concept of personal virtue to turn the "unwanted leisure" of his political retirement to good use.[44] Just as he adapted Greek ethics to Roman social decorum in order to formulate a retrospective conduct code for the lost republic, likewise Horace, writing within the principate that had ultimately succeeded Caesar's dictatorship, uses the notion of "retirement" as a literary *mise en scène*. His adaptation of Ciceronian decorum calls attention to new rules governing the interplay of public and private concerns.[45]

Syme observes that the addressees of the *Epistles* are generally men of lower social degree than those in other collections.[46] This point can be interpreted to enforce the "private" aspects of the poems. Horace's meditations shape a philosophy for a politically restructured world: that a man's primary moral responsibility is to himself, yet the field of application is not restrictively private. Epistle 1.16 is a case in point. Horace addresses Quinctius Hirpinus, who had earlier figured in

[42] McGann, *Studies* 10; Kilpatrick, *Friendship* xx–xxii.

[43] Kilpatrick, *Friendship* xxi–xxiv.

[44] *De Off.* 2.2–6. André (*L'otium* 205–34) analyzes the relationship between the sentiments expressed in this work and Cicero's career-long ambivalence towards *otium*.

[45] McGann, *Studies* 24, remarks on the singularity of Horace's "hidden life in the country" in conjunction with his adaptation of basically Stoic ethics, oriented towards a life of involvement. The singularity should be attributed to Ciceronian precedent and to Roman custom.

[46] Syme, *Augustan Aristocracy* 396.

Ode 2.11, as a potential public actor with his mind on military affairs.[47] This profile is in keeping with Horace's examination of the complexities of social role-playing in this epistle.[48] Often treated as an essay in antimaterialism aimed towards defining rational limitations for desires,[49] in fact the poem has at least as much articulated concern with the rhetorical construction of personality and its difficulties. *Tu recte vivis si curas esse quod audis,* Horace observes to Quinctius. Does he in fact know his own state of mind? Does he accept a popular definition of felicity, or his own? While he is no doubt sapient enough to distinguish the public persona of Augustus from himself, he may still be unjustifiably ready to claim such epithets as *bonus et sapiens* when he hears them applied to himself. External estimation is compared with public office as a detachable good that can quickly and capriciously be stripped away. We see the *fasces* given to an unworthy candidate who is immediately forced to relinquish the honor. Illustrations of conduct in the poem are drawn from the world of public activity. The image of the ideal jurisconsult looms large; the sacrificer performs his act for the welfare of the people on a conspicuous stage. Such public actors hope to be seen as *beatus* or *sapiens*. Corruption behind these facades is characterized as secret thievery. Such definitions merge into the great variety of roles to be played, of positions to be filled, many of these imposed by outside observers. It is a version of the philosophical quest for conformity between inner and outer virtue seen from a characteristically Roman perspective.

This is of course the importance of Quinctius' questions, to place virtues in a relative scale. Each person distinguishes both overt and hidden goods as his characteristic perception dictates. In noting how Horace structures an economy that illustrates his own values, it is useful once more to invoke Cicero's principle in *De Officiis* that an owner's reputation should distinguish his house (*domino domus honestanda est,* 1.139). Instead of thinking that Horace values the farm because it is simple, we should realize that it is simple because Horace's particular blending of ethics and aesthetics demands a decorum of simplicity. This

[47] Syme, *Augustan Aristocracy* 386, noting this exception to his rule of obscurity, reviews the family connections of the Quinctii and concludes that Quinctius is probably a senator.

[48] McGann, *Studies* 73–74.

[49] Kilpatrick, *Friendship* 96–102, emphasizes the "material and therefore illusory" concept of well-being attributed to Quinctius.

is, in fact, an Augustan/Callimachean decorum whose sophistication belies its simplicity. But where this aesthetic is personal and inspirational in the *Odes*, in the *Epistles* it has a more social dimension. Philosophical and poetic productivity is the mission of the villa, but quotidian economy must be realistically valued as the practical support for these matters. This economy also has its place in the larger Roman world. Comparing the *Satires* and *Epistles*, one may notice how many more place names appear in the latter; this is another aspect of their broad view. The poet's addressees are situated in a variety of places both within Italy and abroad. Florus is campaigning with Tiberius in Thrace or the Hellespont (1.3); likewise Celsus Albinovanus is with Tiberius away from Rome (1.8). Numonius Vala is at Salerno or Velia (1.11). Bullatus has been traveling among the splendid cities of the eastern Mediterranean (1.11), while Iccius is collecting revenues for Agrippa in Sicily (1.12). The motives are both business and pleasure. For one thing this cosmopolitan horizon reflects the role of Rome in a worldwide context.

In this geographical plan, it is notable that Horace travels infrequently and never very far. Winter, as he tells Maecenas, may send him from the Alban snowfields to seek warmth at the shore, but in the interim he prefers a stationary life (*Ep.* 1.7.10–12).[50] This and similar statements have given rise to the impression that Horace, by the time of the *Epistles*, had forsaken Roman life for the farm.[51] The inference may be accurate, since the book contains more Sabine references than others, while allusions to physical distance highlight the speaker's air of philosophical detachment; yet these points should not lead to the conclusion that his intellectual engagement in Rome had diminished. One should remember that Horace never in any place describes or even mentions a physical residence in the city. His identification with his alternative place as his main place makes him different from Cicero and other villa–owning aristocrats in such a way as to suggest that the life of a poet is always an alternative life with a consequent balance of advantages and disadvantages.

[50]The journey of 1.15 is merely putative. Since the cold–water cure of Antonius Musa has come into vogue, one no longer needs to travel to Baiae for hot baths, but Horace is willing to consider what amenities Vala has to offer in his villa further down the shore.

[51]E.g., Johnson, *Idea* 144–45; he takes this impression of retirement as the expression of a freedom finally achieved.

Tenuous communication is one potential disadvantage, and the importance that Horace assigns to his dialogic interaction with Roman life is underscored by the future that he envisions for his writings. His final epistle addresses his book at the moment that this restlessly ambitious offspring prepares to leave the farm for the allurements of Rome (1.20.3–5). The personified *liber* is breaking out of a condition of "unwilling servitude" recalling that in which Horace retains his bailiff. Figuratively also, in "fleeing the nest" the *liber* repeats the biographical history of an author who has "spread his wings" to rise above his humble origins as a freedman's son. Nothing but culture shock, Horace warns, will await such a nursling of private solicitude who plunges into the vicissitudinous process of being read, struggling to gain the right audience, to be seen in the right places. Couched in terms suggesting social politics, these perils adumbrate the precarious transformation of literary communication from a creative dialogue between book and author to an interaction of book and reader. In consequence we can see the book itself taking on that role of emissary between city and country that Horace had acted out in Satire 2.6.

To complete this consideration of Horace's topographical and cultural location of the Sabine Farm I now turn back for a second look at Ode 1.17 and what it contributes to its collection. At this point the reader may raise objections. Although it may be acceptable to talk about geographical and social perspectives in the hexameter poems—which after all Horace exempts from the category and requirements of poetry—these concepts can scarcely pertain to the more rarified and aesthetic locale of the *Odes*. Here surely should not the naturally enclosed and divinely protected Sabine property appear as a refuge, or a symbol of retreat into self? Is this not what the Lucretilis ode is about?

With its structuring of an enclosed and resonant landscape to intensify the value of music, the ode does strikingly embody a principle that W. R. Johnson has aptly singled out as one of Horace's inventions: "the creation of an illusion of music and performance."[52] Johnson is talking about Horace's bid to recreate that vital sense of interaction between poet and audience that Horace himself saw in Greek lyric tradition and celebrated in his vision of Alcaeus, the heroic lyricist transfixing the underworld shades (2.13). But the reader of Ode 1.17 ought to notice that this poem, which emphasizes the potency of song,

[52]Johnson, *Idea* 126–27.

does not feature Horace as a performer, but two other musicians: Pan and Tyndaris. Here the aspiring *vates* limits his personal function to creating the sympotic atmosphere that fosters performance. At the same time this is the only poem in which Horace explicitly pictures his property. Further references to the rural location occur in *Odes* 1.20, 1.22, 2.13, 3.1, 3.18, and 3.29. Within the collective sum of eighty-eight odes, these references are proportionately few, but their distribution and their reflection in one or another shape of the topography of Ode 1.17, delineated as a setting for a variety of performative self-dramatizations, give them the function of markers in an ongoing progress.

How Horace's artistic self-definition progresses with the progress of the collection is a matter on which many contemporary scholars have remarked.[53] Awareness of artistic self-definition is in itself a perspective that has shaped recent studies of Horatian lyric, redeeming the poet's one-time image as a jocund and comfort-loving wordsmith crafting platitudinous thoughts into elegant and intricate designs. Discussions of Horace's farm bear witness to this critical transformation. Thus E. K. Rand observed that "many miracles, good subjects for poems," happened within the context of the farm.[54] Approaching these from a contemporary critical point of view, William Anderson shows that they are miracles of poetic sanctity.[55] The Sabine wolf that fled before Horace's song about Lalage proved that love poets lead a charmed life (1.22). Faunus rescued the poet from the murderous tree (2.13, 2.17, 3.8). The first of these miraculous events is folkloric, the other brilliantly original; but both are related with a touch of self-caricature that solicits our imaginative assent to their fantasy. These events in combination with similar proofs of divine favor manifested in the poet's infancy on Monte Volture (3.4.9–20) and on the battlefield of Philippi (2.7.13–14) contribute to the cumulative myth of consecration by the Muses with which he bolsters his statements of poetic vocation. The elevation of poetic vocation through inspiration is associated with the genres of lyric and epic—the genres that Horace *does* call poetry—whose speaker in some manner addresses the community. In fact, the reason that poetic consecration is so important to the *Odes* is that the stakes are so high. Through ceremonial presentations of his credentials Horace engages in a dialogue with tradition that constitutes his per-

[53] Santirocco, "Maecenas Odes" and *Unity*; Porter, *Poetic Journey*.
[54] Rand, *A Walk* 4.
[55] Anderson, "Autobiography" 43–50.

sonal redefinition of the genre and its mission. His lyric persona counterbalances elements of idiosyncratic self–caricature and visionary responsibility.[56] As a parcel of real earth, the Sabine Farm provides the practical context that unites these disparate facets of self–presentation. To establish the authority by which he addresses his Roman audience the lyric speaker needs to define his spatial boundaries and his conduct as proprietor.

Although the boundaries of the Sabine valley are secure in Ode 1.17, in succeeding poems they exist to be challenged or violated; this is part of the process by which the poet establishes the scope and limits of lyric discourse. The noteworthy feature of the singer's encounter with a wolf in Ode 1.22 is its having occurred when his carefree absorption in song had led him to stray *ultra terminum* into the thick of the *silva Sabina*. Thus the heroic posturings of his opening lines: how an *integer vitae* can face Moorish darts or travel with impunity to the desert or wild Caucasus. A discrepancy between extravagant vision and small situation keeps the situation humorous. In conclusion the poem narrows its confines with the repeated name of Lalage.

By contrast, the disturbing accident of the tree in Ode 2.13 occurs within the farm's boundaries. That a fixture of his own valued property could thus threaten the security of its master offends the egotism of ownership. Horace denounces tree, planter, and the *dies nefastus* of the planting. He compares his misadventure with the unforeseeable dangers always dogging two practitioners of the restless, unstable life: the sailor and the soldier (2.13.13–20). Because Horace has frequently invoked these deliberate risk–takers as temperamental opposites of himself, the comparison signals a virtual crisis of identity, but Horace converts the precarious moment into an occasion for clarifying his poetic affiliations when he envisions Sappho and Alcaeus in the underworld performing endlessly for admiring crowds. By weighting the preference of this crowd towards Alcaeus' civic themes, Horace anticipates the civic turn of his own verse in the so–called Roman Odes. Before that moment, however, he will have upgraded his close escape into a divine rescue as proof positive of the favored status of the poet when he criticizes Maecenas' excessively morbid preoccupation with death (2.17).

Another way in which we should notice the function of boundaries and proprietorship in the evolution of Horace's lyric persona is those

[56] Connor, *Force of Humour* 28–30, discusses the intertwining of humor and poetic self–reflexivity.

moments when Roman visitors come to the farm. Here is another difference from the *Satires* and *Epistles,* in which Horace's own activity as a guest is frequently mentioned but visitors seldom come to him. (As Vitruvius notes in *De Arch.* 6.5.1, persons of ordinary station discharge social obligations by going around rather than by receiving.) In the *Odes* Tyndaris is only the first of a number of invitees or guests welcomed in Horace's territory. The majority of such hospitable occasions are convivial, and their literary significance is not far to seek. Just as wine in Horace's *Odes* has been shown to imply poetic self-reflexivity,[57] likewise sympotic occasions open the boundaries between lyric past and present, granting such Roman figures as Maecenas, Messala, or Numida entry into a privileged literary community of conviviality.[58]

But Horace also presents his proprietorship in terms suggesting the discourse of clientship. Focusing on this feature, Matthew Santirocco has proposed that the development of lyric *auctoritas* throughout the three books effects an eventual reversal in the roles of poet and patron.[59] In Ode 2.18.1–11 the poet formally styles himself as a patron in claiming that neither his clients nor his habitation are pretentious. The *dives* comes as visitor to seek him despite the absence of ivory, gilt coffers, and Hymettus columns from his atrium. Although *dives* is commonly referred to Maecenas, the epithet is no less relevant to other individuals addressed in book 2, a book that shows its engagement in the contemporary moment by its focusing on several prominent personages whose careers Augustus' political dispositions had affected. Ostensibly the collection is apolitical in its foregrounding of the good life, yet when we consider the presence of men such as Pollio, Sallustius Crispus, Quintus Dellius, or Pompeius—all pardoned by Augustus—we may begin to see that exhortations to good living are in themselves politic advice.[60] That Horace makes himself a model practitioner of the life style he recommends lends cogency to his message. While

[57] Commager, "Wine."

[58] Murray, "Symposium and Genre," examines the manifold transformations Horace effects by his adaptation of this form.

[59] Santirocco, *Unity* 166. In this context it is also useful to consider the idea of patronage as a literary theme, developed by Zetzel, "Poetics of Patronage."

[60] For the political tone see Santirocco, *Unity* 81–85. Syme (*Augustan Aristocracy* 384–93) reviews personalities and raises the issue of aversion to political life, noting how many of the named persons seem to behave like Epicureans. The point is valid, I think, that Horace, by emphasizing the good life as politically expedient, aims to extend the exhortation to Pollio in Ode 2.1 to turn away from the dangerous past.

encouraging Dellius, Postumus, or Grosphus to enjoy their own commodious villas, Horace also owns a property he enjoys.

These images prepare the way for Ode 3.1, where the enclosure of the farm takes its definition from contrast:[61]

> cur invidendis postibus et novo
> sublime ritu moliar atrium?
> cur valle permutem Sabina
> divitias operosiores? (*O.* 3.1.45–48)

Readers emphasize the poet's denial of luxury as a profession of inner freedom,[62] yet spiritual independence is not the whole sum of the message. Material luxury is inessential to this persona because Horace has created an authoritative status needing no symbols. In the opening lines of this ode he has claimed the role of *vates* to which he had confessed his aspirations in Ode 1.35–36. As a precinct to frame his hieratic performance, the Sabine valley functions no less as an atrium/tablinum where a Roman *dominus* advises his clientage.

The significance of this lyric space is always conceived with respect to Rome. Two odes specify the relationship. In 1.20 the city occupies the foreground. Horace has stored up a jar of Sabine wine for Maecenas on a noteworthy day when his friend was applauded in the theater. A concentrically visualized landscape bounded by the echoing Mons Vaticanus parallels the resonant valley we have already seen in the Lucretilis ode, so that the poem implicitly contrasts two worlds: that of Horace as private proprietor with that of Maecenas as an actor in the public world. A further distinction between Horace's *vile Sabinum* and the costly, choice vintages of Campania sets limits on the poet's individual powers. The duality of Roman and Sabine is recapitulated in the invitation of the penultimate ode (3.29), but here the topographical context within which the farm is situated is made continuous with Rome. Standing on some eminence amidst and above the "smoke, wealth, and clamor of blessed Rome," Maecenas can look outward to the surrounding hills of Tibur, Praeneste, and Tusculum. Horace encourages him to follow his vision and receive the benefits a modest accommodation can offer, yet this poem is far more than a summons to

[61] Witke, *Roman Odes* 24–25, perceives the balance between two worlds expressed by this image.

[62] Johnson, *Idea* 140–41.

escape. City and country participate in one and the same world. The summer is hot in both places. The lesson Horace has to offer concerns tempering anxieties.[63] The poet's own maturing of perspective is shown in the contrast between two descriptions of the Tiber in flood. In Ode 1.2 the poet attempts a rhetorical diminution of the threatening river through frivolous mythological exaggeration. Can this really be Deucalion's second flood? In 3.29 he confronts the turbulent waters as a regular phenomenon within nature's cycle of changes. The farm itself cannot be separated from the maturation of the wisdom it has fostered. As a projection of the poet's own identity it has become virtually synonymous with the odes he has composed.

By contrast, the farm of the *Satires* and *Epistles* does not so readily yield its material existence to the signified. This is because the world of these poems is not so easily to be reshaped by art. It is a world of social and political interactions where even a poet has to reconcile his own spellbinding magic with demands of practical life.[64] Epistle 1 shows the creator of the *Odes* seeking some identity even larger than what his vatic craftsmanship provides. The Sabine property of these poems does not need to be ideal in any utopian sense, since it fulfills its function most effectively by reflecting reality. In both genres of poems, Horace identifies this property with his social personality, as a Roman aristocrat identifies with his *domus*. The impression of accessibility that so many readers have received from the farm is not misled, even though the modern critic may interpret Horace's air of candid intimacy as part of a complex and sophisticated play of persona. The invitation to familiar acquaintance emphasizes the importance of self-presentation.[65]

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[63] I have discussed this poem and its relationship to landscape and Horace's poetic persona at greater length in *Rhetoric of Space* 291–97.

[64] Anderson, "Autobiography" 52–53, remarks a significant difference between *Odes* and *Epistles* insofar as what is called poetic inspiration in the former is replaced in the latter by "hard intellectual . . . effort."

[65] This paper was first presented at CAMWS in April 1989 as a part of a symposium in honor of A. G. McKay. Versions had been given as site talks for NEH Summer Seminars in 1986 and 1989 and for the Summer School of the American Academy in Rome in 1988. Versions focused on the hexameter poems alone were given at the Ohio State University and SUNY–Buffalo. I wish to thank those who offered hospitality on those occasions, and especially William Batstone for his very penetrating questions.

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THE PREFACE TO JUVENCUS' BIBLICAL EPIC: A STRUCTURAL STUDY

Writing during the reign of Constantine, the Spanish priest Gaius Vettius Aquilinus Iuuencus left us the earliest Christian Latin epic. Juvencus, as he is commonly named, had as his aim the creation of a poem in the tradition of Homer and Virgil but one that would not be based on fictional or mythological themes. Instead his epic would relate the life and accomplishments of Jesus Christ as recorded in the New Testament. It would be part of a body of new Latin literature intended for reading by educated Christians.[1] The *Euangeliorum Libri Quattuor,* or to give it an English title, *Four Books of Gospels,* was based mainly on the gospel of Matthew[2] and recounts in four books of Latin hexameters the life of Christ. Christians could, it was hoped, now enjoy the traditions and beauty of the classical epic, but without the falseness of pagan religion.

E. R. Curtius neatly captured the task and the spirit of Juvencus: "The poet's attitude toward antique poetry, then, is one of admiration, he rejects only its philosophical basis and wishes to furnish a Christian counterpart to the pagan epic. Accordingly, his work springs from a conscious program, which was to be of importance for medieval literary theory: the building up of a literature of Christian content in antique form."[3] Juvencus' poem thus offers us the opportunity to examine a special moment in the history of the epic when there was a conscious effort to retain the classical genre with all its poetic sophistication[4] but to purge it of religious error and to redirect it along the safe and true path of the Christian faith. Achilles, Odysseus, and Aeneas would yield to Christ as the epic hero. It is in the preface to his epic (lines 1–27) that Juvencus furnishes us with the poem's theme and doctrinal position. In

[1] On Juvencus' choice of biblical paraphrase in epic form for the educated reader see Roberts, *Biblical Epic,* 67–74.

[2] See the table of Juvencus' borrowing from the Gospels in Hansson, *Textkritisches* 18.

[3] Curtius, *European Literature* 459–60. See, however, Herzog, *Bibelepik* xlv–xlix.

[4] Mohrmann, "La langue" 156–67, uses four lines (1.10–13) of Juvencus to illustrate the poet's "tendances conservatrices et puristes" in vocabulary. E.g., Juvencus substitutes the classical *nuntius* for the Christian *angelus.*

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so doing, the poet through deliberate literary reminiscence evokes Homer, Lucretius, Virgil, and Ovid.

Here, our limited purpose is to examine closely the structure of the twenty–seven lines which form that preface. Although the passage has been studied in great detail during the last quarter of this century, except for a very different approach by Murru almost no critical attention has been given to its poetic architecture.[5]

Inmortale nihil mundi conpage tenetur,
Non orbis, non regna hominum, non aurea Roma,
Non mare, non tellus, non ignea sidera caeli.
Nam statuit genitor rerum inreuocabile tempus,
Quo cunctum torrens rapiat flamma ultima mundum.
Sed tamen innumeros homines sublimia facta
Et uirtutis honos in tempora longa frequentant,
Adcumulant quorum famam laudesque poetae.
Hos celsi cantus, Smyrnae de fonte fluentes,
Illos Minciadae celebrat dulcedo Maronis.
Nec minor ipsorum discurrit gloria uatum,
Quae manet aeternae similis, dum saecla uolabunt
Et uertigo poli terras atque aequora circum
Aethera sidereum iusso moderamine uoluet.
Quod si, tam longam meruerunt carmina famam,
Quae ueterum gestis hominum mendacia nectunt,
Nobis certa fides aeternae in saecula laudis
Inmortale decus tribuet meritumque rependet.
Nam mihi carmen erit Christi uitalia gesta,
Diuinum populis falsi sine crimine donum.
Nec metus, ut mundi rapiant incendia secum

[5]The last quarter of the twentieth century has indeed witnessed the appearance of excellent scholarship on Juvencus. For discussion of the preface, with extensive bibliographical references, see Kirsch, *Versepik* 84–92. Cf. also Fontaine, *Naissance*, and Kartschoke, *Bibeldichtung*; the latter (56–60) includes a German translation of the preface. For a different approach see Murru, "Analisi." I do not wish to dispute Murru but to employ a different and more traditional methodology. In the "methodological introduction" to his article Murru concludes that "la presente analisi si propone di operare prevalentemente nel settore linguistico–letterario dei segni denotativi (testuali) e connotativi (memorie dotte), con l'evidenziazione specifica anche delle caratteristiche relative al rimaneggiamento operato da Giovenco su produzioni macrotestuali diacronicamente precedenti utilizzate a fini palesemente microtestuali." My approach is to establish line by line and section by section the structure of the preface with attention to demonstrable patterns of thought, transitions, and interrelationships of concepts, style, and vocabulary. Most importantly, while Murru does discuss the themes of paganism (1–14) and Christianity (15–27), he does not address the poem's linear allocation and structural symmetry.

Hoc opus; hoc etenim forsan me subtrahet igni
Tunc, cum flammiuoma discendet nube coruscans
Iudex, altithroni genitoris gloria, Christus.
Ergo age! sanctificus adsit mihi carminis auctor
Spiritus, et puro mentem riget amne canentis
Dulcis Iordanis, ut Christo digna loquamur.[6]

Nothing is held together as immortal in the structure of the universe: not the world, not the kingdoms of men, not golden Rome, not the sea, not the land, not the fiery constellations of the sky. For the Creator of the universe has ordained an irrevocable time at which a scorching, final flame will destroy the entire universe. But nevertheless sublime deeds and the honor derived from virtue extol for long periods of time countless men whose fame and praises the poets heap high. Some, the lofty songs flowing from the fount of Smyrna celebrate; others, the sweetness of Virgil from the region of the Mincio River.

Nor does the glory of the poets themselves run any less far and wide, which as if it were eternal endures as long as the ages will fly on and the spinning axis turn the starry heaven around the lands and the seas in an ordered manner. But if poems, which weave lies into the deeds of ancient men, have merited such long-lasting fame, for us a sure faith will bestow an immortal glory of eternal praise forever and earn a reward.

For my song will be the vital[7] deeds of Christ—a divine gift to humanity without the crime of falsehood. Nor is there fear that the conflagration of the universe will destroy this work with itself. This work, indeed, will perhaps snatch me from the fire at the time when the gleaming judge, the glory of the high-throned Father, Christ will descend in a flame-belching cloud. Come, therefore, let the sanctifying spirit assist me as the inspirer of the song and let him cleanse the mind of the poet in the pure stream of the sweet Jordan so that I may speak things worthy of Christ.[8]

[6]The text is that of Huemer.

[7]Not without some misgivings, I have chosen to translate *uitalia* as "vital." In doing so I hope that this English word can be as equally imprecise and suggestive as was Juvencus' original. Considerable debate has occurred on the exact meaning intended by Juvencus; cf. Constanza, "Giovenco" 255 n. 6. My sense is that Juvencus' text allows the reader to see the *gesta* (19) of Christ in contrast to the *gestis* (16) of the ancients from more than one point of view: (1) "real-life" as opposed to fictional *mendacia* (16); (2) "life-giving" with reference to eternal salvation; (3) "life" and deeds as if the Latin read *uita et gesta*; (4) "energizing" or "powerful." It seems to me impractical and unwise to search for an exclusive meaning—poetry is, after all, preeminently suggestive.

[8]My close translation of lines 1–27 is included because there is no English version. There is a French translation by P. Tamisier (Lyon 1591), and German translations by A. Knappitsch (Graz 1910–13) and by Kartschoke (see note 5 above).

The first three lines tell us, in Lucretian fashion, that nothing in the fabric of the universe is everlasting, for God or the Creator of things (*genitor rerum*) has established a time at which the ultimate flame will consume the world (4–5). As something of a counterpoint (*sed tamen*), the next block of five lines (6–10) asserts that high achievements and the honor of virtue celebrate countless men for long periods of time (6–7) and that the poets, notably Homer and Virgil, spread their fame (7–10). Thus the linear allocation of the first ten lines achieves a chiastic balance: 5 (= 3 + 2) + 5 (= 2 + 3).

These first ten lines, crafted with special care, invite analysis in detail. Line 1 begins the epic with its key word, *inmortale,* which immediately focuses our attention on the poem's theme of immortality even as the first words of the *Iliad* (*mēnin*), of the *Odyssey* (*andra*), and of the *Aeneid* (*arma virumque*) identify their respective themes: anger, a man, and arms and the man. But the remainder of line 1 evokes not Homer or Virgil, but the philosopher and epic poet Lucretius as it argues in atomistic fashion that nothing is held together as immortal in the structure of the universe. The Latin line rings with Lucretian vocabulary and thought; indeed, viewed in isolation, the line might well be identified as one taken from *De Rerum Natura.* Thus this first line deliberately locates the poem in the traditions of the classical epic but with a decidedly didactic bent.

The following two lines (2–3) reinforce the notion that nothing (*nihil*) is immortal, as Juvencus relies on anaphora, balance, and grouping by three. The word *non* is placed first in each of the six phrases which comprise the second and third lines. Additional balance is achieved by including one noun in the nominative case in each phrase: *non orbis, non regna, non . . . Roma, non mare, non tellus, non . . . sidera.* Line 2 contains the first grouping by three (a technique of which the poet Horace is especially fond): we begin with the sphere of the world (*orbis*), move to a smaller unit in kingdoms (*regna*), and conclude with the quintessence of kingdoms and cities, Rome (*Roma*). There follows in line 3 a second and conventional grouping by three: sea (*mare*), land (*tellus*), and stars (*sidera*). But Juvencus does not allow the device of repetition to irk or to bore the reader, for he deftly weaves elements of structured variety by inserting a modifying noun in the genitive case (*hominum*) after the second noun, an adjective in the nominative case (*aurea*) before the third noun, and finally both a preceding adjective in the nominative case (*ignea*) and a subsequent noun in the genitive case (*caeli*) around the sixth noun.

Lines 4 and 5 complete the notion of the mortality of our universe by identifying the authority for and describing the means of destruction: God has established an irrevocable time at which the final scorching flame will destroy the entire world. Again in line 4 as in line 1, Juvencus assumes the Lucretian manner for the Christian message: God is termed the begetter of things (*genitor rerum*), and a compound adjective (*inreuocabile*)[9] is employed. The last word of line 5, *mundum,* echoes the *mundi* of line 1 to round off this unit.[10] Less obviously, the fire of *ignea* (3) prepares the reader's mind for the flame of *flamma* (5). Here the technique is to place a word toward the end of a unit where it is appropriate in its own context but can also serve to foreshadow a significant idea which occurs in the subsequent unit.

The first two words of line 6 (*sed tamen*) signal a sharp contrast of thought which continues until line 10. Having earlier asserted that nothing in our universe is immortal, Juvencus in lines 6 and 7 offers something of a consolation or corrective by noting that sublime deeds and the glory derived from virtue endow countless men with fame for long periods of time. Lines 8–10 then tell us how preeminently this extended mortality or limited immortality through the preservation of one's memory is achieved. The poets increase the repute and praises of great human beings—some heroes are celebrated by the lofty verses of Homer, while others are celebrated by the charm of Virgil.

The next eight lines (11–18) pit one group of four lines (11–14) against a second group of four (15–18): the fame of the pagan poets for tales which are false will last only as long as the earth itself endures, but Juvencus' poem, devoted to faith and truth, will earn him an eternal reward. The linear allocation is again symmetrical: 4 + 4.

The reflections of the previous unit (6–10) upon the fame conferred on heroes by the poets Homer and Virgil lead naturally into the observation that no less a glory spreads far and wide for the poets themselves. This glory, resembling the eternal one, will endure for as

[9]Bailey, *Lucretius* II 592, comments: "compound adjectives are particularly characteristic of Lucr.'s style and among those he uses are many which occur for the first and some for the only time in Latin."

[10]These first five lines can be compared with Lucr. 5.92–96: *principio maria ac terras caelumque tuere; / quorum naturam triplicem, tria corpora, Memmi, / tris species tam dissimilis, tria talia texta, / una dies dabit exitio, multosque per annos / sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi.* See also 2 Peter 3:7 and Ovid *Met.* 1.256–58, where fire is identified as the means of destruction. Editors cite parallels to Ovid but miss the stronger affinity to Lucretius.

long as the ages proceed and the spinning axis revolves the starry sky about the lands and the seas in a fixed order. One notices that in order to underscore the elevated position of the poets themselves, who were earlier called simply *poetae* (8), Juvencus now employs the lofty term *uatum* (11), which embraces the functions of both poet and prophet. For a third time there is a significant grouping by three, *terras, aequora,* and *aethera sidereum* (13–14), which neatly echoes the earlier grouping of *mare, tellus,* and *sidera caeli* (3) as if to remind the reader that the restriction of *inmortale nihil* (1) still obtains. Our universe and the glory of men may endure for a long time (*tempora longa,* 7) and seem everlasting (*aeternae similis,* 12) but they are not immortal. It may be stretching Juvencus' allusiveness too far to suggest that these three conspicuous groupings by three are also intended to prefigure the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit which appears later in the preface (19ff.).

Even as *sed tamen* of line 6 marked the contrast between lines 1–5 and 6–10, so too *quod si* of line 15 signals the contrast between lines 11–14 and 15–18. In the larger structure of the entire preface, line 15 also marks the near midpoint at which the focus shifts from pagan concepts, gods, and poets to Christian concepts, Trinity, and poet. Although the epics of Homer and Virgil merited extended fame, they nonetheless weave lies into the lives of ancient men, Juvencus argues. It is at this point that our Christian poet censures his ancient models on the key issue of untruthfulness (*mendacia,* 16), while delicately avoiding naming them.[11] By the personification of *carmina* (15), the poems rather than the poets create lies—a small but fine distinction. Both lines 17 and 18 begin with key words in emphatic positions. With *nobis* (17) Juvencus introduces the opposition between the two-line unit devoted to prior epics (15–16) and the two lines which proclaim the unerring truthfulness of his own poem. Juvencus' unswerving faith (*certa fides,* 17) will earn as a reward the immortal glory of eternal praise without end. It is important to notice that he has begun line 18 with the word *inmortale* as a deliberate echo of *inmortale,* the first word of line 1. The thought has come full circle: nothing in our physical world is immortal, but faith in the truth of the Christian gospel can bestow eternal glory upon the soul.[12] Homer and Virgil earned a glory that was similar to an eternal

[11] For the difference in attitude toward the ancient epic poets between Juvencus and Sedulius see Constanza, "Giovenco" 259.

[12] The shift by Juvencus from the mortality of the universe to the immortality of the soul is nicely noted by Arevalus, *Historiae* 65: *Affirmauit supra, immortale nihil mundi*

one (*gloria . . . aeternae similis,* 11–12), but Juvencus will actually receive eternal praise (*aeternae . . . laudis,* 17). The cluster of words is stunning: *aeternae in saecula laudis inmortale decus* (17–18).[13] The phrase *in saecula,* "forever," would be an empty redundancy were it not part of the crescendo movement of the poem's first eighteen lines, which progress from denied immortality, through quasi–immortality, to affirmed immortality.

The third major section of the preface comprises the last nine lines (19–27), whose linear allocation is 6 + 3 = 9 and whose unity is based on Christ (named in lines 19, 24, and 27) as the theme of Juvencus' work and the source of his salvation. The first six lines (19–24) immediately focus our attention on the poet and his work, beginning with the words *mihi carmen*: the theme of his epic will be the deeds of Christ, a divine gift to humanity without the blemish of falsehood (19–20). In contrast to the temporally limited fame of the pagan poets, Juvencus professes no fear that the final conflagration will destroy his work. Indeed, this work may even save him from the flames (21–22). Charles Witke persuasively interprets this view of poetic and personal immortality as a significant departure from classical conventions:

> The situation of Juvencus is different from that of Homer and Vergil, . . . and with Juvencus the situation of Christian poetry is for the first time clearly defined. The poet will not confer immortality on his subject through art; rather, the subject, the eternal truth of Christ, will bring immortality to the work as literature and on another level to the poet as a man. This is the point of lines 21ff.: the poet as a human being hopes for salvation from the fire of hell.[14]

At the last hour, the Judge, who is Christ, the glory of the high–throned Father, will descend, resplendent in a cloud of flames, to destroy the earth (23–24). This six–line unit (19–24) begins with Christ (*Christi,* 19)

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compage teneri: nunc autem immortale decus ex suo carmine euangelico sibi pollicetur, quia, etiam quum mundus incendio peribit, sperat se uitam aeternam ob tempus ita bene collocatum consecuturum.

[13] I agree with the comment of Kievits, *Commentarius* on line 17: "*aeternae in saecula laudis": non iungendum est cum "fides," quod facit Knappitsch, sed cum "decus."* If we accept the reading of Palla, "Aeterna in saecula" 280, in the sense *nobis certa fides tribuet immortale decus laudis in saecula aeterna meritumque rependet,* Juvencus' basic meaning remains little changed.

[14] Witke, *Numen* 200–201.

in its first line and concludes with Christ (*Christus,* 24) as the last word of a beautifully crafted last line, which places the appositives Judge and Christ at either end and an enthroned God the Father at its center: *Iudex, altithroni genitoris gloria, Christus.*

Juvencus completes the Trinity by calling upon the Holy Spirit in the first line of the subsequent section (25–27). In so doing the poet has created a linkage and avoided what might otherwise have been an abrupt transition to the invocation. Notice too that the phrase *mihi carmen* (19) which began the prior section is balanced by the phrase *mihi carminis* (25) in the first line of this final unit. Where Homer and Virgil invoked the pagan muse (*thea* and *musa*) and Lucretius called upon the goddess Venus (*Aeneadum genetrix*), the Christian poet asks that the Holy Spirit be the inspiration for his epic.[15] Juvencus has constructed an effective series of liquid and geographic images which link Homer, Virgil, and himself.[16] Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are termed "lofty songs flowing from the fountain of Smyrna," Virgil's *Aeneid* is described as "the charm of Maro the Minciade" (i.e., of the River Mincio), and the *Euangeliorum Libri Quattuor* will be created with the help of the pure stream of the sweet Jordan River. Surely, *puro* (26) conveys the notion of freedom from untruth and *dulcis* (27) reflects Juvencus' aspiration to compose an epic which will also have the charm (*dulcedo,* 10) of Virgil. Thus the art and form of the classical epic will serve truth so that the poet may "speak things worthy of Christ." The final three words of the preface[17] neatly juxtapose the poet, his epic, and his God, but with an excusable pride of authorship the last word *loquamur* is reserved for Juvencus.

We may now view the linear symmetry of the entire preface:

$$27 = 10\,(= 5\,[= 3 + 2] + 5\,[= 2 + 3]) + 8\,(= 4 + 4) + 9\,(= 6 + 3)$$

The preface falls into three main blocks of nearly equal lines: 10, 8, 9. Each of these blocks is subdivided into two groups of lines: 5+5, 4+4, 6+3. The first group displays an especially elegant use of structural

[15] For the classical antecedents of the invocation see Quadlbauer, "Invocatio," and for the topos of rejection of the Muses in early Christian poetry see Curtius, *European Literature* 235–37.

[16] See van der Nat, "Praefatio."

[17] The similarity of *ut Christo digni loquamur* to Vir. *Aen.* 6.662 (*quique pii vates et Phoebo digna locuti*) again signals that Juvencus consciously places himself in the Virgilian tradition but decidedly as a Christian rival who has found the truth: Christ has replaced Apollo.

balance and chiasmus. Whereas the first two groups achieve precise equality (5 and 5, 4 and 4), the third group departs from this pattern (6 lines is twice 3 lines). Complete symmetry would have required that the 6 lines be balanced by another 6 lines. It is fair to ask why the poet did not finish the pattern he had initiated. The answer emerges naturally for the thought and emotion of the text. Notice that the last 3 lines of the poem (25–27) begin with an impatient command to the Holy Spirit: *Ergo age!* Juvencus has introduced his theme and established its context in both a literary and a religious tradition. It is time to unfold the subject itself, the *Christi uitalia gesta,* without further delay. Thus the expected pattern of 6 lines is truncated, but in the process attention is still paid to structured symmetry: the 6 lines are reduced, exactly in half, to 3. Juvencus has artfully structured the entire preface so that sense combines with symmetry, but without mechanistic rigidity.

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BRIEF MENTION

RECENT BOOKS ON FOLKLORE AND MYTHOLOGY

Early in this century Axel Olrik (1864–1917) formulated a theory of folklore, including the "laws" of folk narrative, and a method for study, including the use of literary sources in reconstructing folktales and their classification by genres. Although he worked chiefly with Germanic and Scandinavian material, he made some reference to Homeric and other classical sources, and his theory is potentially useful for classicists studying ancient folktales. Olrik's theory of folklore, published in Danish in 1921 and as a result less known than it should be, has now been translated into English by Kristen Wolf and Jody Jensen and published by Indiana University Press (1992) under the title *Principles for Oral Narrative Research*.

Nonclassicists, usually scholars in comparative literature, English, or history, continue to produce books that trace the literary or intellectual history of classical motifs or ideas through the centuries. Some rely chiefly on secondary sources and can be rather inept, but they also often contain insights into classical literature worth serious consideration by classicists. Since we have space to review only a small number of books, I list here a few that I have looked into recently and that may have escaped the attention of our readers.

Annabel Patterson, *Fables of Power: Aesopian Writing and Political History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). Patterson discusses Aesop and the development of the fable in antiquity, including the fable of "The Belly and Members" from Livy and Plutarch, but concentrates primarily on the use of fables for political purposes in the English Renaissance. This is an elegant little study though of limited scope.

Mihoko Suzuki, *Metamorphoses of Helen: Authority, Difference, and The Epic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Suzuki discusses Helen in Homer, Virgil, Spenser, and Shakespeare, making much use of modern feminist theory and concentrating on negative images. Though there are good insights, a major flaw is that the more positive variant traditions found in Stesichorus, Herodotus, Euripides' *Helen*, and later sources are never taken into account. We thus don't get a balanced view of Helen.

Susanne Lindgren Wofford, *The Choice of Achilles: The Ideology*

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of Figure in the Epic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). This also discusses Homer, Virgil, and Spenser. It is a considerably better book, with interesting discussions of simile, tropes, characterization, and narrative technique.

James D. Garrison, *Pietas from Vergil to Dryden* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). In this thorough, learned study Garrison examines varying views of *pietas* and related or contrasted terms such as *clementia* in Roman writers and their medieval and Renaissance successors; already in Cicero, and more so under the Empire, *pietas* carries some negative connotations, and emerges as a key term in political, religious, and moral debate. An excellent book, though by the end I had heard enough about piety to last for a long time.

Leonard Barkan, *Transuming Passion: Ganymede and the Erotics of Humanism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). This little book is a tour de force if one enjoys the game of troping in accord with poststructuralist rules. Ganymede is offered as a key to the conceptualization of "otherness" and represents both homosexuality and the desire of the soul to attain divinity. Ancient sources are discussed, but focus is on the Renaissance and especially on Benvenuto Cellini. A less imaginative but probably sounder book on the subject was *Ganymede in the Renaissance* by James M. Saslow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), which Barkan dismisses in one patronizing footnote.

Ricardo J. Quinones, *The Changes of Cain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Ostensibly a study of the story of Cain and Abel in Western literature, the book actually deals more widely with myths of fratricide, including Romulus and Remus, and seeks to offer a critical perspective on the ambiguities of human action and the complexities of historical change. A weakness is that Quinones constantly refers to "Cain" in texts where his name never appears.

George A. Test, *Satire: Spirit and Art* (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1991). I recommend this to anyone interested in Roman satire, though it ranges widely over world literature. It also has much to say about literary irony. Test, who obviously loves his subject, sets out a practical theory of satire and a sensible classification of its overlapping subgenres.

C. Jan Swearingen, *Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Three-fourths of this rather difficult book is devoted to a revisionist history of rhetoric as an art of deception from the pre-Socratics to Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Augustine.

I have always liked a little verse, though I have forgotten its source, that goes:

> When eras die their legacies are watched by strange police,
> And professors in New England guard the glory that was Greece.

The "strange police," of course, have regularly included nonclassicists, though in the past most of them could read Greek and Latin more competently than is now the case. Relatively little research in the humanities is collaborative, but I suspect that the books listed above, except perhaps Garrison's, could have been improved if they had been collaborative projects between a classicist and an expert on later literature.

G. A. K.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ROBERT A. BAUSLAUGH. The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. xxxvi + 306 pp. Cloth, $45.

It is ironic that a people who taught us moderation and restraint from excess had such difficulty tolerating among themselves a passive or middle course in politics and war. A law of Solon, for example, denied citizen rights and a share of *polis* life to any Athenian who failed to take sides during a time of *stasis* (*Ath. Pol.* 8.5), and over 150 years later political "moderates" (τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν) were killed by fellow πολῖται for refusing to participate actively in the Corcyraean revolution of 427 (Thuc. 3.82.8). A similar exasperation and revulsion existed toward states that opted to remain neutral in war, as if the mere thought of such a posture, regardless of the circumstances, was a disgrace to Hellenism. The neutrality of a state was, by its very nature, far more complex than the political preferences of single individuals, for not only did it transcend the confines of community, it persisted topsy–turvy without formal definition or endorsement into the fourth century B.C. Indeed, neutrality existed only as a notion with no commonly agreed standard formula. Thanks to Robert Bauslaugh, we now have a splendid investigation of this intriguing problem that provides a comprehensive and judicious study of the role of nonbelligerents in the diplomacy of war.

Far from daunted by the protean nature of his quest or the insistence of modern scholars of international law that neutrality per se cannot exist without legal definition, Bauslaugh meticulously and patiently weaves his way through the relevant evidence of relationship between Greek classical states. He hopes "that a careful study of nonbelligerency and neutrality in classical Greece will not only shed light on ancient attitudes towards states that refused to participate in specific conflicts but also provide insight into how the Greek states conducted themselves under the harsh disruption of warfare and its tests of self–imposed restraints. Furthermore the identification of either principles or regularized procedures connected with uncommitted states may provide additional insight into the realities and limitations inherent in any formulation of international law" (xiv).

In Part I (chapters 1–4) Bauslaugh examines the language of neutrality, the bias and limitations of the ancient sources, the "institutions and customary practices that contributed to the recognition of uncommitted states in the diplomacy of the classical period" (xxiii), and what could and did happen when "concept" clashed with reality. In Part II (chapters 5–9) he compiles an exhaustive catalog of "neutrality cases" arranged chronologically from the late seventh

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century to 338 B.C. In addition to a conclusion, he appends a summary at the end of each chapter. True to the spirit of his topic, he refrains from controversy yet is ever prepared to challenge and augment current opinion with new insights and interpretations—e.g., the impact of *agraphoi nomoi* on the development of interstate relations during the classical period (47ff.), the status of Melos in 416 (142ff.), and the causes of the Corinthian War (172ff.).

Bauslaugh acknowledges the imprecise terminology associated with neutrality, that is "neither specialized nor exclusively restricted to diplomacy" (3). He is also wary of the lack of critical objectivity of ancient sources that tend "to disapprove of any form of noncommittal abstention if it conflicts with the interests of the leading states and their hegemonial ambitions" (21). Thucydides, to be sure, represents the exception when he analyzes neutral states in crisis, yet he is regrettably silent about their situations when they were not vital to the purpose of his narrative: "the frequency and length of [Thucydides'] discussion can be simply characterized as inversely proportional to the success of the policy of neutrality—that is, the more secure and undisturbed the policy, the less frequently Thucydides mentions the state" (24).

Bauslaugh begins his search for institutional roots with the *nomoi Hellēnikoi,* those customary and unwritten rules of behavior between states "grounded in the moral consciousness of those involved" (53) and "understood to be universally valid and ultimately enforceable because they represented the will of the gods" (36). He argues convincingly that they promoted a general consensus affecting the sacrosanctity of heralds and holy places, the obligations of *xenia,* the proper burial of the dead, and the inviolability of another's territory—even in times of war. They thus set the stage for the drafting of formal treaties and alliances from the sixth century on. How effectively these practices were implemented depended, of course, on the mutual tolerance and probity of the Greeks themselves, but the *nomoi Hellēnikoi* constituted the core of Greek diplomacy from the early days of the autonomous *polis.* As far as would-be neutrals might be concerned, they could and did appeal to "custom" in defense of their uncommitted stance. To illuminate the problem at hand Bauslaugh also scrutinizes the role of third-party arbitrators and mediators for any "assumingly neutral and unbiased" bent (54–56), treaties of bilateral *philia* (56–64), and instances of "elective abstention" in multilateral alliances (64–67). "Scattered though the evidence may be," he concludes, "it nevertheless provides in the aggregate, substantial support for the idea that something akin to the modern concept of neutrality might be a legitimate diplomatic option within the context of customarily respected rules of warfare" (69).

The notion of neutrality eventually fell prey to the pressures of *Realpolitik.* Whatever progress the Greeks had made up to and including the treaty of 445 quickly deteriorated during the course of the Peloponnesian War, when "the diplomatic realities . . . were far more complex and . . . less predictably consistent with ideological imperatives or traditional norms than might be expected" (79). It is not surprising, therefore, that neutrality was easily manipu-

lated and abused in an almost capricious fashion. The Athenians in particular grew desperate under the stress of an exhausted treasury and became much less forbearing in their dealings with allies and neutrals alike. Nor did the Spartan victory improve matters: "The negative impact of the Peloponnesian War on respect for traditionally accepted rules of war was great and led many states to abandon virtually all trust in restraint on the part of belligerents" (166). Still, Bauslaugh insists, there were other states ("allies of neither side," or "those remaining at peace") which clung to the belief, or perhaps indulged in the wishful thinking, that neutrality as such could and would survive as a viable diplomatic alternative (82–83).

The diplomacy of the fourth century was more international in scope, and whereas neutrality remained an item of negotiation, there arose twists and pitfalls after Persia became the major arbiter of Greek affairs. By 371, however, the Greeks proclaimed a new era of mutual understanding when the First Common Peace guaranteed the right of any participating state to abstain from aiding an injured city. But, unfortunately, this clause proved another self-serving convenience on the part of the Athenians and was repealed within the same year by a Second Common Peace signed after Leuctra. The Greeks reorchestrated the theme of neutrality in the Common Peace of 362 when they bizarrely declared a "collective abstention" from the revolt of the Persian satraps and again in a variety of treaties that accommodated Philip II's strategies of division and annihilation, but in the end they were forced to comply with the Macedonian's League of Corinth that effectively eliminated the option of neutral status by sounding the closing chord on the era of the free and independent *polis*.

Neutrality endured a long and tortuous existence as both creature and victim of a system that was too absorbed in the priorities of self-interest to appreciate the blessings of national harmony. Instead of being steadily nurtured by mutual trust, decency, and moderation, it was continually fractured by fear, jealousy, and suspicion—until finally, like Hope, it was trapped in Pandora's box. This is another story of missed opportunity, one that Bauslaugh tells with skill and lucidity. His work is a major contribution to the study of Greek diplomacy. I suggest that in any future edition the catalogue section of the book be cross-indexed by pages instead of chapters and cases. The present format necessitates too much thumbing, given that chapter and case numbers do not appear on the top of each page. Consequently an erroneous citation becomes all the more frustrating: for example, on page 138 Bauslaugh refers us to "6.1 above" somewhere in pages 110–17, when he really means 5.1 in pages 88–91. For consistency the text should actually read "5.I" because he labels cases with Roman numerals. Such are minor matters, however; presumably they will not mar his forthcoming study of Hellenistic neutrality (254 n. 20), which we eagerly await.

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ECKART SCHÜTRUMPF. Aristoteles, *Politik*, übersetzt und erläutert. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991. Teil I (Book 1). 390 pp. Cloth, DM 68. Teil II (Books 2 and 3). 590 pp. Cloth, DM 98.

Eckart Schütrumpf has been preparing a new commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* for the past several years, and these are the first volumes to appear. The further volumes that will complete the commentary are projected to come out within the next five years. These volumes contain, along with a detailed commentary, a German translation, general introductions to the *Politics* as a whole and to the individual books, and extensive bibliographies (with useful selections made for particular parts or chapters within books).

Aristotle's *Politics* has been attracting increasing interest from scholars, but few of the many books and articles that have appeared take the form of commentaries, and those that do are focused on particular parts. To consider a whole philosophical text partially has its advantages, of course, and is often necessary; but it also has its dangers. One such is to draw far-reaching conclusions about the whole based on an analysis of a mere part or to indulge in broad generalizations without considering if the whole can really support them. Schütrumpf thinks this fault characterizes many publications on Aristotle's *Politics*, and I am inclined to agree. Certainly a commentary on the whole should enable one to avoid this fault, and in this regard, as in many others, commentaries are indispensable tools. Such commentaries already exist (e.g., Newman's now classic one from the last century, and the recently completed one by Aubonnet), but not in such abundance or such a condition of flawlessness that more cannot be welcomed.

In assessing Schütrumpf's achievement, however, it is well to separate his overall method and approach to Aristotle's text from his detailed commentary on it. For the merits of his book divide according to this division: as regards the commentary the book is a qualified success; as regards the method and approach it is a general failure.

Schütrumpf is a follower of Jaeger and has adopted the view that the *Politics* is not a coherent whole but a series of ill-fitting and contradictory parts that reflect different stages of Aristotle's development. Admittedly Schütrumpf does not follow the particulars of Jaeger's famous thesis, but he has taken over its principles. This is not a little surprising given that those principles are, and have been shown by scholars to be, highly questionable. I mention in particular Pierre Pellegrin's introduction to his recent translation (1990) and his article "La *Politique* d'Aristote: unité et fractures" (*Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger* 177 [1987] 129–59), which Schütrumpf doubtless knows (though, perhaps because they appeared too late, they do not appear in his bibliography).

Jaeger's approach requires one to do two things: first, to identify contradictions or incompatibilities in the text and, second, to show that these can only be explained by supposing the parts where they appear were written at different times and according to the different beliefs that mark the stages of Aristotle's

development. But whether or not one passage contradicts another presupposes that we have understood both passages correctly. This is not impossible, but it is remarkable how often a contradiction that one scholar says is insoluble another says is easy to explain. None of us is perfect, of course, and we can always get something wrong. Moreover how many would claim to possess a philosophical genius that rivals Aristotle's? In the interpretation of a text from one of the greatest minds in human history the first rule must surely be to exercise great caution. When confronted with a contradiction our first response should be to wonder whether we have misunderstood something. If, despite all our attempts to remove it, the contradiction remains, we must still be cautious about concluding it is what it appears to be. Perhaps we are missing something that a better mind than ours could perceive. We should certainly be wary of building on the basis of our own capacity to comprehend a grand edifice about the development of the author's mind. Far better in this regard to follow Pellegrin and prefer "la docte ignorance" to "la fausse science."

But quite apart from the doubt whether we have understood the text, there is the problem of what makes our chosen theory of the author's development the correct one. Notoriously Jaeger's account was challenged by those of others (notably von Arnim's) which were themselves challenged in turn. For the truth is that any number of accounts could all explain the same phenomena. The whole Jaegerian game seems, in fact, to be a dead end: the alleged phenomena are uncertain, and they point to no one explanation over another.

As regards Schütrumpf himself, he proposes a division of the *Politics* into four disparate parts: two fragments or "torsi" of incompleted treatises, namely books 1 and 3, and two groups or "blocks" of more or less completed treatises, namely books 2, 7, and 8 on the one hand and books 4, 5, and 6 on the other. He is insistent that the fact of mutual incompatibility between these parts legitimates the search to date them to different periods of Aristotle's career, and he follows in this respect, though with reservations, the Jaegerian view that the earlier parts are those that betray greater Platonic influence. Hence he sees books 2, 7, and 8 as earlier than books 4, 5, and 6 (I 64–65, 130). Book 3, however, he thinks is made up of materials from several different periods (II 117–18). Book 1 is earlier than books 4, 5, and 6, but its relation to the other books is more problematic and Schütrumpf reaches no clear conclusion about it (I 128–34).

Schütrumpf's project stands or falls by his claims about the incompatibility between the books of the *Politics*. One would thus expect him to have some powerful arguments to back up these claims. But the arguments he actually gives are remarkably weak. For instance, he notes that Aristotle often raises the same question several times and gives differing answers in different places. Especially is this true of the question about what parts the city is constituted from. The facts adverted to here are clear enough, but by themselves they prove nothing. Any one of several explanations could account for them. Schütrumpf takes it as obvious that the only adequate explanation is that these different

answers reflect different stages in Aristotle's development (I 47–53, 61–63). But this is not at all obvious unless one makes certain assumptions: first, that the correct way to write a unified book on politics, and the way Aristotle would have agreed was correct, is to raise and answer each question only once (rather after the fashion of a geometrical treatise); second, that the different answers Aristotle gives are in conflict such that they cannot all be true together. Thus if Aristotle divides the city in one way (farmers, artisans, soldiers, judges), he cannot also divide it in another (poor and rich) without having changed his mind. But Schütrumpf gives no argument for such assumptions, though they are far from obvious. Indeed they would seem plainly false. For, as regards the first, Aristotle denies that one should seek the same sort of precision in all sciences and especially notes the variability of moral and political subject matter (*Ethics* 1094b14–27). This makes more probable in the case of a practical treatise what is not uncommon even in more theoretical treatises, namely that the same question is relevant in more than one context and requires consideration from more than one point of view. As regards the second assumption, many things can be divided differently according to differences of context and intention. The parts of a university are in one sense its several buildings (library, classrooms etc.) and in another sense its various persons (professors, students etc.). If a treatise on universities gives both divisions in different parts, must we therefore suppose that it cannot be a unified whole?

Schütrumpf also sees book 3 of the *Politics* as an incompleted part of a project abandoned in later books because, though it divides constitutions into six types, it only deals with one of them, kingship, instead of all six (I 47–48). But here the alleged facts are themselves doubtful. Aristotle's words make it more likely that kingship is only dealt with in book 3 to confirm the division of regimes into six types with kingship as one of the correct kinds, overriding the objection that absolute rule by one man cannot possibly be correct. Kingship as a regime would seem instead to be treated along with aristocracy in books 7 and 8; Aristotle regards kingship and aristocracy as together naming the best regime (1289a30–32), and nothing in his treatment of that regime requires it to be an aristocracy as opposed to a kingship if one man outstanding in virtue happened to arise in it. Schütrumpf also points to the fact that Aristotle speaks of democracy and oligarchy as single kinds in book 3 but in book 4 says that there are at least four kinds of each (I 46). Is it, however, really impossible for a thinker to divide first into single, general types and later, when dealing with these types in detail, to show that they subdivide further without contradicting himself? Schütrumpf similarly says that the concept of freedom used in books 1 and 8 is a "functional" one (freedom from necessary work), whereas in books 4–6 it is a "politically real" one (free birth) (I 130). But again this difference proves nothing by itself. What must be shown, and what Schütrumpf fails to show, is that these concepts cannot be coherently combined in a unified treatment of political things.

The detailed commentary, insofar as it is made to serve the same overall thesis, suffers from the same faults. Still, precisely because it is a commentary, it has merits that are generally lacking elsewhere. Schütrumpf has judicious and interesting things to say on the translation and interpretation of many particular passages and lines. As random examples I mention his remarks on Aristotle's claims about slaves as instruments for practice (I 238–41), about commerce as not by nature but by experience and art (I 326), about the translation of 1257a41–b2 (I 335), about acquisition as part of domestic rule (I 348–50), and about the criticism of unity desired for the city by Socrates in the *Republic* (II 158–60). In addition he often gives enlightening comparisons with Plato and other ancient authors, and has many useful discussions, and exact criticisms, of the interpretations of other scholars. Indeed even where I think his particular interpretations are wrong, I find them not infrequently provocative and instructive.

Schütrumpf also displays an enviable mastery of the secondary literature. His bibliographies are thorough and helpful, especially his selections with respect to particular chapters of the text. These bibliographies are an invaluable resource. Moreover, both in his introductions and his commentary, he gives very useful reviews and criticisms of this scholarly literature. However, I think he is ill served by the way the text of the commentary itself is presented, for this is often unnecessarily hard to follow. The print in the first volume is small, and sentences in both volumes sometimes snake over several lines, interrupted by parentheses (and subparentheses) dense with references. These references are well worth having (especially for comparative purposes) and display an extensive knowledge of ancient literature. But they do interrupt the flow of his argument. One hopes that in the later volumes and the projected English translation something will be done to make the text more readable.

The commentary is the best part of the book, which is all to the good since it comprises the greatest part. Its line–by–line treatment of the whole text, its extensive discussion of the secondary literature, its instructive examination of alternative interpretations, its rich collection of sources and references, its often judicious remarks on particular points, will make it, despite the flaws associated with its Jaegerian trappings, a valuable study aid. It will repay the reading even where one finds it wrong. So while one can hardly expect Schütrumpf to abandon Jaeger in the later volumes (he seems too committed to the thesis), the resulting whole will be something students of the *Politics* cannot afford to ignore.

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L. D. REYNOLDS, ed. C. Sallustii Crispi: Catilina, Iugurtha, Historiarum Fragmenta Selecta, Appendix Sallustiana. Recognivit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. xxx + 249 pp. Cloth, $28. (Oxford Classical Texts)

Besides *Catiline* and *Jugurtha* this edition contains the more substantial fragments of the *Histories,* also the spurious *Letters to Caesar* and *Invectives.* A preface of 22 pages expertly surveys the manuscript tradition; contrary to previous editors, Reynolds decided virtually to ignore the *libri integri,* except to fill the long lacuna in *Jugurtha* (xii–xiii).

The apparatus is predictably clear and *soigné.* As for the text, Sallust's strangely late arrival in the Oxford series comports an obvious advantage. Reynolds's text diverges from A. Kurfess's Teubner of the two monographs (3d ed. 1956) in at least ninety places, and while many of the choices are trivial and/or indifferent, not a few are definitely for the better (some of them already in intervening editions). Punctuation and paragraph arrangement have also benefited. Reynolds is generally conservative, and apart from an occasional minor palaeographical improvement on earlier proposals, like ⟨*factis*⟩ *facile* in place of *facile* ⟨*factis*⟩ in *Jug.* 63.4, offers practically nothing by way of original conjecture.

A few points of detail, some discussed in *Mnemosyne* 34 (1981) 351–56. *Jug.* 15.5: *polluta* is obelized and the conjecture *provoluta* mentioned in the apparatus, which, however, proceeds: "an *prompta, prolata, aperta* vel sim.?" How to emend, and how not to emend? *Jug.* 27.4: *L. Bestia Calpurnius,* an onomastic monstrosity, apparently provoked no qualms. *Jug.* 35.2: readers might have been told in the apparatus, and not merely in the index, that the praenomen of Minucius Rufus, cos. 110, was Marcus, not, as in Sallust's manuscripts, Quintus, and that of Sicinius, tr. pl. 76, probably Gnaeus, not Lucius; also, what is not revealed in the index, that L. Postumius of *Epist.* 2.9.4 is almost certainly T. Postumius of Cic. *Brut.* 269 (see *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature,* 2d ed. [1991] 37). *Jug.* 42.2–3: this much-discussed problem is ignored, recalling what I wrote in *CP* 74 (1979) 77 on Reynolds's edition of Seneca's *Dialogi,* "Now and again he offers an unacceptable text with nothing to show that it has ever been challenged." *Jug.* 65.1: if Sallust wrote this text, his wits were wandering. Maybe they were, but the reader should have been cautioned.

There is a redundant *et* on page 147, line 20, and *prope* seems to have accidentally fallen out on page 140, line 19. On pages 20 and 21 the balance of the fifth line has disappeared, leaving a blank space.

A paragraph in the preface (xxv–xxvi) defends archaistic spellings. Actually Reynolds's spellings are almost identical with Kurfess's, except that he regularly has *corr-* where Kurfess has *conr-* (but *inrumpere* on page 75, line 19).

There is no bibliography, only a reference (xxvi) to A. D. Leeman's *Systematical Bibliography of Sallust 1879–1964* and a *conspectus editionum.*

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R. A. B. MYNORS, ed. Virgil, Georgics. With a Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. xci + 345 pp. Cloth, $85.

JOSEPH FARRELL. Vergil's Georgics and the Traditions of Ancient Epic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. xiv + 389 pp. Cloth. $35.

Until about thirteen years ago a reader of the *Georgics* was pretty much on his or her own. Mynors's OCT (1966) was readily available, but commentaries were hard to find and good interpretative studies of the poem practically nonexistent. Nearly everyone who has ever read the *Georgics* has responded to the beauty of its language, but many, I am sure, wondered what it was really about and how it all fit together. The year 1979 inaugurated what we might call "The Age of the *Georgics,*" as a stream of commentaries and books tumbled into our libraries and bookstores. So much has been written in the last decade or so that a potential reader is likely to wonder whether Mynors's commentary and Farrell's book can add significantly to our understanding and appreciation of the poem. I think they can.

When I first heard that Mynors's *Georgics* was in press, I wondered whether the classroom needed a new commentary, since I had used Williams with undergraduates and Thomas with graduate students and found both satisfactory. Mynors is much too expensive to use as the text for a class, but it will be a wonderful addition to the reserve shelf. It is a model of what I think a commentary should be. Mynors has no axe to grind, no hobbyhorse to ride; his aim seems to be to help readers understand the poem in all its variety rather than to urge a particular interpretation of it. His excellent notes cover difficult Latin phrases, all kinds of technical matters including the identification of plants and birds, poetic technique, parallels of subject and diction in other ancient authors, Vergil's use of his models, and much more. And he writes with wit and charm.

Commentators often translate difficult Latin instead of explaining it, a very annoying practice. Mynors very seldom translates at all; in general he explains the different possible meanings of a phrase, sometimes, but not always, opting for one. See, for example, on *satis . . . dentibus* (2.141) or *averso . . . astro* (1.218). He is also very good at connecting the poem with real life, both the agricultural world of Rome and our own. On the subject of Tarentine wool (2.197) he refers us to Diocletian's price edict; in connection with Vergil's *iam*

tum acer curas venientem extendit in annum / rusticus (2.405–6) he reminds us of Pliny's practice of letting vineyards in the fall so that the new tenant could see to the pruning. Readers like me who are unfamiliar with the habits of bees will find his discussion of the reality of Vergil's bee battle (4.67–87) very helpful.

Mynors is good on technical matters, whether it is rooks (1.410ff.), tree propagation (2.9ff.), cheese making (3.400ff.), or the construction of the Portus Iulius—he even tells us where we can find a sketch map (2.161–64). His commentary is full of references to Greek and Roman prose writers: Varro and Columella, of course, but also Plato, Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Oppian, Cicero, Manilius, Seneca, Pliny, and Palladius. It is packed with useful information and would be worth buying for that alone, but it is much more than a compendium of facts.

Mynors also helps us appreciate the poem by conveying his own sense of its rhythms and movements. A new reader can get bogged down with the details of some aspect of farming and lose sight of how it fits into the poem. Mynors's summaries of the various sections of the poem are very illuminating. The care of young foals (3.179–208), for example: "There are two principal stages in the colt's education: primary, 182–9, from weaning to the end of the third year; secondary, with two sharply-contrasted subdivisions, 190–3, the ring and the manège, when every step can be precisely monitored and the young thoroughbred looks as if constrained and chafing to get free, and 193–5, when the brakes are taken off at last (*tum . . . tum*) and away he goes, so fast and free that his feet seem scarcely to touch the ground. These stages are marked out in decreasing detail and with increasing intensity, until as though it could be controlled no longer the narrative erupts into a six-line simile. Then in 202, with the training behind us, we resume our normal course."

Horses are intrinsically interesting; but Mynors, like Vergil, can make even a very prosaic topic come alive. On the establishment of vineyards (2.259–396): "A series of operations, many of which are of wider validity (even extending in 317 to arable crops), though expressed in terms of the vine grown on living supports (*arbustum*), save where timber trees (290–7) and olives (302–14) insist on being heard because they bring with them each a vivid picture—the great tree and the fire. . . . Five times the course of instruction is interrupted by a picture; but after three of these care is taken to bring our imaginations back to earth again with some almost prosaic lines (284–7, 312–14, 343–5). We are left with the exhilarating impression of industry and skill set against the changing background of the elements and the evolving year, guiding the young vineyards up to man's estate, and ending in a well-earned holiday for ourselves." These seem to me to be the words of a man who really understood the *Georgics* because he could see with Vergil's eyes, in part perhaps because he knew and loved the countryside himself. In the preface Nisbet quotes Mynors on Vergil: "A keen eye for nature, for light and shade, mountain and river, beast and bird and tree; a mind which found the work of earlier poets as rich a source of stimuli

as things seen and felt" (5). Something very like this could be said of Mynors himself. I would give much to have the introduction he did not live to write.

I conclude by briefly considering Mynors's treatment of what is perhaps the greatest strength of Richard Thomas's commentary: Vergil's use of his sources. Mynors is very much aware of Vergil's allusions to earlier writers, but, perhaps because he is less concerned than Thomas with establishing, as Farrell puts it, "that the Callimachean and Neoteric outlook was the decisive factor in the development of Latin poetry in the first century" (17), he often notes parallels to non–Hellenistic and neoteric poets that others do not mention. He is very good on Lucretian parallels. His treatment of Vergil's use of Lucretius in his ode to spring (2.323–45), for example, is fuller than either Williams's or Thomas's. Thus his commentary is a good starting point for a reader interested in assessing a subject that is one of Farrell's main concerns, the presence of Lucretius in the *Georgics*.

Farrell's aim in *Vergil's Georgics and the Traditions of Ancient Epic* is to provide a coherent reading of the *Georgics* by thoroughly and systematically examining Vergil's allusions to earlier poets, most importantly Hesiod, Aratus, Lucretius, and Homer. Farrell argues cogently that we need to get away from piecemeal, one by one, comparisons of single Vergilian passages with single source passages in order to appreciate the complexity of Vergil's argumentation through sustained allusion.

Part I, "Vergil's Allusive Artistry," consists of three chapters establishing and demonstrating the nature of Vergil's allusive program. In the first chapter, Farrell lays claim, as the foundation of his method, to Knauer's "concept of an extensive, systematic program of allusion based on the analytical reading of major sources" (9), modified by the work of Pasquali, Giangrande, Clausen, Thomas, and Conte. Chapter 2 examines the use of antonomasia in Vergil's predecessors and in the *Eclogues* to establish that Vergil's famous allusion to Hesiod in *Ascraeumque cano Romana per oppida carmen* (2.176) is a claim to be at once the "real" Hesiod and the Hellenistic "Hesiod" (that is, "non–Homer"), and to mark the *end* of a major phase in his poem. In chapter 3 Farrell takes his first hard look at Vergil's method of imitation. In his adaptation of *WD* 414ff. for the farmer's *arma* (1.160ff.) Vergil condenses his model while conflating it with other Hesiodic material and "animates his borrowed material with a sensibility that is altogether new" (pp. 76–77). The bulk of this chapter is Farrell's discussion of a series of passages as examples of ever more complicated modes of *contaminatio* of Vergil's sources. At 1.351ff. Vergil edits and transposes a single passage from Aratus (733ff.) to create his weather signs. For the plague (3.478ff.) he adds to his main model (*De Rerum Naturae* 6.1090ff.) material from elsewhere in Lucretius; his source for the praise of spring (2.323ff.) is a complex of Lucretian themes found in *DRN* 1.2ff., 1.248ff., 2.991ff., and 5.737ff., with the last "the focus both of Lucretius' poem and of Vergil's allusions" (p. 101). Vergil's Aristaeus conflates two episodes from the *Iliad* (1.345ff.

and 18.22ff.) with one from the *Odyssey* (4.351ff.). And finally, in the most elaborate multiple allusion of the series, the lucky and unlucky days (1.276–86), Vergil brings together both Hesiodic poems (*WD* 765ff., *Th.* 131–34, 617–868) and Homer (*Od.* 11.305ff.).

Part II, "Vergil's Program of Allusion in the *Georgics*," develops Farrell's analysis of the poem as sustained and complicated *contaminatio* and *variatio* of one primary source after another. Chapter 4 deals with the role of Hesiod and Aratus in *Georgics* 1. Vergil begins by reworking *Works and Days*; with the weather signs, however, ostensibly his version of Hesiod's "days," he draws increasingly on Aratus (identified by Callimachus as a Hesiodic poet in *Ep.* 27), in this way claiming to be both the poet of a real Ascraean song and a Callimachean poet, all this in the context of civil war, treated in increasingly Lucretian terms. Chapter 5 establishes that Vergil's debt to Lucretius is analogous to, but much greater than, his debt to Hesiod and Aratus. A quick look at *Georgics* 1 establishes the pattern. Lucretius' pessimistic treatment of geography (5.195–234) is the source of two Vergilian passages: the zones (1.231–58), where Lucretius' "facts" reject Lucretius' message, and the "likelihood of failure" (1.176–203), where Lucretius' diction bolsters Vergil's own pessimism. The center of Vergil's Lucretian program is *Georgics* 2 and 3, his versions of *DRN* 5 and 6. The Lucretian core of *Georgics* 2 reworks two Lucretian themes, variety and creativity, saving the negative points for book 3. The plague culminates and ends Vergil's Lucretian allusive program (much as *Ascraeum carmen* ended his Hesiodic program and his obvious reworking of Aratus his Aratean weather signs. Chapter 6 deals with Homer. Farrell argues convincingly that Vergil has carefully prepared the reader in his earlier books for his extended use of Homer in book 4, first in the epic coloring of his bees, and finally in his Aristaeus, where he uses Homeric material in a new way as the *substance* of an episode. Farrell argues that Vergil is drawing on an "ancient tradition of allegorical exegesis that represented Homer not merely as a poet of heroic saga, but more importantly as a poet of natural philosophy" (p. 257), that the very Homeric passages Vergil uses and alludes to in his Aristaeus had already been allegorically interpreted as cosmologies in antiquity. Thus the Homeric Aristaeus not only makes a very fitting conclusion to his didactic epic, it is the crown of Vergil's allusive program.

In Part III, "The *Georgics* and Literary History," Farrell looks mainly at the *Eclogues* and the *Aeneid* in relation to his reading of the *Georgics*. In chapter 7 he considers the neoteric background of the *Eclogues* and concludes that even then Vergil was interested in expanding the horizons of the new poetry, especially in *Ec.* 6. Not until the *Georgics*, however, did he see, influenced by his study of Lucretius, that the two seemingly different epic traditions (the heroic and the didactic) were really one, with Homer at the source. In chapter 8, to me the least compelling in the book, Farrell considers the *Aeneid* as a philosophical and allegorical poem, arguing strongly against reading it as a "panegyric of Rome or Augustus" (p. 329), and concludes with a few words on the impact of

the *Georgics* on the work of Horace, Propertius, and Ovid. As Farrell says, "Ovid stands squarely on Vergil's shoulders as he celebrates the possibility of moving freely between what had once been treated as discrete traditions, the tradition of Hesiod and that of Homer, and his treatment of Vergilian material in the *Metamorphoses* declares his debt to Vergil's pioneering reconciliation of them" (p. 342). As usual. Vergil showed Ovid the way, and not just with his *Aeneid,* but, as Farrell has shown, with his *Georgics* as well.

"The Age of the *Georgics*" continues on into the 1990s. These two fine new books make a welcome addition to the ever–growing store of tools available to students of Vergil's great poem.

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CEBRIONES THE DIVER: *ILIAD* 16.733–76

During his fateful *aristeia,* Patroclus takes a rock and strikes the forehead of Cebriones, Hector's driver. The force of the blow results in the expulsion of the victim's eyes,[1] which fall to the ground in the dust at his feet (16.741–42). Cebriones himself follows with a backward somersault from the chariot, leading the narrator to liken his fall to the movement of a diver:

> . . . ὁ δ' ἄρ' ἀρνευτῆρι ἐοικὼς
> κάππεσ' ἀπ' εὐεργέος δίφρου . . . (16.742–43)

Early in this century Scott ("Repeated Verses" 319–20) described the problem which has sometimes led commentators to question the appropriateness of this simile to its narrative context. The Homeric chariot was set close to the ground, so that a fall from so low a platform seems to provide little occasion for such a comparison. The simile of the diver has a more obvious application to the fall of Epicles, who plummets like a diver (ἀρνευτῆρι, 12.385) from a lofty (ὑψηλοῦ, 12.386) tower when struck by Ajax. Moreover, since Cebriones did not fall head first but must have tumbled over backward from a blow to the forehead, the simile seems all the more inappropriate. Scott concluded that the simile is better suited to *Odyssey* 12.411–14, where it occurs in a nautical context. Yet we are certainly entitled to wonder what the narrator saw in the scene that justifies the comparison.

I think that the gruesome taunt of Patroclus over the body of his fallen foe provides the context necessary to an appreciation of the narrator's choice of a diver simile. For Patroclus too reverts to a nautical image in visualizing the death of Cebriones:

[1] The expulsion of the eye by means of a blow to the head occurs several times in the surrounding books: cf. Janko, *Commentary* on 13.616–19.

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εἰ δή που καὶ πόντῳ ἐν ἰχθυόεντι γένοιτο,
πολλοὺς ἂν κορέσειεν ἀνὴρ ὅδε τήθεα διφῶν,
νηὸς ἀποθρῴσκων, εἰ καὶ δυσπέμφελος εἴη . . . (16.746–48)

Patroclus says that if only Cebriones were in the fishy sea, he would satisfy the hunger of many, leaping from a boat and groping in the depths for sea squirts (τήθεα διφῶν, 16.747), even though the sea might be rough (δυσπέμφελος, 16.748).[2] The details of Patroclus' image—the diver groping in the depths, the unappetizing fare for which he searches, perhaps even the rough and stormy sea—all find analogues in the world of the narrative. Patroclus' taunt involves a multiple-correspondence comparison of extraordinary sophistication.

First of all, the diver's action of "groping" springs from an obvious source in the narrative, for Cebriones has lost his eyes from the blow to his forehead. Patroclus adjusts the details of his image to conform with the physical deformity of his victim: the diver is imagined as suffering from a visual handicap. Secondly, the loathsome food for which he gropes finds a grisly and bizarre analogue in the narrative, as the eyes of Cebriones lie at his feet in the dust. Appropriately enough, the sea squirt was considered a particularly repulsive dish, fit only for the very hungry. Hence Zenodotus, thinking it unlikely that many would want to eat such food, read δυσπέμφελοι εἶην, "even if they were surly" (cf. Janko, *Commentary* ad loc.). Finally, the detail of the roughness of the sea in which the diver swims may mirror the swirling motion of the cloud of dust in which the dead Cebriones lies:

. . . ὁ δ' ἐν στροφάλιγγι κονίης
κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, λελασμένος ἱπποσυνάων. (16.775–76)

Willcock (*Iliad* ad loc.) rightly calls these lines "the most impressive epitaph in the *Iliad*." Indeed, the death of Cebriones is depicted with great art throughout. Tumbling from the platform of his chariot after his eyes, which lie in the dust, the hero is likened to a diver seeking unappetizing food in the sea. Both the narrator and Patroclus are impressed by these similarities.

ROBERT J. RABEL
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

[2] For the identification of this form of mollusc cf. Janko, *Commentary* on 16.747–48. Janko rightly elucidates the meaning of διψάω, "to grope after," from Hes. *Erg.* 374.

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THE DETERMINATION OF EPISODES IN GREEK TRAGEDY

Although it is clear that Greek tragedy is, as Oliver Taplin (*Stagecraft* 50) has said, a "structure of parts," no completely adequate account of a division into constituent parts has ever been advanced. No one would dispute that this division is at least partly determined by strophic odes sung exclusively by the chorus. Not infrequently, however, evident breaks in a play's action are not marked by a strophic choral ode,[1] and the distribution of such songs is very uneven.[2] That such breaks may be accompanied by other lyric forms, brief astrophic choral odes, choral anapaests, or songs in which actors participate, was recognized by Walther Kranz.[3] Even so, Kranz, influenced, like most students of tragic lyric, by the authority of *Poetics* 1452b20–21,[4] undervalued the articulating function of these lyrics, regarding anapaests, astrophic odes, and actors' songs[5] only as occasional substitutes for strophic choral odes.[6] This undervaluation is not entirely illogical, since

[1] At *Ag.* 1330, for instance, Cassandra enters the palace. Twelve lines of choral anapaests follow, then twenty-nine lines of iambic trimeter which "mirror" the killing which takes place inside. At 1372 Clytemnestra appears with the bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra. At *Phil.* 1080 Odysseus and Neoptolemus depart with Philoctetes' bow. After the departure Philoctetes and the chorus sing a kommos (1081–1217), at the end of which Philoctetes departs in despair into his cave. At 1218–21 the chorus announces the reappearance of Odysseus and Neoptolemus.

[2] Between A. *Sup.* 524 and 824, for instance, occur three strophic choral odes. Between *Or.* 356 and 806, on the other hand, there is no lyric intervention.

[3] See Kranz's "Übersicht über die vom Gesamtchor vorgetragenen strophisch gegliederten Lieder," *Stasimon* 124–25, as well as (for choral anapaests) 162.

[4] Which seems to define the basic unit of dramatic action as everything standing between two strophic choral odes. On problems of interpretation of Poetics 1452b14–27 see Taplin, *Stagecraft* 470–79.

[5] Here I use "actor's song" to refer to any lyric in which an actor participates, including not only lyrics sung in responsion to choral song but also solo lyric and epirrhematic passages in which an actor responds to a song of the chorus or another actor, or the chorus to a singing actor, in spoken verse. "Strophic choral ode" refers exclusively to lyrics sung by the chorus alone, without interruption.

[6] See Kranz, *Stasimon* 117, 162, 177, 202, 229. See also Detscheff, *De Conformatione* 57–65. Neither Weissinger, *Act Divisions,* nor Aichele, *Epeisodien* 17–21, directly addresses the question of what exactly defines a unit of dramatic action. Very recently Hamilton, "Comic Acts" 353–55, has asserted that in the drama of Euripides, at least,

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occasionally astrophic songs and not infrequently actors' songs stand within otherwise continuous passages of spoken verse, where they seem to advance the dramatic action rather than to suspend it.[7] But how are we to determine which lyrics perform which function? Kranz's method was ultimately subjective, and his decisions can seem arbitrary. He recognized the short epirrhematic ode, E. *El.* 859–79, following the departure of a messenger, and the lyric lament of Electra at S. *El.* 823–70, following the departure of Clytemnestra and the paedagogue, as episode–separating; but from his list of strophic choral odes and the lyrics which substitute for them he omits the solo lament of Electra at *Or.* 960–1011, which also follows a messenger's exit.[8]

The essential solution to this problem has been given by Oliver Taplin. Taking it as a given that strophic choral odes are "act–dividers" (*Stagecraft* 51), and observing that most strophic odes are preceded by an actor's exit and followed by an entrance (54), he proposed that non-strophic choral lyrics, lyrics in which actors participate, and choral anapaests should be regarded as act–dividing if they likewise are preceded by an exit and followed by an entry (55). Taplin thus provides a much more objective criterion than Kranz for the determination of episode divisions. Nevertheless, his rule is not entirely satisfactory, because he says so little to explain its theoretical basis. Indeed, he insists

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there is already a development toward a standardized five–act form which is defined only by parodoi and stasima, not by the shape of the dramatic action standing between them. Since, however, only eight of seventeen plays have five "acts" so defined, the idea is hardly persuasive. A very different attempt by Holzapfel, *Akteinteilung*, to divide each play into five acts, basing the articulation on fictional lapses of time, regardless of lyrics, is interesting, but his act–divisions are very subjective.

[7] An actors' song often represents an emotional outburst by agents of the plot to what has just occurred or just been reported. The epirrhematic S. *El.* 1232–87, for instance, begins and ends within the course of a single conversation (1098–1325) between Electra and Orestes. Astrophic lyrics such as *Cho.* 152–63 and E. *Sup.* 271–85 may be what Rode, "*Chorlied*" 102, calls "programmatic." That is, they may belong, as accompaniments of ritual, to the dramatic action. More often lyrics like *PV* 687–95, *Trach.* 205–24, E. *Sup.* 918–24, and *Phil.* 391–402 and 507–18 represent brief emotional outbursts. The former of the last two passages is a strophe to which the latter passage responds. Throughout discussion here such isolated strophes and antistrophes are regarded as independent astrophic lyrics. Choral anapaests, on the other hand, are always found in conjunction with an actor's entrance or an exit or with both, so that it may be argued that they always accompany a turn in the dramatic action.

[8] See Kranz, *Stasimon* 124–25. He includes no lyrics in this list that are sung by actors without choral participation, even though he remarks (229) that solo lyrics may have an articulating function. *Or.* 960ff. is not mentioned as an example of such a lyric.

upon its practical applicability: "In practice it works" (55). But let us consider whether in fact it does completely work. If the rule does not do violence to reality, it does not necessarily tell the whole truth; and I believe that it is especially vulnerable to objection on two points.

(1) The exact role played by entrances and exits in the articulation of the dramatic structure is not at all clear. Taplin himself declares that many entrances and exits occur within acts (53), and he gives no hint that individual movements on and off the stage have in themselves any articulating capacity. He allows, moreover, that lyrics other than strophic choral odes may be "inextricably tied within the units which contain speech" (51), that is, that they may not divide the two passages which they stand between. Actors' songs, in particular, often carry dramatic action at least a small step forward. The epirrhematic S. *El.* 1232–87 expresses the joy of Orestes and Electra after she has discovered his identity. S. *El.* 823–70 is a passionate lyric exchange between Electra and the chorus after she has falsely been told that Orestes is dead. The former Taplin would regard as an integral part of the actional dialogue that precedes and follows it; upon the latter, because it is preceded by an actor's departure and followed by an entry, he would bestow the title "act-dividing."[9] It may be true that in the latter case actional dialogue is suspended more completely. But if we consider that virtually all lyrics, to the extent that they slow or postpone action, have the effect of dividing passages of actional dialogue, we should ask ourselves whether the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. To take the other side of the coin, why should a sequence of entrance and exit, separated by a few lines of iambic dialogue, not be act-dividing, if the addition of a short intervening lyric would mark the end of one act and the beginning of another? Here we may compare *Bac.* 1152–68, where the departure of a messenger and the arrival of Agave are separated by an astrophic code of twelve lines, and *Phoe.* 1264–69, where Jocasta turns immediately after a messenger's departure and summons Antigone from the house. In an article on Sophocles' *Philoctetes* Taplin points out correctly that instances of the entrance of one character a few lines after the departure of another are rare and suggests that they occur only in special circumstances; the absence of lyric intervention at *Phoe.* 1264–69, for instance, he justifies by the close link between the two scenes which Jocasta's remaining onstage provides ("Significant

[9]Taplin, *Stagecraft* 247 n. 3. See below, note 16. Kranz, *Stasimon* 124, also regarded this lyric as episode-dividing.

Actions" 41 and n. 38). Surely this is weak. At *Hipp.* 1268–82 an astrophic choral ode follows the departure of a messenger despite Theseus' remaining onstage. In all three instances cited above, there is a close connection between the messenger scene and the one which follows; but if in only one instance the two scenes belong to the same act, perhaps our definition of an act is too inflexible.

(2) Although Taplin remarks that tragic drama maintains a formal continuity (*Stagecraft* 50), he does not take the implications of that fact adequately into account. Thus his distinction between act-divisions and other, lighter divisions, which may be occasioned within an act by a lyric (other than a strophic choral ode) in association with only an entry or only an exit (55), implies a formal hierarchy which we should suspect is not real. Even extended strophic choral odes do not suspend action as completely as the modern theater curtain, and the suspension effected by strophic odes is by no means uniform. It may be true that strophic choral odes occasion a substantial suspension of action proportionally more often than actors' songs, which usually express an emotional reaction to what has immediately occurred in spoken dialogue, and more often than astrophic odes and choral anapaests, which several times follow a messenger's report and lead into a disclosure scene which the report has announced (see note 125 below). But some strophic choral odes minimize the separation between two units of action. Consider, for instance, A. *Sup.* 776–824, S. *El.* 1384–97, and E. *El.* 1147–64. The first is an expression of despair standing between Danaus' sighting of the Egyptian ships and the Egyptian herald's arrival. The two latter precede the murder of Clytemnestra, which their content, like the dramatic departures which close the foregoing scenes, anticipates. It is very hard to believe that these strophic choral odes mark a stronger division of the action than the astrophic[10] *Hipp.* 362–72, for instance, which is preceded by the departure, or perhaps loss of consciousness,[11] of the nurse but is not followed by an entrance. For the

[10] *Hipp.* 362–72 is in its context astrophic. It is an isolated strophe to which the antistrophe 669–79, a solo lament by Phaedra which follows the departure of Hippolytus, responds.

[11] It is sometimes assumed that the nurse faints. Whether she falls unconscious or exits is unimportant, because I here treat the few instances of complete loss of consciousness as departures, the regaining of consciousness as an entrance. I can see nothing, however, in the nurse's speech (353–61) that compels us to believe that she collapses at its end, and I think it more likely that she rushes from the scene in dismay. For (1) when she

nurse's state of mind and her agitated departure go completely ignored in the subsequent lyric and in the first sixty lines of the dialogue which follows. I do not at this point claim that *Hipp.* 362–72 divides two acts. I am saying only that it sometimes is hard to determine what an act is.

I am, in fact, uncomfortable with the word "act,"[12] because "act" suggests that the passages standing between certain lyrics are more independent, self-contained units than often they are, and it encourages us to think of these units as more or less equivalent in size, structure, and dramatic importance. Two consecutive units of dramatic action often differ greatly from each other in length and complexity,[13] and not seldom the former of the two is clearly preparatory and subordinate to the latter.[14] When, moreover, an ode like A. *Sup.* 776–824 (see above) maintains a considerable degree of continuity between two units, the point at which the preceding unit of action ends and the succeeding begins is to a greater or lesser degree obscured. Even when consecutive dramatic units are not closely linked, it is not uncommon for the end of the former to have a close logical connection with the song which fol-

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returns to the dialogue she clearly has been rethinking her original reaction, and (2) after her departure neither the chorus nor Phaedra makes any further mention of her until her next intervention in the dialogue. Elsewhere when a character collapses onstage it invariably is in some way remarked by bystanders. Usually they concern themselves directly with the well-being of the affected character (cf. *Phil.* 821–26, *Hcld.* 602–4, *And.* 1076–77, *Tro.* 462–65). See Spitzbarth, *Spieltechnik* 92. Even when the chorus in the ode *Hec.* 444–83 makes no direct mention of Hecuba's falling to the ground, immediate notice is taken of her condition at the beginning of the next scene.

[12] I prefer the more traditional "episode." In the discussion of actors' entrances which follows, I tentatively accept Taplin's principle that actors' exits before lyrics are structurally significant. Since, however, we have not yet defined what an act or episode is, I avoid both words, referring to passages which stand between two lyrics, whether strophic choral odes or other lyrics preceded by exits, simply as "dramatic units" or "units of dramatic action."

[13] For instance, *Trach.* 141–496, 531–632; *OC* 720–1043, 1099–1210; *HF* 451–636, 701–33; *IT* 658 (or 467?)–1088, 1153–1233.

[14] For example, the Teiresias scene (*Ant.* 988–1114) foreshadows the tragedy which is reported in the next dramatic unit. A messenger's report at E. *Sup.* 634–777 of the Athenian military success and the imminent return of the bodies of the Seven is followed, after a brief strophic ode, by the processional entry of the bodies at 794–836. Messenger scenes which precede what Kremer, "Tragödienschluss," 117–41 passim, calls an "Ecceschluss," constitute the most obviously subordinate dramatic units. Messenger scenes usually are connected with the following scene by an anapaestic system or, as here, by an astrophic ode (see Taplin, *Stagecraft* 172). Occasionally, however, as at E. *Sup.* 778–93 and at *Hcld.* 892–927, the lyric is strophic.

lows.[15] The brief strophic choral ode *Aj.* 693–718, for example, is a cry of jubilation at what Ajax has just said in his *Trugrede*. E. *Sup.* 955–89 is a lament by the mothers of the Seven as the bodies are borne away to be burned. *Hel.* 1451–1511, which follows Helen's final departure with Menelaus, contains a prayer for her safe arrival.[16] In these instances it may be more meaningful to think of a lyric not as act-dividing or act-connecting but as an extension of the dramatic unit which precedes it. Thus we see that "acts" vary greatly among themselves not only in length and degree of independence but even in the integrity of their structure.

Given so many variations, are we entitled to speak of a formal structure at all? I believe that the answer is a qualified yes. I have criticized Taplin's account of tragic structure on the ground that it implies that the divisions between units of dramatic action are more complete than they actually are, and that the units themselves are to a greater degree equivalent. Nevertheless, Taplin's sequence (actor's exit–lyric–actor's entrance) does describe a repetition that underlies the differences among individual dramatic units in individual plays. His definition of an "act" is unsatisfying not because it imposes on tragic drama a patterned regularity that is not real. Rather it leaves open the question whether the repetition may be insignificant. If the only important difference between the "acts" separated by S. *El.* 823–70 and the passages of spoken verse separated by S. *El.* 1232–87 (see above) is the

[15] It is much less common for a lyric which is not closely connected with preceding action to lead into the dramatic unit which follows. A good example is the epiparodos at *Alc.* 861–934, which Kranz, *Stasimon* 125, does not regard as episode-separating. For a discussion, with examples, of choral odes which anticipate action, see Helg, *Chorlied* 10–16, and Rahm, *Zusammenhang* 26–28.

[16] Because one or more dramatic agents participate, actors' songs especially often maintain a certain dramatic continuity from spoken dialogue to lyric. For example, when the paedagogue and Clytemnestra depart into the *skēnē* at S. *El.* 803, Electra delivers a bitter speech of complaint which at 823 breaks into a passionate lyric exchange with the chorus. This actor's song is considered by Kranz, *Stasimon* 124, and Taplin, *Stagecraft* 247 n. 3, to be episode-dividing. The logical progression comes to an end at line 871, when Chrysothemis arrives joyfully with the news that someone has made an offering at Agamemnon's grave. See above, note 9. During the epirrhematic E. *El.* 859–79, a song accompanying the triumphal entry of Orestes after the killing of Aegisthus, Electra fetches a crown (870–72), which the chorus tells her (873–75) to raise to his head. This she does at the beginning of iambic dialogue, continuing a process begun in the lyric. Actor–choral exchanges are especially frequent in parodoi (Schmidt, "Eingang" 12–17, 18 n. 67, giving as examples the parodoi of *PV, Med., Hel.*, S. *El.* and *OC*; see also Detscheff, *De Conformatione* 43–50; Aichele, *Epeisodien* 20; Taplin, *Stagecraft* 247), and in several instances dialogue continues afterward, without a break, in spoken verse.

exit and entrance flanking the former lyric, then we should ask ourselves whether the word "act" has much meaning. We need, in other words, a more detailed description of what may happen within a dramatic unit, which will show us whether there are other norms of procedure which govern the dramatic action, restricting the possibilities of variety.

As a contribution to such a description, I examine not only movements into and out of the playing area which immediately precede and follow lyrics, but those which occur within dramatic units as well. Accepting, for the moment, Taplin's conception of an act (see note 12 above)—which I shall continue to call a "unit of action"—I consider actors' entrances in sections 1 and 2 below; section 3 considers exits. I believe that it can be demonstrated that these movements and certain procedures associated with them fall into a recurrent cycle. But the cycle is subject to many variations. Not all of these procedures occur in every dramatic unit; some occur less often than others; and in individual instances even the most frequently occurring may fail. Each, however, occurs with enough frequency that the audience will have been conditioned to a greater or lesser degree to expect it, and together these procedures constitute a pattern of expectations which gives shape and definition to the dramatic action.[17]

[17] I do not take into account here evidence from *Rhesus* or from *Septem* after the last strophic choral ode, which begins at 822, because of doubts about their authenticity. I do, perhaps wrongly, consider relevant passages from *IA* and *Phoe.* despite evidence of considerable reworking of both plays. For bibliography relevant to problems of authenticity in the latter three plays see Poe, "Entrance" nn. 3–4. For the sake of consistency I have adopted the following guidelines: (1) Prologues, whose structure is significantly different from that of other dramatic units of action, as well as final exits of plays, are left out of account; also one-actor units of action except when specific mention of them is made. (2) Lines delivered by the chorus or coryphaeus immediately before or immediately following a choral song are not considered to belong to the dialogue which follows or precedes. Analogously, any anapaests or astrophic lyric lines which an actor delivers immediately before or immediately following a lyric which is sung in whole or in part by the chorus are considered to belong to the choral lyric if that actor remains, or has remained, onstage while the chorus sings. That is, a unit of action ends with the departure of an actor immediately before a lyric or with the last words delivered in spoken verse by an actor before the lyric. A unit begins with the arrival of an actor immediately after a lyric or with the first words delivered in spoken verse by an actor who has remained onstage. (3) A lyric is considered to be strophic if it is in greater part strophic. (4) Isolated strophes and antistrophes are treated as astrophic lyrics. (5) An entrance is said to follow a lyric even when it may take place during the lyric. Similarly, an exit which "precedes" a lyric may be accompanied by it. (6) A character's losing of consciousness is counted as an exit, the gaining of consciousness as an entrance. (7) "Actor" is applied only to actors

1. ENTRANCES FOLLOWING STROPHIC CHORAL ODES AND OTHER LYRICS WHICH ARE PRECEDED BY AN ACTOR'S EXIT

Most strophic choral odes, as Taplin has shown, are followed closely by an entrance of an actor. It is true that five strophic choral odes, a little less than 4 percent of the total, are neither accompanied nor followed by an entry.[18] A strophic choral ode is, nevertheless, a strong signal that a new factor—a character or characters arriving from some backstage experience—is about to be introduced into the dramatic action.[19] Astrophic odes, on the other hand, give, by themselves, a much weaker signal, and actors' songs no reliable signal at all. Eight astrophic choral odes[20] and a considerable majority of actors' songs are followed by no actor's entrance. This should not be a surprise, since astrophic lyrics because of their brevity lend themselves to the expression of sudden emotional reactions to a dramatic event which may be unrelated to the arrival of a new character; and they occasionally accompany some stage action, such as a ritual.[21] Actors' songs, as we have seen (above, note 16), are in general more actional in character because dramatic agents participate in them. If, however, a system of

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with speaking roles. An actor is regarded as having a speaking role if he speaks at any time before his departure from the playing area. (8) Processional exits and entrances of corpses are treated in the same way as those of actors with speaking roles. (9) An actor is regarded as having arrived onstage as soon as he or another who accompanies him speaks/sings or as soon as either is spoken to (unless it is clear from context that the actor addressed is still backstage). (10) All parodoi, since their articulating function is beyond question, are treated as strophic choral odes. (11) Lines delivered offstage are left out of account.

[18] A. *Sup.* 625–709; *PV* 397–435, 887–906; *Trach.* 94–140 (parodos); *Hipp.* 525–64.

[19] Choral anapaests indicate an arrival almost as dependably. All but four independent systems of choral anapaests from only two plays (*Med.* 357–63, 759–63; *Hcld.* 288–96, 702–8) either precede or accompany an actor's entry. A fifth system of anapaests (*Aj.* 1163–67) is followed by the entrance of a character, Tecmessa, who from that point remains mute.

[20] *Cho.* 152–63; *PV* 687–95; *Phil.* 391–402, 507–18; *Hipp.* 362–72; E. *Sup.* 271–85, 918–24; E. *El.* 585–95. I do not include in this list *Eum.* 254–75, which accompanies part of the entrance of the chorus. The members of the chorus begin their reentry speaking in iambics as they look around for Orestes' track. They break into astrophic song when they catch sight of him.

[21] E. *Sup.* 918–24 and *PV* 687–95, for example, are emotional outbursts. E. *Sup.* 271–85 is a supplication, and *Cho.* 152–63 accompanies the pouring of a libation.

anapaests, an astrophic lyric, or an actor's song follows an actor's exit, we can expect an entrance after the lyric with a fair degree of confidence. Fourteen of eighteen independent systems of choral anapaests which are preceded (or accompanied) by a departure are followed (or accompanied) by an entrance; ten of eleven astrophic odes; and fourteen of twenty–two actors' songs.[22] Although this supports Taplin's assumption that nonstrophic or extrachoral lyrics in association with exit and entrance deserve as much to be considered "act–dividers" as strophic choral odes, we have not yet proven that this is so. For we have not yet demonstrated that the cycle of recurrent procedures which characterize a unit of dramatic action (see above) succeed these lyrics as often as they succeed strophic choral odes. We have shown only that an

[22] Choral anapaests preceded or accompanied by a departure which are followed or accompanied by an actor's arrival: A. *Sup.* 966–79; *Ag.* 1331–42 (followed by choral iambics and two cries of Agamemnon from offstage before Clytemnestra's appearance at 1372; see note 17 item 2); *Cho.* 719–33, 855–68; *Aj.* 1163–67 (the entrance of a mute; see note 19); *Ant.* 1257–60; *OT* 1297–1306; *Alc.* 741–46; *Med.* 1081–1115; *And.* 1166–72; E. *Sup.* 1114–22; *Tro.* 1251–59; E. *El.* 988–97; *Phoe.* 1480–84. Astrophic choral odes: *Aj.* 866–90 (866–78 are astrophic; 879–90 constitute an isolated strophe whose antistrophe begins at 924); *Hipp.* 1268–82; *Hec.* 1024–34 (followed by choral iambics and cries from within the *skēnē*); *HF* 875–908, 1016–38; *Ion* 1229–49; *Hel.* 515–27; *Or.* 1353–65, 1537–48; *Bac.* 1153–64. Actors' songs: S. *El.* 823–70, 1398–1441; *Phil.* 827–66, 1081–1217; *OC* 510–48, 1447–99, 1670–1750; *Alc.* 861–934; E. *Sup.* 778–837; E. *El.* 859–79; *Hel.* 330–85; *Or.* 960–1017, 1246–1312; *IA* 1475–1531. I follow Aichele, *Epeisodien* 19, in interpreting *Aj.* 866–90, which precedes Tecmessa's entrance, as an independent astrophic choral ode. Lines 879–90, however, constitute a strophe whose antistrophe is 925–36. Rode, "Chorlied" 86, regards 866–78 as an independent astrophic ode. This passage offers a good example of the lack of clear definition which sometimes exists between lyric and dramatic action even when the lyric is preceded by an exit (here Ajax' death) and followed by an entrance.

In addition, the actor's song *IA* 1279–1335 is followed by an entrance, but it occurs only after eight lines of dialogue between the actors who have remained onstage. After the lyric E. *Sup.* 778–837, I consider the next unit of dramatic action not to begin until 838, when the newly arrived actor begins to speak. The brief choral passage standing between Orestes' departure at S. *El.* 1436 and Aegisthus' arrival at 1442 I do not regard as an independent lyric. The lines, which correspond metrically to 1417–21, belong to a larger epirrhematic passage which is strophic. I include in this list S. *El.* 1398–1441 because the passage accompanies an actor's exit. This exit, however, does not begin at or before line 1398, because the departing actor, representing Orestes, has arrived on stage only at 1424.

Thirteen lyrics other than strophic choral odes are preceded by or accompany an exit but are followed by or accompany no entrance. Choral anapaests: *Med.* 357–63, 759–63; *Hcld.* 288–96, 702–8. Astrophic choral ode: *Hipp.* 362–72. Actors' songs: *Ag.* 1072–1177; *Eum.* 778–880; *OT* 649–99 (Creon's exit does not begin until 677, halfway through); *Alc.* 393–415 (a kommos sung by a child following Alcestis' death); *Hipp.* 669–79; E. *Sup.* 1072–79; *IT* 643–57; *IA* 1279–1335 (see above).

actor's entrance can be predicted with considerable confidence after a lyric which follows an exit.

A peculiarity of Greek tragedy which often has been recognized but whose implications have never, to my knowledge, been sufficiently appreciated, is its tendency to move actors on and off stage individually, or consecutively, rather than simultaneously. Actors occasionally enter together when they come from a common offstage experience,[23] but simultaneous entrance from different directions was avoided. I know of only one certain example.[24] There are, on the other hand, at least eighteen instances, following strophic choral odes or other lyrics which have been preceded by an exit, of what may be called "double entry," which separates the arrival of two actors by a few lines.[25] Since the

[23] I count entries of characters who will speak before they depart the playing area (although not necessarily in the same episode). Here, as elsewhere in this essay, I leave out of account entrances in the prologue, where conventions of entry and exit are, to some degree at least, different. I have found at least twenty-one instances at the beginnings of episodes of the simultaneous entry of two or more actors from the same direction; seventeen of these occur in three-actor dramatic units. In two-actor units, all after strophic choral odes: *Phil.* 730; *Hipp.* 176; *HF* 822; *Ion* 725.

In three-actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Ag.* 810; *Ant.* 384; *Alc.* 244; *Hcld.* 928; *And.* 501; E. *Sup.* 381; *HF* 451; E. *El.* 1177; *IT* 467; *Phoe.* 834; *Bac.* 434; *IA* 303, 607. Perhaps *Trach.* 971 should be added to this list; see note 24. After other lyrics: *Phil.* 1222; *OC* 1670; E. *Sup.* 1123; *Or.* 1018. (At *OC* 1670ff. the lyric is sung by entering actors with the chorus.) I omit *Hel.* 1369, following Richard Kannicht, commentary (Heidelberg 1969) ad 1390–91, who argues that Menelaus follows Theoclymenus out of the *skēnē* at 1390.

[24] *HF* 701, introducing a two-actor unit which follows a strophic choral ode. See Poe, "Entrance" n. 50. It seems probable that *Trach.* 971, which follows a strophic choral ode and introduces a three-actor unit, offers a second instance. J. C. Kamerbeek, commentary (Leiden 1959) 205 and ad 902, suggests that Hyllus, who has departed into the palace at 820, leaves the *skēnē* at 947 and departs without speaking through a parodos so that he can arrive with the old man and the stricken Heracles. There is, however, no other evidence in extant tragedy of an entry and exit, neither of which is announced, by an actor who neither speaks nor is spoken to. In a third passage, at *Sept.* 369–74 the entrances of the scout and Eteocles may well be consecutive because they are separately announced. At *Hel.* 1512 the messenger's arrival just as Theoclymenus happens to be walking out of the house is not credible. As Kannicht says, convention dictates that the recipient of a messenger's address must already be onstage when the messenger arrives, or he must be called out. Line 1512 is in any case defective, and Kannicht suggests the possibility of an actor's interpolation.

[25] Two actors' entrances within ten lines of each other in two-actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Alc.* 606, 614; *Hipp.* 1153, 1157; *Ion* 510, 517; E. *El.* 751, 761; *IT* 1153, 1157; *Or.* 844, 852; *Bac.* 912, 918. To this list *Sept.* 369–74 should perhaps be added; see note 24.

In three-actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Cho.* 653, 657; *Eum.* 566, 574; *Aj.*

alternative of a simultaneous arrival in these cases patently would not alter the plot, we can be reasonably sure that the motive for these double entries is purely structural. It makes individual entries possible even when the poet wants to bring two actors together quickly.

I lay special emphasis on the practice of individual entry because it gives the beginning of many episodes a distinctive character. Although it is common for an actor to remain onstage during strophic choral odes as well as during lyrics of other kinds,[26] at least fifty-six—more than 40 percent—of the actional passages in which two or three actors ultimately participate, and which follow a choral ode or an exit and a lyric of another kind, begin with the arrival of a single actor on an empty stage.[27] On ten of these occasions the actor arrives singing.[28] If, however, his first words are in spoken verse, he has no one in the

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1223, 1226; *Ant.* 384, 387; *Hec.* 658, 667; E. *El.* 487, 493; *Phoe.* 1067, 1072; *Bac.* 170, 178; *IA* 1098, 1106. After other lyrics: *Cho.* 875, 885; *IA* 1532, 34.

[26] Aichele, *Epeisodien* 19–20, says that about 60 percent of all choral odes are sung to an empty stage. He includes, of course, those odes which precede one-actor dramatic units, which I do not here take into account. And he arbitrarily excludes from consideration most of the nonstrophic and not-exclusively-choral lyrics which I count.

[27] Two-actor dramatic units: *Per.* 159; A. *Sup.* 176, 873; *Ag.* 1372; *Aj.* 201, 719; *Ant.* 162, 806, 1155, 1261; *Trach.* 531, 663; *OT* 1307; *Alc.* 476, 606, 747, 935; *Med.* 214, 1293; *Hipp.* 790, 1153; *And.* 1047, 1173; E. *Sup.* 990; *Ion* 510; E. *El.* 751; *IT* 1153; *Hel.* 386; *Phoe.* 1310; *Or.* 844, 1369; *Bac.* 912. Three-actor units: *Cho.* 653, 875 (between 875 and 930 four actors speak); *Aj.* 891, 1223; *Ant.* 384; *OT* 513, 911; S. *El.* 1398; *And.* 802; *Hec.* 658, 1044; *HF* 1042; *Ion* 1250; E. *El.* 487; *IT* 1284; *Hel.* 1369; *Phoe.* 261, 1067; *Or.* 1554; *Bac.* 170, 576, 1168; *IA* 801, 1098. In addition, Electra at *Cho.* 84 is effectively alone, since Orestes is hidden and she speaks initially to the chorus. Similarly, at E. *El.* 112 Electra fails to see the hidden Orestes when she arrives (before the chorus) singing. The herald at *Ag.* 503 may be alone onstage until 586, but it is possible that Clytemnestra, whose departure never is indicated, has remained onstage through the previous ode.

[28] In dramatic units in which two actors participate, after, or during, strophic choral odes: *Aj.* 201–62; *Ant.* 806–82, E. *Sup.* 990–1030. After anapaests: *Ant.* 1261–77; *OT* 1307–66; *And.* 1173–1225. After an astrophic ode: *Or.* 1369–1502.

In units in which three actors participate, after strophic choral odes: *Bac.* 576–603. After astrophic odes: *HF* 1042–86; *Bac.* 1168–99. In addition, A. *Sup.* 873–911 (in a two-actor unit) and S. *El.* 1398–1423 (in a three-actor unit), both following strophic choral odes, are epirrhematic passages in which the actors upon arrival address the chorus in iambic trimeters. At *Aj.* 891 Tecmessa's cries follow the strophe of a choral ode whose antistrophe begins at 925. From 896 to 924 she speaks in iambic trimeters, carrying on a dialogue with the chorus, who respond in both iambics and lyric meters. At *Hec.* 59–96 and S. *El.* 86–120 an actor enters singing anapaests immediately before the entry of the chorus.

playing area except the chorus to speak to, unless he speaks to mutes.[29] He may, of course, address his first words to no one in the playing area, apostrophizing a deity, absent persons, or inanimate objects, or speaking to the world at large.[30] Communications with the chorus, however, are far more common, occurring on thirty-one occasions.[31]

[29]Twice actors do not speak to anyone in the playing area but call to someone with a speaking part who is still in the *skēnē*: *Bac.* 912–17 and *Hec.* 1044–46. The practice of addressing mutes is especially characteristic of later Euripidean plays. Actors arriving on an empty stage, who are unaccompanied by another actor with a speaking part, address mutes on three occasions: *IT* 1284–87; *Phoe.* 1067–71 (probably calls inside); *Bac.* 170–77 (calls inside). I do not include in this list *IA* 802–3, where Achilles is speaking to the whole playing area when he asks, Who of the attendants will tell Agamemnon that Achilles wants him? At *Phoe.* 834–40 and E. *Sup.* 381–98 one of the two actors arriving together on an empty stage addresses his first words to a mute. At *Cho.* 653–56 and *Hel.* 435–36 an actor arriving on an empty stage calls inside to an unknown servant who responds. Sometimes an address to a mute gives a superficial dramatic color to a speech whose purpose is to convey background information to the audience (see below). Thus Teiresias at *Bac.* 170–77, who commands someone to summon Cadmus, devotes most of his speech to an account of Cadmus' genealogy and the agreement to dress in fawnskins, etc. Since none of this is information which the unseen servant inside needs to know, it must be said for the audience's benefit. See Poe, "Entrance" 147.

[30]Actors arriving on an empty stage unaccompanied by another actor with a speaking part address their first words to no one, or to no one physically in the playing area, at least eight times. (It sometimes is uncertain whether a character is addressing the chorus or the world at large.) Line numbers indicate the length of the entering actor's first speech, which may have more than one addressee. In a two-actor unit, after a strophic choral ode: *Phoe.* 1310–21. *Ag.* 503–37 should be added if Clytemnestra has not remained onstage during the previous ode. After other lyrics: *Alc.* 747–72; *Hel.* 386–436. Both arrival speeches are spoken to a playing area which has been emptied to the accompaniment, in the first instance, of choral anapaests, in the second, of an astrophic ode. In addition, Orestes at *Eum.* 235–43 arrives and speaks to a playing area whose emptying has been neither preceded nor followed by a lyric.

In three-actor units, after strophic choral odes: E. *El.* 487–92, *Phoe.* 261–77. After other lyrics: *Cho.* 875–84; *Aj.* 891 (following a strophe whose antistrophe begins at 925, Tecmessa's unmetrical cry of grief has no addressee); *Or.* 1554–60.

[31]In two-actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Per.* 159–72; A. *Sup.* 176–203; *Aj.* 719–34; *Ant.* 162–210, 1155–71; S. *El.* 1442–44; *Trach.* 531–87, 663–64; *Alc.* 476–77, 606–10; *Med.* 214–66 (regarding the nurse's anapaests 184–204 as a continuation of the parodos in which she participates), 1293–1305; *Hipp.* 790–96, 1153–55; *And.* 1047–52; *Ion* 510–13; E. *El.* 751; *IT* 1153–55; *Or.* 844–45. In addition, at *Cho.* 84–105 Orestes is hidden, so that for practical purposes Electra is alone with the chorus. Above I have counted only passages which continue in spoken verse. At S. *El.* 1398–99, Electra addresses the chorus in iambics. Lines 1398–1421, however, constitute the strophe of an epirrhematic passage. After other lyrics which are preceded by an exit: *Ag.* 1372–98, *Alc.* 935–61.

In three-actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Aj.* 1223–25; *Ant.* 384–85; *OT* 513–

Such communications take various forms. The arriving actor may, after a statement, command, or request, immediately enter into dialogue.[32] Fairly often he begins with a question or a series of questions.[33] Not infrequently, however, an actor entering after a lyric delivers a set speech, sometimes of considerable length. The speech is likely to identify the new arrival if he has not appeared before, to indicate his mood, and to express his purpose, perhaps alluding additionally to the circumstances of his arrival.[34] I have argued elsewhere that an actor's opening words, whether they are directed at the chorus or at the world at large, often are patently intended to convey background information to the audience, and that mimesis of dramatic interplay with the chorus, or with other actors when they are present, is likely to be very slight or nonexistent.[35] What special content an entry speech is likely to have,

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22, 911–23; *And.* 802–19; *Hec.* 658–60; *Hel.* 1369–89 (assuming that Menelaus enters with Theoclymenus at 1390; see note 23); *IA* 801–18, 1098–1105. After an astrophic ode which is preceded by an actor's exit: *Ion* 1250–51.

We should keep in mind that it is sometimes uncertain, as at E. *El.* 487–92 and *Or.* 1554–60, whether an entering actor is speaking to the chorus or to the world at large.

[32] At *Trach.* 663–64, for example, Deianeira tells the chorus that she fears that she has gone too far. Dialogue continues to 672, when she embarks upon a long narrative explanation of her fears (672–722).

[33] At *Cho.* 84–99, for instance, Electra asks the chorus a series of questions about how to proceed with the sacrifice. At *Hipp.* 790–96 Theseus asks the chorus the cause of the noise in the house and suggests with a question that Pittheus may have died.

[34] These are features attributed by Schadewaldt, *Monolog* 240–42, to a series of entry speeches, occurring in the later plays of Euripides, which are addressed to no particular person. A coherent list of most of the speeches which Schadewaldt recognizes as belonging to this group appears in Leo, *Monolog* 30–31. On the information-giving function of entry speeches see also Ludwig, *Sapheneia* 34–35, and Hunger, "*Andromache* 147–53" 372 n. 8. Deckinger, *Darstellung* 58, points out that first words of arriving characters often explain the purpose of their arrival and also observes (60) that entering actors often initially address the chorus. On the character and function of entrance monologues in New Comedy see Blundell, *Menander.*

[35] "Entrance" 142–54. At *Or.* 1549, for instance, Menelaus is sighted coming in great haste toward the palace to save his daughter. At 1554 he arrives in the playing area, but he turns to his task only at 1561, having paused first to declare his intent, in a speech which could conceivably be addressed to the chorus but which has no specific addressee, and to express skepticism about the story of Helen's miraculous disappearance. (See "Entrance" 154.) In a speech addressed unambiguously to the chorus, Creon at *OT* 513–22 ("Entrance" 140–41) states at the outset the reason for his arrival and proceeds to describe his state of mind. This speech and the ensuing dialogue with the chorus in no way further the play's plot, for Creon learns nothing that he did not already know, and their function is purely to give the audience information. An entering actor's distance from

however, is not a question that is important to us here. For the present purpose it is enough to observe that speeches made by an entering actor in the presence of the chorus alone and even dialogue between him and the chorus are significantly different from the actor–actor dialogue which normally follows. Such communication is not often fully "actional"—that is, it seldom furthers the plot more than minimally—because the chorus is only exceptionally a dramatic agent (Poe, "Entrance" 140–41 and n. 54).

If, as I have suggested, it was in response to a purely structural need that the tragic poet often caused a new arrival to address his first words to the chorus or to no one in the playing area, it is also true that dramatic poets appreciated the aesthetic value of postponing full resumption of dramatic action after a lyric. Speeches directed to the chorus or to no one in the playing area may be of considerable length, and they often are followed by a dialogue between actor and chorus, creating a preliminary one–actor scene (that is, one that precedes the arrival of a second actor) far longer than would be necessary if its only function were to make individual entries possible.[36] Of such one–actor scenes which, beginning in spoken verse, immediately succeed strophic

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dramatic interplay is perhaps most obvious when another actor is already onstage. Thus Menelaus at *Tro.* 860–79 (see "Entrance" 145) delivers a systematic exposition of factual detail without interruption from Hecuba. It would seem much more natural if Menelaus' command to his mute attendants at line 880 to fetch Helen had been made at 860, followed by a question from Hecuba: What do you intend to do with her? At *Eum.* 397–407 (see "Entrance" 143 and Schadewaldt, *Monolog* 53 n. 2) Athena, upon entering, immediately declares the reason why she has come and where she has come from, alluding to her present state of mind. For eleven lines she ignores Orestes and the chorus of Erinyes, to whom she refers in the third person.

[36] At *Med.* 1293–95, for instance, Jason arrives with a question for the chorus: Is Medea inside? He then says that she must flee (1296–1300)—a fact of which both the chorus and the audience have been informed. He then follows with a statement (1301–5), characteristic of new arrivals and introduced by the conventional ἦλθον (1303), of the reason for his arrival. Finally at 1306–13 he enters into dialogue with the chorus, ending (1314–16) with an unfulfilled command to attendants to break down the door (cf. *Or.* 1561–66). Obviously Medea could have appeared at 1301 rather than 1317 with no loss to the plot and with perhaps an enhancement of dramatic tension. At *Trach.* 663–730 Deianeira takes nearly seventy lines to express her anxiety about the effect of the centaur's potion, and to tell in great detail exactly what happened to the tuft of wool. Tecmessa's anxiety and the reason for it could have been conveyed with considerable dramatic effectiveness in a few lines, the remaining information provided in subsequent dialogue. But the leisurely description of events occurring offstage and of the arriving actor's state of mind before it is affected by onstage action clearly was valued for its own sake.

choral odes or other lyrics which have been preceded by an actor's exit, I have found eleven which are twenty to thirty–nine lines long and seventeen of forty lines or more.[37] Dramatic interplay between actors is likely, moreover, to be postponed after a lyric even in instances when it could as easily be initiated immediately. When, after a strophic choral ode or after another lyric which has been preceded by an exit, an actor enters into the presence of another who has remained onstage during the lyric, more than one–third of the time[38] he speaks first to the cho-

[37] Numbers in parentheses indicate the length of the actor's initial speech. Scenes of twenty to thirty–nine lines in two–actor dramatic units, after strophic choral odes: *PV* 907–43 (21); *Ant.* 1155–82 (17); *Alc.* 476–508 (2); *Med.* 1293–1316 (13); *And.* 1047–69 (6); *Phoe.* 1310–34 (12). In addition, S. *El.* 1398–1424 is part of a strophic epirrhematic passage whose first six lines are delivered in iambics. After anapaests: *Alc.* 747–72 (26).

Scenes of forty lines or more in two–actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Per.* 159–248 (14); A. *Sup.* 176–233 (28); *PV* 197–283 (45); *Aj.* 719–83 (16); *Ant.* 162–222 (49); *Trach.* 531–97 (57), 663–733 (2); *OT* 216–99 (60); S. *El.* 254–327 (56); *Med.* 214–70 (56); *Hipp.* 565–600 (1), 790–901 (7). After anapaests: *Ag.* 1372–1576 (27). After an astrophic choral ode: *Hipp.* 373–432 (58). After an actor's song: *Hel.* 386–436 (51).

Scenes of twenty to thirty–nine lines in three–actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Trach.* 141–79 (39); *And.* 802–24 (18); *IT* 1284–1306 (4); *Hel.* 1369–89 (21). Scenes of 40 or more lines, after a strophic choral ode: *Phoe.* 261–300 (19). After an astrophic ode: *Aj.* 891–973 (1, regarding Tecmessa's outburst at 891 as unmetrical), which contains several brief lyric outbursts. In addition, *Cho.* 84–211 is, for practical purposes, a one–actor scene since Orestes is in hiding. *Ag.* 503–86 should be added to the list if Clytemnestra does not enter until just before she speaks. We should note that at *Hipp.* 790ff. and *IT* 1284ff. the chorus plays an actional role. In the former passage it informs Theseus of Phaedra's death. In the latter it attempts to deceive the messenger, allowing the fugitives to escape. It is possible that *Hel.* 1369–89 is a two–actor scene; I assume that Menelaus, who remains silent through this passage, first appears with Theoclymenus at 1390 (see note 23).

[38] At least nineteen times (excluding instances in which an actor enters singing). (The places in which an arriving actor speaks first to an actor already in the playing area or is spoken to by him are those listed in note 41, with the exception of the six passages cited in note 50.) Lines cited are those of the actor's first utterance. In some cases additional dialogue with the chorus follows before the inception of dialogue between actors.

To the chorus or everyone in two–actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Per.* 681–93; *Cho.* 84–105 (Electra fails to see Orestes, who has hidden himself); *Aj.* 646–92 (Tecmessa, who has remained onstage during the previous dramatic unit, is not a mute, although she does not speak in this unit); *Ant.* 988–90; *And.* 147–80; *Hec.* 484–85; E. *Sup.* 634–40. After an actor's song: E. *Sup.* 838–40. In three–actor units, after strophic choral odes: S. *El.* 1098–99; *Phil.* 219–31. After actors' songs: S. *El.* 1442–44 (following an epirrhematic passage, 1398–1441, during which Orestes both enters, 1424, and exits, 1438); *OC* 1500–1504. In addition, at E. *El.* 215–19, Electra, who has entered before the parodos,

rus, or to no one in the playing area, or to everyone.[39] This is true even though assumption of actor–actor communication is virtually mandatory when an actor coming from the *skēnē* enters a stage already occupied.[40] Overall, strophic choral odes or other lyrics associated with an exit are followed much more often by an actor's utterance which is not directed toward any other actor than by an address of one actor by another (seventy–six and thirty–seven times respectively).[41]

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directs her first lines after the parodos to the chorus in preference to Orestes, as he emerges from hiding. See note 41.

To no one in the playing area in two–actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Eum.* 397–407 (408–14 to the chorus); *Or.* 211–16 (Orestes awakes). *Ag.* 503ff. should also be included if Clytemnestra already is onstage when the herald arrives. At E. *El.* 998–1103 Clytemnestra, after speaking her two opening lines to mute attendants, addresses the next four to the world at large, ignoring Electra until Electra intervenes at 1104. In three–actor units, after strophic choral odes: E. *Sup.* 87–99; *Tro.* 860–79; *Hel.* 1165–76; *Or.* 356–74 (375–79 to the chorus). After an astrophic ode: *Hel.* 528–45 (Helen catches sight of Menelaus only at 541).

[39] When another actor is already onstage, it sometimes is impossible to tell whether a newly arrived actor is speaking specifically to the chorus or to everyone in the playing area. At S. *El.* 1098–1104, for example, Orestes, arriving with the mute Pylades, says: We are seeking the house of Aegisthus. Which of you will tell those inside? The coryphaeus responds, but the speech specifies no addressee and Electra also is present. Aegisthus' speech at *Cho.* 838–47, which indicates the reason for his coming and his state of mind, addresses the chorus explicitly only in the last line. Here I classify entry lines as intended for the chorus, even when they specify no addressee, if they are clearly directed to the whole playing area.

[40] An actor coming from the *skēnē* could ignore another actor only if, like Hermione, who arrives singing at *And.* 825–65, he is so overwhelmed with emotion that he takes no notice of his surroundings. See Poe, "Entrance" 136–37 and nn. 44–46. There are only two clear violations of this rule, *Aj.* 348–427 (a kommos) and *Hcld.* 474–77.

[41] An actor arriving on an empty stage speaks his first words to no one who is in the playing area at least eight times (see note 30) and to the chorus or everyone thirty–one times (see note 31). When an actor already is present onstage, an arriving actor addresses no one in the playing area at least seven times and the chorus or everyone twelve times (see note 38).

An actor who has remained onstage during the lyric addresses the chorus thirteen times. In two–actor units, after strophic choral odes: *PV* 907–27; *Ant.* 631 (Creon responds to rhetorical questions put by the chorus in its announcement and, 632–34, addresses Haemon entering); *OT* 216–75; S. *El.* 254–309. After other lyrics: *Med.* 1116–20 (Medea announces the messenger to the chorus); *Hipp.* 373–430; *Or.* 1313–20. In three–actor units, after strophic choral odes: *OT* 1110–16; *Trach.* 141–79; *OC* 258–91; *Hcld.* 105–106; *Hipp.* 565; E. *El.* 215–19 (in preference to another actor who has appeared from hiding).

When two actors arrive together, one of the two addresses the chorus three times. In a two–actor unit, after a strophic choral ode: *HF* 822–32. In three–actor units, after

To be sure, counting the number of times that the first words of an actor are directed toward a being other than another actor gives us only a very approximate measure of the frequency with which full resumption of actional dialogue is postponed after a lyric. For one thing, an opening address to the chorus may be very short—a question only, or a pair of questions. In the second place, some speeches directed to the chorus are much more actional in content than others. When Theseus arrives at *Hipp.* 790 he immediately asks the chorus about the cry that he has heard within the house. Menelaus' speech, *Tro.* 860–79, on the other hand, is addressed to no specific person and makes little pretense of any realistic mimesis of dramatic action. It is clear that it is largely an information-giving speech, directed primarily at the audience (Poe, "Entrance" 145; see above, note 35). Exclamatory apostrophes to deities, inanimate things, absent persons, etc., clearly are more actional than Menelaus' speech. But when they are uttered by actors entering the playing area they usually contain far more factual detail than seems appropriate to a mimesis of high emotion.[42] Finally, an actor who begins speaking to the chorus or to an entity which is inanimate or which is not in the playing area may subsequently turn away to others. What Theoclymenus says to his father's tomb, *Hel.* 1165–76, primarily informs the audience about the king's state of mind,[43] but at 1177 without a pause he returns fully to the here and now of the dramatic action, noticing, with a

strophic choral odes: *Ant.* 384–85; *IA* 607–10. *Hel.* 1369–89 should be added to this list if Menelaus accompanies Helen (see note 23).

Twice one of two actors arriving together directs his first words to no one in the playing area, both in three-actor dramatic units and both after strophic choral odes: *Ag.* 810–28 (to the chorus, 829–54); *HF* 451–53.

One actor addresses another. In two-actor units, after strophic choral odes: *Sept.* 375–96; *Ag.* 1035–46; *Phil.* 730–31; *Hcld.* 784–87; *Med.* 446–64, 663–64, 866–68, 1002–7; *Hipp.* 176–97 (anapaests); *And.* 309–318; *Hec.* 953–67; *HF* 701–6; *Ion* 725–34; *Tro.* 1123–55; *IT* 238–39; *Bac.* 912–17. After other lyrics: S. *El.* 871–74; *OT* 698–99; *Hipp.* 682–94; E. *El.* 880–89. In three-actor units, after strophic choral odes: S. *El.* 516–51; *Trach.* 971–73 (anapaests); *OC* 720–21, 1249; *Hcld.* 381–88, 928–40; *HF* 140–69; *Ion* 237–46; *Tro.* 235–38; *IA* 303. After other lyrics: *Phil.* 1222–23; *OC* 551–68; *Hcld.* 709–10; *Hipp.* 1283–1312 (1283–95 anapaests); *Hec.* 1044–46; *Or.* 1018–21; *IA* 1338.

[42] Of six such utterances that I have found occurring after lyrics, five (*Ag.* 503–37; *Tro.* 860–83; *Hel.* 386–436, 1165–76; *Or.* 356–79), whose average length is twenty-nine lines, continue after the apostrophe with a statement of what has happened offstage, or of the new arrival's purpose, or both. In the sixth (*Or.* 211–16) the apostrophe leads into a brief self-reflection, a thinking-out-loud speech. See also Poe, "Entrance" 152.

[43] On the essentially nonactional character of this speech see Poe, "Entrance" 144–45.

cry of ἔα, that Helen is no longer at the tomb, and calling (1180ff.) for his horses.

Even if entrance speeches do vary considerably in the degree of their distance from the *niveau* of actional dialogue, a speech which is not directed toward an actor is a clear sign to the audience, at least in the plays of Sophocles and Euripides, that a new division of dramatic action is about to begin. I have found, in the plays of each of those authors, only five speeches to the chorus which interrupt actor–actor dialogue for more than two continuous lines.[44] Speeches directed toward no specified person, or to no entity in the playing area, are even rarer. Within actional dialogue only one passage resembling a thinking-out-loud speech is found (a series of asides made between *Hec.* 739 and 751), and speeches to the world at large—that is, true audience-asides—are unknown to Greek tragedy.[45]

If a speech which postpones actor–actor dialogue is distinctively characteristic of the resumption of dramatic action after a lyric, it is by no means a defining feature of the episode's structure. Significantly often, as we have seen, the tragic poet would dispense with such a postponement, causing an actor entering after a lyric to speak immediately to another actor or to be addressed by him. That the tragic poet thus did not always choose to signal the beginning of a new unit of dramatic action as clearly as possible should not surprise us. Since the performance of tragedy was continuous, and, as I have already pointed

[44] *Aj.* 1093–96; S. *El.* 372–75, 612–15; *OC* 631–39, 1348–53; *Hipp.* 284–310; *Hcld.* 1022–25; *HF* 275–78; *IT* 1056–74; *Phoe.* 962–69. Each of these speeches except for *IT* 1056ff. is a response to an initiative of the chorus. At *Phoe.* 960 the chorus intervenes only after the exit of one of the actors engaged in dialogue. Two of the speeches, *Hipp.* 284ff. and *Hcld.* 1022ff., belong to extended dialogues, each of them initiated by the chorus. Other extended dialogues between actor and chorus are found at *OC* 824–40, 856–62, and 878–83, and *Ion* 747–858. See Poe, "Entrance" n. 52. The last long passage contains two speeches to the chorus of more than two lines, 747–51 and 797–99. I do not include these speeches in the list above because in neither instance has one actor turned from another to speak to the chorus. This unusual passage is instead a three-way dialogue in which the chorus functions (as it does at *OC* 824–83) as a dramatic agent, offering information to both actors. At *Trach.* 385–86 and *Phil.* 974 Deianeira and Neoptolemus respectively turn to the chorus for advice. In the drama of Aeschylus, whose choruses more often play active roles, choral intervention in actor–actor dialogue is more common.

[45] According to Bain, *Actors* 56–57. Exclamatory apostrophes to deities, etc., occur commonly enough at moments of crisis within dialogue. But they are hardly comparable, in length or content, to the exclamatory speeches of entering actors discussed in note 42.

out, the suspension of action between individual dramatic units inevitably varied in degree, the different procedures that might lessen or increase, emphasize or deemphasize, this suspension naturally became sources of exploitation.

To appreciate this we need only compare the measured, leisurely development of the dramatic situation at *Alc.* 476–508, where the newly arrived Heracles gives the chorus no information which could not emerge from the dialogue with Admetus beginning at 509, with the guard's brief and direct announcement to the chorus at *Ant.* 384–85, to which Creon responds as he enters from the *skēnē*. The latter passage, whose procedure perhaps reflects the guard's urgency, allows a resumption of actional dialogue almost as immediate as that at *Med.* 866–68, where Jason ignores the chorus, announcing his arrival directly to Medea. Even so, the *Antigone* passage's more characteristic two–step movement into actional dialogue, along with its stylized double entry, a procedure which only occurs after lyrics (for instances see note 25), signals more clearly to the audience the beginning of a new unit of dramatic action.

At this point it may be useful to remind ourselves that virtually every lyric suspends dramatic action at least to a small degree. Lyric, however, is not the only phenomenon normally associated with the alternating suspension and assumption of dramatic action which divides tragedy into its constituent parts. The employment or omission of any such conventional procedure will strengthen or weaken the division in proportion to the procedure's usual frequency. Thus there is considerable continuity between the strophic choral ode *Hipp.* 525–64 and the actional dialogue which follows, in part because there is no entrance until line 601 (see below). There is, however, an unambiguous break between the dramatic passage, ending with the nurse's departure, which precedes this ode and that which follows. On the other hand, the epirrhematic passage *Eum.* 778–880, which also is preceded by an exit (of Orestes) but followed by no entrance, is so actional in character that we may reasonably doubt, with Taplin, that it can be said to divide two discrete units of dramatic action.[46]

If the opening of a new unit of dramatic action is less immediately apparent at *Hipp.* 565–600 than at *Med.* 866–68, that is because what fails in the former passage, the entrance of an actor after the lyric, is a

[46] *Stagecraft* 408–9. I agree with Taplin, as I shall argue below, that line 777 is a clear point of articulation.

more frequently occurring phenomenon than what fails in the latter, an actor's address of the chorus. The absence of an entrance does not necessarily mean that *Hipp.* 565–668 is to be regarded as a subdivision rather than a full-fledged episode. What *Hipp.* 565–668, along with *Eum.* 881–1047, tells us unambiguously is simply that clarity of the formal division of a play into parts was not always of primary concern to the playwright. He might, out of deference to his plot, for the sake of scenic plausibility, perhaps for the sake of simple variety, choose not to emphasize, or even to obscure or virtually to suppress, the normal structural articulation. Thus Aeschylus could well have employed an exclusively choral strophic ode at *Eum.* 778 followed by an attempt by Athena to reason with the Erinyes. He chooses the more actional epirrhematic form out of regard for the dramatic situation—in order to convey Athena's sense of urgency at this critical moment.

The omission of an entrance after a lyric when an exit has preceded it is, as we have seen (note 22), a license which the tragic poet did not often permit himself. He had at his disposal, however, a repertoire of other, mimetic, devices with which he might suggest continuity with the lyric itself or with what had happened offstage during the lyric.

(1) Usually when an actor enters, it is he who speaks first. On four occasions, however, an actor who has remained onstage takes the initiative, after a strophic choral ode or another lyric which follows an actor's exit, and speaks to an arriving actor before he is spoken to.[47] It has been suggested that this procedure represents eagerness on the part of the actor who has been waiting (Mastronarde, *Contact* 20). That, however, does not always seem to be true. Ion's greeting to the newly arrived guest from Athens at *Ion* 237–46 and Electra's formal welcome of Orestes as victor (E. *El.* 880–89) betray no signs of haste. Since, however, the lyric preceding each of these passages mentions the coming arrival, it may be safe to say that initiation of conversation by a waiting actor usually is an indication of anticipation.

(2) In fifteen instances, following a choral lyric, an actor arrives

[47] After a strophic choral ode: *Hcld.* 381–88. After a parodos in which an actor participates: *Ion* 237–46. After other actors' songs which are preceded by exits: E. *El.* 880–89, *Or.* 1018–21. E. *El.* 880ff. introduces a two-actor unit of action. In addition, at *Ant.* 631 Creon first responds to the chorus, then greets Haemon as he arrives (632–34). Iphigeneia at *IT* 472–81 directs a series of questions to the newly arrived Orestes after commanding attendants to loosen the prisoners' bonds. At *OT* 1110–18 Oedipus speaks to the chorus and is answered, then greets the herdsman (1119–20) as he arrives. The last three passages all follow strophic choral odes.

singing and, on two further occasions, speaking in iambics, engages in an epirrhematic exchange with the chorus.[48] Although such an actor's song seldom furthers the plot in a significant way, it can, because it usually expresses high emotion, represent the arriving actor as deeply engaged in a situation which has begun offstage, before the entry. It is worth noting that seven of the seventeen songs occur in a stereotyped situation: they express fear or despair after an act of violence, the victims of which the returning actor has seen offstage, if he has not been present as agent or witness of the act itself. Independent systems of choral anapaests and astrophic choral odes precede these seventeen actors' songs proportionally more often than do strophic choral odes (see notes 28 and 48). This may be because such lyrics usually are brief or because they suggest excitement. Anapaests, however, may be favored for another reason as well: they are associated with "processional" entrances. Six of our seventeen actors' songs (including two of the seven mentioned above) accompany entrances of litters bearing the dead or dying or entrances of escorted prisoners. Two of these six (*Ant.* 1261–77 and *And.* 1173–1225) are preceded by independent systems of choral anapaests. Each of the other four is preceded by an anapaestic announcement which immediately follows a strophic choral ode.[49]

(3) As two actors enter, one speaks to the other, a device which may imply that they are continuing a conversation begun offstage. Surprisingly, I have found only six places where it is employed, two in a late play of Sophocles and four in the work of Euripides.[50] On at least seven

[48] For entries which are made, after a lyric, to an empty stage, see note 28. In addition, actors enter singing when the stage already is occupied, or two enter together, at *PV* 561–608 and *Alc.* 244–72 in two-actor dramatic units, and at *And.* 501–44, *Tro.* 577–607, and E. *El.* 1177–1232 in three-actor units. All passages follow strophic choral odes. At *Hec.* 59–97, S. *El.* 86–120, E. *El.* 112–66, and *Ion* 82–183 an actor arrives to an empty playing area immediately after the prologue and sings a lyric (in the first two instances anapaestic) which leads into the parodos.

[49] Songs of despair sung by actors coming from a scene of an act of violence or from the presence of its victims: *Aj.* 201–62; *Ant.* 1261–77; *OT* 1307–66; *And.* 1173–1225; *HF* 1042–86; E. *El.* 1177–1232; *Or.* 1369–1502. Actors' songs following or accompanying entrances of litters or of escorted prisoners: *Ant.* 806–82, 1261–77; *Alc.* 244–72; *And.* 501–44, 1173–1225; *Tro.* 577–607.

[50] After strophic choral odes: *Phil.* 730–31; *Hipp.* 176–97; E. *Sup.* 1165–75; *Ion* 725–34; *IA* 303. After an actor's song: *Phil.* 1222–23. *Hipp.* 176–97 is in anapaests. At E. *Sup.* 1165ff. the stage is empty of actors, but at 1123 a supplementary chorus of children has entered bearing the ashes of the dead heroes. *Trach.* 971–73 should be added to this list if Hyllus, who engages in anapaestic dialogue with the old man, arrives with the

occasions, on the other hand, one of two actors who have entered together, after a strophic choral ode or after another lyric which follows an exit, addresses his first words to the chorus, to no one in the playing area, or to another actor already present. On one occasion the actor who has remained onstage speaks first to one of the new arrivals.[51]

(4) On five occasions an order is immediately given to a mute attendant present in the playing area by an actor who has remained onstage during a lyric or who enters after it.[52] One function of such a command is to convey the impression that the speaker is engaged in the dramatic situation even before action is resumed: he already has plotted his course of action, which he proceeds, with the order, to set in motion. In two of the five instances the command is completely actional: at *Eum.* 566 Athena orders a trumpet to signal the opening of the council,

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procession from a parodos. See above, note 24. At *Hipp.* 601–2 Hippolytus, who is accompanied by the nurse, arrives exclaiming to Earth, although he is deep in a conversation which has begun offstage. For other lists, see Taplin, *Stagecraft* 364 (who cites four of the five); Harms, *De Introitu* 33–34, 41; and P. T. Stevens, commentary (Oxford 1971) ad *And.* 146. Both of the latter cite instances from comedy as well.

[51] One actor of two entering together speaks first to the chorus: *Ant.* 384–85; *HF* 822–32; *IA* 607–10, all following strophic choral odes. *Hel.* 1369–89, also following a strophic choral ode, should be added if Menelaus arrives with Helen (see note 23). To no one in the playing area: *Ag.* 810–28 (829–54 to the chorus) and *HF* 451–53, both after strophic choral odes. To a third actor who already is present: *Hcld.* 928–40 and *Bac.* 434–50, both after strophic choral odes.

An actor already present addresses one of two newcomers: *Or.* 1018–21, which follows an actor's song. At *IT* 467–71, following a strophic choral ode, an actor already present first gives orders to attendants, then (472–81) turns to the newcomers.

Twice, at E. *Sup.* 381–98 and *Phoe.* 834–40, both following strophic choral odes, one of two actors arriving together first gives orders to a mute. Three times actors arrive together singing after a strophic choral ode: *Alc.* 244–72; *And.* 501–44; E. *El.* 1177–1232. *Hipp.* 176–97 is in anapaests. At *OC* 1670–1750 two actors, playing Antigone and Ismene, enter together, one of them singing a lyric in which first the chorus, then the second actor participate. This lyric does not, however, follow a strophic choral ode but comes immediately after, or simultaneously with, the departure of a messenger. For the departure of the messenger before the lyric see Poe, "Entrance" 132.

Of the passages cited above, *Alc.* 244–72, *Hipp.* 176–97, and *HF* 822–32 are in two-actor dramatic units.

[52] All five passages follow strophic choral odes and are found in three-actor dramatic units: *Eum.* 566–73; E. *Sup.* 381–98; *IT* 467–71; *Phoe.* 690–96, 834–40. At *Hcld.* 297–319 Iolaus, who has remained onstage during a departure and a system of choral anapaests, turns to the mute children, although Demophon also is in the playing area. At *Phoe.* 1067–69 the messenger, as he enters, addresses attendants who probably are inside the house.

and undoubtedly it does so; at *IT* 467–71 Iphigeneia tells attendants to remove the bonds of Orestes and Pylades. A command to a mute, however, is likely to be of minimal dramatic significance. Indeed, in each of the three remaining instances (all from the works of Euripides) the command actually is rescinded or preempted before it has been carried out; and it seems designed to accomplish little more than to give some dramatic color to the kind of information-giving, nonactional speech which normally is directed to the chorus or to the world at large. E. *Sup.* 381–98, for instance, in which Theseus instructs his herald to announce his intentions to Creon, may be compared with Creon's much longer opening speech at *Ant.* 162–210.[53]

(5) On four occasions an actor entering from the parodos directs a command, a statement, or a question to a mute who is already on stage or who is imagined to be inside the *skēnē*.[54] Each of these speeches, all but one of which are quite brief, is actional in the sense that it provokes a response from an actor or the chorus; and each will have surprised the audience slightly, since a newcomer, if no other actor with a speaking part is onstage, normally directs his first words to the chorus. His ignoring of the chorus and, at *Hcld.* 630–31, of another actor as well, probably, in some instances at least, conveys a certain sense of urgency. Even so, *Bac.* 170–77, which is much longer than the other four, contains a good deal of information which does not help the servant addressed to carry out his task and therefore must be intended solely for the ears of the audience (see note 29).

(6) On two occasions Euripides causes an actor who is emerging from the *skēnē* to turn and address another who is still inside.[55]

(7) A device employed more frequently than any of the six previously mentioned is what I would like to call, following Kremer (Tragö-

[53] At *Phoe.* 834–40 Teiresias gives his mute daughter three orders to do what she already is doing or which she cannot indicate physically that she is carrying out. He then turns to Menoeceus, who in the subsequent scene remains mute, and tells him to say how far they are from town. Before Menoeceus replies, Creon intervenes. The function of these commands may be to identify Teiresias through references to blindness and prophecy and to enhance the character-role that he plays by indicating his infirmity and consequent physical timidity. Cf. *Ant.* 988–90, which Teiresias addresses to the chorus.

[54] *Hcld.* 630–31, *IT* 1284–87, *Phoe.* 1067–69, *Bac.* 170–77. Each of these passages follows a strophic choral ode and each occurs in a three-actor unit. At *Cho.* 657 a slave responds to Orestes' summons of someone within (653–56), delivering a single line.

[55] *Bac.* 912–16, after a strophic choral ode, and *Hec.* 1044–46, after an astrophic ode. The former passage occurs in a two-actor unit.

dienschluss" 124–25, 133–34, 136), a "mirroring" passage—a passage in which an act of violence or a shocking discovery which takes place offstage is reflected by the reaction of the chorus or by that of the chorus and an actor who has remained onstage.[56] This reaction often is reinforced by cries from inside which are audible to the audience. A mirroring passage is an extremely effective means of maintaining dramatic continuity. It represents vividly an event offstage which, almost always,[57] has been anticipated by the audience since the last departure, which in each case has taken place before the lyric. And it arouses apprehension about what will be revealed with the entrance which invariably follows. Sometimes the revelation takes place immediately, with a presentation of a dead or maimed victim or a messenger's report of what has happened offstage.[58] On four occasions, however, the climactic moment is postponed, and the new arrival serves only to heighten the audience's anxiety. At *Cho.* 875, for example, a servant appears, exclaiming that Aegisthus is dead and calling for the door to the women's quarters to be opened. At 885 Clytemnestra appears, as

[56] I have found fourteen examples of mirroring passages. (Here, for the sake of clarity, I do not treat choral anapaests or iambics immediately following strophic choral odes as a part of those odes.) Within strophic choral odes: *Med.* 1271–92; *HF* 749–62; *Bac.* 576–603. Following strophic choral odes: *Trach.* 863–67; *Hipp.* 565–600, 776–89; E. *El.* 747–60, 1165–71. Within actors' songs which are preceded by exits: S. *El.* 1398–1421; *Or.* 1296–1301. Within an astrophic ode which is preceded by an exit: *HF* 875–909. After an astrophic ode which is preceded by an exit: *Hec.* 1035–55. After systems of anapaests which follow actors' exits: *Ag.* 1343–71, *Cho.* 869–74.

Of the passages cited above, *Trach.* 863–67 and *HF* 875–909 introduce one-actor units. S. *El.* 1398–1421, *Hec.* 1035–55, and E. *El.* 1165–71 precede three-actor units. In the dramatic unit following *Cho.* 869–74 four actors speak.

Two related passages also deserve mention. At *OC* 1456–85, following a strophe sung by the chorus, thunder heard in the distance three times prompts the chorus to exclaim in strophic lyrics. Sandwiched between these cries Oedipus and Antigone discuss in iambic trimeter what to do. At 1500 Theseus, whom the chorus has called, arrives in haste. At *Or.* 1345–46 Electra calls inside to Orestes and Pylades as Hermione enters the *skēnē*. At 1347 Hermione and at 1347–48 Orestes are heard from inside. A brief astrophic choral ode (1353–65, a strophe of which 1537–48 is the antistrophe) immediately follows. When Tecmessa twice cries out at *Aj.* 891–93, she probably is not in the *skēnē*.

[57] The sounds of the quarrel between the nurse and Hippolytus at *Hipp.* 565ff. are not anticipated, nor are the shaking of the palace and the fire from Semele's tomb which are described by the chorus at *Bac.* 576–603. At *HF* 875–909 the chorus reacts not only to Heracles' slaughter of his family, which they have been told by Iris and Lyssa to expect, but also to the shaking of the palace, which they claim, like the chorus of Bacchae, to see.

[58] Messengers arrive at *Trach.* 871, *HF* 910, and E. *El.* 761.

does Orestes at 892—just as she has called for an axe. Clytemnestra ultimately is led inside to her death, and the "*ecce* scene,"[59] which has been awaited since Aegisthus' departure at 854, is postponed until after the next choral ode (935–72).[60] At *HF* 815, the expectation of a revelation is immediately and completely disappointed by an unforeseen reversal, when, instead of Heracles with the body of Lycus, whose cries have been heard within, Iris and Lyssa arrive.[61]

Since actors' songs, because of their content (see note 7), and astrophic odes and anapaestic systems, because of their usual brevity if not also their content, occasion a weaker or shorter suspension of action than most strophic choral odes, we might expect devices which obscure articulation of the dramatic structure to be associated more often with these "minor" lyrics. That may in fact be true of (1) and (6) above, although the numbers of occurrences may be too small to offer representative samples. And it certainly is true of the passages cited under (7), which follow strophic choral odes significantly less often, proportionally, than other lyrics. Devices (4) and (5), on the other hand, follow strophic choral odes exclusively. The conventional devices, however, which characteristically occur at the beginning of dramatic units, and which therefore would seem to emphasize the articulation of the dramatic structure, follow strophic choral odes more often than other lyrics. Actors' entrances, as we already have seen, follow strophic choral odes with somewhat greater frequency than minor lyrics which are preceded by exits. Speeches, moreover, which are not directed toward anyone in the playing area, speeches directed toward the chorus, and dialogues between actor and chorus are found significantly more often after strophic choral odes than after other lyrics which have been pre-

[59] Kremer, "Tragödienschluss" 117–41 passim, who discusses only exodoi, uses the term "Ecceschluss."

[60] When at S. *El.* 1424 Orestes reappears within an epirrhematic passage from the *skēnē*, it is not to display the body of Clytemnestra. Aegisthus' approach is announced by the chorus at 1428, and Orestes departs at 1436 to avoid being seen, so that Aegisthus may be lured inside the house. At *Med.* 1293, after the cries of the dying children have been heard at 1271–72 and 1277–78, Jason arrives to say (1301–5) that he has come to save his sons, who subsequently are displayed by Medea at 1317. At *Hipp.* 790 Theseus arrives unexpectedly just after the discovery of Phaedra's body within. This arrival, however, like that of Jason, postpones the revelation of the body by only a few lines, until 810.

[61] A display of the body also fails after Helen's death cries are heard at *Or.* 1296 and 1301. At 1311–12 the chorus breaks off Electra's lyric outburst to announce the approach of Hermione. Apollo, of course, announces Helen's salvation at 1633–34.

ceded by an exit. An examination of the lists in notes 30, 31, 38, and 41 will show that such procedures follow about 54 percent of 113 strophic choral odes,[62] but only about 35 percent of other lyrics which are associated with actors' exits.[63] This suggests that Taplin's principle, that astrophic odes, choral anapaests, and actors' songs have an act-dividing function equivalent to that of strophic choral odes, may not be quite right. At least we can say that the suspension of actional dialogue after a "minor" lyric is less often reinforced by other structural conventions. Keeping in mind, however, that no single device in itself determines what is or is not an episode, we should beware of drawing further conclusions. To say that two units of dramatic action which flank an actor's song, astrophic ode, or system of choral anapaests are unobtrusively separated or even closely connected does not necessarily mean that the two are less than full-fledged episodes, or that the lyric dividing them is somehow subordinate to the strophic choral odes in the play. Since we have not yet arrived at a definition of the episode, we are not yet in a position to say whether that is so or is not.

2. ENTRANCES WITHIN UNITS OF DRAMATIC ACTION

In the discussion that follows I use the term "unit of dramatic action" (in abbreviated form, "unit") as it is described in note 12 above, to refer to passages of spoken verse or of spoken verse and song which are limited on each side by lyrics, either strophic choral odes or other

[62] Taking into account only the strophic choral odes and parodoi which precede a unit of action in which two or more actors with speaking parts participate. For a convenient list of the strophic choral odes in the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, see Kranz, "Übersicht" (*Stasimon* 124–25). (For the one-actor dramatic units which follow strophic choral odes, see note 65.) Rode's list of strophic choral odes, "Chorlied" 87–88, does not include parodoi in which actors participate, and it omits *Ant.* 944–87. Rode regards E. *Sup.* 778–93 as an independent strophic choral ode, while I treat it as part of a longer actor's song, 778–837.

[63] For a list of all such lyrics see note 22. I take into account only the forty-three which are followed by units of action in which two or more actors participate. From the list in note 22 eight precede units in which only one actor participates: Astrophic ode: *HF* 875–908 (Amphitryon, who participates in the lyric, remains in the *skēnē*). Anapaests: A. *Sup.* 966–79; *Cho.* 719–29; *Med.* 357–63, 759–63. Actors' songs: *Ag.* 1072–1177; *Eum.* 778–880; E. *Sup.* 1072–79. After *Aj.* 1163–67 Tecmessa enters carrying her child, while Teucer already is on stage. Tecmessa is not at this point, however, represented by an actor with a speaking role. See note 64.

lyrics which follow or are accompanied by an exit. This does not imply that all such dramatic units are equivalent in size or complexity or that they may justifiably be termed "acts" or episodes. For we have not yet demonstrated that an exit occurring before a lyric has any special significance.

Units so defined usually begin, as we have seen, with an actor's entrance. The majority of units have entrances within them as well, occurring after—often well after—the inception of spoken verse. In units in which only one actor participates, there is, of course, no later entrance. But single-actor units are exceptional, at least in the works of Sophocles and Euripides. After the 105 strophic choral odes (including all parodoi) of the extant works of these poets I have found only seven one-actor units. Five of these (*Trach.* 871–946, *OT* 1223–96, *OC* 1579–1669, *Ion* 1106–1228, and *Bac.* 1024–1152) are messenger scenes; the other two (*Alc.* 141–212 and *Hel.* 255–329) follow parodoi. (The parodos of *Helen* is an exchange between actor and chorus.) Five times—proportionally somewhat more often than strophic choral odes—other lyrics precede single-actor units.[64] After three of these five no entrance takes place; that is, the participating actor was onstage before the beginning of the lyric. And of the three, two are anapaestic systems occurring in an early play of Euripides. In Aeschylus, of course, single-actor units are more common, occurring after eleven[65] of the twenty-six[66] choral odes in the extant plays. Of four systems of choral anapaests in Aeschylus' work which are associated with an actor's exit (see note 22), two are followed by single-actor units which begin with an actor's entrance. Only two actor's songs in Aeschylus are preceded by an exit. Both are followed by single-actor units in which no entrance occurs.[67]

[64] *Med.* 357–63 and 759–63, both anapaestic systems; *Alc.* 861–933 (following the emptying of the playing area) and E. *Sup.* 1072–79, actors' songs; *HF* 875–908, an astrophic ode. Only *Alc.* 861–933 and *HF* 875–908 are followed or (in the former passage) accompanied by the entrance of an actor. Technically the anapaestic system *Aj.* 1163–67 should be added to this list. It is followed by an entrance, of Tecmessa with her child, but they remain mute until the play's end. I do not count *Aj.* 1168–84 here as a single-actor unit because it is atypical in form. Teucer, except for the entrance announcement 1168–70, speaks not to the chorus but to the mutes Tecmessa and Eurysaces.

[65] *Per.* 532–97, 852–907; *Sept.* 78–181, 720–91; A. *Sup.* 524–99, 625–709; *PV* 397–435; *Ag.* 40–263; *Cho.* 783–837, 931–72; *Eum.* 140–78.

[66] Excluding from consideration *Sept.* 822ff. See note 17.

[67] Choral anapaests preceding single-actor units: A. *Sup.* 966–79; *Cho.* 719–29. Actors' songs: *Ag.* 1072–1177; *Eum.* 778–880. Taplin, *Stagecraft* 222–30, doubts the au-

In addition, thirty-five two-actor units—a little more than one-third of the total—lack any entry after an actor has begun to speak. Only five of these two-actor units begin with the simultaneous entrance of both actors, a device that is, as already observed, comparatively uncommon (see notes 23 and 24). (In a sixth, *Sept.* 375–625, both entrances, if they are not simultaneous, have at any rate taken place before either actor speaks.) Three two-actor units (*OT* 698–862, *Hipp.* 682–731, and *Hcld.* 297–352, the two former following actors' songs, the third choral anapaests) have no entrance at all, since both participating actors already were onstage before the lyric began. But at least twenty-five two-actor units begin with a second actor arriving to join an actor who has remained onstage during the preceding lyric.[68]

As is to be expected, comparatively few three-actor dramatic units have no internal entrance. In four instances (two from one play) a third actor arrives onstage at the end of a lyric during which two actors have remained.[69] In six, one actor has remained and two arrive together.[70] At the beginning of one three-actor unit (*Alc.* 244–434, which follows a strophic choral ode) there is a simultaneous entrance of all three actors.

When more than one actor participates in a unit of dramatic ac-

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thenticity of A. *Sup.* 966–79, but on no good grounds, in my opinion. Astrophic songs are never associated with exits in the extant works of Aeschylus. The astrophic parodos of *Septem* is, of course, associated with an actor's entrance. For a useful summary discussion of the use of astrophic odes see Rode, "Chorlied" 92–94. See also Kranz, *Stasimon* 117, 202.

[68] Line numbers indicate the beginning of a new arrival's first words or of the first words spoken to him by the other actor. After strophic choral odes and parodoi: *Ag.* 503, 1035; *Eum.* 397; *PV* 561; *Ant.* 988; *Med.* 446, 663, 866, 1002; *Hcld.* 784; *And.* 147, 309; *Hec.* 177 (regarding 154–76, anapaests sung by Hecuba, who has been onstage during the anapaestic parodos, as belonging to the parodos), 484, 953; E. *Sup.* 634; *Tro.* 1123; *IT* 238; *Or.* 211. After other lyrics: S. *El.* 871; *Med.* 1116; *And.* 1231; *Tro.* 1260; E. *El.* 880, 998. In addition, when Ajax enters, after a strophic choral ode, at *Aj.* 646 to deliver his "Trugrede," there is no reason to believe that Tecmessa, to whom he speaks at 684, has not remained onstage during the preceding ode. Ajax' failure to speak to her at once is highly unusual, since she should be standing near the *skēnē* door. But one of the two certain instances of an actor's entering from the *skēnē* and deliberately ignoring another actor onstage occurs in this same play, at line 348. See Poe, "Entrance" 136–37 and n. 45.

[69] E. *Sup.* 87 and *HF* 140, both following parodoi; *OC* 551 and 1500 after actors' songs.

[70] *Ag.* 810 (where there is no evidence that Clytemnestra previously has left the stage); *Hcld.* 928; *IT* 467; *Phoe.* 834; *Bac.* 434, all after strophic choral odes; *Or.* 1018, following an actor's song.

tion, however, one of the entrances usually occurs at least a few lines, if not more, after the end of the preceding lyric (or after the chorus ceases to speak, if the chorus or chorus leader continues in a spoken meter without interruption after a lyric; see note 17). On twenty–four occasions a second actor, who may be accompanied by a third, arrives within ten lines after the first actor begins to speak (or, if the actor has been on stage during the lyric, after his first words in a spoken meter). In four further instances a third actor joins two others already present.[71] More often, the first entrance within a unit is postponed for twenty lines or more. I have found fourteen dramatic units in which a second actor arrives between twenty and thirty–nine lines after the unit's inception,[72] and four in which it is a third actor who makes the first "internal" entrance.[73] In twenty–seven units a second actor arrives forty or more lines after,[74] and in twenty–one it is a third actor who

[71] In addition to the eighteen places cited in note 25, where two (or more) actors arrive within ten lines of each other, six times an actor who has remained onstage during a lyric speaks, or exchanges with the chorus, ten lines or fewer before the arrival of a second actor. (In each of the following citations the first number indicates the line at which an actor first speaks after the lyric, the second number the line at which the new arrival begins to speak or is spoken to.) In two–actor units: *Ant.* 631, 632; *Med.* 1116, 1121; *Phoe.* 690, 697, after strophic choral odes; *Or.* 1313, 1321, after an actor's song. In three–actor units, both following actors' songs: *Phil.* 865, 867; *Or.* 1018, 1021. In four instances, all after strophic choral odes, two actors have remained onstage and a third arrives within ten lines after one of the two begins to speak in iambic trimeters: *OT* 1110, 1119; *OC* 720, 728 and 1249, 1254; *IA* 1338, 1345.

[72] Eleven passages which precede the arrival of a second actor and which begin in spoken verse are cited in note 37 above. To this list should be added *OT* 513, 532, where Oedipus enters exactly twenty lines after Creon. In addition, two passages of twenty to thirty–nine lines, both in two–actor units, begin with an actor's lyric: S. *El.* 1398, 1424; A. *Sup.* 873, 911. In each case the second number indicates the point at which the second actor delivers his first words or first is spoken to.

[73] First internal entrances by third actors arriving alone between twenty and thirty–nine lines of the dramatic unit's beginning: S. *El.* 1442, 1470; *Tro.* 860, 895; *Hel.* 1165, 1186; *IA* 607, 633, all after strophic choral odes. The former number indicates the unit's beginning, the latter the point of the third actor's arrival.

[74] Seventeen passages which precede the arrival of a second actor and which begin in spoken verse are cited in note 37. In addition I have found ten which begin with actors' songs and continue for forty lines or more before the arrival of a second actor. In each case the second number indicates the line at which a new arrival begins to speak (or sing) or is spoken to. In two–actor units, following strophic choral odes: A. *Sup.* 836 (?), 911; *Aj.* 201, 348; E. *Sup.* 990, 1034. Following choral anapaests: *OT* 1299, 1422; *And.* 1173, 1231 (since the cortège bearing Neoptolemus' body clearly has entered by 1231, I treat Peleus' kommos, 1173ff., as the beginning of the dramatic unit). Following an astrophic choral

makes this first internal entrance.[75] We should notice that it is much more common within two–actor units (twenty–one) than within three–actor units (six) for the second actor to be delayed forty lines or more.

But in three–actor units the distance separating the arrival of the third actor from that of the second is likely to be much greater than that separating the arrival of the second from the unit's beginning. I have found only six third–actor entrances that follow within ten lines of a previous entrance. Interestingly, five of the six occur within ten lines of the end of the preceding lyric—that is, from the dramatic unit's beginning; the sixth occurs within seventeen lines.[76] By contrast, fifty–three third–actor entrances follow the most recent previous entrance (or the unit's beginning) by more than twenty lines, forty–six of them by forty lines or more, and twenty by more than one hundred lines.[77] This sug-

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ode: *Or.* 1369, 1506. In addition, Creon may exit at *Ant.* 780, before a strophic choral ode, and return to the stage after the subsequent actor's song *Ant.* 806–82.

In three–actor units, after a strophic choral ode: *Bac.* 576, 642. After choral anapaests: E. *Sup.* 1123, 1165. At E. *Sup.* 1123 a supplementary chorus of children enter singing in responsion to the chorus; at 1165 the first and second actors enter. After astrophic choral odes: *HF* 1042, 1089; *Bac.* 1168, 1216.

[75]The former number in each case marks the unit's beginning, the latter the point of arrival of the third actor. In units following strophic choral odes and parodoi: *OC* 258, 324; S. *El.* 516, 660 and 1098, 1326; *Phil.* 219, 542; *Hcld.* 381, 474; *Hec.* 177, 218 and 658, 726; *And.* 501, 547; *HF* 451, 523; *Tro.* 235, 308 and 577, 709; E. *El.* 215, 341 and 1177, 1238; *Hel.* 1512, 1642 (assuming that the character who speaks at 1627 is the chorus leader); *Or.* 356, 470. In units following actors' songs: *Phil.* 1222, 1263; *OC* 1670, 1751; *IT* 657, 725. At *OC* 1669 an actor departs and at 1670 two others enter, one singing. In units following astrophic odes: *Hipp.* 1283, 1347; *Hel.* 528, 597. In a unit following choral anapaests: *Phoe.* 1485, 1539.

[76]The first number in each instance indicates the unit's beginning, the second the point at which the second actor arrives (or the unit's beginning if he already was onstage during the preceding lyric), the third the point of arrival of the third actor: *Eum.* 566, 566, 574; *Ant.* 384, 384, 387; *OC* 720, 720, 728 and 1249, 1249, 1254, all following strophic choral odes; *Cho.* 875, 885, 892; *IA* 1338, 1338, 1345, following other lyrics. In addition, at *Cho.* 653, 657, 668; *OT* 1110, 1110, 1121; *Trach.* 971, 971, 983 (Heracles awakens); E. *Sup.* 381, 381, 399; *Hcld.* 630, 630, 646; *IA* 303, 303, 317, all after strophic choral odes, the third actor's entrance follows that of the second (or the beginning of the dramatic unit) by fewer than twenty lines.

[77]The first number in each instance indicates the point at which the second actor enters, or, if he has remained onstage during the preceding lyric, at which the dramatic unit begins; the second number the point of the third actor's arrival; the number in parentheses the beginning of the unit. Third–actor entrances occurring twenty to thirty–nine lines after: *OT* 924, 950 (911); *Tro.* 860, 895 (860); *Hel.* 1165, 1186 (1165); *IA* 607, 633 (607); 819, 855 (801), all following strophic choral odes. Following actors' songs: S. *El.*

gests a tendency for dramatic units to divide into two scenes of significant length. Certainly it is exceptional for a unit to contain three lengthy scenes. In only nine dramatic units do two entrances take place, each of which is forty lines or more from its most recent predecessor or from the beginning of the unit.[78]

An examination of notes 37, 74, and 77 will show that astrophic choral odes are followed surprisingly often by dramatic units which divide into two or more substantial scenes. After ten of the eleven cited in note 22 either a second or a third actor, if not both, arrives forty or more lines after his latest predecessor or the end of the previous lyric. Are we to conclude from this that astrophic odes which follow an actor's exit in themselves signal more strongly than strophic odes the coming of a long and complex dramatic unit? Certainly not without qualification. Note 22 shows that astrophic odes tend to be employed toward the ends of plays, probably because of their brevity. Of eleven which follow an exit, eight occur after the play's last strophic choral ode.[79] It probably, therefore, is not as meaningful to say that astrophic odes necessarily introduce major dramatic divisions as to say that they

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1442, 1470 (1442); *Phil.* 1263, 1293 (marking a second entrance of a third actor) (1222).

Occurring forty to one hundred lines after, in units following strophic choral odes or parodoi: *Aj.* 1226, 1316 (1223); *Trach.* 180, 227 (141); *OC* 258, 324 (258); *Hcld.* 381, 474 (381); *Hec.* 177, 218 (177) and 658, 726 (658); *And.* 501, 547 (501) and 825, 881 (802); *HF* 451, 523 (451); *Tro.* 235, 308 (235); E. *El.* 503, 553 (487) and 1177, 1238 (1177); *Bac.* 178, 215 (170); *IA* 317, 414 (marking the second entrance of a third actor) (303). In units following actors' songs: *Phil.* 1222, 1263 (1222); *OC* 1670, 1751 (1670); *IT* 657, 725 (657); *IA* 1534, 1621 (1532). In units which follow astrophic odes: *Aj.* 977, 1047 (891; see note 22); *Hipp.* 1283, 1347 (1283); *Hec.* 1056, 1109 (1044); *HF* 1089, 1163 (1042); *Ion* 1261, 1320 (1250); *Hel.* 528, 597 (528); *Or.* 1567, 1625 (1554). In a unit which follows anapaests: *Phoe.* 1485, 1539 (1485).

Third-actor entries occurring more than one hundred lines after. In units which follow strophic choral odes: *Ant.* 387, 531 (marking a second entrance of a third actor) (384); *OT* 532, 634 (513); S. *El.* 516, 660 (516) and 1098, 1326 (1098); *Phil.* 219, 542 (219) and 867, 974 (865); *Ion* 237, 401 (222); *Tro.* 577, 709 (577); E. *El.* 215, 341 (215); *IT* 1307, 1435 (1284); *Hel.* 1514 (?), 1642 (1512); *Phoe.* 301, 446 (261) and 1072, 1270 (1067); *Or.* 356, 470 (356) and 470, 729 (the second entry of a third actor) (356); *IA* 1106, 1211 (1098). Although at *Hel.* 1512ff. it is unclear in which order the first and second actors appear (see note 24), certainly more than one hundred lines intervene before the entrance of the third. In units following astrophic choral odes: *Ion* 1320, 1553 (the second entry of a third actor) (1250); *Hel.* 597, 865 (the second entry of a third actor) (528); *Bac.* 1216, 1330 (1168). In a unit following an actor's song: *Phil.* 1293, 1409 (the third entry of a third actor) (1222).

[78] *Aj.* 891–1162; *Trach.* 141–496; *Phil.* 1222–1471; *HF* 1042–1428; *Ion* 1250–1622; *Hel.* 528–1106; *Phoe.* 261–637; *Or.* 356–806; *Bac.* 1168–1392.

[79] Exceptions are *Aj.* 866–90, *Hipp.* 362–72, and *Hel.* 515–27.

sometimes are employed in a specialized situation. Systems of choral anapaests (five of eighteen) and actors' songs (five of twenty–two), on the other hand, introduce dramatic units containing two or more substantial scenes somewhat less often than strophic choral odes (forty–four of 131). This suggests that an audience hearing anapaests and actors' songs would have been less confident that an important dramatic unit was about to follow.

I count 182 dramatic units which are introduced by a strophic choral ode or an actor's exit and a lyric of another sort. Of these more than one–third are characterized by an actor's entrance which follows by at least forty lines its nearest predecessor or, if there has been no previous entry, the unit's beginning.[80] This comparatively large number suggests that it may be reasonable to regard entrances occurring well within dramatic units as secondary dividers and the scenes which they separate as subdivisions of the larger unit. The articulating function of entrances would seem to be confirmed by the relative frequency with which an actor entering within a unit pauses to direct his first words to the chorus, or to everyone, or no one in the playing area before he enters into conversation with an actor or actors on stage. An utterance that is not directed to a dramatic agent is, as we have seen, especially characteristic of the resumption of spoken discourse after a lyric. Such (predominantly nonactional) speeches are found at the beginning of seventy–six (note 41) of the 156 units (notes 62–63) in which two or more actors participate, even though it clearly was conventional for actors arriving from the *skēnē* onto a stage already occupied to enter immediately into dialogue with another actor.[81] Within dramatic units, as well as at their beginning, an actor entering from the *skēnē* could ignore the presence of other actors only in very exceptional circumstances. Even so, within dramatic units I have found thirty–one entrances of actors who with their first words address in spoken verse someone or something other than an actor who is present.[82] Of these, seventeen (55 percent) terminate scenes of forty or more lines in length.[83]

[80] Sixty–four of a total of 131 units which follow strophic choral odes and parodoi, and fifty–one units (note 22) which follow another kind of lyric which is associated with an actor's exit. See notes 37, 74, and 77.

[81] Generally an actor entering from the *skēnē* can ignore the presence of another only if he immediately indulges in an emotional outburst like that of Cassandra at *Tro.* 308–40. See note 40.

[82] It may seem surprising that such speeches occur after dramatic dialogue has been resumed, since we have seen that it is unusual for an actor to break off actional dialogue to address the chorus or the world at large. The reason, I think, that an actor

It is now time to review what we have so far discovered. We have accepted as a working assumption that most divisions of the dramatic action in Greek tragedy begin (1) with an actor's entrance which is (2) preceded by a strophic choral ode. And we have pointed to other characteristics of the structure of such a division: (3) following the lyric a speech which is not directed toward a dramatic agent, (4) the participation of more than one actor, and (5) the postponement of the arrival of one actor well after the resumption of spoken verse. None of these characteristic features, however, occurs in every cycle of the dramatic structure. Even strophic choral odes fail significantly often to introduce a cycle which contains a majority of the other features. We have, therefore, not yet discovered a sufficiently reliable criterion for determining what is and what is not an episode. It is clear, for example, that a lyric other than a strophic choral ode may, at least when it is associated with an exit, introduce a new dramatic cycle. But should we consider this

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newly arrived from the parodos is licensed to direct his first words to someone other than an actor is that his entrance has already occasioned a brief but perceptible break in the dialogue. I have argued elsewhere ("Entrance" 130) that dramatic action is suspended by the announcement which normally (as Hamilton, "Announced Entrances" 72, has proven) marks an entrance not immediately preceded by a lyric. The announcement, which informs the audience that actors and chorus have noticed the entering actor, avoids an unmotivated silence while the dramatic ensemble waits for the new arrival to reach his playing position.

[83] Numbers in parentheses indicate the point at which the most recent previous entry has taken place or the unit has begun. Speeches initially addressed to the chorus or to everyone in the playing area by the second actor in two-actor units which follow strophic choral odes: A. *Sup.* 234–45 (176); *Aj.* 787–88 (719); *Ant.* 1183–91 (1155); E. *Sup.* 1034–44 (990); E. *El.* 761–64 (751). During an actor's song: *Or.* 1506 (1369). To no one in the playing area; after strophic choral odes: *Per.* 249–55 (155); *Phoe.* 1335 (1310). After choral anapaests: *Ag.* 1577–1611 (1372).

Speeches initially addressed to the chorus or to everyone in the playing area by the second actor in three-actor units which follow strophic choral odes: *OT* 924–26 (911); *IT* 1307–8 (1284). To no one in the playing area after a strophic choral ode: *Bac.* 642–45 (576). After other lyrics: *Aj.* 977–78 (891); *HF* 1089–1108 (1042); *Ion* 1261–81 (1250). In addition, at *Bac.* 1216–32, in a dramatic unit preceded by an astrophic choral ode, Cadmus directs his first line to mutes, the remainder of his speech to the world at large.

Speeches of third actors initially addressed to the chorus or to everyone in the playing area in dramatic units following strophic choral odes: *Eum.* 576–81 (566); *Aj.* 1318–19 (1223); *Ant.* 387 (384); *OC* 728–60 (720); S. *El.* 660–61 (516), 1442–47 (1424); *Hcld.* 120–22 (109); *And.* 547–58 (501), 881–82 (825); *Or.* 470–75 (356); *IA* 317 (303). After an astrophic choral ode: *Hec.* 1109–13 (1056). To no one in the playing area, after strophic choral odes: *Trach.* 983–87 (anapaests) (971); *HF* 523–30 (451); *Ion* 401–3 (237); *Bac.* 215–51 (178).

cycle or division an episode? The answer, I think, is probably yes, but the evidence is by no means decisive. Speeches which are not addressed to a dramatic agent immediately follow strophic choral odes significantly more often than lyrics of other kinds. Yet feature (4) follows other lyrics proportionally about as often as strophic choral odes; feature (5) occurs more often in cycles following astrophic odes. Certainly it cannot be said that nonstrophic lyrics and those in which actors participate give a dependable signal that the division of dramatic action which follows will be a minor one or in any way subordinate to what has preceded.

We have seen that an actor entering long after actional dialogue has begun may interrupt that dialogue to deliver a speech which is not directed to a dramatic agent. I have proposed that the comparatively lengthy scenes preceding and following such entrances might be regarded as subdivisions of the larger unit defined by strophic choral odes and/or by other lyrics which are preceded by an actor's exit. But does this not suggest that such scenes may be as complete and self-contained as many passages which I have identified tentatively as dramatic units? That is, is it not possible that the repeated cycles into which the play's dramatic action falls do not have to be separated by a lyric? Thus when Heracles at *HF* 523–30 greets his house and asks himself what the scene before it could mean, he interrupts a dialogue which began at line 451 and introduces another which continues for another hundred lines. We may compare this scene with the following "act" of thirty-three lines, *HF* 701–33, a brief dialogue preceded and followed by actors' exits and strophic choral odes. A scene like *HF* 523–636 differs *internally* in no essentials from a number of relatively brief and simple dramatic units which are defined on both sides by strophic choral odes. Even so, I do not believe that the audience would perceive 523–636 as a dramatic unit of the same order, since before 523 it has received no signal that a dramatic unit was ending. Not only does 451–522 lack a lyric at its end but, like almost all passages of spoken dialogue which precede a second or third actor's entrance, it lacks an actor's exit as well. And an actor's exit, as I shall argue below, is a very reliable signal that spoken verse is about to be interrupted by a lyric.

3. EXITS

Simultaneous exits of actors are somewhat more common than simultaneous entrances (see above), almost certainly because, as we

shall see, the stage is normally cleared much more quickly than it is filled. Actors not infrequently leave the stage together when they are departing to a common offstage experience. Such simultaneous exits are particularly frequent in three–actor units of dramatic action. On at least thirty occasions when actors depart in the same direction, the text allows, where it does not demand, simultaneous exits. Twenty–four of these exits take place in three–actor units.[84] In fourteen further instances actors leave simultaneously for different destinations.[85] Even

[84] Simultaneous departures in the same direction in two–actor units of dramatic action, before strophic choral odes: *OT* 862; *Phil.* 675; *And.* 463; E. *Sup.* 954; *Ion* 675. Before an astrophic ode: *Hec.* 1022.

In three–actor units, before strophic choral odes: *Cho.* 930 (where a fourth actor has delivered 900–902); *Ant.* 581; *Trach.* 496; *OC* 1043, 1555; S. *El.* 1375 (assuming that the paedagogue exits with Orestes into the palace); *Alc.* 434 (counting as an actor the child who has just sung a kommos); *Hcld.* 747; *And.* 765, 1008; *Hec.* 437; E. *Sup.* 364; *HF* 636; *Tro.* 461, 1059; *IT* 1088; *Hel.* 1300, 1450; *Phoe.* 1282; *Or.* 806; *Bac.* 369, 518. Before actors' songs: S. *El.* 803; *Or.* 1245.

[85] Simultaneous departures in different directions in two–actor dramatic units, before strophic choral odes: *Cho.* 584; *Aj.* 692; *OT* 462; *Trach.* 632; *Ion* 1047. Before an astrophic choral ode: *HF* 873. In three–actor units, before strophic choral odes: *OT* 1185; E. *El.* 431, 698; *IT* 1233; *Bac.* 518; *IA* 542, 1035. Before choral anapaests: *Cho.* 718.

In several other places actors may or may not depart simultaneously and in different directions: *Sept.* 719 (scout and Eteocles); *Ag.* 680 (Clytemnestra, who may not exit at all, and messenger); *Eum.* 777 (Apollo and Orestes); *Aj.* 814 (Tecmessa and messenger, preceding an empty stage rather than a lyric); S. *El.* 1375 (the paedagogue and Orestes) or 1383 (the paedagogue and Electra); *Trach.* 496 (messenger and Deianeira with Lichas); *Alc.* 860 (servant and Heracles); *Hcld.* 596 (Demophon and Macaria); *And.* 1008 (nurse and Orestes with Hermione); *Tro.* 789 (Andromache and Talthybius); *Phoe.* 635 (Jocasta and Polyneices); *Phoe.* 1282 (messenger and Jocasta with Antigone); *IA* 1474 (or 1509; Clytemnestra and Iphigeneia). We should notice that in most of the uncertain cases one of the departing actors represents a subordinate character. Not infrequently such characters depart in silence, so that it is impossible to be certain exactly when the departure takes place. Messengers' exits must take place not later than *Aj.* 814, *Trach.* 496, and *Phoe.* 1282; for, as *Ant.* 1253–56, *Hipp.* 1268–83, *HF* 1016–1163, and *Phoe.* 1480–1539 show, messengers customarily leave with the next lyric, if not earlier.

Taplin, *Stagecraft* 91, takes note of the comparative infrequency of simultaneous departures in different directions and claims that the only possible instances in Aeschylus are at *Sept.* 1078 (here left out of consideration; see note 17) and *Eum.* 93 (a prologue departure). There is no reason to believe, however, that, despite Taplin, *Stagecraft* 339–40, Orestes and Electra do not go in different directions; and at *Cho.* 712ff. the text indicates explicitly that Clytemnestra and Orestes depart at 718 for different destinations, even if there is only a single *skēnē* door through which they both must exit. On the question whether the *skēnē* of the fifth century had more than one door, see Dale, "Seen and Unseen" and "Interpretation"; Dover, "Skene"; Hourmouziades, *Production* 20–25; Taplin, *Stagecraft* 344, 349–51, 438–40.

so, individual exits are significantly more frequent than simultaneous ones. Counting only those departures occurring within twenty lines of the beginning of a lyric (since all simultaneous departures except that at *Tro.* 461 occur shortly before lyrics), I have found (in units in which two or three actors have participated) forty–eight highly probable, if not certain, exits by single individuals,[86] following which, during the next lyric, any other actors present remain onstage, and at least twenty–six additional instances of successive departures, one or more of which must, of course, be made by a lone actor.[87]

Normally the departing actor, or one of the two or three who may be leaving the stage simultaneously, draws attention to his (their) exit with a parting statement or other utterance, such as a command, a prayer, or an exclamation. Of the forty–eight actors whose departures are cited in note 86, only six, five of which belong to three earlier plays of Euripides, leave in silence.[88] In twenty of the twenty–six instances of

[86]In two–actor dramatic units, preceding strophic choral odes: *Eum.* 489; *PV* 396, 886; *Aj.* 595; *Ant.* 765 (assuming that Creon remains onstage during the succeeding lyric), 943, 1114; S. *El.* 471, 1057; *Med.* 622, 975; *Hcld.* 352, 891; *Hipp.* 524, 731; *And.* 268; *Phoe.* 783; *Or.* 315. Preceding choral anapaests: *Aj.* 1160; *Med.* 356, 758, 1080; *Hcld.* 283; *Tro.* 1250 (the processional departure of a body); E. *El.* 987; *Phoe.* 1479. The departure of Teucer at *Aj.* 1184 should perhaps be included, although technically it belongs to a one–actor unit; see note 64. Preceding astrophic choral odes: *Hipp.* 361, 1267. Preceding actors' songs: *Ag.* 1068; *Phil.* 820; *And.* 1165; E. *Sup.* 770, 1071; E. *El.* 858; *Or.* 956.

In three–actor units, preceding strophic choral odes: *OT* 1072; *OC* 667, 1210; *Ion* 451, *Hel.* 1106; *Phoe.* 1018. Preceding choral anapaests: *Hcld.* 701. Preceding actors' songs: *OT* 677; *OC* 509, 1446; *Hipp.* 668; *IT* 642; *IA* 1275.

[87]I count only departures separated by no more than twenty lines. In two–actor dramatic units, preceding strophic choral odes: *Per.* 514, 531 and 842, 851; A. *Sup.* 503, 523; *Ant.* 326, 331; *Trach.* 812, 820; *Alc.* 550, 567; *Med.* 1230, 1250; *Hipp.* 1089, 1101; *Hec.* 608, 628; *HF* 725, 733; E. *El.* 1138, 1146; *Bac.* 846, 861 and 972, 976; *IA* 741, 750. Preceding other lyrics: A. *Sup.* 951, 965; *Ant.* 1243, 1256; *Alc.* 733, 740; *Or.* 1345, 1352 and 1526, 1536.

In three–actor units, preceding strophic choral odes: *Ag.* 957, 974; *And.* 746, 765; E. *Sup.* 580, 597; *HF* 335, 338, 347; *Hel.* 1440, 1450. Preceding actors' songs: S. *El.* 1375, 1383 (assuming Orestes' departure after his final line); *Phil.* 1069, 1080.

In addition, consecutive departures perhaps but not certainly occur at *Ant.* 765, 780, and at *Hec.* 897 (where the servant ordered away may be a mute), 904. Spitzbarth, *Spieltechnik* 55, considers sequential exits a Euripidean technique, whose purpose is to allow the second actor to express himself freely. Ten of the twenty–six instances cited above, however, are found in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles.

[88]That is, all but six speak immediately before they depart: *Med.* 758, 975, 1080; *Hcld.* 352, 701; *Hipp.* 1267. I leave out of account *Tro.* 1250 (the departure of a corpse).

two or more successive departures, an utterance is delivered by a departing actor before each exit.[89] In only two of the cases of simultaneous departure (*Ant.* 581, *OC* 1043) do both exiting actors leave without a word. When "silent" exits do occur, they often seem to be indications of subordinate status. Of the seven single individuals who depart within twenty lines of the next lyric without speaking, four are anonymous messengers. The three departures of named characters occur in two early plays of Euripides.[90] In a number of other cases, silent departures of subsidiary characters are indeterminate, and are therefore not included in the numbers above. Thus the old servant who interrupts Clytemnestra and Achilles at *IA* 855 simply falls silent after line 895. Probably he departs at the same time as the other two actors, at 1035 (for other examples see note 85).

When a character whose further actions are of interest to the audience departs, however, his departure is usually preceded immediately by lines delivered by him or by another actor leaving with him. The expectation that a major participant in the dramatic action will

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Since it is not always certain when an actor exits, there is an element of subjectivity in these calculations. At *Hcld.* 283, for instance, I believe that the herald turns to go and that Demophon's insulting retort, "φθείρου," at 284 is spoken to his back. I regard Philoctetes as departing at 820, immediately after his final words. For although Neoptolemus tells the chorus that Philoctetes soon will be asleep, clearly the latter is not supposed to hear these words.

[89] In two-actor dramatic units, before strophic choral odes: *Per.* 480–514 (a messenger speech), 517–31, 800–42, 845–51; *Ant.* 324–26, 327–31; *Med.* 1136–1230 (a messenger's speech), 1236–50; *Hipp.* 1088–89, 1090–1101; *HF* 722–25, 726–33; E. *El.* 1132–38, 1139–46; *Bac.* 845–46, 847–61. Before choral anapaests: A. *Sup.* 950–51, 952–65; *Alc.* 730–33, 734–40. Before astrophic lyrics (*Or.* 1353–65 and 1537–48 are strophe and antistrophe): *Or.* 1344–45, 1345–46, 1349–52 (at 1347–48 the cries of the first departer, Hermione, and Orestes can be heard from inside the *skēnē*), 1526, 1527–36.

In three-actor dramatic units, before strophic choral odes: *Ag.* 944–57, 958–74; *And.* 729–46, 757–65; E. *Sup.* 580, 581–97; *HF* 332–35, 336–38, 339–47; *Hel.* 1429–40, 1441–50; *IA* 739–41, 742–50. Before actors' songs: S. *El.* 1372–75, 1376–83; *Phil.* 1068–69, 1074–80.

On the other six occasions the first of two departing actors leaves without speaking (numbers in parentheses indicate lines spoken afterward by the second actor, immediately before his departure): Danaus at A. *Sup.* 503 (516–23); Eurydice at *Ant.* 1243 (1253–56); Deianeira at *Trach.* 812 (815–20); Heracles at *Alc.* 550 (563–67); Talthybius at *Hec.* 608 (609–28); Pentheus at *Bac.* 970 or 972 (971–76).

[90] The three silent departures of named characters: *Med.* 758 (Aegeus) and 975 (Jason with his mute children); *Hcld.* 352 (Demophon).

speak before departing is so high that a silent departure of such a character seems in itself to have been a demonstration of his (at least temporary) subordination to another. At *Ant.* 581, for example, Antigone and Ismene are prisoners. At *Alc.* 550 Heracles, who yields the last word to Admetus, has been won over by him in an argument. At *Hec.* 608 Talthybius, who is distressed by his mission, departs wordlessly at Hecuba's command.[91] In two exceptional cases, however, an actor's wordless departure aims at exploiting the audience's expectation in a different way. At *Ant.* 1244–45 and *Trach.* 813–14, an expression of bewilderment by the chorus calls attention to the abrupt departures of Eurydice and Deianeira respectively, arousing apprehension about what they are about to do offstage.

Two silent departures should be mentioned whose function does not seem to have reference to the status of the character departing. When Aegeus at *Med.* 758 and Jason at 975 depart leaving Medea with the last word, this is probably not intended so much to convey to the audience the insignificance of these characters as to avoid a temporary diversion of the audience's interest from Medea, who dominates the stage. Because of the potential dramatic impact of a wordless departure, however, this will have been a risky procedure. When, therefore, the poet wanted to focus attention at the close of a dialogue on only one of the participants, he seems usually to have resorted to another device: the simultaneous departure of both, or all three, in two or more directions. Thus Sophocles probably causes Oedipus to exit without a final speech at *OT* 462 so as not to detract from the force of Teiresias' ominous speech of departure (447–62).[92] At *HF* 873 Lyssa and Iris depart simultaneously after a sixteen-line speech by Lyssa describing what she will do to Heracles and his family. In nine of fourteen examples of simultaneous exits in different directions, the character who speaks just

[91] Oedipus' short speech (*OC* 1042–43) just before the exit of Theseus and Creon may be an indication of his moral authority. Pentheus, now completely in Dionysus' control, exits at *Bac.* 970 or 972, allowing the god the last word. (Pentheus must turn to leave before Dionysus because he cannot hear Dionysus' final apostrophe of Agave.) Of all the characters who depart immediately after another actor, who will remain longer onstage, has spoken, only Demophon at *Hcld.* 352 unambiguously is in a position of greater power or prestige than his speaking partner.

[92] Another common procedure, employed at the close of a dispute or a hostile confrontation, is for one character to remain longer onstage, flinging a final comment at the back of the departing actor. Amphitryon at *HF* 726–28, for example, says to Lycus, who has turned his back and is conventionally not supposed to hear: Expect to suffer evil! See Mastronarde, *Contact* 30.

before departure is unambiguously the one whose subsequent activities are of more interest to the audience.[93]

All this would seem to suggest that the function of individual exits, with their accompanying exit lines, is to highlight the various offstage intentions of dramatically significant characters. This is, I think, in general true, but it is too narrowly stated. Individual exits may also reflect different opinions, or states of mind, which the parting words express. Thus, when two actors leave together, they have in mind not only a common destination and, usually, a common activity, but a shared attitude as well.[94] The poet may, moreover, even when two characters have the same destination, cause them to depart separately.

[93] In addition to the two passages cited above: *Aj.* 646–92 (Ajax' "Trugrede"; Ajax and Tecmessa exit); *Trach.* 630–32 (Deianeira speaks; Deianeira and Lichas exit); *OT* 1182–85 (Oedipus speaks; Oedipus, messenger, and herdsman); *Ion* 1039–47 (tutor, who will attempt the murder of *Ion,* speaks; old tutor and Creusa); *IT* 1222–33 (Iphigeneia speaks; Iphigeneia with prisoners and Thoas); *Bac.* 515–18 (Dionysus speaks; Dionysus and Pentheus); *IA* 528–542 (Agamemnon agonizes over his decision; Agamemnon and Menelaus). In addition, at either S. *El.* 1372–75 (Orestes speaks) or 1376–83 (Electra speaks) the paedagogue departs silently; but whether he departs with one of the speakers or in a different direction is uncertain. On two occasions (both in Orestes–Electra scenes) the two participants depart for different destinations but with a common purpose: *Cho.* 554–84 (Orestes speaks); E. *El.* 693–98 (Electra speaks).

In only three of the fourteen cases does a character whose viewpoint is different from that of his dialogue partner leave in silence if his dramatic significance is equal to or greater than that of the one who speaks: *Cho.* 707–18 (Clytemnestra, Orestes, and servant; Clytemnestra speaks); E. *El.* 420–31 (Electra and farmer; farmer speaks); *IA* 1033–35 (Clytemnestra, Achilles, and probably the old servant; Clytemnestra speaks).

[94] When two actors leave together it normally is an indication of substantial agreement, unless one is a captive. Characters in agreement: *Trach.* 496 (Deianeira and Lichas); S. *El.* 803 (Clytemnestra and the paedagogue); *OT* 862 (Oedipus and Jocasta); *OC* 1555 (Theseus, Oedipus, and Antigone); *Phil.* 675 (Neoptolemus and Philoctetes); *Alc.* 434 (Admetus, children with the body of Alcestis); *Hcld.* 747 (Iolaus and the messenger from Hyllus); *And.* 765 (Peleus and Andromache with child), 1008 (Orestes and Hermione); *Hec.* 1022 (Hecuba and Polymestor); E. *Sup.* 364 (Theseus and Aethra), 954 (Adrastus and Theseus); *HF* 636 (Heracles, Megara, and Amphitryon); *Ion* 675 (Xuthus and Ion); *IT* 1088 (Iphigeneia, Orestes, and Pylades); *Hel.* 1300, 1450 (in both cases Helen and Menelaus); *Phoe.* 1282 (Jocasta and Antigone); *Or.* 806, 1245 (in both cases Orestes and Pylades); *Bac.* 369 (Teiresias and Cadmus). In three instances—S. *El.* 803; *Phil.* 675; *Hec.* 1022—the sympathy is one mistakenly perceived by one of the characters. Prisoner or prisoners and captor: *Cho.* 930 (Orestes and Clytemnestra); *Ant.* 581 (Antigone and Ismene in custody of mutes); *OC* 1043 (Theseus and Creon); *And.* 463 (Andromache and Menelaus); *Hec.* 437 (Polyxena and Odysseus); *Tro.* 461 (Cassandra and Talthybius), 1059 (Menelaus and Helen); *Bac.* 518 (Dionysus and guard). It should be noted that in four of the prisoner–departures it is the captive who has the last word.

Among the twenty-six consecutive departures listed in note 87 I have found thirteen such instances.[95] In eight of these the poet's motive clearly is to emphasize difference of opinion, if not downright enmity, which (except in two instances of silent departure) the separate exit speeches make explicit. For example, Neoptolemus' failure to obey Odysseus' peremptory command (*Phil.* 1068–69) to come with him, and his order to the chorus to remain (1074–80), indicate his dissatisfaction with Odysseus' contemptuous treatment of Philoctetes.

Exit lines may, in fact, fail to mention where the speaker is going at all, or even that he is about to depart.[96] Often what he is about to do, or what he wants, is only implied, in a command, a threat, a reassurance, or a prayer, all of which are stock ingredients of the departure speech. The queen at *Per.* 517–31, for example, exclaims that she is wretched, apostrophizes her dream-vision, says that she will offer prayers to the gods, and bids the chorus accompany Xerxes to the palace if he should return. At *OC* 1208–10 Theseus merely assures Oedipus of his personal safety. Clytemnestra at *Ag.* 973–74 calls on Zeus Teleios to provide unspecified help. Nevertheless, the speaker's will and his outlook are in some way reflected, if not precisely articulated, in almost all exit lines. And his state of mind may be communicated in considerable detail, especially in the works of Euripides, who likes to exploit the departure speech as a vehicle for the display of emotion. Thus Andromache, whose child is about to be taken by the Greeks, delivers a forty-line speech of farewell at *Tro.* 740–79.

What kinds of things actors say at departure is, however, not of direct importance to my argument. What is important is that the speech

[95] A. *Sup.* 503 and 523 (Danaus and Pelasgus); *Ag.* 957 and 974 (Agamemnon and Clytemnestra); *Ant.* 1243 and 1256 (Eurydice and the messenger); S. *El.* 1375 and 1383 (Orestes and Electra); *Trach.* 812 and 820 (Deianeira and Hyllus); *Phil.* 1069 and 1080 (Odysseus and Neoptolemus); *Alc.* 550 and 567 (Heracles and Admetus); *HF* 335, 338, and 347 (Lycus, Megara, and Amphitryon), 725 and 733 (Lycus and Amphitryon), E. *El.* 1138 and 1146 (Clytemnestra and Electra); *Or.* 1345 and 1352 (Hermione and Electra); *Bac.* 846 and 861, 970 and 976 (both Pentheus and Dionysus). At A. *Sup.* 503 and 522 the difference of opinion is insignificant. At S. *El.* 1376–83 and *HF* 339–47 one actor lags behind the other to deliver a final prayer. Admetus' delayed exit at *Alc.* 567 gives him the opportunity to justify his entertainment of Heracles. After *Ant.* 1243 the messenger must remain onstage and continue speaking to the chorus in order to call attention to Eurydice's silent departure (cf. *Trach.* 813–20).

[96] At *Ant.* 324–26, for example, Creon threatens the guard and leaves without announcement. We know that at 326 he turns and leaves, because the guard's statement (327–31) that he will not return is in specific contradiction of what Creon has just said.

focuses attention on the actor about to exit and therefore on the exit itself. I argue that in Greek tragedy an exit normally marks the suspension of dramatic action. This is most obviously so when, after one or more departures, an actor finds himself alone on the stage. If he is himself to leave the stage, he must speak. But to whom? One resource was available to him which was not available to an actor entering an empty stage. He might, in scenes involving disagreements, speak to the back of a departing actor, usually with a taunt (Mastronarde, *Contact* 30; Bain, *Actors* 34 n. 4; Taplin, *Stagecraft* 221–22). But since by their nature such addresses can be no more than a few lines long, the speaker in the majority of such cases turns elsewhere after the exiting actor has disappeared.[97] A few times the actor who remains turns to mutes with a command. But such lines are also characteristically brief and never encompass the whole of an exit speech of an actor standing alone onstage.[98] The most frequent addressee of such an actor is, of course, the chorus,[99] but not infrequently he directs at least part of his speech to no

[97] In the following instances a lone remaining actor, who is himself about to exit, addresses at least some of his departing lines, indicated by numbers in parentheses, to another actor who already has started to leave the dramatic ensemble. A. *Sup.* 952–65 (952–53); *Ag.* 958–74 (958–72); *Ant.* 327–31 (327–31); *Alc.* 734–40 (734–38); E. *Sup.* 581–98 (581–84) (assuming that the herald has turned away after delivering his last line at 580); *HF* 726–33 (726–28); E. *El.* 1139–46 (1139–46); *Or.* 1527–36 (1527–30). In addition, *Or.* 1345–46, 1349–52 is an exceptional case in which the remaining actor (Electra) calls behind the back of the departer (Hermione) to those within the house. I assume that Dionysus' words to Pentheus at *Bac.* 971–72 are spoken before Pentheus turns to depart.

[98] At *Hec.* 608, for instance, after Talthybius leaves Hecuba alone, less than five lines (609–13) of her departure speech are directed to a maidservant. From lines 613 to 618 she thinks aloud, and from 619 to 623 she apostrophizes her home and Priam. Lines 623–28 are reflections on the vanity of human pride. Other commands to mutes, indicated in parentheses, are found in the following speeches: *Ant.* 1108–14 (1108–10); *Hipp.* 1090–1101 (1098–1101); E. *Sup.* 581–97 (584–87). After commenting at E. *Sup.* 1080–1103 on old age and its sorrows, Iphis commands his mute attendants to lead him home (1104–6), then (1108–13) apostrophizes old age. This whole speech, however, is technically delivered in a one-actor unit of action, for a brief series of choral dochmiacs follows Evadne's leap into the flames at 1071.

[99] I have found fifteen places where he addresses at least part of his exit speech to the chorus. In two-actor units: *Per.* 517–31, 845–51 (845–48 apostrophe of a deity); A. *Sup.* 516–23, 952–65 (952–53 to departing actor); *Ant.* 1108–14 (1108–10 to mutes), 1253–56; *Trach.* 815–20; *Alc.* 563–67, 734–40 (734–38 to departing actor); *Med.* 1236–50 (1242–50 a self-address); *Hipp.* 724–31; *HF* 726–33 (726–28 to departing actor); *Bac.* 847–61 (849–61 probably all part of an apostrophe of a deity). In three-actor units: *Phil.* 1074–80, *Phoe.* 991–1018. Three of the passages above precede choral anapaests: A. *Sup.* 952–65;

one at all, or at least to no one who is present and immediately responsive.[100] His closing words may include a prayer or an apostrophe to a deity,[101] an apostrophe to an absent person or an abstraction,[102] a thinking-out-loud speech,[103] or lines addressed to the world at large.[104] For us the significant thing about these speeches is not their form or their specific content, but the fact that they are, with perhaps a couple of exceptions, predominately nonactional in character.[105] Even the

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Ant. 1253–56; *Alc.* 734–40; *Phil.* 1074–80, an actor's song. All others precede strophic choral odes. Three of the passages above are not listed in note 87 because the first departure occurs more than 20 lines before the second (points of departure indicated in parentheses): *Ant.* 1108–14 (1090 and 1114); *Hipp.* 724–31 (709 and 731); *Phoe.* 991–1018 (990 and 1018).

[100] Twelve times after the departure of one or more actors, an actor who is left onstage addresses, before his departure, no one who is in the playing area or an entity which is inanimate. In two-actor dramatic units: *Per.* 845–51 (849–51 presumably to the chorus); *Med.* 1236–50 (1236–41 to chorus); *Hipp.* 1090–1101 (1098–1101 to mutes); *Or.* 1527–36 (1527–30 to departing actor); *Bac.* 847–61 (847–48 to the chorus); 971–76 (971–72 to departing actor). In three-actor units: *Ag.* 958–74 (958–72 to departing actor); S. *El.* 1376–83; *Hec.* 609–28 (609–13 to a mute); *HF* 339–47; *Ion* 429–51; *IA* 742–50. *Or.* 1527–36 precede lyrics which in their context are astrophic. All others precede strophic choral odes. In the case of *Ion* 429–51 the earlier departure (428) occurs more than twenty lines before the later (451).

[101] For instance, Hippolytus at *Hipp.* 1092–94, to Artemis. On prayers in exit speeches see Schadewaldt, *Monolog* 101–4, 243; Leo, *Monolog* 29, 53; Taplin, *Stagecraft* 306. More generally on dramatic prayers see Langholf, *Gebete*, esp. 69, 73–76.

[102] For example, Dionysus at *Bac.* 971–72 first speaks to Pentheus, then at 973–76 apostrophizes Agave. Hippolytus, after addressing Artemis, bids farewell to the city, the land of Erechtheus, and the plain of Troezen (1094–97).

[103] After the successive exits of Xuthus and Creusa, Ion asks himself (*Ion* 429–32) what Creusa's remark about Apollo's wrong could have meant, indicates (433–36) that he will go to attend to his duties, admonishes Apollo for immorality (436–40), and reflects upon the injustice of the gods generally and the bad examples that they set for men (440–51). Medea finishes her long speech (*Med.* 1236–50) with an address to her heart and hand, and admonishes herself not to be cowardly, etc., ending with an exclamation that she is an unfortunate woman (1242–50). On addresses to parts of the body see Leo, *Monolog* 32; Schadewaldt, *Monolog* 24–25, 207–208, 211, 219–21; Spitzbarth, *Spieltechnik* 87–88.

[104] After flinging a taunt at the back of the Phrygian slave as he departs, Orestes continues (*Or.* 1531–36), long after the slave is out of earshot, with a declaration, addressed to no one in particular, that he does not fear Menelaus and that if Menelaus attacks he will find his wife and daughter dead. At *IA* 742–50 Agamemnon, after he has failed to convince (the now departed) Clytemnestra that she should return home, exclaims that he is frustrated, says that he will consult Calchas, and ends with a gnomic statement on the wisdom of marrying helpful wives.

[105] Possible exceptions are A. *Sup.* 952–65 and *Or.* 1345–52. In the former, the maidens of the chorus, despite their passivity, are agents of the plot (although what

lines which are spoken to departing actors cannot affect subsequent action because, as Mastronarde (*Contact* 30) has shown, the addressee in such cases is by convention unable to hear.

Because simultaneous exits are more common than simultaneous entrances, actors stand alone onstage and speak less often immediately before a lyric than immediately after. There is, nevertheless, a pronounced tendency for actors to turn away just before a lyric and to address the chorus, an absent person, a deity, etc., even when structural convention does not demand it. (1) I have found, for example, forty places where two or more actors almost certainly depart simultaneously just before a lyric.[106] In each case it would be possible for the actors to remain in conversation with each other until the moment of departure or for them to exit with one speaking to the other. This in fact occurs about half the time. On eight of these occasions, however, the actor who speaks immediately before departure turns away to address at least some of his lines to the chorus;[107] on twelve occasions, to himself or an inanimate being or one not physically in the playing area.[108] (2) Thirty times immediately before a lyric an actor departs after speaking, leaving one or more other actors, to whom he might address his final lines, on the stage. On about 53 percent of these occa-

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Pelasgus says to them in this passage—"Go to the town"— has no direct effect on the plot). In the latter, Electra twice calls inside to her brother and Pylades, telling them to seize Hermione. Creon's command to attendants to hurry (*Ant.* 1108–10) is hardly more than a confirmation of his intent to free Antigone.

[106]The instances cited in notes 84 and 85, less S. *El.* 803, 1375; *Hec.* 437; and *Tro.* 461, all of which precede the next lyric by some lines. It is possible that a simultaneous exit takes place not at S. *El.* 1375 but at 1383, immediately before a lyric. See note 85.

[107]In two-actor dramatic units: *Cho.* 554–84 (579–80 to the other actor); *Aj.* 646–92 (Ajax' "Trugrede"; 646–84 to the world at large, 684–86 to the other actor); E. *Sup.* 947–54 (947 to another actor). In three-actor units: *Alc.* 420–34; E. *Sup.* 334–64 (334–41? to another actor; 342–58 a self-address); E. *El.* 693–98 (693 to another actor); *IT* 1078–88 (1079–81 to another actor, 1082–88 an apostrophe of Artemis); *IA* 528–42 (528–41 to another actor). All passages precede strophic choral odes.

[108]In two-actor units: *Aj.* 646–92 (684–86 to other actor, 687–92 to chorus); *HF* 621–36 (621–28 to mutes), 858–73 (872–73 to another actor); *Ion* 1039–47 (1039–40 to another actor); *IT* 1222–33 (1222–25 to another actor?, 1226–29 to the world at large? to everyone present?). *HF* 858–73 precedes an astrophic choral ode, the other passages strophic choral odes. In three-actor units: *OT* 1182–85; *OC* 1518–55 (1518–48, 1552–55 to another actor); *Hcld.* 740–47; *Tro.* 424–61 (424–50, 455–58 to other actors); *IT* 1078–88 (1078 to chorus, 1079–81 to another actor); *Hel.* 1441–50; *Or.* 1240–45 (1240–42 to other actors). *Or.* 1240–45 precedes an actor's song, other passages strophic choral odes.

sions he directs his words exclusively to another actor or to a mute.[109] One-third of the time, however, he directs at least part of his exit speech to the chorus (six times),[110] or (four times) to an entity not in the playing area or to the world at large.[111] (3) Finally, when an actor will remain onstage during a lyric, the lyric commences, in most instances, immediately after the exit of the actor(s) with whom he has been speaking. I have found eleven places, however, where the actor left alone on the stage postpones the lyric with a statement to the chorus, a self-address, an apostrophe or prayer, or a statement which has no clearly defined addressee.[112]

[109] Sixteen times he directs his parting words exclusively to another actor and/or to mutes. In two-actor units, before strophic choral odes: *PV* 393–96; *Aj.* 594–95; S. *El.* 1055–57; *Hcld.* 884–91; *Phoe.* 748–83; *Or.* 307–15. Before other lyrics: *Med.* 348–56; E. *Sup.* 1069–71; E. *El.* 985–87.

In three-actor units, before strophic choral odes: *OC* 656–67, 1208–10; *Hec.* 898–904; E. *Sup.* 581–97. Before other lyrics: *OT* 676–77; *OC* 1443–46; *IT* 628–42.

[110] In two-actor dramatic units: *Ag.* 1064–68; *Eum.* 470–89 (470–84 to another actor); S. *El.* 466–71; *Hipp.* 353–61 (353 to another actor, 355 to an entity not in the playing area). In three-actor units: *Phil.* 1074–80; *OC* 507–9 (only part of line 507 to chorus). S. *El.* 466–71 and *Eum.* 470–89 precede strophic choral odes, the other passages other lyrics. An additional four of these speeches are addressed in their entirety to both chorus and remaining actor: *And.* 1085–1165; E. *El.* 774–858; *Phoe.* 1427–79; *Or.* 866–956. *Phoe.* 1427–79 precede choral anapaests, the other passages actors' songs.

[111] In two-actor units: *PV* 877–86 (in anapaests); *Ant.* 937–43 (in anapaests); *Hipp.* 521–24 (521 to other actor). In a three-actor unit: *Hipp.* 616–68 (656–64 to another actor). *PV* 877–86, *Ant.* 937–43, and *Hipp.* 521–24 precede strophic choral odes; *Hipp.* 616–68 an actor's song.

[112] In two-actor units: *Ant.* 766–80 (dialogue with the chorus ending with a longer statement by the actor, 773–80); *Phil.* 821–26 (to chorus); *Med.* 1019–80 (1019–41 to mute children, 1042–44 to chorus, 1044–52 thinking out loud, 1053 to children, 1053–68 thinking out loud, 1069–77 to children, 1078–80 thinking out loud); *And.* 269–73 (probably to the world at large); E. *Sup.* 771–77 (771 to departing actor, 772–77 to the world at large); *Tro.* 1240–50 (to chorus, 1246–47 to attendants to take the corpse of Astyanax, 1248–50 to chorus or to the world at large); *IT* 344–91 (344–47 to heart, 348–50 to absent future captives, 351–77 to chorus, 378–79 to absent Orestes, 380–91 thinking out loud); *Hel.* 483–514 (thinking out loud). In three-actor units: S. *El.* 804–22 (804–7 to chorus, 808–14 to absent Orestes, 814–22 to Orestes? to chorus?); *Hec.* 438–43 (438–40 to departer, 440–43 to chorus); *Tro.* 466–510 (466–99 to chorus, 500–502 to absent Cassandra and Polyxena, 503–10 to mutes). S. *El.* 804–22, *Phil.* 821–26, and E. *Sup.* 771–77 are followed by actors' songs; *Med.* 1021–80 and *Tro.* 1240–50 by anapaests; *Hel.* 483–514 by an astrophic ode. All other passages are followed by strophic choral odes. In three additional passages an actor left alone to remain onstage during the following lyric delivers a final speech which he directs to the back of the departing actor or to mutes (*Phoe.* 636–37; *Tro.* 790–98; *Hcld.* 597–607).

I am not arguing that all of these exit speeches are necessarily nonactional. I am simply saying that a certain disengagement from actor–actor dialogue is a conventional feature of speeches which immediately precede lyrics.[113] It is by no means an indispensable feature, and when such disengagement occurs, it varies greatly in degree. What is of special interest to me, however, is that after most actors' exits the disengagement is unambiguous. The tragic poet seems to have been concerned to give passages of spoken verse which follow exits a formally distinctive character from what has gone before. Dialogue, even with the chorus, is avoided.[114] It occurs in only four of the thirty–seven passages cited in notes 87 and 112.[115] When two actors remain onstage after a departure, there is of course no realistic reason for dialogue not to continue. There clearly, however, is a conventional reason. In six of the instances cited in note 87, the first departer leaves two actors on the stage. In only one of the six is there a continuation of dialogue after the exit of the first actor.[116] In four of the six neither of the remaining actors speaks to the other at all.[117]

[113] Schadewaldt, *Monolog* 243, recognizes that certain "non–dialogic forms" such as prayers and self–addresses develop into stereotyped forms at the end of dialogue. He suggests (230) that at least one of these forms, the thinking–out–loud speech, occurs at the beginning and end of dialogue ("Ruhepausen") because it does not have enough power to break into the action. See also his pp. 29, 219–21.

[114] Dialogue between actor and chorus immediately after a lyric, preliminary to dialogue between actors, is, however, not uncommon. Here, as elsewhere, I consider a minimal dialogue to be an exchange between two parties in which each responds once to an utterance of the other.

[115] A. *Sup.* 504–23 (Pelasgus and chorus); *Ant.* 766–80 (Creon), 1244–56 (messenger); *Alc.* 551–67 (Admetus). In two further instances of double departure, *Ant.* 1091–1108 and *Hipp.* 710–31, which are not cited in note 87 because the two exits do not occur within twenty lines of each other, Creon after Teiresias' departure, and Phaedra after the nurse's, engage the chorus in conversation.

[116] At *And.* 747–49, after Menelaus' departure, Peleus urges Andromache to come. She thanks Peleus and expresses apprehension (750–56). Peleus responds (757–65) with an assurance and again urges her to leave the stage.

[117] At *Ag.* 958–74 (Clytemnestra and Cassandra), *Phil.* 1070–80 (Neoptolemus and Philoctetes), *HF* 336–38 (Megaera and Amphitryon), and *Hel.* 1441–50 (Menelaus and Helen) neither actor speaks to the other. At E. *Sup.* 581–97 Theseus addresses part of his departing speech, after the herald from Argos leaves, to Adrastus, who does not reply.

Twice when an exit leaves two actors onstage spoken verse continues, but there is no second exit; that is, both remain during the lyric which follows shortly. In neither instance does dialogue between the two take place. At *OT* 1076–85 Odysseus ignores the messenger from Corinth to speak to the chorus. At *IA* 1276–78 Clytemnestra speaks to Iphigeneia and the chorus in anapaests and Iphigeneia replies with a long lyric.

When, therefore, an actor leaves the stage, even if his exit is not immediately followed by a lyric, the audience must expect a suspension of actional dialogue. It is true that occasionally, especially after the departure of an anonymous figure, no such suspension occurs;[118] it may be, since such departures sometimes go unremarked in the text,[119] that they occur in the midst of actional dialogue more often than we are aware. The rule seems to be, however, that when an actor leaves the stage whose offstage activities are of interest to the audience (and often when one leaves whose activities are not), actor–actor dialogue is not continued or resumed before the beginning of the next lyric.

Did the dramatist want to avoid diluting the exit's dramatic value by diverting the audience's attention immediately after? Or does the usage go back to a time when he had only one actor at his disposal? The significant thing for us is that the tragic poet had to forgo the full exploitation of his three actors in order to observe this rule. And indeed the rule was not always strictly observed. Euripides in his late plays experimented sporadically with the employment of departures within actional dialogue as a new structural technique. Eight times in his work actor–actor dialogue follows the exit of a named actor before the intervention of a lyric. Six of these instances are found in plays produced in 412 and after, four of them in two plays and two in a single, extended dramatic unit, *Or.* 356–806.[120] Five such departures are to be found in the works

[118] I have found at least four places where certain departures of messengers or servants are followed by actional dialogue: *Ant.* 445; *Phoe.* 1263; *Bac.* 786; *IA* 441. At *Cho.* 667 a departure probably also occurs which is followed by actor–actor dialogue, but this is not a perfectly unambiguous case. It may be that the servant who is ordered by Orestes to announce his arrival has never emerged from the door of the *skēnē*. At *Hec.* 890–94 Hecuba sends away a servant who may be a mute, then turns to Agamemnon, who replies (898–904). Although the departure of the messenger at *Phoe.* 1263 is not explicitly announced in the text, it is a general rule that messengers depart after they cease to speak, as *Ant.* 1256, *Hipp.* 1267, *HF* 1015, and *Phoe.* 1479 clearly show. (The messenger's departure at *Ant.* 1256 is announced. In the other cases the actor must appear in a new role.)

[119] At some point after *IA* 316, for example, the old manservant must depart quietly, for he must return at 414 as a messenger. After falling silent again at *IA* 895, does he exit or remain until the beginning of the stasimon at 1036? Probably, but not certainly, the old man who falls silent at *Trach.* 433 waits until 496 to depart. But does the scout remain onstage after *Sept.* 652?

[120] Exits occurring at: *And.* 746 (Menelaus; Andromache and Peleus remain); E. *El.* 400 (Orestes; Electra and her husband remain); *Hel.* 1029 (Theonoe; Helen and Menelaus); *Phoe.* 959 (Teiresias; Creon and Menoeceus); *Or.* 629 (Tyndareus; Menelaus and Orestes), 716 (Menelaus; Orestes is left alone but joined at 729 by Pylades); *IA* 685

of Sophocles (three in his last two plays),[121] of which four, at least, are patently violations of convention for dramatic effect. At *Trach.* 334, for example, Deianeira is about to enter the *skēnē* with Lichas, who precedes her. Unexpectedly, however, she is waylaid by the messenger, and the action continues to 496. (In this passage the audience's surprise at the postponement of the awaited choral ode will have been reinforced by a second violation of convention: the old man, who has been silent for more than one hundred lines, should, like a good messenger—see note 118—have left the stage with the earlier lyric, 205ff.). *OC* 847ff., where Antigone is dragged away by Creon's henchmen, offers another example of false departure. Creon should follow Antigone, thus ending the unit of dramatic action, and he attempts to do so, but he is prevented at 856 by the startling intervention of the chorus.[122]

Here I think that we are safe in saying that the exceptions generally confirm the rule, and that an actor's exit is a dependable indication that dramatic action is about to be suspended. When an actor leaves the stage, the audience will expect a lyric before dialogue between actors is resumed. The question remaining is whether the suspension of dramatic action which an exit signals, necessarily marks the end of an episode. We observed, for instance, at the beginning of this paper that units of dramatic action vary greatly in size and complexity, and that certain lyrics, astrophic odes, choral anapaests, and actors' songs, by virtue of their content or length suspend actional dialogue either more briefly or less completely than most strophic choral odes. Since this is so, we may reasonably wonder whether astrophic odes, choral anapaests, and actors' songs, even when they are preceded by departures,

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(Iphigeneia; Clytemnestra and Agamemnon), 1432 (Achilles; Clytemnestra and Iphigeneia). The exchange between Andromache and Peleus at *And.* 747–66 is fundamentally an exit announcement set in dialogue form. I do not include the departure of the anonymous messenger at *Hel.* 757 or that of the Pythia at *Ion.* 1368. For although neither role is an insignificant one, the audience is interested, at the point of departure, in the future of neither. Neither this list nor that in the following note includes departures which are followed by an empty playing area rather than by a lyric.

[121] *Aj.* 989 (Tecmessa; Teucer is joined at 1047 by Menelaus); *Trach.* 334 (Lichas; Tecmessa and the old man remain); *Phil.* 1258 (Odysseus; Neoptolemus is joined at 1263 by Philoctetes), 1300 (Odysseus; Neoptolemus and Philoctetes); *OC* 847 (Antigone; Creon and Oedipus). Perhaps wrongly, I do not include the silent departure of the anonymous guard at *Ant.* 445. In addition, at S. *El.* 1436 Orestes exits near the end of an epirrhematic passage ending at 1441. At 1442 Aegisthus enters.

[122] At *Phil.* 1258 and 1300 the unceremonious departures of Odysseus clearly underscore his defeat.

more often follow dramatic units which deserve to be called subdivisions rather than episodes. Before these minor lyrics is dramatic action less often brought to a decisive close? Are the dramatic units which precede them usually briefer or less complex? To the first question an examination of the thirty-eight passages cited in notes 99, 100, and 112 should give us a rough answer. For, as we have seen, the suspension of dramatic action which is effected by an exit and a lyric is often reinforced, in the last iambic lines before the lyric, by a certain disengagement from actor–actor dialogue. In almost all passages that leave an actor standing alone onstage, this disengagement is not subject to doubt. If, therefore, proportionally fewer of these passages precede astrophic lyrics, anapaests, and actors' songs, that should indicate a tendency for the suspension of dramatic action preceding these lyrics to be less strong. In fact fewer do occur, but the difference is too slight to be significant. After another actor's departure a single actor remains onstage and speaks before astrophic odes, actors' songs, or systems of choral anapaests in eleven instances, about 27 percent of all of lyrics which follow an exit in two- or three-actor units.[123] Twenty-seven strophic choral odes, about 31 percent,[124] follow such passages.

But if the answer to the first of our two questions above is "probably not," the answer to the second seems to be yes. At any rate choral anapaests and astrophic odes (but not actors' songs) seem to follow structurally simple dramatic units disproportionally often. Of eighteen systems of choral anapaests which follow or accompany an exit, four are preceded by one-actor units; of astrophic odes, four of eleven (note 123). By comparison, only fourteen of one hundred strophic choral odes follow one-actor dramatic units, nine of these in the works of Aeschylus (note 124). Moreover, messenger scenes, which very often are preparatory and therefore subordinate to the following dramatic unit (see

[123] Of the fifty-one lyrics cited in note 22 the following choral anapaests follow one-actor units: *Ag.* 1331–42; *Cho.* 855–68; *OT* 1297–1306; E. *Sup.* 1114–22. Astrophic choral odes: *Aj.* 866–90; *HF* 1016–38; *Ion* 1229–49; *Bac.* 1153–64. Actors' songs: *OC* 1670–1750; *Hel.* 330–85.

[124] Taking into account only the eighty-six strophic odes which follow units of action in which two or more actors participate. For a convenient list of strophic choral odes see Kranz's "Übersicht," *Stasimon* 124–25. From Kranz's list the following lines (according to his numeration) mark the beginning of strophic choral odes which follow one-actor units of action: *Per.* 633; *Sept.* 287, 832; A. *Sup.* 630, 778; Prom. 526; *Ag.* 367; *Cho.* 783; *Eum.* 321; *Trach.* 947; *Alc.* 213, 962; *Med.* 410, 824. In addition *Aj.* 1185 follows a single-actor unit, 1168–84, which is atypical in form. See note 64 above.

note 14), precede a relatively large proportion of the systems of choral anapaests (four of eighteen) and the astrophic odes (five of eleven) which are associated with an exit.[125]

Some of these short lyrics, on the other hand, stand between two dramatic units which are neither unimportant nor closely connected with each other thematically. Consider, for instance, the anapaestic system E. *El.* 988–97, which follows a unit (880–987) including Orestes' triumphal return and Electra's famous speech to Aegisthus' head, and precedes Electra's confrontation with Clytemnestra (998–1146); or the astrophic *Hel.* 515–27, which stands between Menelaus' scene with the Egyptian portress (386–514) and an unusually long and complex dramatic section (528–1106) containing Menelaus' recognition of Helen and their conversations first with a messenger, then with Theonoë. It cannot, therefore, be said that an astrophic lyric or an anapaestic system is in itself a sign that the dramatic units which it stands between are subdivisions of a larger whole or that one of the two is too dependent upon the other to be regarded as a full-fledged episode. It would be nearer to the truth to say that these lyric types, because of their length, tend to be used in places where the action quickens and excitement intensifies,[126] and that messenger scenes, many of them one-actor dramatic units,[127] are usually found in such contexts.

But to say that some exits which precede lyrics other than strophic choral odes divide and define, with the lyric that follows, two units of action which surely deserve to be called episodes is not to say that all do. And it is unquestionably true that occasionally what follows an actor's exit and a system of anapaests, in particular, betrays hardly a single characteristic of a unit of dramatic action. After Creon's exit and

[125] Choral anapaests: *Ant.* 1257–60; *OT* 1297–1306; *And.* 1166–72; *Phoe.* 1480–84. Astrophic odes: *Hipp.* 1268–82; *HF* 1016–38; *Ion* 1229–49; *Or.* 1537–48; *Bac.* 1153–64.

[126] Choral anapaests are also often employed in a very different context. Seven times anapaestic systems introduce or accompany processional exits or entries: *Ant.* 1257–60; *Alc.* 741–46; *And.* 1166–72; E. *Sup.* 1114–22; *Tro.* 1251–59; E. *El.* 988–97; *Phoe.* 1480–84. An astrophic lyric accompanies the entrance of the chorus and Helen at *Hel.* 515–27. On the association of anapaestic announcements with processional entrances, see Halleran, *Stagecraft* 12–18, and Taplin, *Stagecraft* 73–77. See also note 49 above.

[127] In the works of Sophocles and Euripides four of the six one-actor units which precede an exit and an astrophic lyric or system of anapaests are messenger scenes. The exceptions: *Aj.* 815–65 (Ajax' suicide, followed by an empty playing area and an astrophic ode) and E. *Sup.* 1080–1113 (Iphis and the chorus after Evadne's suicide, followed by choral anapaests).

the anapaests which follow (*Med.* 357–63), Medea indulges in a long speech which extends to the beginning of a strophic choral ode (364–409). Are we to call this speech an episode? In the speech, which is directed to the world at large, Medea declares her intentions: she will poison father, daughter, and husband. She ponders where she can seek asylum, turns to Hecate with an apostrophe, arouses herself to action, and prays to the sun god for support. This is, in other words, a typical, if somewhat overlong, episode-closing speech. If we cut the anapaests out of the text, we would have a single normal unit of dramatic action. It does not follow, however, that what the anapaests separate are two incomplete parts of a single unit of dramatic action. Creon too leaves the stage after a brief speech of departure (*Med.* 348–56); and then a system of anapaests follows. The audience therefore awaits a new entrance at this point, and it perceives nothing unusual until that entrance fails. What precedes the anapaests, therefore, might stand as a complete unit of dramatic action—deserving as much as many another such unit to be called an episode—which Creon's exit closes. How then should we regard the passage between anapaests and strophic ode? The anapaests have given a false signal, and the audience vainly expects the arrival of a new character bringing a new momentum to the plot. Instead it hears the kind of speech that normally signals the end of actional dialogue.[128] Here the normal structure simply breaks down. It cannot be accidental that only four times in surviving tragedy does an entry fail to occur after anapaests which are preceded by an exit, all four in two early plays of Euripides (*Med.* 357–63, 759–63 and *Hcld.* 288–96, 702–8). With this unusual procedure Euripides is consciously experimenting with dramatic form.

In the case of two further passages, both following actors' songs, it is less easy to decide whether a new section of dramatic action begins after an exit and a lyric. At *Eum.* 754–77 Orestes thanks Athena, announces his departure for home, promises that he will protect Athens forever against Argos, and bids farewell to the city and her people. The lyric passage which follows (778–92) is an angry reaction to Orestes' exoneration. This leads into an epirrhematic debate with Athena, who attempts to allay the Furies' anger, promising them special honor in Athens. When the now calmer chorus shifts to iambics at 892, it is to ask what seat of worship they will have. In the subsequent iambic con-

[128]Taplin, *Stagecraft* 110, calls Medea's speech "a sort of tailpiece."

versation they continue to negotiate with Athena, until a new lyric exchange at 916ff. marks their acceptance of her offer. At *IT* 636–42 Iphigeneia announces that she will go into the temple to fetch her letter, asks Orestes not to think badly of her, promising that she will tend his grave well, and orders attendants to guard the prisoners without bonds. The following brief choral song (643–57) is interrupted by two iambic lines: 646, spoken by Orestes, an attempt to console the chorus; and 650, an exclamation from Pylades. At line 658 the two actors enter into a discussion of their situation, which continues until Iphigeneia's return at 723.

Eum. 778–880, following Orestes' departure, is regarded by neither Kranz nor Taplin as episode-separating. At *Eum.* 777, Taplin asserts strongly, there is an act-division, but he denies, in contradiction to his general conception of tragic structure, that the following lyric is an act-dividing song. *IT* 643–57 is held by Kranz to be episode-dividing; Taplin believes that it marks only a subdivision of a long "act" (Kranz, *Stasimon* 124–25; Taplin, *Stagecraft* 210, 408–10). What should we think? In my view Taplin is completely right when he asserts that with Orestes' departure an act comes to an end. But I see no reason why the departure of Iphigeneia should be interpreted differently. Each departure is well prepared by a speech of some length which announces the speaker's intention to leave. The promises, statements of intent, commands, and words of farewell all belong to the conventional repertoire of departure speeches. The only motif in either speech that does not occur frequently in closing speeches is Orestes' protective blessing bestowed on the Athenian state. Even that, however, finds a parallel at the end of Oedipus' final pronouncement (*OC* 1518–55).

When Taplin maintains that *Eum.* 778–880 is not act-dividing, what he is objecting to is that, at the point where the chorus switches from lyric meter to iambic, the plot receives no new impetus in the form of an actor's entry. He must admit that the passage contributes something new to the plot, but the impetus comes in the lyric itself, which cannot be "act-dividing" if it is part of the action. Taplin's reluctance to label *IT* 643–57 as act-dividing is perhaps not entirely unjustified, because the lyric is unquestionably a weak divider, and it is not so clear that after Iphigeneia's departure a new factor is introduced to the dramatic situation. But, except for the usual actor's entrance, the iambic passage 658–1088 lacks no element of the normal structure of a unit of dramatic action. Actors' dialogue, entrance of a third actor (725), further dialogue, departure with a prayer to the goddess Artemis (1082–

88), and choral ode all follow in the normal sequence. We need only compare 658–1088 with the next passage of iambic dialogue, 1153–1233—by Taplin's definition unambiguously an act—to see that in the process of labeling something has been lost.

The question, therefore—is this particular passage or that an episode?—sometimes has little meaning. It is completely false to regard the tragic structure as a straight line which is divided by lyrics into equivalent and parallel segments. First of all, the segments are not equivalent and parallel. Some have a fully developed structure, others do not; some are functionally subordinate to others. But there are so many degrees of subordination that to regard any segment as a subdivision of a larger whole is a gross oversimplification. Secondly, it is misleading to think of the lyrics as boundaries between the structural components. The structure is defined not only by the lyrics but by a repeated sequence of procedures to which the lyric belongs. It would be more instructive to think of this sequence as a repeated cycle. The cycle is sometimes larger, sometimes smaller; some elements may or may not be repeated; and in each repetition some expected element—or several—can be lacking. But the cycle almost always returns to a fixed point: an actor's exit which signals the suspension of actional dialogue.[129]

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THE MANY FACETS OF *HYBRIS* IN DEMOSTHENES' *AGAINST MEIDIAS*

Friedrich Blass, who had a remarkable facility for discerning the stylistic individuality of Demosthenes' separate orations, called attention to the extraordinary number of pleonasms and recurrences (*Häufungen und Wiederholungen*) in the speech against Meidias (Oration 29). Although both stylistic techniques appear frequently throughout the Demosthenic corpus, in *Against Meidias* they are, to use Blass's expression, "countless" (*unzählig*).[1] As interesting as their frequency, moreover, is the manner in which Demosthenes has combined them to produce what will be called "recurrent *hybris* clusters." In the following remarks I intend (1) to describe the different functions of recurrence in Demosthenes' orations, (2) to identify the recurrent *hybris* clusters by their components and locations in the speech, and (3) to account for the importance of the clusters to Demosthenes' persuasive purpose.

Although in any text recurrence ipso facto serves the purpose of emphasis, with Demosthenes it takes different forms in different orations. In some, such as *Against Androtion* and *Against Leptines,* the technique enables Demosthenes to carry along and to elaborate previously introduced themes, giving a sense of the entire message at any point in the speech.[2] Other orations reveal the use of recurrent imagery to establish a pervasive tone or mood. In the oration *On the Crown* recurrent imagery establishes a tragic versus comic dichotomy; and in the *First Philippic* it develops into a satiric portrait of Athens as a *mundus perversus,* or "topsy–turvy" world.[3] The speech against Meidias, instead of reiterating themes or images, uses clusters of recurrent words—words that tend to be abstract, have strongly moral and ethical meanings, and are semantically related to each other.

The single most important recurrence in the speech is the root of *hybris* in its various grammatical forms and parts of speech. In fact *hybris,* to use the noun for every manifestation of the root, occurs in the speech 131 times, as opposed to 274 times in the entire Demosthenic corpus and 170 times in all the other Greek orators. The word appears,

[1] *Attische Beredsamkeit,* III.1 340.

[2] See Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion* 222.

[3] See Rowe, "Portrait of Aeschines," and "*First Philippic.*"

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often more than once, in 96 of the 227 sections of the speech (a section averages about seven lines in an Oxford Classical Text) and is rarely (nine times) separated from its next appearance by more than five sections. The largest separation between the word's appearance is twelve sections, which occurs once. In general one may say that the first half of the speech has the greatest frequency of instances, although the difference in frequency between the first and second halves is only about 15 percent. The purpose of mentioning these figures is simply to establish that instances of *hybris* are pervasive and hence indicate the importance not only of the word itself but also of the technique of recurrence as a stylistic feature of the oration.

Repeatedly throughout the speech Demosthenes combines with *hybris* one or more words which seem to be synonymous or in some other way related in meaning. These combinations bear the rhetorical designation of pleonasm;[4] however, I use the term "*hybris* cluster" to distinguish them from the many other examples of pleonasm to be found in the speech. Section 19 offers an example of a *hybris* cluster:

> These, men of Athens, are the *licentious acts* that he inflicted upon me and my tribesmen and the *wrongs* that he committed during the festival for which I brought him before the assembly. There are many other deeds and I shall shortly tell you as many of them as I can. I can talk about the abundance of the rest of his *worthlessness,* his *acts of hybris* against many of you, and the *effronteries,* many and strange, of this *impious man.* As a result of them many of his victims, intimidated by him and by his *audacity* and by his associates and by his *wealth* and by all his other assets, kept silent; but some tried to get justice and failed; and there were those who reconciled themselves to him, probably thinking it the expedient thing to do.

[4] Lausberg, *Handbuch* 250, prefers the Latin term, *adiectio,* to "pleonasm," apparently because Quintilian uses the latter to designate the misapplication (*vitium*) of the technique; but Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 50 and 58) uses "pleonasm" in a manner that is appropriate to the *hybris* clusters—as a manifestation of Demosthenic fullness (cf. Wooten, "Style of Demosthenes," 580–81). Pleonasm (or *adiectio*) is a broader expression of fullness than other terms, such as "synonymity," insofar as it (1) consists of semantically related but not necessarily synonymous words and (2) presents these related words in both coordinate and subordinate positions (Lausberg 336). Both are typical characteristics of *hybris* clusters. I am indebted to Wooten for calling my attention to passages in Quintilian (6.1.17 and 6.2.24) and Hermogenes (*Id.* 1.11, p. 281 Rabe) which focus on Demosthenes' fullness in the Meidias speech.

The italicized words describe Meidias' behavior and character. As they individually designate the motives, qualities, and effects of his action, they are semantically related to the specific legal offense (ἀδίκημα) *hybris,* with which Demosthenes charges him; however, it is the distinctive nuances of the individual words that are as important as their collective similarity to each other and to the main word, *hybris.*[5] As different aspects—or facets—of *hybris,* they clarify, enrich, and expand the meaning of a word that by itself would tend to be ambiguous and colorless (see Appendix 1).

The facets can be classified according to four different semantic groups. One group characterizes Meidias' *hybris* as a violation of human or divine law. It contains the roots αδικ (wrong), ασεβ (impious), ασελγ (licentious), ατιμ (dishonorable), and μιαρ (religiously polluted). A second group, consisting of αναιδ (shameless), θρασ (audacious), πλου (wealthy), τολμ (effrontery), υπερηφαν (arrogant), and ωμ (savage), portrays the character of Meidias as perpetrator. A third group stresses the quality of the offense as βδελυρ (disgusting), κακ (base), and πονηρ (worthless). The final group, with the word roots βι(α) (violent), επηρε (abusive), προπηλακ (contumacious; lit., "to trample in the mud"), and τυπτ (beat), describes the act itself and gives particular emphasis to its violent and physical aspect.

The clusters also contain words describing and qualifying Meidias' *hybris,* some of which, though not recurrent,[6] are synonyms or periphrases for the recurrent facet words—for example, ἐξουσίας (138) and χρήματ' ἔχοντες (124) for the facet πλου (see Appendix 2). Taking these words into account would create additional clusters and expand several of those already identified, giving them at the same time the kaleidoscopic effect that is characteristic of Demosthenic recurrence. As a result the reader experiences an undefinable sense of *déjà vu* combined with that which is somehow fresh and different.

It is interesting that several of the Greek orators express *hybris* in

[5] In technical terms, in an action of *probolē,* the charge against Meidias was ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν, "to commit a crime regarding the festival" (cf. MacDowell, *Meidias* 14 and 16); however, as an explanation of Meidias' crime, that merely begs the question. Demosthenes has clearly stated that all Meidias' misdeeds are a matter of *hybris.* Cf. 34, πάνθ' ὅσ' ἠδίκηκεν ὑβρίσας φαίνεται; and 38, ἐπὶ πάντων φαίνεται προῃρημένος μ' ὑβρίζειν.

[6] To qualify as "recurrent" a facet word must occur in at least three clusters with *hybris* (at least once) and with other facet words apart from *hybris* (at least once).

pleonastic form;[7] however, Demosthenes' *hybris* clusters differ from those of the others in size and frequency of recurrence. In the speech against Meidias eighteen word roots (facets) appear recurrently and in clusters with *hybris* and with each other (see Appendix 1). Of the nineteen (including *hybris*), as many as eight appear in a single cluster; and four to six are not uncommon. The other orators seldom use more than three facets per cluster. With regard to frequency, one can identify in Demosthenes' speech sixty–two clusters distributed rather evenly from beginning to end.[8] Nothing comparable to this frequency exists elsewhere in the Demosthenic corpus or in the other Greek orators' speeches. It therefore appears that Demosthenes in his use of clusters has adopted and exceedingly elaborated a common, perhaps colloquial, means of expressing the idea of *hybris*.[9]

The problem, in the speech, of the meaning of the charge against Meidias may explain the importance of the *hybris* clusters to Demosthenes' persuasive purpose. The law, which Demosthenes quotes in section 47, simply identifies *hybris* as an offense against another person but does not describe it. What seems especially problematic about the word is that it conveys not a simple meaning but a complex of related aspects, or facets, pertaining to the motives and character of the perpetrator and to the effects that the act has upon its victim and upon those who observe it.[10] A further complication presents itself in the difficulty of describing to anyone who was not present the depths of humiliation felt

[7] Aeschin. *Tim.* 188–89; And. *Alcib.* 21–22; Demad. fr. 48; Is. *Dicaeo.* 11; Isoc. *Lochit.* 16–17; Lys. *Cripple* 15.

[8] I have not found any universally valid criteria for demarcating the clusters from each other. The criteria that come readily to mind, such as separation by punctuation and/or number of lines, are accidents of modern editing. There are twelve instances, involving 29 clusters, in which separate clusters are identified in contiguous sections of the *OCT.* If the 29 clusters were consolidated into twelve, the total number (45) of clusters would still be impressive; however, this consolidation in most cases would not accord with Demosthenes' meaning and rhetorical intention. It is, of course, equally possible to argue for a greater, rather than a smaller, number of clusters.

[9] Theon (*Progymn.* 63.27) states that Demosthenes in the speech against Meidias adapted material from the speeches regarding *hybris* that were written by Lysias, Lycurgus, and Isaeus. Perhaps the borrowed material included *hybris* clusters. Weil, *Plaidoyers politiques* 103 n. 2, believed that Lycurgus' name appears in Theon's statement only because of a scribal error. Despite this indication of a possible literary influence for Demosthenes' *hybris* clusters, the tendency to express the idea of *hybris* with more than one word could have been a colloquial practice.

[10] Cf. MacDowell, *Meidias* 18–23, and "*Hybris*."

by the victim and of depravity exhibited by the perpetrator in an act of *hybris* (see 72), a crime that could leave no visible effects—no loss of life or property and no permanent physical incapacity. The challenge to the accuser, therefore, was to establish and to maintain a definition of *hybris* that encompassed its most important facets; to illustrate and to carry along in the course of the speech these several facets; to make them appear, individually and collectively, as a serious threat to the state; and to associate them inseparably with the ethos of the perpetrator, as not merely a personal adversary but more importantly a public menace. The recurrent *hybris* clusters constitute Demosthenes' response to the challenge.[11]

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[11] I thank the Department of Classics of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for its gracious and stimulating hospitality in the fall of 1989, while I conducted the research for this study.

APPENDIX 1
HYBRIS CLUSTERS IN DEMOSTHENES' *AGAINST MEIDIAS*

Cluster Location[a]	Facets (instances[b])									
	αδικ	αναιδ	ασεβ	ασελγ	ατιμ	βδελυρ	βι(α)	επηρ	θρασ	υβρ
1.1–7	1			1			1			
2.3–12	1					1			1	
6.1–7.7	1									
9.5–10.2	1								1	
14.5–15.5								2		
19.1–20.3	1		1						1	
23.2–3	1				1					
27.2–5	1		1							
31.2–32.6				1					2	
33.7–34.3	2									
45.1–46.7	2						2			
51.2–3			1							
55.7–9			1							
56.6–57.6							1	1		
58.5							1			
61.10										
62.3–4		1								
66.8–10									1	
67.7–8				1						
68.6										
69.5								1		1
72.2–9					1					
76.5–6				1						
77.3				1			1			
81.6–82.4	1			1						
83.2–5										
88.6–7				1						
91.1–2		1		1						
92.7–9	1									
96.2										
97.1–98.9				1		1			1	

[a]References are to section and lines of the OCT, ed. Butcher.

[b]To qualify as a facet, a word root must (1) occur in at least three clusters, (2) appear in at least one cluster with *hybris*, (3) appear in at least one cluster without *hybris*, (4) directly or indirectly refer to Meidias, and (5) be semantically related to *hybris*.

per cluster)[b]									Different Facets[c]	Total Facets[d]
						2			4	5
									3	3
						5			2	6
						1			3	3
						1			2	3
1	1	1		1		1			8	8
						1			3	3
									2	2
						4			3	7
						2			2	4
						4			3	8
						1			2	2
						1			2	2
						1			3	3
						1			2	2
			1		1				2	2
				1					2	2
	1		1						3	3
					1	1			3	3
					1	1			2	2
									2	2
			1		2	3			4	7
						1			2	2
									2	2
						2			3	4
						1	1		2	2
								1	2	2
									2	2
						2			2	3
	1						1		2	2
	1					3		1	6	8

[c]Number of different facets contained in the same cluster.

[d]Total number of facets, including those appearing more than once, in the same cluster.

Table continues on following page.

APPENDIX 1 (*cont'd*)
HYBRIS CLUSTERS IN DEMOSTHENES' *AGAINST MEIDIAS*

Cluster Location[a]	Facets (instances[b])									
	αδικ	αναιδ	ασεβ	ασελγ	ατιμ	βδελυρ	βι(α)	επηρ	θρασ	υβρ
99.9–100.4	1				1					
104.2–6	1		2							
105.2–9	1									1
106.9–107.2		1				1				
109.2–8	2	1								1
114.1			1							
117.1–2		1								
123.8–124.3	1					1				
126.2–8	3									1
128.2–4	1			1			1			
130.6–7			1							1
131.4–9										
132.9									1	
135.4–5										
137.2–138.4	1			2			1			
143.4–8						1				
148.4–5							1			
151.1		1				1				
172.2										1
174.9										
183.4–9	1									
185.4		1								
186.6				1			1			
189.6–10		1								
194.1–195.8		1							1	1
197.1–199.5			1			1				
201.5–6		1					1		1	
204.1–9										3
211.2–212.1										
217.4–5				1			1			
219.1–220.3	1							1		

[a]References are to section and lines of the OCT, ed. Butcher.

[b]To qualify as a facet, a word root must (1) occur in at least three clusters, (2) appear in at least one cluster with *hybris*, (3) appear in at least one cluster without *hybris*, (4) directly or indirectly refer to Meidias, and (5) be semantically related to *hybris*.

per cluster)[b]									Different Facets[c]	Total Facets[d]
μαρ	πλου	πονηρ	προπηλακ	πλουτ	πατη	ὑβρ	ὑπερηφαν	πλο		
						2			3	4
				1					3	4
						1			3	3
						2			3	4
	1		1			1		1	7	8
1									2	2
1									2	2
						1			3	3
						2			3	6
						1			4	4
						1			3	3
			1			1			2	2
		1							2	2
1						1			2	2
	1	1				2	1		7	9
	1					2			3	4
		1				1			3	3
	1								3	3
		1							2	2
	1			1					2	2
	1					2			3	4
						1			2	2
									2	2
	1								2	2
1	1		1			1	1		8	8
1							1		4	4
	1								4	4
					1	2			3	6
	1					2			2	3
						2			3	4
			1		1	1			5	5

[c]Number of different facets contained in the same cluster.

[d]Total number of facets, including those appearing more than once, in the same cluster.

APPENDIX 2
NONRECURRENT SYNONYMS/PERIPHRASES

Recurrent Facet	Nonrecurrent Synonym/Periphrasis
αδικ	παρανενομηκώς (9) παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους (57) τοῦ φανερῶς τοὺς ὑμετέρους νόμους ἐφ' ὕβρει παραβαίνοντος (92)
επηρε	ἐπιβουλευόμενος, ἐπεβούλευσεν (126) ἑλᾷ (131)
θρασ	οὐδὲ καθεκτόν (2) πᾶν ἂν ὑποστὰς εἰπεῖν καὶ πρᾶξαι (114)
μιαρ	θεοῖς ἔχθρον (197)
πλου	οὐσίας (2) ἀφορμήν (98) περιουσίας (110) χρήματ' ἔχοντες (124) ἀφορμήν (137) ἐξουσίας (138)
τυπτ	πληγὰς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λαβὼν (1) πληγὰς εἰληφώς (6) συγκόψας (57) μηδὲ τοῦ σώματος τὼ χεῖρε τελευτῶν ἀποσχέσθαι μου (69) κονδύλοις (72) οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἔχειν παρὰ σεαυτῷ τὼ χεῖρε (204) ἐπαίεσθε (219)
υπερη	τοὺς μὲν πτωχούς, τοὺς δὲ καθάρματα, τοὺς δ' οὐδ' ἀνθρώπους ὑπολαμβάνων (185) καὶ πάντες εἰσὶ τούτῳ καθάρματα καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ οὐδ' ἄνθρωποι (198) καὶ πτωχοὺς ἀποκαλεῖ (211)
ωμ	ἀγνώμονα (97) τῶν μηδέν' ἐλεούντων (100) τῶν ἀσυγγνωμόνων (100)

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS AT *AENEID* 3.684–86: A SMOOTHER PASSAGE

Following is the text of *Aeneid* 3.682–86 as edited by R. A. B. Mynors, together with the relevant apparatus criticus:

> praecipitis metus acer agit quocumque rudentis
> excutere et ventis intendere vela secundis.
> contra iussa monent Heleni, Scyllamque Charybdimque
> inter, utrimque viam leti discrimine parvo,
> ni teneam cursus: certum est dare lintea retro.

684 movent *F*: monet P^1
Scyllamque Charybdinque *N. Heinsius* (*cf. A.* i 218, *G.* ii 344): Sc. atque Ch. *codd.*
Scyllam MP^2p: Scylla FP^1
Charybdin *Pp*, –dim *M*: –dis *Fad*
Post Charybdin *distinguunt Prisc.* xviii 79, *Serv.; post* inter *'nonnulli' teste DServ.*
685 utrimque *Nisbet*: utramque *codd.*
686 ni] nec P^1: ne P^2R^2c; ni *pro* ne *positum testantur Prisc.* xv 2 *(auctore Donato), Serv.*
teneam *'alii' ap. DServ.*: teneant *codd., Prisc., Serv.*

R. D. Williams calls lines 684–86 "among the most discussed in the whole *Aeneid*."[1] The general sense of the passage, however, is clear enough: Aeneas and his followers are beating a hasty retreat before the advancing Cyclopes; remembering the warning of Helenus, they decide to avoid Scylla and Charybdis; they double back, taking the long way around the Sicilian coast. The difficulty lies in punctuating and, if necessary, emending the text of the last three lines to yield the sense required in Latin worthy of Vergil. Few will deny the awkwardness of lines 684–86 in Mynors's text, where two clumsy phrases (*Scyllam . . . inter* and *utrimque . . . parvo*) float like *disiecta membra* between *monent* and its *ne* (*ni*). It is only fair to say, however, that despite the ingenuity expended on this passage, none of Mynors's predecessors had done much better. Williams throws his hands up in despair: "It is no

[1] *Aeneidos Liber Tertius* 202.

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compliment to Vergil to torture these disjointed phrases into the faint semblance of a grammatical sentence."

Of major importance for the interpretation of this passage is the comment of Servius Danielis on line 686. I reproduce here the text of the Harvard edition, except that I read *inter utrumque* with *FGP*, where the Harvard editors read *inter utramque* with *T*.

> NI TENEANT CURSUS antiqui "ni" pro "ne" ponebant, qua particula plenus est Plautus *ni mala ni stulta sis*. sensus ergo talis est: timor cogebat ut quocumque navigaremus et ventum sequeremur, non iudicium; sed occurrebat praeceptum Heleni, vitare Scyllam et Chrybdim. quare placuit, ne cursus teneant, hoc est, agantur et impleantur, inter utrumque, viam modico mortis interstitio, id est, Scyllae et Charybdis, retro dare lintea; quod dum cogitamus, prosperior nobis flare coepit Boreas.

Clearly, Servius has taken *Scyllam atque Charybdim* as objects of *monent* and *inter . . . teneant* as a negative purpose clause, whose main clause is *certum . . . retro*. From N. Heinsius on, however, modern editors have found difficulties with this interpretation. Their reservations are expressed by Ribbeck as follows: "Igitur ut de verbis primum dicam, 'iussa *monent* Heleni' cum accusativis 'Scyllam atque Charybdin' coniungi non possunt: monent socios *de* monstris illis vel monent instare vel cavere utram monent. . . . Quod autem in nostro libro paulo post v. 712 legimus 'cum multa horrenda moneret' nota est neutrius generis licentia. . . . Itaque aut absolute positum 'monent' verbum aut cum 'ni teneant cursus' membro coniungendum."[2]

Most modern editors, accordingly, eschewing the apparently anomalous accusatives with *monent*, have preferred to follow the view of *nonnulli* recorded in Servius Danielis and take *Scyllam atque Charybdim* as objects of a postponed *inter*. Vergilian parallels for this can be cited at *Aeneid* 1.218 (*spemque metumque inter dubii*) and *Georgics* 2.344–45 (*frigusque caloremque / inter*). These parallels convinced Heinsius and Mynors that the correct reading in 384 should be *Scyllamque Charybdimque*.

While Ribbeck's doctrine regarding objects after *monere* is in essence correct, it overlooks an important exception. In contexts of prophecy and augury *monere* may take an accusative of the object warned about. For instance, in Cicero *De Divinatione* 1.18 (= *De Consu-*

[2] *Vergili Opera* V 75.

latu 2.26–27), *Iam vero variae nocturno tempore visae / terribiles formae bellum motusque monebant.* Again, at *De Divinatione* 2.32, *Aut quando aliquid eius modi ab haruspice inspectis extis audivimus? Ab aqua aut ab igni pericula monent* (sc. *haruspices*). Since our passage is similarly concerned with a prophet warning about dangers, the objection to *Scyllam atque Charybdim* as an object of *monent* falls to the ground.

The second major difficulty centers on *utramque viam,* for Scylla and Charybdis are "ways of death," not "ways only a hair's breadth removed from death." Mynors attempted to get around this difficulty by adopting Nisbet's *utrimque,* though precisely how this adverb relates to the rest of its phrase is not clear. The best solution is to read *inter utrumque* and understand *viam* as accusative in apposition to the sentence.[3] This, despite his Harvard editors, seems clearly to have been what Servius Danielis read in his manuscript of Vergil (see above). The phrase *inter utrumque* is regularly found in the sense of "between two extrèmes or points"; see *OLD* s.v. *uterque* 2c. The neuter *utrumque* is used even when both nouns referred to are feminine; compare Plautus *Pseudolus* 710, *dic, utrum Spemne an Salutem te salutem, Pseudole?—immo utrumque,* and other examples cited in *OLD.*

In Ovid there are frequent reminiscences of this passage which lend support both to the reading *inter utrumque* and to the interpretation of the *ni/ne* clause as a negative purpose clause. At *Metamorphoses* 2.137–40 Sol counsels Phaethon to guide his chariot between the constellations Anguis and Ara as follows:

> medio tutissimus ibis.
> neu te dexterior tortum declinet ad Anguem
> neve sinisterior pressam rota ducat ad Aram,
> inter utrumque tene.

Here the juxtaposition of *inter utrumque,* a form of *tenere* (used intransitively or with a word like *cursum* understood), and the repeated *ne* indicate that Ovid has Vergil's passage in mind. Note the use of *inter utrumque* at the beginning of the line. Also significant is the fact that the *neu . . . neve* segments are negative purpose clauses. Consider now *Metamorphoses* 8.203–6, where Daedalus gives his instructions to Icarus:

[3] Kühner and Stegmann I, pt. 1, 248; cf. *Aen.* 6.223, *pars ingenti subiere feretro, triste ministerium.*

instruit et natum "medio" que "ut limite curras
Icare," ait, "moneo, ne, si demissior ibis,
unda gravet pennas, si celsior, ignis adurat;
inter utrumque vola."

Here too the close juxtaposition of *inter utrumque, moneo,* and a *ne* clause in a context similar to that in *Aeneid* 3 makes it clear that Ovid is recalling the Vergilian passage. Note that the *ne* clause is not a prohibition dependent on *moneo,* but a negative purpose clause dependent on *curras.* In the corresponding passage at *Ars Amatoria* 2.63 Daedalus again advises: *inter utrumque vola.* In these passages, of course, Icarus and Phaethon are being warned to steer a middle course between two extremes.[4] Aeneas and his companions, on the other hand, are seeking to avoid sailing between Scylla and Charybdis.[5]

In line 686 *cursus teneant* of the manuscripts poses a problem. It appears to mean "they (i.e., Aeneas and his men) hold their course." But since Aeneas is the narrator here, the verb should be in the first person, and most editors prefer to read *teneam.* However, Servius Danielis' paraphrase *quare placuit, ne cursus teneant, hoc est, agantur et impleantur, inter utrumque* . . . ("therefore it was resolved that lest their passage hold fast, that is, be made and accomplished, between the two . . .") shows that he took *cursus* as *nominative* plural. This seems to me the best solution. It eliminates the need to alter the firmly attested *teneant* to *teneam,* which awkwardly gives an unwanted first–person singular in a context of first–person plurals. As nominative plural, *cursus* is a poetic variation of the prose formulation we find in Cicero (*Ad Att.* 10.4.10): *mihi cursus in Graeciam per tuam provinciam est.* While *cursum tenere* is, of course, the standard phrase, it is perhaps for that very reason that Vergil seems to have avoided it.[6] It occurs only once in his corpus, in the markedly prosaic lines given to Anna:

dis equidem auspicibus reor et Iunone secunda
hunc cursum Iliacas vento tenuisse carinas. (4.45–46)

[4] Besides our passage in *Aen.* 3, Ovid is also recalling the description of Mercury in *Aen.* 4 and, in particular, line 255, *haud aliter terras inter caelumque volabat.*

[5] Other Ovidian instances of *inter utrumque* which seem to recall *Aen.* 3.685 include *Tr.* 1.2.25 and *Met.* 8.13.

[6] What one would have expected to be the poetic alternative, *cursus tenere,* is not found anywhere in Vergil.

With *cursus* as nominative, *teneant* has the sharper meaning of "persist," "continue," which is appropriate to our context. In this usage, nonpersonal subjects such as *imber, silentium,* and *aquilones* are common; see *OLD* s.v. *teneo* 15d.

Finally, there is the difficulty with *ni*. Elsewhere in Vergil *ni* is always used in the sense of *nisi,* never in any of the senses of *ne*. In our passage too it can be interpreted as a negative conditional, dependent on *certum est*: "if our course was not to hold fast between the two. . . ." Ultimately this differs little from a negative purpose clause. Hence the comment of Servius and the Ovidian imitations. But a negative conditional more vividly portrays Aeneas' thinking as he sizes up the situation; if we so understand *ni* here, we avoid foisting on Vergil a use of *ni* for which there is no parallel.

Our passage should accordingly be printed as follows:

> praecipitis metus acer agit quocumque rudentis
> excutere et ventis intendere vela secundis.
> contra iussa monent Heleni Scyllam atque Charybdim.
> inter utrumque, viam leti discrimine parvo,
> ni teneant cursus, certum est dare lintea retro.

The interpretation of Servius Danielis given above is correct. The *quocumque* in line 682 is crucial. The Trojans are so alarmed by the approach of the Cyclopes that when they push off from shore they hoist their sails, not caring in what direction they are carried. Soon, however, they recall Helenus' warning about Scylla and Charybdis, and Aeneas, fearing that they might be carried between them, decides to lower the sails. At this point the wind changes and blows them to the south, away from danger. I would translate lines 684–86 "On the other hand, the commands of Helenus warned us against Scylla and Charybdis. To avoid continuing on course between them, a path only a hair's breadth removed from death, I decided to pull down the sails."[7]

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[7]I am grateful to my colleague at Berkeley, Charles Murgia, for his incisive and extremely helpful criticism of my earlier attempts to make sense of these lines and to an anonymous reader for some useful suggestions.

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

A NOTE ON OVID *ARS AMATORIA* 1.117–19

In Piam Memoriam R. W. P. Bates

ut fugiunt aquilas, timidissima turba, columbae
utque fugit visos agna novella lupos
sic illae timuere viros sine lege ruentes. . . .

Scholars have long seen the significance of Ovid's description of the Rape of the Sabine Women in *Ars Amatoria* 1.101–34, into which this eagle–and–wolf simile fits.[1] Ovid mocks the Augustan ideal of *prisca virtus* (as well as Augustus' quasi–Romulean pretensions)[2] by portraying the City's founder as a woman–hungry bandit–king;[3] he perhaps mocks Augustus' arrangements for the segregation of women in the theater;[4] and he mocks the greatness of the Roman military vocation (and hence Augustus'), a point immediately and neatly knocked home by lines 131–32 (*Romule, militibus scisti dare commoda solus: / haec mihi si dederis commoda, miles ero*), lines which also confirm the identification between Romulus and Augustus.[5]

If we turn to lines 117–18 specifically, it is very easy to pass them by as mere conventional illustration, and this is the position of the commentators.[6] We are, nevertheless, entitled both to acknowledge the conventionality and to ask why Ovid chose to use this pair of similes here; and we should dismiss the lines as mere illustration only if we have no answer.

Prima facie, there is a ready answer: that Ovid chose these images because the one, the eagle, was at the heart of Roman military and

[1] See, e.g., Wardman, "Rape of the Sabines."

[2] On Augustus as Romulus see Syme, *Roman Revolution*, esp. 186, 305–6, 313–14, 520.

[3] Wardman, "Rape of the Sabines" compares Ov. *Fast.* 3.202, where the Rape is again described and Romulus is depicted as the originator of civil war: *tum primum generis intulit arma socer.*

[4] Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 44.

[5] The identification between Augustus and Romulus in this passage suggests that Ovid is also referring to Augustus' reputation as a womaniser from whom no man's wife was safe; cf. Suet. *Aug.* 69.

[6] Hollis in his edition ad loc. describes the similes as "very conventional" and compares *Il.* 22.139–40 and Theo. 11.24, as well as Ovid himself at *Met.* 1.505–6.

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imperial iconography, and the other, the wolf, stands as an emblem of the miraculous foundation of the State,[7] and also of Roman arms (since the wolf was sacred to Mars).[8] In this place, then, these similes contribute to the denigration of antique *virtus* regained, by associating the powerful images of eagle and wolf with this episode *sine lege* (line 119).

We can go further. The eagle–standard had a special place in Augustus' political–military imagery after he persuaded the Parthians in 20 B.C. to return the standards lost in Parthia by Crassus, Decidius Saxa, and Antony,[9] a triumph which gave rise to the famous issue of coins *signis receptis*. The standards, once returned, were housed with other triumphal spoil on the Capitol until 2 B.C., when they were placed in the temple of Mars Ultor at its dedication,[10] and it was enacted that in future *de bellis triumphisque hic consuleretur senatus, provincias cum imperio petituri hinc deducerentur, quique victores redissent, huc insignia triumphorum conferrent.*[11]

Eagles therefore played a significant part in an important public ritual in 2 B.C., significant enough to be mentioned specifically by Augustus in the *Res Gestae,* and their impression on the public mind in that year must have been heightened further by the departure of C. Caesar's expedition to Parthia, a proposition which is confirmed by Ovid himself in lines 179–81, part of the so–called propempticon for C. Caesar:[12] *Parthe, dabis poenas, Crassi gaudete sepulti / signaque barbaricas non bene passa manus. / ultor adest. . . .* In the coin which shows C. Caesar galloping in front of an *aquila* and two standards[13] there is another piece

[7]The wolf which suckled the twins was, of course, female, whereas *lupos* (line 118), though it might encompass a mixed pack, is grammatically masculine. Some might see this as a flaw in the argument; but cf. the passages cited in the following note.

[8]Cf., e.g., Hor. *O.* 1.17.9; Livy 10.27.9; Ov. *Fast.* 3.37–38; Virg. *Aen.* 9.566.

[9]*Anc.* 29.2; Suet. *Aug.* 21.3.

[10]*Anc.* 29.2, *ea autem signa in penetrali quod est in templo Martis Ultoris reposui.* They had been associated iconographically with Mars on some of the *signis receptis* coins.

[11]Suet. *Aug.* 29.2.

[12]Galinsky, "Triumph Theme" 96–97, has demonstrated that Ovid need not be taken very seriously in his apparent praise of this latest venture of the imperial house. The suggested link between the various eagles would point the same way.

[13]Sutherland and Carson, *Roman Imperial Coinage,* nos. 198–99 and pl. 4 (Mattingly and Sydenham *RIC* I *Aug.* (1923) nos. 348–49) OBV.: Head of Augustus, laureate, r. AVGVSTVS DIVI F. l. down, r. up. Outwardly. REV.: C. Caesar galloping r. holding sword in r. hand and shield in l., behind him, on l. aquila between two standards set up in ground, C. CAES. above, AVGVS. F. in ex.

of evidence which goes the same way, if Romer's argument for a date of 2 B.C. (based upon the proposition that the coin commemorates and links Gaius' setting-out for the East and the Parthian standards' re-housing) is accepted.[14]

The relevance of all this to our lines becomes clear when we consider the date of *Ars* 1: it is almost universally accepted that book 1 as we have it was written and published in late 2 or early 1 B.C. *Ars* 1.171 refers to the naumachy which formed part of the dedication-celebrations of the temple of Mars Ultor in August 2 B.C. as having taken place recently (*modo*); and the propempticon for Gaius similarly supports such a date.[15] In short, for the reflective reader, the eagle of line 117, which is the bandit-horde of King Romulus, who is Augustus, imparts the colour of this disreputable scene to the *aquila* of the legions and Rome's imperial destiny, to the restoration of the lost standards, to the ceremony of their placing in the temple of Mars Ultor and all for which the temple stood,[16] and to the Parthian expedition of Gaius (and hence to the propempticon later in the book).

The wolf is coloured by these reflexions too. A symbol of divine providence for the City because of the miraculous fostering of Romulus and Remus, the wolf reappears at moments of crisis in Rome's history.[17] Under Augustus, however, the wolf suffered something of an eclipse in the official iconography;[18] it appears, nevertheless: on the west face of the Ara Pacis Augustae, one of the crucial monuments of Augustus'

[14]Romer, "Numismatic Date," accepted hesitantly by Bowersock, "Augustus" 173. The date does not seem to be universally accepted, however: Sutherland and Carson still appear to prefer the traditional date of 8 B.C. on the basis of die-linkage with IMP XIII gold and silver coinage.

[15]There is, of course, some dispute over the number of editions through with the *Ars* went. On the one hand, Hollis, *Ars* xiii, 64, maintains that the evidence for more than one edition is not convincing; on the other, Syme, *Ovid* 13–20, holds that it is. I am not convinced that there was more than one edition; even if there was, however, we are entitled to examine the possible effect of the unitary second edition on its readers in 2/1 B.C., and to that extent the question is irrelevant.

[16]In the Romulean context of this passage it should also be remembered that Romulus' statue appeared in the pediment of the temple of Mars Ultor.

[17]Cf., e.g., Livy 10.27.8–9, 22.1.12 cited in Dulière, *Lupa Romana* I 13.

[18]This eclipse, especially on coins, goes hand in hand with the comparative eclipse of Romulus after Actium both for reasons of avoiding monarchic comparison—the reason why Octavian did not, as he had originally wanted, call himself Romulus (Dio 53.16.7)—and also, perhaps, because the details of Romulus' life (as fratricide and rapist of Sabine women, for example) were not all edifying; cf. Dulière, *Lupa Romana* I 144–54.

reign,[19] and in *Res Gestae* 19, where the Lupercal (the grotto on the Palatine where the wolf suckled the twins) is recorded by name as one of the monuments restored by Augustus.[20]

The Roman wolf is also described in the *Aeneid,* appearing at 8.630–34 as the first figure on the shield created by Vulcan for Aeneas. These lines and what follows are most significant: Virgil next describes after the wolf–scene how there was placed on the shield *nec procul hinc Romam et raptas sine more Sabinas* (8.635). It does not stretch belief to find in Ovid's *viros sine lege ruentes* (119) a deliberate evocation of *raptas sine more Sabinas*.[21] The message is clear: Virgil's description of the shield begins with the wolf and primitive, lawless Rome, and culminates with the glory of the victorious Caesar Augustus as the apogee of Roman history. Ovid, however, by his use of the image of the wolf, which is Romulus, who is Augustus, and the verbal reminiscence, assimilates Augustus' glory, and his victories, his nomothetic position, and Augustus himself to this primitive, lawless Rome, and denies the Augustan–Virgilian vision of the progress of history.

What is suggested, then, is that far from being mere conventional illustration, the similes of lines 117–19 were chosen with great care, both for their innocent appearance and for the depth of meaning which they could yield to the careful reader and add to the meaning of the passage in which they are set.[22]

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[19] Cf. Dulière, *Lupa Romana* I 96–97.

[20] The Lupercal, perhaps because of its restoration, was also sufficiently important for Virgil to put a mention of it into Evander's tour at *Aen.* 8.343.

[21] A variant recorded in Kenney's apparatus criticus to *Ars* I would import *sine more* into line 119 ("lege *ROSαAω*: more *Burmannus ex cod. Schefferi, Og*"); cf. Williams on *Aen.* 8.635. The frequent references to Virgil in the *Ars,* as Alan Roxburgh reminds me, often depend upon one or two simple words or rhythms only; cf. *Ars* 1.335 → *Geo.* 3.6; 1.401 → *Geo.* 1.224; 1.436 → *Geo.* 2.43–44; 1.757–58 → *Geo.* 1.2–3.

[22] With the effect suggested one might compare the purity of the propaganda in a gem, perhaps of the Augustan period, catalogued by Dulière, *Lupa Romana* II 74, as G.22 (fig. 65): "Autel décoré de la louve; au-dessus un aigle; flanqué de Parthes agenouillés tenant une enseigne."

I am grateful to N. J. Richardson, Alan Roxburgh, and David West for their comments and encouragement, and to Dominic Berry for suggesting in the first place that this note might be committed to print. Any errors and infelicities are, of course, mine alone.

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

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STELLIO NON LACERTA ET BUBO NON STRIX: OVID *METAMORPHOSES* 5.446–61 AND 534–50

In a recent article in this journal K. Sara Myers convincingly set forth the thematic connection between these two passages. Yet in her painstaking effort to analyze all relevant evidence, Myers overlooked a useful refinement—precise translation. At *Metamorphoses* 5.462 the reader deduces for himself the etymology of *stellio* from the skin of a newly transformed boy that has been "starred with various spots" (*variis stellatus . . .*). Although Myers tells us several times that the lad has thus become a lizard, his is *not* the common variety. In that case the noun *lacerta* would have been used.[1] A *stellio* is a particular kind of lizard, one with spots, known to us as a gecko.[2] Helping to make this distinction is Pliny the Elder, who tells us that geckoes "have the shape of lizards" (*stellionibus . . . lacertarum figura, Nat.* 11.90), but of course different skins.

In regard to the meaning of *bubo,* Myers errs by trying to be too specific. Ovid informs us at *Metamorphoses* 5.550 that Ascalaphus has been transformed into a "sluggish owl" (*ignavus bubo*), not, as Myers would have it, into a "screech owl" (*strix*). That Ovid knows the difference is demonstrated by his description of an ill-favored tree in *Amores* 1.12.18 that "has given vile shade to noisy owls and has borne on its branches the eggs of the vulture and the screech owl" (*illa dedit turpes raucis bubonibus umbras / vulturis in ramis et strigis ova tulit*). Seneca, Lucan, Statius, Silius Italicus, and Servius make the same distinction.[3] So should we if we want to obtain a fuller understanding of Myers's otherwise perceptive article.

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[1] Pliny uses *stellio* six times, *lacerta* sixty-one. In sixteen instances he refers to "green lizards," *virides lacertae*. On *lacerta* see Toynbee, *Animals* 220–21.

[2] See Scribonius Largus *Compositiones* 164.1; Pliny *Nat.* 1.17, 1.47, 8.111, 11.90, 11.91, 22.132; Serv. 5.795. For the scientific classification of the order Lacertilia, one that includes among its many families the Geckonidae and the species Ascalabotae as well as the Chamaeleontidae under the suborder Rhiptoglossia, see Boulenger, s.v.

[3] Sen. *Her.* 687–88, *luctifer bubo . . . infaustae strigis*; *Med.* 733, *cor bubonis et raucae strigis*; Luc. 6.88, *trepidus bubo quod strix nocturna*; Stat. *Theb.* 3.511–12, *strigies et / feralia bubo damna canens*; Sil. 13.597, *bubo ac sparsis strix sanguine pennis*; Serv. on *Geo.* 1.472, *ut striges aut bubones.*

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HERMEIAS ON PLATO *PHAEDRUS* 238D AND SYNESIUS *DION* 14.2

μὴ παρόντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἥδεται καὶ χαίρει, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρεκάκου· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ἐραστὴς ὑπερβαλέσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν ἐρώμενον· προσδοκωμένων (προσδομένων M; προσδεομένων Ast) δὲ γενέσθαι διακωλύει, ὅ ἐστι βασκάνου· γινομένων δὲ †διακωλύει, ὅ ἐστι φθονεροῦ (Ast; φθόνου *codd.*). (Hermeias 56.25–30 Couvreur)

A lover rejoices and is happy, if his beloved is not in possession of good things; such conduct is characteristic of a man who rejoices in the ills of others; for a lover does not wish his beloved to surpass him; if there is an expectation that the beloved will come into possession of good things, a lover tries to prevent this happening; this is a characteristic of a jealous man; if the good things do come into the possession of the beloved, a lover tries to get rid of them; this is conduct characteristic of an envious man.

The passage printed above is part of a summary that Hermeias gives of Socrates' first speech in the *Phaedrus,* before he proceeds to a point–by–point exposition of the speech. The passage is puzzling in two respects: the text is corrupt and makes little sense; and as a summary of Plato it bears very little relation to what we find in the text of the *Phaedrus*. There is, however, in Synesius' *Dion* a passage inspired by Socrates' first speech in the *Phaedrus* that follows the same tradition of interpretation and enables us to reconstruct Hermeias' run of thought and to make some headway in emending the text.[1] It is a matter of some interest that Hermeias and Synesius should subscribe to the same not very obvious interpretation of the *Phaedrus*. I argue that they both draw on Iamblichus' commentary on the *Phaedrus*. If that is so, we must revise our ideas about Synesius' supposed aversion to Iamblichus and his preference for the more sober and restrained Neoplatonism of Porphyry. Such a revision of received opinion would be in accord with work done recently on the nature of Alexandrian Neoplatonism that has called into question the widely accepted assumption that Alexandrian Neoplatonism was more Aristotelian in its sympathies and less given to

[1] I cite Synesius' *Dion* by chapter division of Terzaghi, *Opuscula,* and by paragraphs of Treu, *Synesios*. Citations to Hermeias are (unless otherwise noted) to Couvreur's edition.

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wild flights of abstraction, not to speak of theurgy, than the Athenian school.

I

The passage in question comes at the end of Hermeias' rather schematic and not wholly accurate analysis of the structure of the speech in which Socrates argues that it is better to yield to a nonlover than to a lover. In his analysis Hermeias is much concerned with triadic structures: hence he holds that Plato wishes to demonstrate that a lover is harmful (βλαβερός), ugly (αἰσχρός), and unpleasant (ἀηδής) (56.4–6 Couvreur) and that Plato does so because the good life for the mind is constituted of the opposites of these, the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), the fair (τὸ καλόν), and the pleasant (τὸ ἡδύ). For this account of the good life Hermeias appeals to the authority of Plato at *Philebus* 66a–c (56.8–17 Couvreur). Hermeias says that the speech in the *Phaedrus* begins with a demonstration that the vulgar (φορτικός) lover is ugly; it then proceeds to show that he is harmful and finally that he is unpleasant (56.18–23). Hermeias maintains that Plato in his discussion of the harm done by the lover divides harm into what affects three forms of good, that of the soul, of the body, and of external possessions (56.23–25).

Following this tripartite division of harm is the further tripartite division with which we are concerned.[2] It is supposed to show the vulgarity of spirit such a lover shows in each of these areas of good. The most obvious objection to this analysis of the speech is that Socrates has really nothing to say about the lover as αἰσχρός at the point in the speech at which Hermeias finds a reference to ugliness, although later Socrates does mention the distaste the beloved will come to feel when forced over a long period to consort with one whose looks are those of an old man and not of those in their prime (240d5–6). These are the lines, however, that Hermeias deals with under the heading of the lover as ἀηδής (58.12–15 Couvreur). The lines that Hermeias cites as proof of the lover's ugliness are Socrates' discussion of the lover's enslavement by desire, which Socrates takes to be a form of sickness (238e1–5). Hermeias argues that sickness is a kind of asymmetry and that all asym-

[2] Hermeias (58.1–2 Couvreur) finds yet another tripartite division in the external goods harmed by the lover: parents, friends, and possessions. He is equally fertile in finding tripartite distinctions in Socrates' second speech (157.9–159.3 Couvreur).

metry creates ugliness (πᾶσα δὲ ἀσυμμετρία αἴσχρους ποιητική) (57.1–18 Couvreur).

In any case, his desire to find triadic structures has evidently led Hermeias to find a tripartite division in the vulgarity of the lover (ἐπιχαιρεκακία, βασκανία, φθόνος) and to see a temporal progression that begins with the lover rejoicing in the beloved's lack of goods, next seeking to prevent him from acquiring them, if they seem to be in the offing, and finally seeking to eliminate them once acquired. Neither the division nor the progression are to be found in the actual Platonic text. Socrates says that it needs must be that a lover will be jealous (φθονεῖν) of his beloved if the latter acquires material resources of his own, and will rejoice in their loss, and that he would pray that the beloved remain unmarried, childless, and without an establishment of his own for as long as possible (240a4–8); earlier in the speech, in connection with the harm the lover does to the beloved's intellectual development, he says that he needs must be jealous (φθονερός) and in his jealousy keep the beloved from all beneficial associations with others (239a7–b1). Hermeias then rather inaccurately describes the lover's ἐπιχαιρεκακία as the pleasure he takes in the beloved's not possessing resources of his own, not as the delight the jealous lover experiences when his beloved loses his wherewithal. What Hermeias describes is hardly ἐπιχαιρεκακία, that is, malicious delight in another's misfortune.[3] More importantly, Socrates has nothing to say about any measures a lover may take to deprive his beloved of goods, once the beloved has gained possession of goods. Finally, Hermeias' explanation of the reason for the lover's delight in his beloved's being kept deprived of goods, namely, that he does not wish to be surpassed by his beloved, is not in Plato, though Socrates does say that the lover's motive in keeping the beloved from beneficial intellectual associations is so that the beloved may look to him alone (239b6–7). It is in Lysias' speech, not that of Socrates, where the idea is found that the lover will keep his beloved from meeting men of substance, lest they surpass him in wealth (μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλωνται) (233c6–7).

Couvreur, the second and most recent editor of Hermeias, saw that the text was corrupt and put a dagger in front of the second διακωλύει, but he does not seem to have understood the full extent of its

[3] Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1386b34–87a3, ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ' ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν.

incoherence or the progression of thought involved. In place of διακωλύει he proposed in his apparatus criticus ἀπείργει, a synonym of διακωλύει and a word that Socrates uses of the lover in his φθόνος keeping his beloved from beneficial associations with others (239b1). It still remains a puzzle what Hermeias' meaning is, if he is saying that it is the mark of a βάσκανος man to try to prevent something happening and a φθονερός man to try to ward it off as it happens.

What the progression of thought must be emerges from a passage in Synesius' *Dion* in which Synesius criticizes the character of those who teach philosophy for a living:[4]

> ἐπεὶ ὅγε διδάσκαλος, ἐπειδὰν ἐξαρτήσηται τοὺς θαυμάσομένους, οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ἀποδέξεται λέγοντος. ἢ κίνδυνος καταφρονηθῆναι καὶ περιιδεῖν ἀφιπτάμενα τὰ μειράκια. εἰ γὰρ οὐ διοίσεται, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔφθειρε· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν τηρεῖσθαι διδάσκαλον. εἱμαρμένη τοίνυν ἀνδρὸς διδασκάλου καὶ φθονερὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ ὑλικώτατον τῶν παθῶν· καὶ ἀπεύξεται μὲν μηδένα γενέσθαι σοφὸν ἐν πόλει· γενομένου δὲ λυμανεῖται τὴν δόξαν, ἵνα μόνος ἀποβλέποιτο. κατεδεῖται δὲ ὥσπερ κεράμιον ἐπιχειλὲς τῆς σοφίας, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι χωρῆσον. οὔκουν ἀγαθόν γέ τι χωρεῖ, τελχὶς καὶ βάσκανος ὤν. (14.2 Terzaghi)
>
> The teacher, when he has won the attachment of those who will gaze on him with awe, will not tolerate anything said by anyone. Otherwise there is the danger that he may be despised and allow his boys to fly away. For if he does not agree, he will destroy his position. He must then be on his guard against other teachers. It is a necessary element in the lot of a teacher that he be jealous, the most powerful of the passions and that most characteristic of the world of the flesh: he will pray that there be no other learned man in the city and if one does appear, he will seek to damage his reputation, so that he alone may be the object of everyone's attention. He will sit like an earthenware vessel so full to the brim with wisdom that it can take no more. Consequently, he does not then admit any good into himself, since he is spiteful and jealous.

The inspiration for this aspect of Synesius' portrait of the philosophy teacher is Socrates' characterization of the lover in his first speech in the *Phaedrus*. Synesius' teacher is like Socrates' lover in keeping his pupils, out of jealousy and fear of being made to look inferior, from contact with any other teacher. There can be no question that Synesius

[4] See Lacombrade, *Synésios* 138–49; Bregman, *Synesius* 125–37.

has the *Phaedrus* in mind here: in the same chapter he adduces Socrates as an example of a man who was prepared, unlike the envious teacher, to learn from others and goes on to describe how the Socrates of the *Phaedrus* was ready to humor Phaedrus by listening to Phaedrus' vulgar assault on love and then make a similar speech himself before giving a truer account of love's nature (14.3–7 Terzaghi). Furthermore, in the covering letter Synesius sends with the *Dion* to his teacher, Hypatia, he speaks of the essay's being organized under several headings in the manner set out in the *Phaedrus* (*Ep.* 154 = 274.18–275.5 Garzya). Finally, in Synesius' portrayal of the teacher's jealousy there are four elements drawn from the relevant portion of the *Phaedrus*:

(1) οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ἀποδέξεται λέγοντος. ἢ κίνδυνος καταφρονηθῆναι καὶ περιιδεῖν ἀφιπτάμενα τὰ μειράκια = τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὄν, ἧς ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκη πόρρωθεν εἴργειν, περίφοβον ὄντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι (*Phdr.* 239b4–6)
(2) εἱμαρμένη τοίνυν ἀνδρὸς διδασκάλου καὶ φθονερὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι = φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι (*Phdr.* 239a7–8)
(3) ἀπεύξεται μὲν μηδένα γενέσθαι σοφόν = ἔτι τοίνυν ἄγαμον, ἄπαιδα, ἄοικον ὅτι πλεῖστον χρόνον παιδικὰ ἐραστὴς εὔξαιτ' ἂν γενέσθαι (*Phdr.* 240a6–7)
(4) ἵνα μόνος ἀποβλέποιτο = μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν ᾖ πάντα ἀγνοῶν καὶ πάντα ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστήν (*Phdr.* 239b6–7).

A parallel for Synesius' allusive use of the *Phaedrus* in the *Dion* is his allegorical account of the benefits literature confers on those who would be philosophers (11.2–3, 263.1–20 Terzaghi) and, in the same passage, his comparison of the philosopher to the eagle, the bird of Zeus (11.5, 264.5–15). He begins his account in concrete form by speaking of how poets, orators, and historians mix the agreeable with the beneficial and so strengthen and escort the young on their way, before handing them over to the sciences. They prepare their charges to aspire to that which is highest (οἵους εἶναι τῶν ἄκρων ἐπορέξασθαι, 11.3, 263.11), and when they see the souls at that highest point spattered with sweat, they call them back gently. Calliope now takes charge of them and rests them by bringing them to flowery meadows and by setting a feast of Attic morsels and poetic delicacies in front of them, by which means she at first relaxes them and then spurs them on unawares and finally trains them for the contest again. The imagery Synesius uses here comes from Plato's account of the souls' ascent to the vertex of heaven

(ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρῳ γένωνται, 247b6) and the struggle they have there (ἔνθα δὴ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος, 247b5–6), in which much sweat is expended (248b2). The meadow in which Calliope restores the weary philosophers comes from the meadow that lies in the plain of truth, where the best pasture for the souls is provided (248b2). Finally, Calliope is the appropriate muse for weary philosophers, since she is the muse whose particular province is philosophy (259d3–6).

In the lines that follow Synesius uses the image of the eagle, who soars higher than other birds, is kingly, and dwells by the scepter of Zeus, to represent the philosopher. This derives in part from the notion found in the *Phaedrus* that the souls of those who were to be philosophers and leaders followed in the train of Zeus (252e1–3), which is why such souls are Zeus-like.

J. R. Asmus thought that Synesius' portrayal of the philosophy teacher (13–14) owed much to Dio Chrysostom's *Or.* 77/78 (Πέρι φθόνου) and, in particular, that εἱμαρμένη . . . φθονερὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι . . . καὶ ἀπεύξεται μηδένα γενέσθαι σοφὸν ἐν πόλει . . . ἵνα μόνος ἀποβλέποιτο derived from ἐκείνοις φθονοῖ . . . καὶ εὔχοιτ' ἂν ἀπολέσθαι αὐτούς (*Or.* 77/78.28) and ὅπως ἂν περίβλεπτος (*Or.* 77/78.26).[5] It is understandable that Asmus should suppose that Synesius' account of the jealousy a teacher might feel towards others' in the same city practicing the same calling as himself has its origins in Dio's essay on φθόνος, since much of that work is devoted to the jealousies that arise among those pursuing the same craft. The idea, however, that those in the same field are jealous of each other is so common as to make it unnecessary to posit a source for it; it goes back to Homer and Hesiod.[6] Secondly, the echoes of Dio's *Or.* 77/78 that Asmus thinks he detects are illusory: the point of the jealous man's prayer in Dion is that the successful may perish, not that he may not have a rival; the man who in Dio wants to be the cynosure of all eyes does not want this honor exclusively for himself, as Synesius' teacher does. There is, in sum, no very good reason to believe that Dio Chrysostom rather than the *Phaedrus* is the inspiration for Synesius' picture of the jealous teacher.

Synesius, accordingly, in a passage inspired by Socrates' account in the *Phaedrus* of the flaws in a lover's character, gives us a very clear idea of what the progression of thought in Hermeias must be and offers

[5] Asmus, "*Synesius*" 141–43.

[6] Hom. *Od.* 18.15–19; Hes. *Erg.* 24–26. Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1387b23–24, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ ευπραγίᾳ φαινομένη τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους.

some indication of how the corruption in the text should be cured. Hermeias must be making a distinction between what a jealous man will do when he expects a benefit to befall someone else and what he will do if that other receives the benefit: he will seek to prevent the other's being benefited and, if the benefit befalls him, he will try to destroy it. We need therefore in Hermeias something that marks the temporal progression from expecting something to happen to its having happened. The present participle γινομένων should therefore be replaced by the aorist γενομένων to mark that progression. Secondly, we need a verb meaning "destroy," "eliminate," or "eradicate" to characterize what the jealous man does when confronted by the fait accompli. Although διακωλύει may have replaced through dittography a verb such as λυμαίνεται that is visually and phonetically not at all like it, it is more likely that it has replaced a verb similar to it in either or both of these respects. As it happens, the verb κολούειν fulfills both of these requirements very tidily and at the same time has a sense appropriate to the context. It is used of cutting someone down to size, a characteristic act of φθόνος.[7] The first instance of the coupling of φθόνος and κολούειν is to be found in Herodotus, where the Divine is said to cut what is excessive down to size out of sheer φθόνος.[8] Thereafter κολούειν is found in association with φθόνος in Plato, Philo, Dio Prusias, Plutarch, and Themistius—in the latter two with some frequency—and finally in Gregorius Nazianzenus.[9]

I turn now to the question of the source of Hermeias' and Synesius' shared interpretation of the *Phaedrus*. There can be little doubt that an eagerness to find triadic structures throughout the speech and indeed throughout the *Phaedrus* provides a partial explanation of the ἐπιχαιρεκακία, βασκανία, and φθόνος that Hermeias sees in the lover's conduct. That point granted, the distinction that Synesius, inspired by the *Phaedrus*, makes in the *Dion* between what φθόνος causes a man to do to prevent something happening and what he does once it has

[7]Cf. Plut. *De Invid.* 538F, καὶ (*sc.* οἱ φθονοῦντες) κολούουσι μέν, εἰ δύναται, την δόξαν αυτῶν καὶ λαμπρότητα, συμφορὰς δ' ἀνηκέστους ουκ ἂν προσβάλοιεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἰκίας ὑπερεχούσης τὸ ἐπισκοτοῦν αυτοῖς καθελόντες.

[8]Hdt. 7.10e, φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θέος τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολουειν, recalled from memory, and not altogether accurately, at Eustath. *In Il.* 1364.9–11.

[9]Pl. *Lg.* 731a; Ph. *De post.* 150; D. Chr. 23.10–11; Plut. *Rom.* 25.1, *Arist.* 7.2, *Galb.* 10.4, *Mor.* 486F, 487B, 538E, 796A–B; Themist. *Basan.* 255C–D, *Soph.* 285B, 295B; Greg. Naz. *Carm. de Vita* 335 (*PG* XXXVII 1052), *Carm. de se* (*PG* XXXVII 1005); Xiphil. *Epit. Dio Cass.* 16 Dindorf.

happened makes it clear that Hermeias' fondness for finding tripartite divisions cannot be the whole story. Hermeias must in this matter be the heir to a tradition of interpretation. It is furthermore a tradition of interpretation that has lost touch with what it purports to interpret, not an uncommon phenomenon.

It is probably significant that the tripartite division ἐπιχαιρεκακία, βασκανία, and φθόνος occurs in a summary account of Socrates' speech. This is where we would expect, if anywhere, such a distortion. It is less easy to imagine it occurring in a word–by–word or line–by–line commentary. The most economical explanation for its presence is that Hermeias took it over, either in whole or in part, from a summary account in an earlier commentary. Synesius will have had access to the same commentary or to one belonging to the same tradition.

There is one other passage in the *Phaedrus* that Synesius interprets in the same way as does Hermeias: Thamous' praising and criticizing Theuth's inventions, in particular his invention of the art of writing (274d2–275b2). Synesius in the *Dion* compares the man who is able, because of some divine intellectual gift, to lay down the foundations of philosophy and who has resources within himself to the Egyptian Amous, who did not invent but passed judgment on the art of writing, so great was his intellectual superiority (ὁποῖος ἐξεῦρεν, ἀλλ' ἔκρινε χρείαν γραμμάτων· τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ τοῦ νοῦ περιῆν, 9.2, 255.13–15 Terzaghi). Nabers suggested that Synesius' Amous was one and the same person as Plato's Thamous and scoffed at the idea that Synesius at the time he composed the *Dion* would have written in such laudatory tones about the Christian monk Amous of Nitria.[10] Terzaghi cites the *Phaedrus* passage in his testimonia, an indication that he too identified Amous with Thamous.[11] Lacombrade assumes that it is Amous of Nitria.[12] Marrou deplored the identification of Amous with Thamous and complained about scholars' rewriting texts to make them fit their own preconceptions; he, for his part, plumped for Amous of Nitria, since he believed that Synesius was attempting an amalgam of pagan philosophy with Christianity and that the sharp antithesis drawn by many scholars between paganism and Christianity was misguided.[13]

[10]Nabers, "Epistulas" 95–96. Hauck, *Synesius* 50, sees the influence of *Phdr.* 274e.

[11]So also Treu, *Synesios* 61.

[12]Lacombrade, *Synésios* 144–45.

[13]Marrou, "Synesius" 144.

There can be no question that Synesius has Plato's Thamous in mind; the words οὐκ ἐξεῦρεν, ἀλλ' ἔκρινε χρεῖαν γραμμάτων echo Plato's ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τεχνῆς, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι τίν' ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελίας τοῖς μέλλουσι χρῆσθαι (274e7–9). That Synesius a little later speaks in the same breath of Amous, Zoroaster, Hermes, and Antonius (10.3, 259.18–20 Terzaghi) is no very strong argument for taking Amous to be the Christian monk. There are indications that this list has been tampered with and that the name Antonius has been added or has replaced some other name.[14] The list may have been altered by a scribe convinced that Amous is the monk whose soul the eremite Antony saw being led by angels and taken up into heaven (Pall. *H. Laus.* 7.6 Bartelink; *Vit. Ant.* 60.1–3 Bartelink). There is in the manuscript tradition evidence of a determination to identify Synesius' Amous with the monk of Nitria in the story patently concocted by a scholiast to make sense of Amous' not having invented writing but passing judgment on its use: when Amous was asked whether writing was necessary, he replied that there was no need of writing if the mind itself was vigorous. The scholiast goes on to comment that while Amous had not invented writing, he was an excellent judge of its worth without using it himself.

Hermeias takes the judgment Thamous displays in praising and finding fault with the discoveries of Theuth to be proof of Thamous' superiority to Theuth. The reason he gives is that judgment is superior to discovery, since discovery is the product only of natural apprehension, whereas judgment comes from a rational, intellective activity (ἡ μὲν γὰρ κρίσις ὑπερτέρα ἐστὶν, ἡ δὲ κρίσις λογικῆς τινὸς καὶ νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας, 256.16–18 Couvreur). Hermeias, like Synesius, treats the ability of Amous to judge to be a sign of an intellect superior to that needed for invention (τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ τοῦ νοῦ περιῆν, 255.14–15 Couvreur). It is difficult to believe that Hermeias and Synesius could have independently come to the conclusion that Thamous signified the superiority of judgment over discovery. It is much more likely that they both depend on the same tradition of exegesis or, to put the matter more specifically, had read the same commentary or had heard lectures that were ultimately based on the same commentary.

The commentary was probably that of Iamblichus. The case for identifying Iamblichus as the source of Hermeias' and Synesius' anal-

[14] Nabers, "Epistulas" 96, thought that Πλώτινος had been corrupted into Ἀντώνιος.

ysis of Socrates' first speech rests on three elements: (1) summary accounts that try to explain the gist of or the underlying unity of a work seem to have been invented or popularized by Iamblichus in his commentaries; (2) Hermeias used Iamblichus' commentary on the *Phaedrus*; (3) Synesius also used the commentary.

It is easy to show that Hermeias used Iamblichus' commentary. We know from Proclus' explicit statement that Iamblichus wrote a commentary on the *Phaedrus*: καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Φαίδρου γέγραφεν ὑπομνήμασι (*Theol. Plat.* 215.27–28 Portus).[15] Hermeias refers on several occasions to Iamblichus' views on the *Phaedrus*, not always to agree with them, although invariably with respect.[16] It is reasonable, then, to suppose that Hermeias' knowledge of Iamblichus' interpretations of the *Phaedrus* comes from Iamblichus' commentary on that work. There is no doubt other material in Hermeias' commentary from Iamblichus whose origin Hermeias did not feel it necessary to signal because it represented the received view within the school.[17]

As for Synesius, it seems to me likely on general grounds that he knew Iamblichus' commentary. There are indications in his letter sent to Hypatia with the *Dion* that he had been influenced by Iamblichus' conception of what the *Phaedrus*' overall goal (σκόπος) was and that he subscribed to the view that literary works should have a primary goal to which all else was subordinated. He says in the letter that if the *Dion* has certain technical and external excellences, these are the gifts of skill and nature (*Ep.* 154, 274.18–275.5 Garzya). Among the technical excellences mentioned are the division of the essay under several headings in the manner of that inspired piece of writing, the *Phaedrus*, which Plato published on all of the forms together of the beautiful (περὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ καλοῦ), and the subordination of all of the elements in the essay to one goal (μεμηχάνηται δὲ ἅπαντα συννεύειν ἐφ' ἓν τὸ προκείμενον).

The characterization of the subject of the *Phaedrus* as all of the forms together of the beautiful agrees with the definition Iamblichus gives of the primary aim or focus of the dialogue, which is that it was

[15] On this work see Bielmeier, *Phaidrosinterpretation* 19–29, and Larsen, *Jamblique* 361–72.

[16] See 9.10, 68.26, 113.25, 136.17, 143.24, 150.24, 200.29, 215.12 Couvreur. Not in agreement: 113.24–26, 136.17–24 Couvreur. When he disagrees, Hermeias refers to Iamblichus as ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος.

[17] See Larsen, *Jamblique* 361–72.

about the beautiful under all its forms (διὸ περὶ τοῦ πανταδαποῦ καλοῦ φησιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος εἶναι τὸν σκόπον, Herm. *in Phdr.* 9.9–10 Couvreur = Iamblich. T176 Larsen, fr. 1a Dillon). In the anonymous *Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae* Iamblichus' definition is given in a slightly different form: ἐν ὅλῳ γὰρ τῷ διαλόγῳ περὶ τοῦ διὰ πάντος κάλλους διαλαμβάνει (22.5 Westerink). What Iamblichus meant in saying that the *Phaedrus* was about beauty in all its forms was that it dealt with a hierarchy of forms of beauty, beginning with the visible beauty of Phaedrus and ascending to the beautiful itself before descending back again to visible beauty (Herm. *in Phdr.* 11.20–12.5 Couvreur = Iamblich. fr. 1b Dillon).[18]

The idea that all elements in the *Dion* should be subordinated to one goal (ἓν τὸ προκείμενον) also comes from Iamblichus.[19] It was Iamblichus' view that all Platonic dialogues had one overarching goal or focus (σκόπος).[20] He certainly believed this to be true of the *Phaedrus* (Herm. *in Phdr.* 9.6–10 Couvreur = Iamblich. T176 Larsen, fr. 1a Dillon), and it may well be that Socrates' assertion that a speech should be put together as though it were a living creature was what engendered the idea in Iamblichus' mind.[21] That Synesius in a work modeled on the *Phaedrus* should seek to ensure that all parts of it were subordinated to an overarching goal is exactly what is to be expected in an author influenced by Iamblichus' views on unity and, in particular, on the unity of the *Phaedrus*.

What Synesius goes on to say in the letter to Hypatia, after he has rehearsed the *Dion*'s external and technical excellences, also betrays the influence of Iamblichus, though perhaps not of the commentary on the *Phaedrus*: one who is trained in detecting the divine countenance hidden below an undistinguished outward form will notice certain sacred doctrines lying concealed in the work (275.5–13 Garzya). To explain why this should be so Synesius makes a comparison between

[18] So Bielmeier, *Phaidrosinterpretation* 24; Larsen, *Jamblique* 366; Dillon *Commentariorum* 248.

[19] For τὸ προκείμενον as the main subject of inquiry cf. D. Chr. 7.131; as a synonym for σκόπος, cf. Procl. *In Tim.* I 92.14–15 Diehl, ὁ Πλάτων εἰκότα ἂν εὕροι πάντα πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· ἦν μὲν γὰρ σκόπος αὐτῷ τὸν Ἀτλαντικὸν ἀφηγήσασθαι πόλεμον.

[20] For the case in favor of the attribution of this innovation to Iamblichus rather than to Porphyry or some yet earlier Platonist see Heath, *Unity* 131–33.

[21] So Bielmeier, *Phaidrosinterpretation* 22–23, and Dillon, *Commentariorum* 248–49. For argument against taking *Phdr.* 264c1–5 to refer to literary unity as understood by the Neoplatonists see Heath, *Unity* 18–21.

those sick with epilepsy, who only experience chills when exposed to the moon's rays, and those who are alone capable of receiving the effulgences of the rays of the intellect, since the eye of their intellect is healthy and since god has kindled in them his own divine light, which light, says Synesius, is responsible for the things of the intellect exercising their active power of intellection and for the intelligibles being understood (οἷς ὑγιαίνουσι τὸ νοερὸν ὄμμα φῶς ἀνάπτει συγγενὲς ὁ θεός, ὃ τοῖς νοεροῖς τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ τοῖς νοητοῖς αἴτιον τοῦ νοεῖσθαι); this is analogous to the way in which light enables our eyes to see color, which, if it is removed, though the color still be present, means that our potential in that direction remains unactualized (275.13–20).

The distinction, that between the intellectual (τὸ νοερόν) and the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), comes from Iamblichus.[22] Terzaghi in his commentary on Synesius, *Hymn.* 2.73 (pp. 172–73), saw what was the source of Synesius' ideas in the passage. The passage is particularly reminiscent of the exegesis Iamblichus gives in the *Protrepticus* of some lines of pseudo–Archytas' *De Sapientia* (fr. 1 Thesleff = 16.18–19.4 Pistelli): wisdom is the faculty that sees the intelligibles (τῶν τε νοητῶν ἐστιν ὄψις) and is the potential for the most divine and perfect actualities (18.3–5 Pistelli), and, on the other hand, is the eye and life of the intellectual and makes possible the intelligibles' being seen (ὀφθαλμός ἐστι καὶ ζωὴ τῶν νοερῶν ἡ σοφία, καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶσθαι τοῖς νοουμένοις παρέχει πᾶσι, 18.11–13 Pistelli).

More evidence could no doubt be compiled of Synesius' indebtedness to Iamblichus, but we have enough to make it likely that Iamblichus' commentary is the proximate source of the distinction made by both Hermeias and Synesius between what an envious man will do to prevent something happening and what he will do once it has happened.

II

If the case I have made for Synesius' indebtedness to Iamblichus or to Iamblichean doctrines holds water, the current orthodoxy about Synesius' intellectual allegiances will need to be revised. There are in any case serious grounds for doubting its soundness. Those who have written about Synesius in the recent past have persuaded themselves

[22] On the distinction see Zeller, *Philosophie* III.2 746–50. Lacombrade, *Synésios* 165, acknowledges Synesius' debt to Iamblichus here.

that he was a follower of Porphyry and not of Iamblichus[23] and that Iamblichus played little part in the instruction he received from his teacher Hypatia.[24] Marrou went so far as to speak of Synesius' breaking with Iamblichus and returning to Porphyry, a rupture that in his judgment constituted a divorce from the theurgical practices of contemporary paganism and a movement towards Christianity.[25] Indeed one of the targets at which Synesius directs the *Dion* is supposed to be the Athenian theurgists, the corrupt and decadent followers of Iamblichus.[26] There is also the matter of Synesius' learning, which has been belittled as that of a cultivated gentleman–farmer, well–schooled in rhetoric. Marrou, whose assessment of Synesius this is, holds that we find no mention in Synesius' writings "of the learned commentaries on the classical mathematicians, Euclid and Ptolemy, nor on the great philosophers, Plato and Aristotle."[27] I shall deal with this latter issue before proceeding to the question of Synesius' philosophical loyalties.

It would be absurd to pretend that Synesius was a figure of the intellectual stature of a Porphyry or a Proclus, but a rather more balanced portrait than that given by Marrou is called for. That Synesius does not put on a display of overt learning in the same way that Proclus, for instance, does in his commentaries is explicable in terms of literary genre. Synesius does not write commentaries or formal philosophical works in which references to previous discussions of an issue are appropriate. He writes in a lighter and more informal vein essays whose learning is deliberately veiled and allusive and is meant to be appreciated as such by the *cognoscenti*. Synesius does not advertise his indebtedness to the commentators on Plato and Aristotle, but his understanding of Plato, and no doubt also of Aristotle, is, as we have seen, based ultimately on these commentaries. Whether he had read them himself it

[23] Cf. Lang, *Traumbuch* 82; Lacombrade, *Synésios* 148, 165–66; Marrou, "Synesius" 139–49; Bregman, *Synesius* 22–24.

[24] Cf. Lacombrade, *Synésios* 49: "Dans le mesure, toutefois, où les écrits de Synésios permettent de préjuger la doctrine du cénacle alexandrin, on a quelque raison de penser que Jamblique a du tenir une place plutôt reduite dans l'enseignement d'Hypatie." So also Aujoulat, *Néo–platonisme* 6. Aujoulat does concede (424) that Hicrocles, Hypatia's contemporary, brought Iamblichus back to Alexandria from Athens, where he had studied with Plutarch.

[25] Marrou, "Synesius," 139–40, followed by Bregman, *Synesius* 22–23.

[26] So Lacombrade, *Synésios* 165–66, and Marrou, "Synesius" 145.

[27] Marrou, "Synesius" 131.

is impossible to say, but he will have had access to the views contained in them when he attended Hypatia's lectures in Alexandria.

The theory that Synesius was a follower exclusively of Porphyry and abhorred Iamblichus and all he stood for is based on a preconception, almost certainly mistaken, about the intellectual leanings of the Neoplatonic school in Alexandria: it looked to Porphyry as its master and not to Iamblichus, was more interested in Aristotle than Plato, and had a less elevated and mystical conception of its mission than the school in Athens.[28] That picture of the Alexandrian school's intellectual sympathies goes back to a suggestion made by Praechter, who was struck by the relative simplicity of the commentaries of Hierocles and Simplicius in contrast to those of Proclus.[29] Prachter was making no more than a provisional suggestion that needed further investigation. A more thorough examination of the commentaries of Hierocles and Simplicius shows that their alleged simplicity reflects not an inherently simpler system of thought, but simplification designed to meet the needs of beginners.[30]

The uncritical acceptance of Praechter's hypothesis was no doubt reinforced by an assertion on Damascius' part about the intellectual superiority of Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus to Hierocles. Pythagoras and Plato, he believed, and after them Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus mounted up to the heavenly realms. Those toiling away diligently on mere mortal and human concerns (τοὺς μέντοι θνητὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοπονουμένους), such as Aristotle and Chrysippus, never made the full ascent. Among those of more recent generations Hierocles and anyone like him, while well endowed intellectually, eager learners and diligent (φιλοπόνους), never attained to thoughts that were truly blessed (*Vit. Isidor. Epit. Phot.* 36). Damascius' favorable characterization of Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus in contrast to what he says about the Alexandrian Neoplatonist Hierocles is undoubtedly an attempt to show the superiority of his own

[28] There is no evidence that there was any institutional setting at Alexandria, in contrast to Athens, for Neoplatonic teaching; see Marrou, "Synesius" 131–34, and Hadot, *Problème* 11–12. For Porphyry as the spiritual ancestor of Alexandrian Neoplatonism see Bidez, *Porphyre* 134; Lacombrade, *Synésios* 49; Bregman, *Synesius* 22, 39; for "the somber exegesis" of Aristotle in Alexandria see Westerink, *Prolegomena* ix–xxxiii, and Fowden, "Pagan Holy Man" 46.

[29] Praechter, "Hierokles" and "Simplicius."

[30] So Hadot, *Problème* 189–91, and "The Life and Work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources," in Sorabji, *Aristotle Transformed* 275–78; Sheppard, "Proclus" 142–43.

intellectual antecedents. His teacher Isidore had been taught by Marinus, who in his turn had been Proclus' successor as scholarch in Athens (*Vit. Isidor. Epit. Phot.* 42). In other words, Damascius' picture is self-serving and should be used only with the greatest caution in reconstructing Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism.

We really have no adequate grounds for supposing that Synesius was provoked by Iamblichean theurgists into writing the *Dion*. It is probably impossible, given our lacunose knowledge of the intellectual and religious life of the early fifth century, to say who Synesius' opponents were.[31] He has nothing to say about theurgy as such either in the *Dion* or in the letter to Hypatia. A passage in *De Insomniis*, a work written at the same time as the *Dion*, has been adduced as proof of Synesius' dislike of theurgy.[32] There, among the reasons Synesius marshals in favor of the superiority of oneiromancy over certain other forms of the mantic art that need exotic substances, strange places, rituals, and a cast of characters for their successful completion, is the argument that such actions are hateful to god, since their failure to wait for him to come of his own accord and their arousing him by pushing at him and applying leverage to him is akin to forcing him (καὶ ἀπηχθημένον θεῷ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐθελοντὴν περιμένειν ὀντινοῦν, ἀλλ' ὠθισμῷ καὶ μοχλείᾳ κινεῖν, ὁμοῖον ἐστι βιαζομένοις, 169.22–23 Terzaghi). Synesius' criticisms here are directed in the first instance at forms of the mantic that attempt to manipulate the divine by magical means. It is unclear whether theurgical rituals are open to the same strictures and whether Synesius would have wished to extend his criticisms to theurgy.

If we turn to the *Dion* and the letter to Hypatia, it is very difficult to see which of the practices criticized in the *Dion* are to be associated with one or other of the two groups of persons whose criticisms Synesius says in the letter to Hypatia provoked him into writing the *Dion*. In the attack on the Platonizing philosophers in the letter there is nothing to suggest that they were adepts at theurgy. The impression given is that they were semieducated men who had come to philosophy later in life because of some personal reversal (*Ep.* 154.4, 273.5–12 Garzya). Much of what Synesius says about this group of persons conforms to the

[31] The criticism in the *Dion* has also been thought to be directed against Plotinus (cf. Fitzgerald, *Essays* I 232–34) and at both the authors of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the Cynics (cf. Bregman, *Synesius* 131–32).

[32] Cf. Lang, *Traumbuch* 82; Lacombrade, *Synésios* 166.

stereotype of the false philosopher so familiar from Lucian.[33] There are no doubt nuances to the portrait that would have enabled the informed ancient reader to recognize the identity of Synesius' opponents. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that there is a large element of exaggeration and caricature in the picture Synesius draws. There is, for example, the anomaly of the same persons' knowing enough of Plato only to employ the oath he characteristically uses (273.10–12) and being so inarticulate as to resent Synesius' facility with words (154.5–6, 273.17–274.11), while at the same time being able to criticize him for the uncorrected manuscripts he kept in his library (154.7, 274.14–17). On the face of it, then, it does not look as though Synesius had theurgists in his sights; and even if he did, it does not follow that he was unable to make a distinction between them and Iamblichus.

III

I have written of Hermeias as though he were the author of the commentary on the *Phaedrus*.[34] Whether there is anything of Hermeias himself in the commentary on the *Phaedrus* and whether we should properly be speaking of his teacher Syrianus' use of Iamblichus is moot. It is generally supposed that the commentary on the *Phaedrus* is little more than Hermeias' transcription of notes he had taken when he heard Syrianus lecture on the *Phaedrus* in Athens.[35] Bielmeier was of the view that Hermeias himself was responsible for the inclusion in the commentary of material from Iamblichus, a suggestion that does not seem to have found much favor.[36] It is open to the obvious objection that Syrianus in his lectures can hardly have avoided taking note of and discussing the opinions of Iamblichus.

The evidence for Syrianus' having lectured on the *Phaedrus* is

[33] On the stereotyped portrait of the pseudo-philosopher in Lucian cf. Bompaire, *Lucien* 485; for the view that the portraits are not without nuance and reflect genuine observation cf. Jones, *Culture and Society* 31–32.

[34] For an account of the nexus of personal and intellectual relationships of which Hermeias was a part see Aujoulat, *Néo-platonisme* 424–25.

[35] Cf. Praechter, "Hermeias"; Bielmeier, *Phaidrosinterpretation* 29–39; Zintzen in Couvreur, *Scholia* 299; Westerink, *Prolegomena* x; Sheppard, *Studies* 40; Heath, *Unity* 125 n. 3.

[36] Bielmeier, *Phaidrosinterpretation* 29. Westerink, *Prolegomena* x n. 6, holds that the suggestion "requires further proof."

firstly Hermeias himself, who speaks of his companion Proclus' having posed a problem (ἠπορεῖ) concerning the interpretation of the *Phaedrus* and of the philosopher (presumably Syrianus)[37] as having given a solution to the dilemma (92.6–8 Couvreur), and secondly Proclus, who says that Syrianus and he demonstrated a point in their inquiries into the *Phaedrus* (*in Parm.* 944 Cousin). It is in any case likely that Syrianus would have lectured on the *Phaedrus,* since it was one of the dialogues in the canon established by Iamblichus on which the curriculum of the later Neoplatonic schools was based.[38] Damascius' assertion that Hermeias lacked intellectual acumen and originality and was not a real seeker after the truth but remembered everything his teacher had said and whatever was written in books (*Vit. Isidor. Epit. Phot.* 74) has encouraged the belief that Hermeias did no more than copy out his notes on Syrianus' lectures. Damascius also says that Hermeias together with Proclus heard Syrianus lecture and was second to no one in diligence (φιλοπονία).

Syrianus' teaching undoubtedly lies behind some of Hermeias' commentary, but we cannot really say with any assurance that Hermeias has done no more than copy out the notes which he took at Syrianus' lectures. A comparable case is Proclus' sixth essay on the *Republic,* which was widely assumed to be simply the transcription of the notes that Proclus had taken at Syrianus' lectures. Proclus himself is responsible for creating that impression, though he would no doubt have been rather chagrined to find scholars taking at face value his gracious acknowledgment of his debt to Syrianus and his declaration that his task was to reproduce as exactly as possible what he had heard Syrianus say (*In Rem Publ.* 71.22–27). It has recently been convincingly demonstrated that Proclus is only being polite and that many of the ideas in the essay are his own.[39] It is beyond the scope of the present essay to examine Hermeias' commentary to see whether there is any doctrinal disagreement between it and Syrianus, but until that is done, it would be best to leave open the question of the authorship of the commentary. There is besides the question of the relationship of the commentary to Hermeias' own lectures in Alexandria on the *Phaedrus,* if we assume that he lived long enough to give them. Are we to believe

[37] In the margin of three manuscripts (ABC) there is: οἶμαι [εἶναι BC] Συριανὸν τὸν μέγαν φησί· οὗ μαθητὴς Πρόκλος.

[38] Cf. Westerink, *Prolegomena* xxxvii–xl; Dillon, "Iamblichus of Chalcis" 872.

[39] Cf. Sheppard, *Studies* 40–48.

that, if he did lecture on the dialogue, he did no more than reproduce his old teacher's lectures?

Some caution is in any case called for in using Damascius' assessment of Hermeias' philosophical acumen. He is not, as we have seen, a wholly disinterested witness to the history of later Neoplatonism. He had reason to downplay Hermeias' philosophical accomplishments, since he traced his own intellectual ancestry back to Proclus rather than Hermeias. It is worth noticing that to undercut Hermeias, Damascius attributes the same rather dubious virtue in a philosopher, φιλοπονία, to him as he does to Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Hierocles. His treatment of Asclepiodotus of Aphrodisias, an Alexandrian by birth who had studied under Proclus in Athens and was an associate of Isidore, betrays the same tendency to cast doubt on a man's philosophical abilities in order to make Isidore, his teacher, seem all the more brilliant (*Vit. Isidor. Epit. Phot.* 126).[40] Another case in point is Damascius' unfavorable comparison of Hypatia, Synesius' teacher, to Isidore (*Vit. Isidor. Epit. Phot.* 164).[41]

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[40]Cf. Smith, "Philosopher Portraits" 154.

[41]I am much indebted to John Dillon, Malcolm Heath, George Huxley, and Alexander MacGregor for reading drafts of this paper and for their comments.

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BOOK REVIEWS

FREDERICK AHL. Sophocles' Oedipus: Evidence and Self–Conviction. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991. xii + 297 pp. Paper, $12.95.

Frederick Ahl wrote this book, he says, in response to the questions his students raised about inconsistencies in *Oedipus*. He theorized that these inconsistencies arose from the reader's presuppositions about the plot, a theory he "tested" by supplying one group of students with the unedited play and another with a disguised version which they could not recognize as Sophocles' *Oedipus*. The results of this experiment persuaded him, in fact, that "in this play, no conclusive evidence is presented that Oedipus killed his father and married his mother" (x), or, as he more eloquently concludes, "Oedipus' doom, like that of the Sphinx's generalized man, becomes the doom of all men through the poetic form of Sophocles' play as readers struggle to believe, and so often do believe, that Oedipus' guilt is proved" (265).

Ahl's claim is based on a series of intricate arguments, the most important of which eliminate the authority of both myth and religion from a reading of the text. He contends that the usual conclusion that Oedipus is a patricide and incestuous husband is an extreme example of a "myth" determining the reading of the play, which denies the fact that playwrights frequently modified the traditional stories in their works; he suggests that the distortion here results to a large extent from the influence of later dramatizations of the myth, especially that of Seneca. Furthermore, he argues that both Oedipus and the critics privilege the religious underpinnings of the story, as they are presented both in prophets and oracles, and that, in particular, the use of an oracle to find the source of the plague would seem "old fashioned, not efficacious, and politically suspect" to Sophocles' contemporaries (45, 118).

Ahl supports these claims with analyses of both rhetoric and character. The rhetorical element most essential to his argument is the use of "emphasis," the technique of letting facts speak for themselves rather than having the speaker directly articulate a point. He illustrates this with an example from Aristophanes' *Clouds*, in which Socrates, in listing for Strepsiades the names of male and female quadrupeds, includes "cocks and cockettes." The obvious joke is the creation of the word "cockette," but the use of rhetorical emphasis extends the humor to the unremarked inclusion of a biped fowl among the quadrupeds (an example which Ahl also develops in its reference to "feet," a part of the anatomy of great relevance to Oedipus' self–recognition). The uses of emphasis in *Oedipus*, according to Ahl, subvert the more obvious interpretations of the dialogue. For example, when Creon defends himself from Oedipus' accusation of treason, he suggests that anyone who seeks the name of tyrant is mad.

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Jocasta's brother, of course, is buttressing his own claim that he does not desire the position of king; he does not make explicit any reference to Oedipus, who is obviously a *tyrannos* (113). Ahl, however, interprets the unspoken implication as a significant element in Creon's ongoing attempts to undermine Oedipus' rule in order that he may acquire the throne for himself.

In addition to using rhetoric to attack Oedipus, his enemies also manipulate him by taking advantage of what Ahl perceives as a personality that is overly fearful and excessively anxious, especially in dealing with topics that allude to his past and parentage (although one can question how excessive Oedipus' worries would seem to an audience who knew well the importance of kinship, as Ahl himself points out, 190). Oedipus' anxieties, Ahl contends, lead him to overreact to the arguments—spoken and unspoken—of Tiresias and Creon, to fail properly to examine witnesses, to rely too heavily on unproven and hearsay evidence, and ultimately to accept his guilt without sufficient evidence. As Ahl goes through the play, examining at length each of the episodes, he augments his argument with intriguing examinations of the wordplay, etymologies, and puns which permeate the text; for example, he considers the use of Lambdacism to equate Creon with Cleon (252–54), and the implication of the linkage of words indicating drunkenness and truth (143–44).

Although Ahl's discussions are often fascinating, his thesis ultimately is unconvincing, not least because of his dependence upon the argument "that not only *can* literary characters be studied 'as if they were beings with a continuing off-stage existence,' but that in ancient literature they *must* be so studied when the author makes it clear that they are involved in actions extending beyond the compass of the narrative and from which we, as audience or readers, are excluded" (33). This "off-stage existence" provides Ahl with the leeway to make the following assumptions about various characters' motivations: Creon is acting to acquire the rule of the city; Tiresias is seeking revenge for his defeat by Oedipus in solving the riddle of the Sphinx (102); and the Corinthian stranger, who carefully adjusts his story to respond to the clues he perceives in Oedipus, is acting to maximize his opportunity for gain (102). Ahl summarizes: "Sophocles, like the great writers of Roman epic, practices not only dramatic irony but its reverse: where characters know things that we do not know and never learn" (260). This technique would seem to put these characters—and the plays—beyond the reach of interpretation.

Ahl assumes not only that there is a lot of activity offstage but also that much of what is said onstage is false. He argues, for example, that the Corinthian stranger may be lying when he identifies Oedipus as the foundling he was given on the mountain (180), and that the messenger who reports from within the palace cannot be assumed to be telling the truth about Jocasta's death just because he truly reports that Oedipus blinds himself, for "the truth of one statement is no guarantee that everything else said is true" (213). Indeed, Ahl suggests that Jocasta may not have died at all (222). Tiresias too may lie (al-

though not only critics but also the characters in the play consider that he speaks the truth), for the only reason that we assume he is speaking the truth when he suggests that Oedipus will soon be blinded is that later Oedipus blinds himself (89). Sophocles, I admit, does make significant use of falsehoods in at least four of the extant plays: *Trachiniae, Electra, Philoctetes,* and *Oedipus at Colonus*. In each of these cases the impact of the lie is immense (although not so immense as if Tiresias' accusations are false), but also in each of those cases the fact of the lie is clearly indicated in the text itself—as well as the truth of the various prophecies. I cannot deny, however, that the sample of his work is a small one on which to make a case.

Sophocles' Oedipus: Evidence and Self-Conviction, however unconvincing the final conclusion may be, is certainly worth close reading, both because it is fun and because the very clever arguments compel any reader, even one jaded by years of teaching *Oedipus,* to rethink the play. This effect is enhanced by the sheer novelty of reading anywhere an argument against the likelihood of incest in the face of the current burst of material on the topic provided by psychiatrists, pediatricians, and social service workers; by the research of women on women; by television talk shows; and by current claims of some rebellious analysts that Freud suppressed the actuality of incest in his own theories. Here, in an anti–Massonian move, Ahl accuses us of reading the occurrence of incest into the text along with that of patricide. As Ahl—and, he argues, Jocasta too (155, 168, 188–89)—sees it, Oedipus is unusually susceptible to suggestion and unable to distinguish dreams from reality (168). Creon, Tiresias, and the Corinthian stranger, playing upon the hero's anxieties, compel him to accept his fantasies as reality. This Ahlian Oedipus, although he is a far cry from the more frequently described intellectual engaged in a solitary and unrelenting pursuit of a truth that proves to negate both rational assumption and action, deserves some consideration. He can be seen, perhaps, as similar to Euripides' Pentheus, whose own psyche is manifested through the powers of Dionysus into a dramatic presence. I would argue that in its portrayal of this Oedipus, whose internal dynamics of personality correspond to the external actions of the traditional Oedipus, the play itself re–mythologizes the king. In the convergence between traditional story and Sophoclean tragedy, mythological character and psychic process, it is not necessary, as Ahl does, to deny the reality of Oedipus' acts; rather we can add yet another level of irony and meaning to a play that this book proves is able to bear the weight of almost every interpretation.

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THOMAS K. HUBBARD. The Mask of Comedy: Aristophanes and the Intertextual Parabasis. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991. xii + 284 pp. $35.95.

DAPHNE O'REGAN. Rhetoric, Comedy, and the Violence of Language in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 216 pp. Cloth, $45.

Hubbard's is a book whose time has come. There is a consensus—among modern-day sophists, if not among the uncultured groundlings—that Aristophanes' parabases are not irrelevant digressions but are integrally connected with the plays' action through many fine-spun threads of word, image, and idea. Hubbard describes the parabasis as "a very dynamic and flexible form of essentially literary origin, continually evolving and changing in both structure and content" (17). It is extra-dramatic, bridging mimetic drama and external realities, yet remaining "other" and "a deconstruction of the dramatic." It is self-critical. And it is intertextual, interacting (anapests and all) with the play's other themes, issues, language, and dramatic development. What excites Hubbard is, first, Aristophanes' way of projecting himself into the action, as a superhero behind the others (pleading for peace and harmony, or opposing Cleon, or advocating reformation in literary taste), and, second, the humorous self-awareness shown by the poet, as he mixes *alazoneia* with modest (!) *eironeia,* and possibly induced in his fickle, pleasure-seeking audience as well. Aristophanes plays with the audience, and with himself. He makes himself (together with the chorus) spectacle as well as spectator, a participant in human folly together with all the other fools. In all, Hubbard sees the parabasis "not only as integral but as central to the drama's cognitive self-realization as both a literary and social event; it is therefore also central to our understanding and interpretation of each play" (17).

Hubbard's approach works most provocatively for the first five plays, *Acharnians* through *Peace*. They appeared in consecutive years, 425–421 B.C. (though *Clouds B,* the revised version, was written later); Aristophanes speaks in them about his personal hopes, ambitions, and disappointments; and there are multiple cross-references between the plays, backward and (sometimes) forward. I single out as especially helpful Hubbard's account of the levels of disguise in *Acharnians*. To the many disguises, tricks, and confusions usually discussed, he adds still another, the presence of Aristophanes the poet peeking out from behind Callistratus the producer. (The evidence is reviewed in Appendix 1.) This leads to Aristophanes' official "coming out" in *Knights,* his splendidly funny self-statement there, and his renewed attack on Cleon via the Sausage-Seller. Interestingly, too, Hubbard divides the action in *Wasps* into two significant parts, the one reflecting the political comedy of *Knights,* which succeeded, and the other reflecting the literary-reformist comedy of *Clouds,* which did not.

Readers will learn much from these analyses, in large matters and (as I often did) in small. My queries or disagreements are, with one big exception, minor ones. For example: was Aristophanes the poet concealed so long and thoroughly beneath Callistratus' garments? (Athens was a small, gossipy world, after all—unless choreutai and actors were bound by a code of silence unknown to us.) And was Agoracritus, beneath all vulgar appearances, that "selfless benefactor and reformer" all the time? That is rather too neat to be believed, about the Sausage-Seller or about the playwright—though I join Hubbard in regarding *Knights* as basically a hopeful play about Athens. Again: it would be nice to credit Aristophanes with some genuine modesty, as part of his humorous makeup—but how can we tell if this is more than a pose?

I vehemently disagree with Hubbard's conclusions about *Clouds,* as with the assumptions and argumentation, developed in his 1986 article in *Classical Antiquity,* on which these are apparently based. He assumes (1) that the revision of *Clouds* included much or all of the Phrontisterion and bedbug scenes, the Eupolideans and antepirrheme, the proagon, the first agon (probably entire), the creditor scenes, and the exodos. He argues (2) that Aristophanes revised *Clouds,* after its failure, to bring in farcical effects and vulgar humor that he had avoided earlier (phallus, beatings, torches, etc.), and (3) that the revised "anapests" both apologize for the play's repetition and represent Aristophanes' new use of farce and vulgarity as an ironic rebuke to the ungrateful, unclever majority of his audience. Indeed, Hubbard argues, Aristophanes draws a deliberate parallel between Strepsiades' boorish prejudice against Socrates and the intellectuals and the audience's failure to appreciate the playwright's brave new wit. In short, Aristophanes deconstructs his own play for our edification, if only we are clever enough (having sat at the sophists' feet, whether in Athens or America?) to get the point.

The argument matters. It deserves, if not an agon, then at least a much fuller, more detailed refutation than *AJP* permits. I would argue (1) that Aristophanes' revisions were not nearly so extensive as Hubbard believes; (2) that many of the farcical passages and scenes in question (e.g., Strepsiades and the bedbugs, the creditors beaten) belonged integrally to *Clouds A*; and (3) that in the original "anapests" the chorus already praised Aristophanes' inventiveness, wit, and reformation of comedy (perhaps representing *Clouds* as a sequel to *Banqueters*), yet anticipated, and led the audience to anticipate, the usual joke about breaking all one's own rules—a joke that would be spelled out, far more explicitly, in the next year's *Wasps.* I suggest, then, (4) that the revised Eupolideans restate Aristophanes' earlier claims, only with new passion, and new self-irony, in light of *Clouds'* defeat. By failing to provide support and understanding, the spectators made fools both of themselves and of their gifted, idealistic young playwright. Now they, and he (and we today), are given a second chance.

Hubbard's long chapter "From Birds to Frogs" covers the ground gracefully and well. The playwright's own voice(s) is (are) less audible now, except

perhaps in *Frogs*; the parabases of *Birds, Lysistrata,* and *Thesmophoriazusae* are directly integrated into the plays' action, in new, experimental ways. The anapests in *Birds,* Hubbard argues, connect sophistry with politics, critique of traditional religion with the absolute will to power. The herms affair forms a backdrop to *Birds,* as much as the Sicilian Expedition. *Lysistrata* rehearses jokes and themes that will be explored more fully, and with greater self-reflexivity, in *Thesmophoriazusae.* Also, "in the *Lysistrata* the change in women's social position is purely temporary; the *Thesmophoriazusae* seems to point toward a more fundamental and permanent shift in their status and valuation" (189). The two halves of *Frogs* are integrally connected, not least through the displaced anapests spoken by the Initiates in their parodos; aesthetic backwardness and political irresponsibility are here equated. Hubbard ends with thought-provoking observations on the loss of "presence" in later Athenian tragedy and on the tensions within Aristophanic comedy itself, as reflected in the agon between Aeschylus and Euripides and tentatively resolved.

Aristophanes' "Comic Autobiography" (the summary chapter) is grounded most fully in the first five plays. Here we most confidently catch the playwright's sense of himself and his craft in process of development. The later plays are really too few, too scattered, to buttress our more adventurous critical fabrications—though, to be sure, the same can be said of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Yet through this study of the parabasis Hubbard has contributed substantially to our sense of Aristophanes' artistic personality and growth. He is a careful scholar, widely read, at once traditionalist and modern. His footnotes carefully and generously acknowledge the work of others. The book will take an honored place on my Greek 213 reserve shelf. And I wish the author—what? A comfortable grant? Or maybe a good, long drink in the Prytaneion?

In her provocative new reading of Aristophanes' *Clouds* O'Regan justifies the extant play (*Clouds B*) as a witty and challenging comedy of ideas, a multilayered study of human nature and the uses and misuses of argument. Strepsiades fails, and Socrates too, from ignorance of human nature, their own not least. A third failure, of Aristophanes' clean and clever *Clouds A,* is built ironically into the self-reflective thematic and dramatic structure of *Clouds B,* which appeals to new judges, and presumably to ourselves, to reinterpret the play and solve its clouded riddles. We shall have to ask: was this satisfaction reserved for the cultured elite, and is it still? But first, to the substance of the book.

O'Regan's central theme is the ambiguity of *logos,* its alternating power and powerlessness, impressiveness and ridiculousness in the *Clouds.* Her discussion, for which she provides extensive fifth-century background, recalls an old rhyme:

> The King to Oxford sent a troop of horse,
> for Tories know no argument but force.

> To Cambridge then a box of books he sent,
> for Whigs admit no force but argument.

Argument, as the Athenians saw it, was a powerful instrument for good or ill, and throughout *Clouds,* according to O'Regan, it serves to express or fulfill men's selfish wishes, which are derived in turn from urgent bodily needs and desires. Language is a form of violence, though less effective than physical violence, to which it must eventually succumb. Among the paradoxes of *logos* is its dependence on the protective strength of what, in this play, it continually denies: civic life and law, and the gods.

All this could, of course, find abundant confirmation in Thucydides' *History* and in Euripides' tragedies, which much influenced Aristophanes. O'Regan limits her demonstration, perhaps wisely, to the present play, where Strepsiades greedily and stupidly reduces *logos* to his own desires; where Pheidippides does the same thing, only more effectively; and where Socrates is finally brought down by ignorance of other men's comic/human nature, and of his own. O'Regan has studied *Clouds* very carefully, and future scholars will be indebted to her for many details of observation and analysis. I think, *inter alia,* of her remarks on the matchmaker and Strepsiades' early susceptibility to erotic persuasion; on Aristophanes' parody of scientific and sophistic ideas about thought– and speech–production (and here, O'Regan goes rather beyond Aristophanes in her high–vulgar equation of rhetoric, thunder, and farting); on connections, in this regard, between even minor "Socratic" investigations, as of the gnat's hum, and the larger, underlying world view of naturalistic philosophers; and on the old–fashioned violence of the *Kreitton.* Her treatment of the two Logoi is well–balanced and funny, perhaps the best I have seen.

Coming to the Clouds themselves, I have reservations. Although O'Regan very sensibly denies that their role and significance in the play can be defined once and for all, I think she connects them too exclusively with speech, language, and argument, and also with the mirroring and mocking of overly specific desires and attitudes, whether of Strepsiades, Socrates, or the spectators. I cannot believe, for example, that the "moralizing" Clouds of the finale simply reflect Strepsiades' newly repentant state of mind. They are too free–spirited, too playful and independent, to be so reduced. But this and much else involving performance must be argued elsewhere. I have a more urgent bone to pick, with what might be called the extreme revisionist reading of *Clouds.*

O'Regan swallows Hubbard's views almost unreservedly. She believes, and argues in an appendix and in her central chapter 5, "Aristophanes' Failures," (1) that *Clouds A* was a squeaky–clean play, eschewing vulgarity and relying instead on mostly verbal wit for its comic effects; (2) that the philistine audience of 423 rejected it; and (3) that Aristophanes therefore revised it very substantially, to reintroduce all those banished low–class jokes and to invite a new, subtler, and better response from a hypothetical new audience (or reader-

ship). Thus, the parabasis provides *Clouds'* final lesson on how to understand its comedy, which from the beginning has made the comic and our reaction to it decisive terms in its "argument." "We can understand what we see *only* by watching our second, revised comedy and ourselves, its second audience, from the complex, intertextual perspective inescapable in the knowledge of first audience and first play" (68, emphasis mine).

It is a seductive reading. Behind it we might glimpse the sophistic Clouds of deconstructionism and reader–response theory, teasing us, as Strepsiades and Aristophanes' audience once were teased, into new self–awareness and contagious wit. My problem is, first, with that extreme revisionist position—and the burden of proof has certainly shifted against those who would extend the revisions alleged in Hypothesis VII to virtually the entire play (see my review of Hubbard, above); and second, with the implications of that word *only*. It is one thing to find, in Aristophanes' revised parabasis, new self–ironical implications and connections of the playwright's own mistaken assumptions and "failure" with Strepsiades' experience and Socrates' later in the play. It is quite another thing to extrapolate from that parabasis an exclusively ironic, revisionist reading of the entire play. Need we be quite so modern, and so sophisticated?

Any stick, they say, will serve to beat a dog. Whitman used the *Bearbeitungsfrage* to confirm his prejudice against *Clouds*. O'Regan largely enjoys the play but, thanks to the revision, encloses *Clouds B* firmly within the World of Reading, as a text to be read in relation to other texts. Whereas, for me at least, our *Clouds* essentially preserves the script for the (yes!) excellent performance of 423, with some (limited) revisions towards a second, wished–for or imagined reperformance that never came off. In reinterpreting *Clouds* we must ourselves still look to the constraints and, still more, to the opportunities of theatrical performance, both old and new. What Aristophanes thought, finally, of his hypothetical and real audiences, and of the hypothetical and real Athenian democracy, remains an unsolved riddle. As O'Regan says (132), "the pleasures of our *Clouds* tax and extend our democratic capabilities as speakers, as listeners, and as citizens. . . . We are left to enact our own parts, but with a little more reflection than before."

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DAVID WILES. The Masks of Menander: Sign and Meaning in Greek and Roman Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xvi + 271 pp. Cloth, $54.50.

Wiles's work rests on three pillars: structuralism, semiotics, and Aristotle. Using the perspectives of the two modern theoretical systems, he argues

that all aspects of the performance of New Comedy reflect the same ideological assumptions evident in the Aristotelian corpus. The result is an important and exciting book which may well change the way students of New Comedy do business.

At the center of Wiles's study lie the masks of New Comedy. Making good use of both written and archaeological evidence, he argues that the masks should be seen as a system of signs, as important as the text in providing the meaning of Menander's plays. Pollux preserves not a complete list of the masks used, but an attempt by his Peripatetic source to codify this system. The plays are a visualization of Aristotle's notion that moral choice is a product of disposition (represented by the mask) and thought (represented in language), and all of the masks are created with an eye towards the Aristotelian mean. Wiles supplements his analysis with useful analogies drawn from Japanese Noh drama, *commedia dell'arte*, and the codification of facial expressions in eighteenth–century theater.

He uses a similar line of thought to analyze other aspects of New Comedy. Menander's plots are Aristotelian in such aspects as their focus on choice and their emphasis on *mimesis*, and basic tensions of fourth–century Athens cause their obsession with the incorporation of a woman into the *polis*. The physical makeup of the late fourth–century stage reflects similar tensions and concern with the mean: the unused central door mediates between the doors to its left and right, and there is a polarity between what is shown onstage and the world hidden offstage. The shallow, raised stage encouraged actors to manipulate their masks for the greatest revelation of character. Costumes and gestures, like masks, make up a sign system. Menander's language is "poor" rather than "rich," leaving much meaning to be supplied by actors trained in voice technique like that found in the Aristotelian *Problems*.

Wiles's classification of the masks and his interpretation of the physical evidence of fourth–century performance are very persuasive, and his approach as a whole is provocative and illuminating. When he applies his theories to specific plays, however, he is not always as convincing. His most pervasive problem is that in spite of his insistence that the plays are more complex than other scholars have admitted, his own approach to individual plays sometimes reduces complexity to formulae. This is particularly evident when he applies the narratological principles of Greimas to the plots of New Comedy. True, with a sufficient amount of special pleading, all of the extant plots could be reduced to a repeated narrative involving a subject (a young citizen), an object (a woman), and other such "functions." But what does this really tell us? Rather than laying bare "the sociological roots of Menander's comedy," the reduction of all New Comedy to such a simplified sequence seems merely to draw attention away from the variations which make it interesting.

While Wiles is perhaps justified in his confidence that "the fact that we have a large and more–or–less random corpus of fragments allows us to reconstruct a dramatic technique" (xii), his ideas can best be tested against extant

works. It is therefore somewhat distressing to see that too narrow application of those ideas leads him to misleading interpretations of *Dyskolos*. When he defends (correctly, I think) the thesis of MacCary that the names of New Comedy induce specific expectations in the audience, he argues that Daos is both trickster and victim. This combination works reasonably well for Daos in *Aspis* and some other plays, but it scarcely fits Daos in *Dyskolos*. When Wiles proposes that in *Dyskolos* Menander deliberately contradicted his audience's expectations for Daos, he falls into dangerous circularity. He argues that all of Menander's characters, including those of *Dyskolos*, should be interpreted using Aristotelian rather than modern conceptions of psychology and individuality. Perhaps; but do we need Freud to appreciate that Gorgias is much more sympathetic and interesting than the boor Wiles makes him, or that Kallippides, who enters grumpy and is only barely persuaded to give his daughter away, is far more than a "complaisant" opposite to Knemon? Wiles's determination to apply Aristotelian morality also leads him to judge Sostratos far too harshly, and to misread the end of the play, where the joyful and just revenge on Knemon scarcely shows that Kallippides' household is decadent. This assumption of decadence is closely related to Wiles's insistence on a rigid correspondence between the masks and the Aristotelian mean; for Wiles associates the name of Sostratos' sister, Plangon, with Pollux' "pseudo–virgin" mask and concludes that the audience would associate her with sexual experience. Surely it is inaccurate to group courtesans and raped maidens together as some kind of "golden mean" between *hetairai* and virgins. Courtesans and maidens, like slaves and free persons, were viewed not as ends of a continuum with a "mean" lying between them, but as irreconcilable dichotomies.

Wiles does not restrict himself to Greek comedy. He contrasts Roman practice with his findings on Menander throughout, and he includes a separate chapter on masks in Roman comedy. Here he provides many useful insights, but his method is in general less effective. Some of his assumptions about Roman society are questionable. His schema of Athenian democracy versus Roman autocracy is passé at best, and his rather tenuous connection between theatrical masks and the *imagines* of the dead leads nowhere. Wiles explains much of Terence in terms of Stoicism. Some Stoic influence on Terence is certainly likely; but Terence's double plots are far more complex than Wiles's Stoic contrasts between a good young man who marries and his unrestrained comrade who ends up with a *meretrix*.

Wiles has considerably more to say about Plautus. He offers a good, succinct defense of the view that Plautus' actors wore masks, and he has an excellent sense of Plautus' exultation in theatrical signs and of the close relationship between actors and audiences in Plautine theater. Also particularly insightful is his comparison of the escapist Italian milieu of the French *commedia dell'arte* with the Greek setting of Plautus. Again, however, Wiles runs into problems when he applies his theories to specific plays. He exaggerates the stock nature of the characters of *Curculio*, and his proposal that the identity of

the audience changes during the course of *Stichus* is more imaginative than convincing. When he concludes that in the original of *Captivi* Tyndarus must have behaved differently and could not have been revealed to be a Greek, he has allowed his theoretical preconceptions to cloud any reasonable consideration of Plautus' methods of adaptation. Nor is it clear how *Persa* "deals with the plight of those who are poor in Roman society" (140). Wiles's generalizations about Plautus' corpus as a whole are sometimes similarly unjustified. His connection between "lack of a clear narrative subject" in Plautus' plays and the ambiguous political position of much of his audience is strained. Wiles argues that in Plautus "the sense of a festive transgression against morality is enhanced by the fact that a Roman writer is transgressing the rules of Greek comedy" (7). How many in Plautus' audience would have known the rules of Greek comedy?

Some smaller quibbles. I do not see how the introduction of the *ekkyklēma* in *Dyskolos* would allow actors to "come on and off stage without worries about leaving through an appropriate door" (49). Why should we assume that the small theater in Pompeii was "frequented by an educated elite" (55)? Wiles's arguments that the *angiporta* of Plautus and Terence were visible to the audience are not as persuasive as those of Richard C. Beacham (*The Roman Theatre and Its Audience*) which he seeks to refute (56). There were certainly plays of New Comedy (the original of *Captivi*, for example) which did not include all four major genera of masks (77). Wiles refers to the "*mulier* in *Casina*" as if he has discussed her; he has not (142). Does he mean *Curculio* or *Persa*? Demea is not richer than Micio in Terence's (or presumably Menander's) *Adelphoe* (205). Finally, Wiles's plates are excellent, but they are too few, and several important arguments drawn from visual remains are left without pictorial corroboration. Given the high price of the book, Cambridge University Press could certainly have included more illustrations.

These problems notwithstanding, this is a delightful and valuable book, a "must read" for anyone interested in New and Roman Comedy.

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SIMON HORNBLOWER. A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. I: Books I–III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991 xi + 548 pp.

This new commentary on the whole of Thucydides is extremely welcome. The first volume of A. W. Gomme's *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* was "practically, a 1939 book," though published in 1945 (*HCT* I vi); the last volume was completed by K. J. Dover and A. Andrewes in 1981. Hornblower's commentary does not replace *HCT* so much as update it, using recent studies and approaches. The audience has changed: every Greek lemma is given also in the Jowett translation recently revised by Hornblower; Greek grammar is not usu-

ally considered, being replaced by discussion of the translation of particular words or phrases; apart from the lemmata, I have noted no Greek quotations of more than a word or two. Most of the recent bibliography is British. Every effort has been made to make the commentary easy to use. Running heads provide convenient subject headings, chapter references, and (in books 2 and 3) dates by year and season. Headings and subheadings identify units of the text, which often are prefaced by special introductory notes, and each speech receives an introduction and analysis of its structure. Frequent references to Hornblower's previous books, *Thucydides* and *The Greek World 479–323 B.C.*, substitute for Gomme's extensive introduction. Inscriptions and other evidence are cited whenever possible from Meiggs and Lewis and from Fornara's collection of sources. Appendices on chronology and text are promised for the second volume. A detailed index gives rapid access to special topics (e.g., religion, sources, structure).

The commentary is essentially historical. The reader is delighted, even overwhelmed, with the wealth of recent bibliography and the clear expression of opinion on every conceivable point, from athletic nudity (1.6.5; add now M. McDonnell, *JHS* 111 [1991] 182–93) and the Lycurgan constitution (1.18.1; Hornblower favors a date in the eighth century) to the Cylonian *agos* (1.126), the Rogozen silver treasure (2.29.5), and the festival at Delos (3.104, an eight–page discussion). Thucydides' engagement with Herodotus is given special attention, with numerous notes on echoes or apparent corrections of the earlier author. Occasionally Hornblower allows the reader some relief: e.g., at 2.30.1, the lack of lobsters at Astakos; or 2.44.2, a quotation from Dante.

A few sample passages will convey the range of this extremely useful volume.

1.67.4: Hornblower's treatment of the Megarian question receives one and one–third pages against Gomme's three and one–third. A reference to Plut. *Per.* 29ff. replaces Gomme's discussion of the embassy of Polyalkes and of the Anthemocritus and Charinus decrees, and another to Aristophanes *Ach.* 529ff. and Diodorus xii. 39. 4ff. substitutes for Gomme's treatment of the alternative tradition. Attention focuses instead on de Ste. Croix's interpretation of the decree as essentially religious rather than economic. Hornblower disagrees, because "economic damage is clearly implied by Aristophanes" and the religious aspect of the exclusion is overemphasized in Plato due to the context in which it is treated. The authority of Parker on religion and Rhodes on politics confirms the argument. Thucydides' silence on Pericles' personal involvement is explained by his distaste for a "vulgar story" and his characteristic avoidance of "this Herodotean female angle." However, the historiographical explanation for his silence on Aegina and Megara, that Corcyra and Potidaea seemed to give the best example of how Athens frightened Sparta, seems preferable to the notions, approved by Hornblower, that Aegina was unimportant (it was after all important enough to evacuate and resettle in 431, Thuc. 2.27.1) or that Thucydides

"had a blind spot for Megara." Thucydides' account of the causes of the war was not meant to be complete, merely sufficient. Only British writers are cited; there is no reference, e.g., to the substantial criticisms of de Ste. Croix by Will and Gauthier (*RevPhil* 49 [1975] 93–100, *Historia* 24 [1975] 498–503). The problem of the Charinus decree (Plut. *Per.* 30) is treated briefly at 2.31.3, the twice-yearly invasions of the Megarid.

2.2–6, the Theban attack on Plataea: Four pages are given to the chronological introduction, 2.2.1 (versus less than a page in Rusten's 1989 commentary), three and one-half to the attack itself and its aftermath. Hornblower considers at length the multiple moments which seem to serve as the beginning of the war, rejecting Rawlings's solution. He explains Thucydides' emphasis on Plataea by referring to the fate of the town in books 2 and 3, but is silent on the tie with the Persian Wars and Herodotus. Thucydides was very aware that the new war started on the same ground which had seen the greatest demonstration of Greek, and especially Athenian–Spartan, unity. Like Rusten, Hornblower retains the received text at 2.2.1 (and 1.125.2), following Thompson. There are short discussions of the Boeotarchs, of the political situation in Plataea, and of Thucydides' tacit corrections of Herodotus 7.233. At 2.4.2 there is a note on women in Thucydides, with recent bibliography: women appear rarely, and usually in emotional scenes or as irrational agents. The note at 2.5.6 remarks Thucydides' extraordinary mention of two versions of the Plataean–Theban agreement and comments on his method in collecting and selecting accounts. Although Hornblower refers to Connor and Brunt for the style of 2.4.4–7, one misses a reference to H.-P. Stahl's excellent analysis of the whole passage (*Thukydides: die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess*, Munich 1966, 65–74) and generally to the paradigmatic role of this first incident of the war (noted also by Rusten) with regard to rational planning and confidence, the presence of the unexpected (e.g., the rain flooding the Asopos), sudden acts of savagery, and the inability of the Athenians to control events. In the context of the first incident of the war, Thucydides' decision to report the two stories of the surrender negotiations also takes on paradigmatic value. The obvious art with which the passage was composed (note, e.g., the emphatic present at 2.4.5, ἐσπίπτουσιν, and the surprise appearance of the Theban support force at 2.5, similar to that of the Athenian reinforcements at Syboṭa 1.50.5, where Hornblower misses the rhetorical effect and misinterprets Thucydides' silence) warns one not to take the passage as simple reporting. The artfulness of Thucydides' narrative often confuses literal readers, who then question Thucydides' veracity or goodwill when he does not say what they expect. Here Hornblower focuses almost entirely on historical questions, though elsewhere he often notes the structural or narratological aspects of Thucydides' account (cf. the index s.v. Narratology, narrative devices and techniques in Thucydides, Ring composition, and Structure of Thucydides' work), without, however, attempting a larger view of Thucydides' narrative strategy. He does not present or

explain the structure of book 1, e.g., although he notes the interwoven unity of the four speeches at Sparta (1.67–88) and the ties uniting the Cylon–Pausanias–Themistocles episodes with Pericles (1.126). Hornblower is generally unitarian, and does not approve strongly analytical arguments, though he accepts the Pentecontaetia as a late addition to a late book.

Some questions regarding 2.2–6 necessarily go unanswered: how, one wonders, did the Athenians arrest the Boeotians in Attica (2.6.2)? Were these citizen arrests, by those who knew the Boeotians personally or recognized their dialect? Or were soldiers sent out to different areas, to inquire of deme officials? What became of the prisoners? The ability to arrest at once (if indeed it happened this way) all strangers of a certain nationality suggests a degree of cultural homogeneity and awareness of strangers not normally attributed to Athens, but reflected also in Aristophanes' portrayal of the hapless Megarian in the *Acharnians*. At 2.7.1 Thucydides states, "the treaty was clearly violated." By whom? Hornblower's note presumes "by the Thebans," but Thucydides does not say, and later the Thebans defend their "peaceful" entry into the city (3.65–66). It could be argued that the Plateans first used violence, and certainly the Athenians advised them not to do anything violent. Thucydides' expression avoids fixing responsibility; in the whole story the reader's sympathies are made to shift between one side and the other disconcertingly.

3.25–28: On 3.25, Hornblower, in noting this "good story," might have added that Thucydides highlights the Salaithos story with present tenses, as he does Gylippus' similar mission (cf. 6.104.2, 7.1.2, 7.2.1, 3). At 3.26 Hornblower prefers emending forty–two to forty, although forty–two is the *lectio difficilior*. Thucydides regularly rounded numbers (cf. Rubincam, *TAPA* 121 [1991] 181–98): should we not take this as the precise number, and the other references (16.3, 25.1, 29.1) as rounded? Hornblower never discusses the general problem of emending numbers in Thucydides, although individual cases come up frequently. At 3.27–28 he notes that an oligarchy governed Mytilene, agrees with Bradeen that the demos was desperate rather than pro–Athenian, and refers to the modern discussion on the popularity of the empire. Besides, Salaithos' advice and the decision of those in power are both strange and perhaps deserve some discussion: why was the Spartan so insensitive to the situation in Mytilene, and why did the *dunatoi* prefer to deal with the Athenians rather than surrender their grain supplies to the demos? Presumably the *dunatoi*, fearing that the demos would not stop with a grain distribution, trusted the Athenians more. Their wealth meant more to them than their revolt, but they did not expect to pay with their lives.

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THOMAS J. FIGUEIRA. Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. xiv + 274 pp. Cloth, $29.95.

Asserting that Thucydides is precise in his use of terminology on Athenian colonization (7), Figueira evaluates in detail the community established by Athens on Aigina ca. 431 B.C. The result is an intensely focused argument, which is developed into a theory of Athenian colonization to the end of the fifth century.

Figueira begins with a detailed analysis of the language of colonization in Thucydides as it is used in reference to Aigina in four passages (2.27, 5.74, 7.57, 8.69). *Epoikoi* is shown to mean "reinforcing settlers" and is not simply a synonym for *apoikoi*, the general term for colonists. Figueira goes on to show that there were two types of colonial settlement in the fifth century: *apoikia* and *klerouchia*. The one consisted of Athenian citizens who then became citizens of the new foundation. The other consisted of Athenian citizens who did not become citizens of a new community but remained subject to taxes and obligations in Athens. Having established his understanding of the terminology, Figueira turns in Part 2 to a more general discussion of Athenian colonization, particularly of the sixth and fifth centuries. He contends that in the fourth century cleruchies underwent further specialization, becoming "resident communities with developed institutions, including magistrates and deliberative procedures" (10).

The book includes a useful list of Athenian colonies and cleruchies from 478 to 404, and provocative discussions on Thucydides, Pericles' program of colonization (cf. Plu. *Per.* 9 and 12), and inscriptions of the Athenian empire. As we should expect, there is a new discussion of the enigmatic Salamis decree, *IG* I^3 1 (144–46). The book appeared too soon, however, to benefit from H. R. Immerwahr's *Attic Script* (1990) or P. A. Stadter's commentary on Plutarch's *Pericles* (1990).

Figueira has done his homework, at least into the late 1980s. Each of his arguments is well documented. Historical reasoning is colored by economic categories (primary subsistence economy, etc.); we are given a thorough discussion of ancient evidence, especially literary and epigraphical. Inevitably, however, some superficiality creeps into the discussion of evidence adduced for the general survey. The Phanodikos inscription is not a tombstone (137). The decree of the Second Confederacy does not specify *koinē eirēnē* as its purpose (244). This expression has been restored in the *rasura* of *IG* II^2 43.12–14.

In working out a theory of early Athenian colonization in support of his specific argument on the case of Aigina, the author has done a service for students of Greek history. Nevertheless Thucydides' own judgment on his reconstruction of early times comes to mind: "I am aware that not everyone will be able to accept every detail" (1.20).

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CHARLES D. HAMILTON. Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. xxii + 280 pp. 8 maps. Cloth, $37.95.

Agesilaus, the greatest and most illustrious man of his age in Theopompus' view (*FGrH* 115 F 321 = Plut. *Ages.* 10.5), would seem, like Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, to "bestride the narrow world / Like a Colossus" (1.3.134)—especially if Xenophon's encomium of the lame, short-statured, but long-ruling Spartan king merits belief. This battle-scarred veteran, still leading troops in his eighties, commanded Panhellenic crusades against the Persians and stoutly represented Sparta's cause in the political chaos of the early fourth century. The "Spartan mirage" of historiography owed much to his public image as the "Super-Spartan," the epitome of simplicity, self-restraint, conservatism, and obedience to law. Yet, paradoxically, Agesilaus was a failure. His forty-year reign saw Sparta plummet from the peak of hegemony to the depths of insignificance among major powers.

This book seeks to explain the contrast of Agesilaus' personal distinction with Sparta's political collapse and offers a companion to his earlier study of the Corinthian War, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca 1979). Hamilton, whose preference for the scholarship of Donald Kagan and his students is obvious in the footnotes, defines (ix) three purposes for the work: (1) a study of Agesilaus' domestic and foreign policies that resulted in the failure of Spartan hegemony, (2) analysis of the sources, and (3) setting Agesilaus' reign into a psychohistorical context. The king's Theban obsession (e.g., Plut. *Comp. Ages.-Pomp.* 3.2) finds a parallel in the author's own fixation in defining his book. The preface and introduction, which could easily have been combined, immediately confound the reader with the work's "three primary contributions" (ix), its "first aim" (x), its double focus (1), its "central theme" (1), its "central focus" (5), and its "several ends" (6).

The appeal to a trendy notion like psychohistory (also emphasized on the front flap of the dust jacket) may entice readers to expect an innovative, provocative study. As Hamilton argues (x), we have better sources for assessing Agesilaus' personality than Alexander the Great's, but the result is disappointing. Psychoanalysis, essentially limited to the first chapter (now largely recycled as "Plutarch's 'Life of Agesilaus,'" *ANRW* II.33.6 [1992] 4201–21), derives by necessity from Plutarch's biography of Agesilaus, the only source to discuss his formative years. As Hamilton argues, Agesilaus' "ambiguity" in the Spartan system—a prince not expected to become king, and the lame survivor of the prohibition of physically imperfect offspring—fostered a severe identity crisis from which arose an excessive ambition and constant drive for peer approval: hence the "Super-Spartan" public image concealing his insecurity and fear of rejection. Threats to his ambition could result in turning against a friend, e.g., the humbling of Lysander, his former lover, in 396 B.C.; or in bearing a grudge, e.g., the Theban obsession, kindled by the Theban overthrow of his

sacrifice at Aulis in 396 B.C. and Thebes' role in starting the Corinthian War, thereby disrupting his campaign against the Persians. But except for borrowing the concept of "identity crisis" from Erickson's classic *Young Man Luther* (New York 1958), Hamilton's psychoanalysis is hardly clinical, and the bibliography on psychohistory (12 n. 22) is not otherwise manifest in the footnotes. Readers seeking an adventure in psychohistory will be frustrated, as the book from chapter 2 on becomes a work of traditional scholarship.

This book, coming just four years after P. Cartledge's lengthy *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987), invites comparison. Cartledge writes under the influence of the *Annales* school, displaying a penchant for citing Marx and Marc Bloch and for socioeconomic analysis. Thus *oliganthropia* becomes his key to Sparta's failure, and Agesilaus the individual, as customary in this school of thought, is obscurely submerged in structural analysis. Although both agree that a true biography is impossible, Hamilton asserts (7 n. 1) that Cartledge has inadequately studied Agesilaus' personality and that the fall of Spartan hegemony must be sought in political/diplomatic failings rather than military or socioeconomic factors (x, 256). He declines, however, to examine Cartledge's views systematically and to refute his arguments. Indeed Cartledge's division of his book into "Themes" and "Narrative" is paralleled by Hamilton: chapters 1–3, treating Agesilaus' personality, his life as king and general, and Spartan socioeconomic conditions in the early fourth century, constitute "themes," while chapters 4–8 offer a narrative of Greek history 396–362 B.C. from the Spartan perspective. Here Agesilaus the individual is nearly as obscure in a detailed accounting of all the twists and turns of early fourth-century political events as he was in Cartledge. For Hamilton, Agesilaus' foreign policy alienated Spartan subjects and allies, and he failed to devise new policies to appease the disaffected after the myth of Spartan invincibility was dashed at Leuctra. But this thesis is allowed to emerge from a plethora of narrative details rather than offered in a succinct, tightly argued presentation.

Other differences should also be noted. Cartledge favors an "early" chronology for Agesilaus (born 445 or 444 B.C., accession ca. 400, died winter 360/359); Hamilton proposes later dates (born 443/442 B.C., accession 398, died 359/358), without arguments in support. Readers must be content with repeated references to an earlier article (*Ktema* 7 [1982] 281–96, ignored by Cartledge), and a footnote (18 n. 16) is certainly an obscure place to find Hamilton's first statement on the dates of birth and accession. In use of sources Cartledge preferred accounts in Diodorus and Plutarch, on the grounds that those authors used more impartial sources, and that Xenophon omitted too much in his *Hellenica* and as a friend of Agesilaus was too indifferent to accuracy. Hamilton, in contrast, seeks to vindicate Xenophon—the source closer to the events merits more credence. He scrupulously and systematically discusses source conflicts for individual events with arguments explaining Xenophon's omissions or justifying preference for his account. Although he rarely shuns speculation, his conjectures are forthrightly acknowledged, and future specialized studies will

have to evaluate them. Editors for the press, however, have done him a disservice in putting so many single-item footnotes at the bottom of the page rather than enclosed by parentheses in the text. These disrupt and distract the reader. Despite Hamilton's emphasis on source analysis, it is also unfortunate that he does not identify which edition of Plutarch's *Lives* is used, since section numbers of the Loeb, Teubner, and Budé editions differ.

More significantly, Cartledge attacked Hamilton's model of factional Spartan politics found in his earlier book, charging a lack of support for this view in the sources, a failure to demonstrate how factions arose and were maintained, and imputation of incompatible foreign and domestic policies to factional leaders. In reply, Hamilton only meekly takes up the gauntlet with a countercharge (42 n. 13) that Cartledge inadequately discussed Spartan politics; his continued emphasis on factional politics (27, 41, 43, 110, 122, 171) generally ignores Cartledge's objections. Differences are crystalized in contrasting assessments of Antalcidas, to Hamilton an opponent of Agesilaus, but to Cartledge a diplomat whose long career attests a working relationship with him. Apart from *interpretations* of various policies or events, textually this debate must boil down to evaluation of Diod. 15.19.4 and Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.25.

Nevertheless, Hamilton curiously ignores (with a few exceptions) Cartledge's book—a choice not justified by simultaneous composition of the two works, given the span of four years between them. He does not argue down Cartledge's viewpoints or acknowledge where their interpretations agree. One misses his view on Cartledge's acceptance of Hegesilaus = Agesilaus in *P.Lond.* 187, taken as proof that Agesilaus served in the *Krypteia,* or Teles' contradiction (fr. 3 p. 28.7–11 Hense) of Plut. *Ages.* 1.2 that *all* Spartan princes went through the *agōgē.* Cartledge's rejection of Teles is not supported by an argument. Yet despite some fundamental differences of methodology and interpretation of individual points, the two books offer basically the same view of Agesilaus: e.g., skepticism of both his public image (he learned cunning from Lysander) and his Panhellenic sentiments (a mask for Spartan imperialism, a contrivance of Xenophon; Thebes as the real object of his hatred); similarly, both see his vote to acquit Sphodrias as a turning point on the road to Leuctra, and both criticize his failure to reform Spartan institutions in the aftermath of Leuctra.

Some minor points. Although misprints are rare (e.g., 184, "unperiled" for "unimperiled"; cf. 164, Agesipolis for Cleombrotus) and the style of the book is to latinize Greek terms (e.g., *perioecus*), some gaffs occur (e.g., 158, Aristeides; but 162, Aristides). Phrases such as "some scholars deny" (93 n. 5) and "some scholars reject" (165 n. 47), when devoid of identities, deter from the work's scholarly purpose. Eight maps artfully supplement the text, but the map of Agesilaus' Boeotian campaigns of 378–377 B.C. fails to distinguish with its arrows Spartan from Theban movements. Military analysis is not Hamilton's strong suit here, and little new is offered. He follows Lazenby on the battle of

Leuctra and perpetuates Buckler's conjecture (totally lacking textual support) that Agesilaus commanded at Second Mantineia.

In sum, Hamilton presents an excellent synthesis of Spartan history for the years 404–ca. 360 B.C. His psychoanalysis of Agesilaus will prove useful, and his study of the sources should provoke further discussion. Like Cartledge, he has attempted to write that hybrid book so popular with today's publishers—a work for both scholars and the general public. Whereas the bulk of Cartledge's work and its "chatty" verbosity with lame attempts at humor may deter popular readers, Hamilton's more succinct style and compact volume will encourage use by advanced undergraduates and graduate students. But after two major works on Agesilaus since 1987, can much new (historically speaking) remain to be said in Hamilton's projected "Historical Commentary on Plutarch's Agesilaus" (*ANRW* II.33.6 [1992] 4421)? Perhaps he is reserving his real reply to Cartledge for that work.

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W. W. FORTENBAUGH et al., editors. Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Edited and translated by W. W. Fortenbaugh, P. M. Huby, R. W. Sharples (Greek and Latin), and D. Gutas (Arabic), together with A. D. Barker, J. J. Keaney, D. C. Mirhady, D. Sedley, and M. G. Sollenberger. Part 1, Life, Writings, Various Reports, Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, Theology, Mathematics. Part 2, Psychology, Human Physiology, Living Creatures, Botany, Ethics, Religion, Politics, Rhetoric and Poetics, Music, Miscellanea. Leiden, New York, and Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1992. x + 465 (pt. 1); viii + 705 (pt. 2) pp. (Philosophia Antiqua, 54.1–2)

ADELE TEPEDINO GUERRA, editor. Polieno, Frammenti. Edizione, traduzione, e commento. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1991. 219 pp. Cloth, price not stated. (La Scuola di Epicuro, 11; Frammenti dei Kathegmones, 2)

Fortenbaugh and his colleagues have collected into two volumes thousands of passages from Greek, Latin, and Arabic sources that either mention Theophrastus by name or are similar to passages that mention him. Chronologically the passages extend from Aristotle's *Will* to Pico della Mirandola, *Conclusiones*. They are arranged in a numbered sequence, from 1 to 741, with nine more in an appendix. Many of the numbers offer more than one text, in which case they have lettered subdivisions. For example, four passages that comment on Theophrastus' phrase κατὰ πρόσληψιν are numbered 110A, 110B, 110C, 110D. Other numbers provide lists of references rather than texts. Thus 18, List of

Disciples and Pupils, has twenty entries. There are English translations on facing pages of all passages and lists. Texts are accompanied, where appropriate, by references to similar texts and by critical notes. Explanatory notes are appended to some of the translations. Some of the texts are newly edited, others are taken from the editions that were considered the best available, not necessarily the most recent. Now and then a new emendation is proposed.

Texts and lists are divided into the eighteen groups named in the heading of this review. The groups are further divided into two or more subgroups, all except Mathematics, whose only number lists the titles of four works by Theophrastus in this area. The problem of texts appropriate to more than one group or subgroup is solved in part by dividing the texts, in part by cross–references.

To judge by the number of items in each group, Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Religion received the least attention in later writers, Physics and Ethics the most. Yet the work of Theophrastus most commonly referred to was the extant *Historia Plantarum*; 115 references to it are listed in no. 413. By contrast there are only five references to the *Characters,* all from Philodemus (no. 450). The single longest piece is Diogenes Laertius' *Life,* newly edited by Sollenberger (no. 1).

The cooperative effort of the editors will not end with these two volumes. They plan to issue also nine volumes of commentary. One of the nine is scheduled to appear in 1993.

A striking feature of this collection of texts and references is its variety. Theophrastus' wide range of writings evoked a wide range of comments. Information about his writings on logic, including his important contributions to modal logic and the hypothetical syllogism, comes primarily from Aristotelian commentators. In the section on physics also these commentators have a prominent place, but they are joined by many others, notably Philo Judaeus (on the eternity of the universe) and Proclus (on the heavens). What Theophrastus said about waters was of interest to Pliny, Seneca, Aelian, and Athenaeus, among others. Pliny also took from Theophrastus his account of salt and soda, and much else.

The list goes on. Priscian wrote a *Metaphrasis* of Theophrastus' *De Anima*. Averroes and Albertus Magnus were among those who undertook to elucidate his statements about the intellect. Galen invoked the authority of Aristotle and Theophrastus for the doctrine of the four qualities and the four humors. Gellius preferred Theophrastus to Cicero on friendship. Jerome attributed to Theophrastus a litany of reasons why the wise man will not take a wife. Cicero used Theophrastus' book *On the Happy Life*. For Plutarch he was the source for incidents in the lives of Pericles and Demosthenes. Dionysius of Halicarnassus criticized his judgment of the style of Lysias. Porphyry stands alone in his interest in Theophrastus' contribution to the question whether the difference between the notes of the scale is qualitative or quantitative. Photius excerpted nine of Theophrastus' works, and lexicographers and scholiasts

mined his writings for explanations of rare words. These are just a few of the many uses to which Theophrastus was put.

The question how trustworthy our sources are and to what extent they had firsthand acquaintance with Theophrastus' writings will no doubt be discussed in the nine volumes of commentary. Actual quotations from his works are not collected separately. They are often difficult to identify, and in any case they are relatively few. Simplicius stands out as one who quoted the passages he was discussing.

As aids to the reader the editors provide in Part 1 an introduction and a list of abbreviations. In Part 2 there are concordances with the collections of Wimmer and others, and an index of sources. There is no *index verborum* and no extended bibliography. Bibliographies and general essays are promised for the volumes of the commentary, and the last volume is to have a select *index verborum*. It is unclear whether there will be a *Zusammenfassung* comparable to that of Regenbogen in Pauly–Wissowa.

The translations are of course the greatest help, especially with passages that are marked by technical language or abstruse argument. For those of us who are not Arabists they are indispensable. Perhaps they fall short of Theophrastus' divine eloquence, but I found very little to challenge: ἐπισκήπτει (2.28) is not "enquires"; ἠθῶν (2.352) is not "customs"; ὑμᾶς (1.110) is not "us"; ἐν ἴσῳ τῷ (2.120) is not corrupt (it means "equivalent to"). The excerpt from Seneca *Nat. Quaest.* (1.362) is better translated by Oltramare in the Budé edition. Misleading misprints are rare: for "other" (2.433.9) read "others"; for "alternation" (2.167.22) read "alteration."

So too in a cursory reading of the Greek and Latin texts I noticed little that could be misleading. For εἴπομεν (1.428, no. 239.3) read εἴποιμεν. For *issius* (2.368.5) read *ipsius*. For *eventum* (2.330, last line) one would expect *eventuum*. Delete the first line on p. 2.344, or the last line on 2.342. The reference to Plut. *De Cup. Div.* (2.152, no. 359C) should be 526B. The excerpt from Galen on the *Aphorisms* (1.334) should be identified as 1.14. The work cited as Galenus *De Substantia Naturalium Facultatum* (1.94, no. 42) has been identified as part of Galen's *De Propriis Placitis*. Πνεύμονος (2.169.10) is already in Bekker's edition of Photius, *Bibliotheca*.

Perhaps the text of the passage from Porphyry on the Pythagorean names for the fourth, fifth, and octave (2.572) can be salvaged if one punctuates τὴν δέ, διὰ πασῶν· τῷ συστήματι . . . : "they called the other (i.e., the octave) διὰ πασῶν; to the scale . . . they gave the name ἁρμονία." This reading gives the fourth, fifth, and octave the names that they have in Philolaus, fr. B6, Diels–Kranz I 409.15–410.1.

Fortenbaugh has informed me that a second edition is in preparation.

Polyaenus of Lampsacus was one of the early followers of Epicurus. He probably became an Epicurean prior to Epicurus' departure from Lampsacus in

307/306. Cicero tells us that he was a mathematician before he joined the school, and Plutarch says that he predeceased Epicurus. Tepedino Guerra infers from a Herculanean papyrus that he died in 278/277.

Information about him is meager. Tepedino Guerra has for the first time assembled all known references to him, fifty–eight fragments in all. (The fragments are numbered 1 to 59, but 28 and 42 are the same.) They are arranged under six heads: Vita (1–14), Ingenium et Fama (15–23), Dicta (24–26), A Scriptis Certis (27–53), A Scriptis Incertis (54–55), Fragmenta Dubia (56–59). The collection of fragments is preceded by seventy–seven pages of introductory material and followed by an Italian translation, seventy–four pages of commentary, and four indexes.

Polyaenus' writings include *On Definition, On Philosophy, Against Ariston, Problems,* and *Letters*. Philodemus says that there was doubt about two others attributed to him, *On the Moon* and *Against the Rhetoricians,* but in this edition they are defended as authentic. Still another work, a dialogue entitled *Medios* or *Medeios,* was, according to Diogenes Laertius 2.105, thought by some to be by Polyaenus; but it is placed among the Dubia.

There are six quotations from his writings: the three Dicta, another saying in fr. 54, and two excerpts in Stobaeus on the relation of λόγοι to ἔργα (44 and 45), a dozen lines in all. To these may be added terms extracted from paraphrases and other references, yielding altogether a vocabulary of 113 words. They are listed in the Indice delle Parole Principali.

Of the fifty–eight fragments thirty–seven are from the Herculanean papyri, twenty–one from other sources. Of these latter, four are from Plutarch, four from Diogenes Laertius, three from Stobaeus, two each from Cicero, Seneca, Aelian and Maximus Confessor, and one each from Alciphron and Theon's *Progymnasmata*. They do not tell us very much. Cicero, Plutarch, and Aelian are hostile. Cicero chides Polyaenus for renouncing geometry. Plutarch and Aelian base anti–Epicurean arguments on his illness and death. Seneca and Diogenes Laertius, however, have good things to say about him. Alciphron and Theon merely identify him as a leading Epicurean to whom Epicurus is reported to have written a letter. Stobaeus and Maximus Confessor give us excerpts from his writings.

The texts of the twenty–one fragments have been taken from standard editions, with few changes. Critical notes have been omitted from all but one; the changes are explained in the commentary. Emendations, however, that are already embedded in the text of the source are unmarked. For instance, one must go to the Wachsmuth–Hense edition to discover the emendations in 44 and 45, from Stobaeus.

There are some misprints in these fragments. In 7 insert καὶ after Νεοκλέα. In 9 read: fr. 16 Körte, *App.* In 22 (p. 90, line 17) read: τοῖον ἢ τοῖον. In the translation of 53 the key words τὴν ἔμμετρον καὶ ἔνρυθμον λέξιν have been omitted (Theon is criticizing Epicurus' style).

The major contribution of this volume is in the thirty–seven fragments

gathered from the Herculanean papyri. Here the editor was able to take advantage of other recent work emanating from the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi, including some of her own earlier publications. In some cases text and translation are taken from those recent works virtually unchanged, and critical notes are omitted. But the greater number do have critical notes that report new readings of the papyri and new restorations. Such editorial activity is evident, for example, in the four passages from Philodemus *De Libertate Dicendi* and the five passages from his *De Pietate*.

The seven fragments assigned to Polyaenus' *Problems* (Ἀποριαι) are of special interest. Demetrius Lacon wrote a commentary on this work, and parts of the commentary are preserved in at least three papyri, and probably three more. They are so badly damaged that it is not possible to reconstruct the thought of either Polyaenus or Demetrius, other than that the latter undertook to answer the questions raised by the former. But terms such as κέντρον, διάμετρος, περιφέρεια, εὐθεῖα, γωνία, and τρίγωνον have been recovered. They and the two diagrams that have survived indicate that some at least of the questions pertained to geometry. Furthermore, the frequent occurrence of the term ἐλάχιστον, the Epicurean term for the limit of divisibility, suggests that either Polyaenus or Demetrius was engaged in formulating an Epicurean geometry to replace the Euclidean. Tepedino Guerra provides many new readings and restorations of the longest of the seven fragments (PHerc. 1647), whose pitiful remnants occupy six pages; and there is a detailed discussion of Epicurean mathematics in the introduction.

Of special interest also is PHerc. 176, author unknown. It contributes nine fragments. Some are newly edited, others are taken unchanged from earlier editions. This is the papyrus that contains the touching letter to the child Apia. That letter, however, is one of many in the papyrus. Anna Angeli, "La Scuola Epicurea di Lampsaco nel PHerc. 176 (fr. 5 Coll. I, IV, VIII–XXIII)," *Cron. Erc.* 18 (1988) 27–51, identified in this papyrus three groups of letters, one pertaining to Leonteus, one to Idomeneus, and one to Batis. (Batis was the sister of Metrodorus; in Angeli's scheme she was the author of the letter to Apia.) Tepedino Guerra, accepting Angeli's analysis, finds references to Polyaenus, some of them conjectural, in all three groups; and she finds four more in parts of the papyrus not discussed by Angeli. These fragments illuminate the relation of Polyaenus to other early members of the school.

In working with Herculanean papyri one must often make conjectures that are at best probable or at least possible. In the introduction and the commentary Tepedino Guerra ably explains and defends her interpretations of the fragments and her reconstruction of the context in which Polyaenus lived and worked. Not everyone will be persuaded at every step, however. In particular I would suggest a different interpretation of fr. 2. At the beginning of the fragment she reads ἐ[π]ιδεί[κνυ]ται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν | [ὅλων ἐν το]ῖς βυβλίοις τα[ρά]ττων . . . and translates "Egli ostenta il possesso di tutta la dottrina, portando scompiglio nei libri (dei Maestri)." The restoration ὅλων is also in Francesca

Longo Auricchio, *Ermarco* (Naples 1988), where this same passage appears as fr. 3. Angeli, "I frammenti di Idomeneo di Lampsaco," *Cron. Erc.* 11 (1981) 64 fr. 10, had indicated that a word of four letters preceded ἐν. Crönert and Sbordone had supplied τὴν. I would propose τῶν (ω fills the space of two letters) and translate "He is shown to be upsetting the firm grasp of what is (written) in the books. . . ." An example of ἐπιδείκνυσθαι (passive) with the participle may be found in LSJ s.v. ἐπιδείκνυμι.

The present volume is the second in a series on the early leaders of the Epicurean school. The first was on Hermippus, edited by Francesca Longo Auricchio (Naples 1988). A third is promised on Metrodorus. Never have these Epicureans been treated so well.

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R. P. H. GREEN, editor. The Works of Ausonius. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. lvi + 780 pp. Cloth, $185.

Since Gibbon's castigation of Ausonius and his age, most scholars who have dealt with Ausonius have been accustomed to preface their analysis with an apology. Such an attitude is, to say the least, unhelpful. With Green's new major edition and the first ever commentary in English, apologies are no longer needed. This is a new attitude. In 1989 the new Schanz–Hosius, edited by R. Herzog, devoted a lengthy, detailed, and erudite entry to Ausonius (*Handbuch der lateinischen Literatur* V 268–308, by P. L. Schmidt and W. L. Liebermann). Ausonius is fast gaining his rightful place as a writer whose importance for the understanding of literary, religious, historical, and artistic trends in the fourth century cannot be overemphasized.

Ausonius' life encompasses the better part of the fourth century. His work covers an enormous range of topics, genres, and meters, from literary portrait galleries of relatives and school colleagues to a poetic hymn in honor of a river and a prose speech of thanksgiving. Many of his compositions throw invaluable light on education, social relations, economic mobility, and politics in late Roman Gaul. His own career is no less colourful. It supplies vital clues to the elusive process of the formation of a new aristocracy in the fourth century (H. Sivan, *Ausonius of Bordeaux: Genesis of a Gallic Aristocracy*, London: Routledge, 1993).

Ausonius has been lucky in his modern editors. The 1880s saw two excellent editions, each with a lengthy introduction, one edited by Schenkl (*MGH* AA V.2, 1883), the other by Peiper (Teubner, 1886). In 1971 Pastorino produced another useful edition, and 1978 saw as yet another Teubner, this time edited by Prete. Evelyn–White, using Peiper's edition, produced a first–rate English translation (Loeb, 1919–21). The time has certainly come to see a major edition

and commentary coming from the English-speaking world. Few are better equipped for the task than Green. For the past twenty years he has made a substantial contribution to Ausonian scholarship through many articles, and his work is familiar to any student of that author.

A four-part introduction precedes Green's text. It includes valuable pages on the poetry of Ausonius, and on his influence. Green also sets out to provide a definitive answer to a question which has plagued all editors. The issue, somewhat oversimplified, is as follows. The bulk of Ausonius' poetry has been transmitted by two major families of manuscripts, each quite different from the other. Not only does each family give the works in a different order but, at times, the same poem appears in different lengths and versions. Does each family, then, relate to a different archetype? Was Ausonius himself responsible for an edition of his works, perhaps even for two editions? Green's solution is to opt for a single archetype "of epic dimensions," which has been tampered with from very early days. Hence the present state of differences in tone, omissions, additions, and corruption. This solution may appeal to some. Perhaps, indeed, Ausonius' text experienced a long history of early editorial revisions, which may date back even to an unknown hand in Visigothic Aquitania. Yet, before consensus on this point can be reached, a reevaluation of all relevant references in Ausonius' works seems a necessary preliminary (for a list see my appendix on Ausonius' working methods in *Ausonius of Bordeaux*).

As part of his new approach to the text, Green also offers his own order of Ausonius' compositions. Its acceptance would certainly bring relief to Ausonian students, for in the past, each and every editor had the text printed according to his own reconstruction of the elusive Ausonian archetype(s). Thus, for example, Ausonius' speech of thanks to Gratian (A.D. 379) appears eighth in Schenkl's edition, but last in Peiper's. Needless to say, this has also necessitated an ever-growing concordance (as Green gives on pp. 721–27).

Green's arrangement of the text seems to follow a chronological order. Like editors before him, he starts with a collection of short, detached prefaces which include a reply to a letter from the emperor Theodosius I, an introduction to his readership, and four verses to Syagrius. So far Green is in agreement with other editors. Unlike Schenkl and Peiper, however, he relegates an imperial letter from Theodosius to an appendix. This decision is apparently based on his belief that Ausonius refused the imperial request to send Theodosius an edition dedicated to him. There is indeed no evidence of an "imperial" collection or edition. But the possibility that Ausonius did send some of his poems with a dedication to the emperor cannot altogether be excluded. Green adds two further prefaces which other editors have attached to other works or placed differently. His judgment here seems correct. On the whole, Ausonian prefaces merit further investigation (Sivan, "The Dedicatory Presentation in Late Antiquity: The Example of Ausonius," *Illinois Classical Studies* 17 [1992] 83–101).

The bulk of the text is divided between two main periods of Ausonius' life: the first when he resided in Bordeaux, the second when he lived at the

Treveran court of Valentinian I and Gratian. This procedure is generally acceptable. Several divergences from Schenkl's and Peiper's arrangements are noticeable. Green places *Easter Verses,* delivered in Trier at some time between 368 and 375, between Ausonius' earliest dated poem, on the birth of his son (ca. 330), and the verses commemorating the death of his father in 378. Both Schenkl and Peiper grouped *Easter Verses* with other court compositions. Several poems which are, admittedly, difficult to classify, like the *Ordo* and the *Ludus,* come at the end of Green's text, although they may have originated in the schoolroom (between 330 and the 360s). In his dating Green follows Schenkl and Peiper for the most part. Their systems require a thorough reexamination. The *Moselle,* for example, may be earlier than hitherto accepted (Sivan, "Redating Ausonius' *Moselle,*" *AJP* 111 [1990] 383–94). As Green acknowledges with regard to other poems, the possibility of several stages of composition over a number of years cannot be excluded. In this he is undoubtedly right.

Green's text includes about one hundred emendations, all based on his own collation and reappraisal. All are acceptable to the present reviewer, though preference might be given to V's *civis* in *Parentalia* 8 (Attusius Lucanus Sabinus) instead of Peiper's and Green's *quamvis* (Sivan, "Not a Civis? A Note on Ausonius' *Parentalia* 10.6 (Sch.)," *Latomus* 48 [1989] 879–80).

In providing the first ever commentary in English, Green has rendered singular service to Ausonian scholarship. It is comprehensive and immensely useful. It highlights textual, literary, and historical problems connected with each composition. Each individual analysis is prefaced by an introduction which discusses the date of the work, its main thrust, and Green's own interpretation. He often shuns political interpretations, such as, for example, the one which Charlet has proposed for the *Easter Verses.* For Green, these verses refer to a baptism in the royal house. Analyzing the opening of the *Moselle,* Green regards the journey from the frontier back to Trier as imaginary and unhistorical. He also rejects the overpoliticized interpretation of this poem. The message of the *Moselle* may indeed have been complex and multifaceted. At any rate, whether one accepts or rejects Green's analyses, they are unquestionably thought–provoking and deserve the most serious attention.

Three appendixes are included. In the first, particularly welcome is the collection of laws from the Theodosian Code which have been associated with Ausonius' tenure as quaestor in charge of imperial legislation. It seems a pity that Green, with his incomparable knowledge of Ausonius' style, did not add a commentary here. The second appendix includes letters written to Ausonius, all of which are also found in Evelyn–White's Loeb edition with translation. The third appendix quotes a fascinating list of Ausonian works. Side by side with those long known as his, the list includes titles of lost works, such as a history (in verse!) of third–century usurpers based on an otherwise unknown historian by the name of Eusebius of Nantes (Sivan, "The Historian Eusebius of Nantes," *JHS* 112 [1992] 158–63). The list was originally published by Weiss in

1971, and reprinted in Prete's Teubner edition of 1978. Once more, Green's own ideas on their authenticity would have been a welcome addition.

With these few and minor reservations, Green's work must be warmly welcomed as a very important contribution to Ausonian scholarship. It has opened the way to a renewed interest in the poet and, I hope, to his inclusion in academic syllabi. With Green's edition and commentary, there is really no more excuse for either neglect or exclusion of this author.

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GERALD V. LALONDE, MERLE K. LANGDON, and MICHAEL B. WALBANK. The Athenian Agora: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Vol. XIX, Inscriptions: Horoi, Poletai Records, Leases of Public Lands. Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1991. xiv + 245 pp. 16 pls. 1 plan.

Agora XIX is the final publication of a group of texts which deal with the definition and use of land. A total of 219 inscriptions from the Agora excavations since 1932 is composed of 131 *horoi,* 64 records of the public vendors (*poletai*), and 24 leases of public lands. This harvest represents every one of the major types classified in the *Corpora* of Attic inscriptions and increases their number by about 30 percent.

The volume contains some texts previously unpublished but is mostly the republication of known inscriptions. Nevertheless it brings together these texts diachronically and thematically for the first time and shows the relation of subject matter which would be missed by strict adherence to a rigid scheme of classification. Especially illustrative of this interrelatedness is the association of the mining leases (*poletai* records) and the leases of public land by other officials of the state (cf. Walbank, *Hesperia* 51 [1983] 222 n. 93), ranging in date from 367 to the beginning of the first century B.C. The former have been known in quantity from the early excavations and were published in the postwar years. The latter group was dramatically increased by finds of the 1970s.

Indeed the decade just past has witnessed the publication of major texts from the Agora which focus attention on the unity of the material of this volume: Sale of Property Confiscated from the Thirty and Their Associates, 402/1 (P2, Walbank, *Hesperia* 51 [1982] 75–76, 90); Leases of Sacred Property, 343/2–326/5 (L6, 9–12, Walbank, *Hesperia* 52 [1983] 177–231); Decree of two Attic phylai on Oropos, ca. 330 (L8, Langdon, *Hesperia* 56 [1987] 47–58), which illuminates a decree on the Lesser Panathenaia (L7, Lewis, *Hesperia* 28 [1959] 239–47).

Lalonde presents the texts of boundary markers from the Agora. The

classifications as *horoi* of sanctuaries, civil establishments, roads, grave sites, trittys markers, *incerta,* and security *horoi* demonstrate the diverse uses of this type of inscription from the late sixth to the early second century B.C. Although "Termini" was a recognized class of inscription in *IG* I² and II², with 316 inscriptions from the Acropolis, the area of the Agora, Piraeus, and elsewhere, the Agora excavations have increased this total significantly. Only four of the texts published here were included in the *Corpora* (*IG* I² 864; II² 2507, 2581b, 2671). The text of 2671 is improved by new readings.

The inscription hόρος μνήματος is shown to mean "boundary of the grave site" even in the late fifth century, and in other texts σήμα also means "grave site." Thus the meaning of *demosion sema,* the public cemetery discussed by Thucydides and Pausanias, is illuminated. In terms of phonology three unpublished texts of hόρος μνήματος (H54–56), perhaps late fifth–century, attest the use of H to represent both aspirate and eta, confirming an earlier restoration proposed for *IG* I² 906 and observations made by A. G. Woodhead (*Hesperia* 26 [1957] 233, no. 8) and Leslie Threatte (*The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions* [Berlin 1981], 38).

Of the texts illustrating the management of Athenian finance in the fourth century one should note especially the group of leases which span the period in which Euboulos and Lycurgus were important officials in administration of Athenian finance. The text with the name Euboulos (L6, lines 146–47) is particularly noteworthy, as it attests his activity in renovation of a theater, probably the Theater of Dionysus.

Langdon's publication of a decree of ca. 330 by two Attic phylai (Aigeis and Aiantis) on land in the Oropia which they leased (L8) is shown to be related to the Nea as mentioned in the decree on the Lesser Panathenaia published by David Lewis in 1959 (L7). Louis Robert's interpretation of the Nea as land in the Oropia ceded to Athens by Philip II is noted, although Langdon interprets it differently.

Walbank integrates his texts into a history of the leasing of public lands in Attica and lands controlled by the Athenian state. He discusses all texts, from the late sixth to the first century B.C., which provide evidence for this subject. He is thereby able to establish a broad context for interpretation of the Agora leases. Although a compelling case is made for all of the inscriptions discussed, he is perhaps too positive in the interpretation of *IG* I³ 1 as relating to cleruchs on Salamis and providing the basis for understanding *IG* II² 30 (L3) as a decree regulating the holdings of cleruchs on Lemnos in 387/6. The Salamis decree tantalizes, but it does not impose this interpretation, and the decree on Lemnos is insufficiently preserved.

Introductory essays on *horoi, poletai* records, and leases of public lands set these texts in the context of the larger Greek world of which they are a part. Interesting observations are made on why the leases were inscribed at all, contributing to our understanding of the inscribing of texts as distinguished from texts "published" on perishable materials and those kept in archives but not

inscribed. Both Langdon (61) and Walbank (167) call attention to the inscribing of the leases on stone. Langdon suggests that the motive for inscribing the mining leases was simply convenience, providing for increased visibility. He notes that resumption of mining activity in the second century was not also accompanied by inscribed leases. Walbank agrees, in respect to the leases of public lands, adding the desire for accountability in the financial administration of the fourth century.

Though not included among the texts of the volume, *IG* I³ 84, the decree of 418/17 on the sanctuary of Neleus, Kodros, and Basile, figures significantly in Walbank's introductory essay as "the first clear example of the state acting as leasing agent for a public cult" (155). For Langdon it is one of three fifth-century decrees (*IG* I³ 80, 84, 110) in which provisions of the publication formula do not include the *poletai,* although they were probably involved. It is perhaps noteworthy that the publication formula of *IG* I³ 84 (lines 26–28) is added in a rider to the main motion and, in a purpose clause, specifies increased visibility as the reason for inscribing on stone. Expressions of purpose in the publication formulae of decrees do not occur regularly but become more frequent in the fourth century and in Hellenistic times. They usually stress wider dissemination as the reason for inscribing on stone.

The documents published in this volume, together with those also discussed in the essays by Langdon and Walbank, provide valuable commentary on Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 47.2–3 (*poletai*) and 47.4–48.1 (leases of *temenē* under the archon Basileus).

This volume is a worthy contribution to the *Agora* series. What is "new" in it is the bringing together of texts which had been published separately, the publication of a few new texts, and the introductory essays. The documents presented in it will surely open up avenues for investigation by ancient historians, classical scholars, and everyone interested in the world of ancient Athens.

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

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

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

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ACHILLES' SELF-ADDRESS: *ILIAD* 16.7–19

The exchange between Achilles and Patroclus at the opening of book 16 is a crucial turning point in the plot of the *Iliad*. In a scene of extraordinary force and complexity, the poet articulates the volatile emotions of both men in language that is rich with underlying tensions and associations. The Greek losses have been so devastating that Patroclus is overcome by tears. Achilles greets him with a simile that only ambiguously expresses the frame of mind from which the narrator tells us it springs. By comparing Patroclus to a little girl clinging to her mother's dress, Achilles mocks him, and yet the narrator tells us that Achilles' response is a gesture of pity (5). The series of rhetorical questions Achilles then poses is so cutting and ironic that it causes Patroclus to groan heavily and launch a furious attack that, again, takes no account of the pity Achilles has supposedly just shown. He curses Achilles' excessive anger and denies that Thetis and Peleus are his parents, since only the rocks and sea could have produced such a pitiless nature. Achilles is moved by Patroclus' appeal, but also "deeply troubled" (48). The abrupt shifts in his speech represent dramatically the struggles of an unsettled mind. He decides on a compromise that is not so much a resolution as it is a misguided result of his competing feelings of anger and compassion. Though he will not comply with Patroclus' request to reenter the battle, he will allow Patroclus to fight in his place; and thus, with the illusory hope that Patroclus will emerge from the battle victorious, Achilles sets in motion the course of events that unfold in the rest of the poem. With the foresight inaccessible to Patroclus and Achilles, the narrator poignantly reminds us that Patroclus, in his great innocence, did not realize that "he was entreating his own death and evil destruction" (47).

We can begin to address the complexity of this scene by asking two questions that raise themes central to the whole of book 16. First, granted that Patroclus assumes the role of Achilles in battle, is there

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any further sense in which the two men are identified? Some scholars, for example, argue that Patroclus can be viewed as a ritual substitute for Achilles,[1] or as his alter ego.[2] Second, how does the text depict the nature of Achilles' inner struggles, which after all form the powerful thematic and psychological background for so much of the poem?

Several scholars link the answers to these two questions: Patroclus represents the compassionate side of Achilles, who is himself racked by a conflict between compassion and anger.[3] This approach sometimes leads to more specific psychological speculations. Is Achilles denying or repressing his compassionate side?[4] Does he recognize something of himself in Patroclus?[5] Does Patroclus function throughout the poem as a metaphor for one aspect of Achilles' personality?[6]

While the text depicts Achilles' vacillations between compassion and anger with considerable plausibility,[7] the further move that Patro-

[1] Van Brock, "Substitution" 125–26.

[2] Nagy, *Best of the Achaians* 33–34, 292–93, suggests that Patroclus is called "best of the Achaians" (17.689) and "best of the Myrmidons" (18.10)—titles otherwise reserved for Diomedes, Agamemnon, Ajax, and Achilles—"because he has taken upon himself not only the armor but also the heroic identity of Achilles" (34). Developing Van Brock's arguments, he supports his view with the linguistic evidence that the word *therapōn*, used of Patroclus in book 16 (165, 244, 653) and elsewhere, derives from the Anatolian languages, where it originally meant "ritual substitute." Beginning with book 16, then, Patroclus can be seen as the alter ego of Achilles, and ultimately his substitute in death. See also Sinos, *The Meaning of Philos* 29–37.

[3] Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* 197–200, provides the classic formulation of this position. In book 16 Achilles is torn between the defiant expression of his anger, and a genuinely compassionate nature represented by Patroclus. Patroclus thus externalizes one component of Achilles' inner conflict. Whitman also saw this conflict in terms of a tension between Achilles' will to transcendent glory (which has been achieved insofar as Zeus had granted his request for the Trojans to inflict destruction on the Achaians), and his will to take action in the human sphere. Achilles achieves transcendent glory by removing himself from the sphere of human action, but his compassion for humanity demands that he reenter that sphere.

[4] Van Nortwick, *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled* 56, claims that in Achilles' speech in the opening of book 16 we "find the by now familiar attempt to cover genuine concern with a cavalier tone, a sign of stubbornness, or perhaps denial."

[5] In his psychoanalytic study, *Childlike Achilles* 150, MacCary sees the simile Achilles uses at 16.7–11 as especially revealing: "What of himself does Achilles see in Patroklos, in Patroklos' eyes, when they sit apart by themselves and talk? It must be his own weakness; it must be the diminished, effeminized, socialized image of himself that Hektor accuses Diomedes of having become."

[6] Van Nortwick, *Somewhere I Have Never Travelled* 39–88.

[7] See my discussion of 16.49–100 below.

clus represents his compassionate side is not as firmly grounded; it is based on the fact that the compassion Achilles often lacks forms the essence of his most intimate friend's character. It is not clear that we are justified in inferring from this that Patroclus represents or is to be identified with the "compassionate side" of Achilles.

I argue, however, that by exploring the issue from a different perspective we find the precise evidence, which has so far been lacking, in favor of this view. My interpretation relies fundamentally on a repetition which, when recognized, activates a number of interpretive possibilities and textual nuances. The opening of book 16 (1–100), I suggest, recreates the scene in book 1 between Achilles and Thetis (357–427) through the repetition of language, theme, and emotional tone. By simultaneously evoking and inverting the familial context of the scene in book 1, the opening of book 16 identifies Patroclus with one side of Achilles and defines Achilles' conflict in terms of a tension between compassion and ironic distance. This ironic distance is in part a manifestation of Achilles' anger. When viewed in relation to book 1, Achilles' speech thus maps out his relation with Patroclus and the nature of his conflict. This repetition adds a dimension to the beginning of book 16 that at once provides a firmer basis for interpretation and uncovers a further level of literary subtlety in the text.

In the beginning of book 16 the verbal repetitions of book 1 are brief but striking. Achilles addresses Patroclus with the same words Thetis addressed to *him* in book 1 when *he* was weeping: ἐξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε νόῳ, ἵνα εἴδομεν ἄμφω (16.19; 1.363). Insofar as these are the only two instances of this complete line in the *Iliad,* there is an exclusive connection between the two scenes (ἐξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε appears once more at 18.74, again spoken by Thetis to Achilles). In addition, Homer prefaces Patroclus' reply to Achilles with the same formula he used to describe Achilles' response to Thetis: τὸν δὲ βαρὺ στενάχων προσέφης, Πατρόκλεες ἱππεῦ· (16.20); τὴν δὲ βαρὺ στενάχων προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς· (1.364). This repetition not only evokes the former scene between Achilles and Thetis, but it also reverses the role played by Achilles; instead of the child seeking comfort, he is put into the role of the parent, or more precisely, the role of his mother.[8] Patro-

[8]This is not the only time Achilles is put into the role of the parent. Schein, *The Mortal Hero* 107, notes that Achilles' "special sensitivity to parent–child relationships" is revealed in a series of similes in which he assumes the role of a parent. At 9.323–27 he compares himself to a bird bringing back food for her young; at 18.318–22 he grieves for

clus, on the other hand, is put into Achilles' former role as the child in distress.

This repetition and reversal of roles is vividly reinforced by the language, imagery, and emotional context of the scene. As Achilles wept in book 1, Patroclus is here weeping (16.3) and Achilles asks him why: *tipte dedakrusai* (16.7). So too in book 1, Thetis asked the weeping Achilles *teknon, ti klaieis* (1.362). Here in book 16 Achilles is, in fact, identified with a mother (*mētri,* 8) when he compares Patroclus to a young girl who looks tearfully into her mother's eyes and begs to be picked up (16.8).[9] The imagery Achilles uses thus suggests that he steps into the role of the parent whose attention is being sought by Patroclus, and Patroclus takes on the role of the child Achilles was—or is. And so, in addition to the verbal repetition in lines 19 and 20, the thematic links between these two scenes are such that book 16 reenacts the exchange in book 1 between Thetis and Achilles.[10]

We can now consider the implications of this repetition. Achilles

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Patroclus as an anguished lion would groan for his stolen cubs; and at 23.222–25 he weeps for Patroclus as a father mourns over the death of a newly married son. Schein recognizes that "in all four passages there is a curious reversal of roles, for Achilles puts himself, and is put by Homer, in the position of the parent, although it is Patroklos and Agamemnon who, by virtue of age and position, should be caring for him" (107). This role reversal makes the simile Achilles uses at 16.7–11 all the more insulting to Patroclus. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* 84, cites the similes at 16.7–11, 18.318–22, and 23.222–25 as part of the evidence for his larger claim that the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus is actually "parasitic in its conceptualization on kinship relations and on sexual relations. That is, it must borrow terminology and imagery from these other spheres of human relations in order to identify and define itself."

[9]Nagler, *Spontaneity and Tradition* 135–36, points out that when Patroclus is compared to a female he conforms to a pattern of successful supplication, since in a common form of the Embassy motif all male attempts at supplication fail and a woman finally succeeds. (The Meleager story, *Iliad* 9.573–99, typifies this motif. On the possibility that Patroclus' role corresponds to Cleopatra's, and the related possibility of a correspondence between the names Patroclus and Cleopatra, see Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien* 140, and Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* 28–31.) But see Martin, *Language of Heroes* 62, whose arguments suggest that Patroclus is not portrayed as a successful suppliant. There is, according to Martin, a suggestion in the text that Patroclus' powers of persuasion are very weak: the only other person in the *Iliad* who weeps "like a black-watered stream" is Agamemnon (9.14–15), who Martin claims is the *Iliad*'s weakest rhetorician.

[10]Janko, *Commentary* 312–13, finds it plausible that in book 16 Patroclus and Achilles assume roles originally played by Achilles and Thetis (respectively) in a "*Memnonis*." Cf. also Schoeck, *Ilias und Aithiopis* 89. Slatkin, *The Power of Thetis* 85–105, argues that in the *Iliad* Achilles possesses the wrath that in a different mythological context belongs to Thetis.

and Patroclus are both identified with female characters, a mother and a daughter. While this unites and distinguishes them from the male sphere, it also suggests a particular kind of relationship, that of parent to child: and so we find (or rather, Achilles condescendingly *puts*) Patroclus in the subordinate role of the helpless child petitioning her mother (Achilles), who stands aloof from her child's highly emotional state. What, then, is the significance of the stance Achilles adopts toward Patroclus, and is it really the same stance Thetis adopted toward *him* in book 1?

While there is a kind of intimacy and compassion implied by Achilles' and Thetis' words—ἐξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε νόῳ, ἵνα εἴδομεν ἄμφω (16.19, 1.363)[11]—Achilles' tone differs from Thetis' in that it has a strong element of irony. Whereas in book 1 Thetis sits beside Achilles, strokes him, and asks him what sorrow has come to his heart (360–63), in book 16 Achilles provokes Patroclus with a series of questions to which he knows the answers:[12]

> ἠέ τι Μυρμιδόνεσσι πιφαύσκεαι, ἢ ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ,
> ἦέ τιν' ἀγγελίην Φθίης ἐξ ἔκλυες οἷος;
> ζώειν μὰν ἔτι φασὶ Μενοίτιον, Ἄκτορος υἱόν,
> ζώει δ' Αἰακίδης Πηλεὺς μετὰ Μυρμιδόνεσσι,
> τῶν κε μάλ' ἀμφοτέρων ἀκαχοίμεθα τεθνηώτων.
> ἦε σύ γ' Ἀργείων ὀλοφύρεαι, ὡς ὀλέκονται
> νηυσὶν ἔπι γλαφυρῇσιν ὑπερβασίης ἕνεκα σφῆς; (16.12–18)

Whereas Thetis' questions can be understood as a means of comforting Achilles,[13] the questions Achilles asks are sharply ironic. He says, in effect, "Could it be that one of our fathers has died, or are you weeping over the Achaians, whose destruction is their own fault?" Achilles must know that Patroclus is weeping for the dying Argives, since he himself has been viewing their destruction (11.609–10, for example). His ques-

[11] Martin, *Language of Heroes* 210, notes that *exauda, mē keuthe* . . . "characterizes the tender relations between Achilles and Thetis, and Achilles and his companion" and suggests that these words signify that the speech which follows them will be the "candid outpourings of the speaker who is addressed." Foley, *Immanent Art* 136–89, makes a similar claim when he suggests that other Homeric phrases have an "immanent," traditional meaning which pervades each of their particular uses.

[12] Just as Thetis already knows the cause of Achilles' distress—Achilles asks her, "since you know, why must I tell you all this?" (1.365)

[13] τέκνον, τί κλαίεις; τί δέ σε φρένας ἵκετο πένθος; (1.362). But see note 19 for a different reading of Thetis' tone.

tions are not to be taken at face value. Achilles *would* take it badly if Peleus or Menoitios had died, but the destruction of the Achaians—the cause of Patroclus' grief—elicits only scorn and contempt from him.[14] Achilles' ironic questions are thus consistent with the patronizing attitude already demonstrated when he put Patroclus in the position of a pitiful and vulnerable *nēpiē*.[15]

Achilles' emotional tone is, however, too complex to be described as unequivocally ironic, for he also pities Patroclus (*oiktire*, 5). It is unclear whether Achilles' ironic mode of expression undermines or is somehow compatible with his pity. Achilles' tone is, moreover, complicated by a double significance. His irony is both a response to Patroclus in particular, and a manifestation of his anger toward the Greeks. These two objects, in fact, become indistinguishable when Patroclus alone bears the brunt of the anger Achilles directs explicitly against the Greeks, who are losing "on account of their own arrogance" (18). There is, then, not only a link between Achilles' ironic stance and his anger, but also a moment of identification.

Patroclus' response to Achilles' rebuke—*mē nemesa* (22)—may

[14] Willcock, *A Companion to the Iliad* 177, sees in Achilles' speech "a delicate combination of gentleness and irony." The simile of the little girl is, according to Willcock, a gesture of comfort (I disagree; see note 15 below). The irony comes at line 12, when "Achilleus knows perfectly well why Patroklos is weeping but affects to believe that it may be some bad news from home of which he is unaware." Owen, *The Story of the Iliad* 146–47, sees no tension between Patroclus and Achilles in this scene and claims that the tone of Achilles' speech is one of "familiar friendship." While it may be true that *oiktire* (16.5) makes it clear "that conditions are favorable for the success of Patroklos' appeal" (147), there are strong indications that Achilles' attitude is initially quite petulant and that Patroclus resents it.

[15] Von Scheliha's view that Achilles compares Patroclus to a little girl in order to comfort him (*Patroklos* 317–18) assumes that the common negative implications of *nēpios* are absent here. Consider, for example, Hektor's rebuke of Ajax in book 7: μή τί μευ ἠΰτε παιδὸς ἀφαυροῦ πειρήτιζε, / ἠὲ γυναικός, ἣ οὐκ οἶδεν πολεμήϊα ἔργα. / αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὖ οἶδα μάχας τ' ἀνδροκτασίας τε· (235–37). *Nēpios* can also signify a certain pathetic ignorance or foolishness and, in the *Iliad*, is often used of adults who are about to die but are unaware of this fact. Edmunds, *Homeric Nepios*, has argued that the "primal sense" of *nēpios* is not "child" or "without speech," but rather "not-connecting/connected" and that this derivation is borne out by a consideration of the contexts in which this word is used in the *Iliad*. Some kinds of "disconnectedness," Edmunds claims, are characteristic of the adult and child *nēpios* and are relevant to Patroclus and the simile used to describe him at 16.7–11 (see 55, 67). For example, he is pathetically unaware of his approaching doom and thus disconnected from his future (the narrator's use of *nēpios* to describe him at 16.46 certainly suggests this).

be meant to address the anger of Achilles, which has had such dire consequences for the Achaians. But it may also refer to the immediate context, that is, the attitude Achilles has just exhibited to Patroclus with his ironic questions and simile. *Nemesaō* usually means "angry" in the sense of feeling righteous indignation (cf., e.g., 10.129, 10.145, 13.293, 23.494). Patroclus' words at line 22—μὴ νεμέσα· τοῖον γὰρ ἄχος βεβίηκεν Ἀχαιούς—suggest that Achilles is misguided when he ironically teases Patroclus, since he has not fully realized the gravity of the distress that has befallen the Greeks. We have already seen that Achilles' piercing irony is closely connected with his anger. Thus, when Patroclus groans heavily and tells Achilles not to be angry, his words have the force of, "there is no reason to berate me, Achilles; the situation is more serious than you think." The only other occurrence of this line in the *Iliad* (10.145) has the same sense. There Nestor startles Odysseus by waking him in the middle of the night, yet assures him that there is no need to be annoyed or find fault with this disturbance, since there is a just cause: μὴ νεμέσα· τοῖον γὰρ ἄχος βεβίηκεν Ἀχαιούς. Patroclus' response thus acknowledges the irony of Achilles' tone in lines 7–19 as a manifestation of his anger, and a typical demonstration of the harsh and pitiless (*nēlees*, 33) nature he faults Achilles with at 21–45. Achilles thus repeats his mother's words, yet irony colors his role of compassionate mother, and in this sense he deviates from the example set by Thetis. His repetition of his mother's role is modified by his own particular character.[16]

There is another significant respect in which Achilles' response to Patroclus differs from Thetis' response to him. When Patroclus comes to Achilles and sheds plentiful tears (16.3) it evokes the weeping Achilles of book 1 (1.357). In that scene, Thetis sheds a tear in response to Achilles' predicament (1.413). But in book 16, Achilles (assuming the role of his mother) is not moved to tears by Patroclus' grief and in fact, as we have seen, plays the role of the compassionate mother rather badly. Once we recognize the opening of book 16 as a repetition of the scene in book 1, the fact that Achilles fails to cry becomes significant. As the scene in book 1 shows, Achilles is capable of weeping, but the cause of his tears is instructively different from the cause of Patroclus'

[16] It is perhaps significant that Patroclus ironically questions Achilles' parentage at 16.33–35. As Nagler, *Spontaneity and Tradition* 137, points out, it is appropriate that Patroclus attacks Achilles' genealogy at a time when Achilles' identity is especially in question (since Patroclus is about to take his armor and followers).

and Thetis' tears. Thetis weeps out of compassion for Achilles,[17] and Patroclus out of compassion for the Achaians. But Achilles weeps for himself because he has been dishonored; and so, in the context of these two scenes, his compassion for Patroclus is again brought into question. Achilles does pity Patroclus, but as we have seen, that pity is expressed neither in tears nor in words of consolation.

The opening of book 16 repeats the exchange between Achilles and Thetis in book 1 in such a way that Achilles assumes the role of Thetis, while Patroclus assumes the role of Achilles. It is in this sense, then, that Patroclus and Achilles become identified. This identification suggests that Achilles shares Patroclus' compassionate nature. But Achilles' actual words suggest something different; his attitude is provocative and ironic. This scene's deviations from book 1 reinforce the impression of Achilles' lack of compassion, and throw into relief the decidedly more compassionate attitudes of Patroclus and Thetis.

But if Achilles is simultaneously identified with and distinguished from Patroclus, a kind of split in his personality is dramatized in this scene. Patroclus is here playing the role of Achilles. The repetitions of book 1 allude to Achilles' unexpressed compassion by implicitly identifying him with Patroclus. Patroclus could thus be said to externalize one component of Achilles' character. In this sense, Achilles addresses himself when he speaks to Patroclus. In his adopting an ironic attitude toward Patroclus, Achilles' compassionate side is not only distinguished from his ironic behavior, but the two are in conflict; Achilles berates his "compassionate side."[18]

The conflict apparent in the opening of book 16 is representative of Achilles' vacillations between anger and compassion in the rest of his speech to Patroclus (49–100). There, Achilles' swelling anger is punctu-

[17]Thetis is compassionate in part because she has knowledge of Achilles' fate (1.416–18). By contrast, Achilles *lacks* knowledge of Patroclus' fate, and this ignorance invests the whole scene with a pathetic irony. When this scene is recognized as a repetition of the Thetis scene in book 1, Thetis' privileged knowledge as a goddess is poignantly juxtaposed to Achilles' imperfect, mortal knowledge.

[18]The analysis of Homeric psychology by Russo and Simon, "Homeric Psychology," is compatible with my interpretation, although my argument does not require such a view. They see a strong tendency in Homer to externalize inner mental processes and express them as interchanges between a hero and a god, a hero and some external agent, or a hero and one of his organs (e.g., the *thumos* or *kradiē*). In this particular case, Achilles' unexpressed compassion is externalized by Patroclus.

ated by gestures of concession that indicate, but do not always directly express, feelings of compassion. Achilles begins by acknowledging the great force of Patroclus' appeal: "what a thing you have said" (*hoion eeipes,* 49). He then repeats the wrong he has suffered at the hands of Agamemnon and emphasizes the bitter sorrow he still feels (52–59). He has been treated like a "dishonored outcast" (*atimēton metanastēn,* 59). There is a startling shift at 60–61: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν· οὐδ' ἄρα πως ἦν ἀσπερχὲς κεχολῶσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσίν· It is likely that compassion is one of the emotions underlying these words, since Patroclus is the one who has moved Achilles, and as we have seen, Patroclus is here an Achilles–figure. Achilles' change of heart is, however, very brief. What begins as a factual reminder that he has promised not to give way until the fighting has reached his ships (61–63) gradually builds to a sinister and detailed vision of the suffering troops (66–79). The vision seems for a few moments to absorb him completely. Achilles' *Schadenfreude* at Greek and Trojan suffering may, as Janko (*Commentary* 324) suggests, be mixed with true alarm at the desperate situation. Released from the grip of his anger, Achilles again yields to Patroclus and instructs him to enter the battle (80–82). Achilles' honor, however, will be diminished if Patroclus continues fighting too long (90). At this point Achilles directly expresses concern for Patroclus. When Patroclus has driven the enemy from the ships he should not continue the slaughter, since one of the gods sympathetic to the Trojans may crush him (91–96). Achilles' tone again shifts, and his speech ends on an especially harsh note. He prays for nothing less than the destruction of all the Greek and Trojan troops and hopes that only he and Patroclus will emerge from the slaughter alive (97–100).

Achilles' shifts between anger and compassion at 49–100 are adumbrated in his "self–address" at 7–19. The tension between compassion and anger in 49–100 is mirrored by the conflict between compassion and irony in 7–19. The beginning of book 16 thus subtly dramatizes a theme that is eventually brought out more explicitly.

My reading of Achilles' speech shows how the mechanism of repetition can invest the concrete verbal and thematic features of a scene with an implicit, yet precisely delineated level of meaning: by inviting us to consider the ways the opening of book 16 is similar to and different from the Thetis scene in book 1, the links between the two scenes demonstrate how Patroclus and Achilles are in one sense identified and in another sense distinguished. Achilles' conflict is thereby articulated

in terms of compassion and irony.[19] In offering such an interpretation we raise the larger question of whether repetitions are primarily the literary tools of the poet, or are due rather to the exigencies of oral composition. Although there are good grounds for thinking that this question actually assumes a false dichotomy, it is worth noting that the repetition I have pointed to has interpretive implications that correspond so well with the main themes of book 16, and in fact articulate those themes in such precise terms, that it would be less plausible if the repetition were merely accidental.[20]

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[19]My reading of Achilles' speech in book 16 may have implications for the interpretation of the book 1 passage. I interpreted Thetis' words in book 1 as an expression of compassion and as evidence of an intimate relationship with Achilles. This reading seems initially quite plausible; she asks him to share with her his sorrow (1.362–63), and she laments his cruel fate (1.413–18). But when Achilles assumes his mother's role and displays an ironic distance, it suggests a different interpretation of book 1. Achilles' repetition of Thetis' words raises the following questions: Is Thetis really compassionate, or is she just feeling sorry for herself? Is Achilles' response to her questions —οἶσθα· τίη τοι ταῦτα ἰδυίῃ πάντ' ἀγορεύω; (1.365)—meant to suggest that her attitude is ironic? Is Thetis more distant from Achilles than she may at first seem? After all, her divine status inevitably removes her from the realm of mortals, and even though Achilles is half divine, his mortality is at the forefront in this scene. Thus, by offering another perspective from which to view Thetis' relationship with Achilles, book 16 may question or destabilize the meaning I attributed to book 1.

[20]Foley, *Immanent Art* 12, 57, argues that readings like mine are necessarily limited and superficial because they focus on the horizontal axis of repetition within the text instead of on the metonymic, vertical relation between text and tradition. This vertical interplay is, Foley claims, the dominant aesthetic feature of the *Iliad* as oral poetry, and infuses all of the particular words, lines, and scenes with their immanent meaning, thus placing them within the broad, "extratextual" context of the tradition. I think not only that horizontal, "literary" readings can be fruitful, but that they often complement vertical readings. I would argue, in fact, that the "literary" reading of *Iliad* 24.337 and 355, which Foley claims removes "the possibility of hearing traditional resonances" (148), is compatible with and enriches the vertical reading. My consideration of books 1 and 16 tries to show how vertical readings work together with the linear repetitions to generate a coherent interpretation (see note 11 above, which suggests that the traditional meaning of *exauda mē keuthe* . . . may be at play with the particular situations in books 1 and 16).

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SPINNING AND WEAVING: IDEAS OF DOMESTIC ORDER IN HOMER

Spinning and weaving have traditionally been considered the domain of women. All evidence suggests that in antiquity the working of wool and the production of garments were primary occupations of women,[1] who, regardless of their social status—be they slaves or queens—contributed through their handiwork to the self-sufficiency of their own households. In the Homeric poems all women, including queens and goddesses, are either specifically described or said to be involved in the spinning of wool or the creation of cloth on their looms. Their work symbolizes the normal order of life, in which women take care of their households while men defend the city.[2]

Although modern scholarship has appropriately recognized the symbolic or metaphorical function of weaving in literature and in the Homeric poems in particular,[3] no distinction has yet been made between weaving and spinning. Traditionally, spinning has been viewed either as another occupation of women or simply as part of the process of weaving. Despite their obvious connection—both spinning and weaving were performed by women and in a sequence, since weaving depends on the prior production of thread—the two activities do indeed

[1] The Linear B Tablets, as well as ancient iconography and literature, clearly attribute spinning and weaving to women workers. See Chadwick, *Mycenaean World* 151–52; Williams, "Women on Athenian Vases"; Wace and Stubbings, *A Companion to Homer* 531–32. Herodotus (2.35) mentions the difference between Greek culture and Egyptian culture, in which men rather than women weave.

[2] The idea that a woman's duty is to weave and await her husband patiently, while he is taking care of "men's business," is clearly expressed in a formulaic manner by Hector and Telemachus in both the *Iliad* (6.490–92) and the *Odyssey* (1.356–58, 21.350–52). Any change of this order reverses the image of the loom from a symbol of domestic stability to a symbol of disrupted domestic harmony, as we see in Hector's fear that Andromache will serve as a slave at the loom of another man (*Il.* 6.456) or in Agamemnon's desire to substitute Chryseis for his wife (*Il.* 1.29–31).

[3] Weaving has been associated with singing and poetic activity or viewed as a form of language characteristic of women. On the connection between singing and weaving in Homer and the Lyric Poets see Snyder, "The Web of Song." On weaving as a "sign-making activity of women" see Bergren, "Language and the Female." On Helen's weaving in *Iliad* 3 see Kennedy, "Helen's Web"; Atchity, *Homer's Iliad* 82–99; Clader, *Helen* 8; Bergren, "Helen's Web" and "Language and the Female." On Penelope's weaving see Snyder, "The Web of Song" 192–93, and Foley, "Reverse Similes."

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represent different processes of creation. The ancient loom stood upright, and weavers walked to and fro, passing their bobbins through the threads of the warp. It is obvious that this kind of work required a certain amount of physical energy, which probably made weaving an occupation more suitable for younger women. Since looms were situated in the inner palace,[4] weavers could isolate themselves and perform their art away from the public eye. On the other hand, the spinning of wool could easily be done by all women, regardless of age. Since it was portable and could be performed in a standing or a sitting position, it gave the spinner the flexibility to move around,[5] and possibly engage in other tasks, such as the supervision of servants, in the case of queens. Furthermore, the art of weaving produces a fabric which often bears a design and has the potential for conveying a concrete message. In contrast, spinning produces only the thread, that is, the raw material which makes weaving possible and, most importantly, allows the weaver to speak and express herself through the specific artifact she produces on her loom.

My purpose here is to examine the various descriptions of weaving and spinning in Homer, in an effort to show that the poet exploits the differences between the two activities and uses them consistently, as he develops the individual portraits of his female characters.

There are twenty-two passages in Homer in which references to work at the loom occur, but only five female characters are actually depicted as weaving.[6] Homer also uses the verb *hyphainein* metaphorically in several other passages to describe the intellectual process by which men "weave" words or wiles.[7] Spinning is mentioned in several passages either as a separate activity or in conjunction with weaving,[8]

[4] E.g., ἐν μεγάρῳ (*Il.* 3.124); μυχῷ δόμου ὑψηλοῖο (*Il.* 22.439); ἡ δὲ ἔνδον (*Od.* 5.61).

[5] A fine representation of a woman spinning can be seen on a white-ground jug from 490 B.C., British Museum, London: Beazley *Attic Black-Figure* 403, 38. For a description of spinning see Suhr, *Venus de Milo* 44–47.

[6] *TLG s.v.* ἱστός, ὑφαίνω, κερκίς: *Il.* 1.31, 3.124–25, 6.456, 22.439–40, 22.447–48; *Od.* 1.356–57, 2.93–94, 2.103–4, 2.108–9, 5.61–62, 7.104–5, 7.109–110, 10.222, 10.226, 10–254, 13.108, 15.516–17, 19.139, 19.149, 24.129, 24.139, 24.144–47.

[7] *Il.* 3.212, 6.186, 7.324, 9.93; *Od.* 4.678, 4.739, 5.356, 9.422, 13.303, 13.386. For a discussion of the metaphorical use of the verb see Snyder, "The Web of Song" 193–94.

[8] *TLG s.v.* ἠλακάτη, τάλαρον, νῆμα, στρωφῶ, στροφαλίζω: *Il.* 6.491; *Od.* 1.357, 7.105 (in conjunction with weaving); *Od.* 4.125, 4.131–35, 6.53, 6.306, 17.97, 18.315, 18.568, 21.351 (as a separate activity).

although only two women, Helen and Arete in the *Odyssey,* are actually presented as spinning wool. But let us begin with a brief discussion of the actual scenes where either spinning or weaving occur.

Helen's work at the loom in *Iliad* 3.125–28 marks her first appearance in literature and is, without doubt, the best known and most studied scene of weaving in Homer. When Iris comes to summon Helen to the Wall to witness the decisive duel between Menelaus and Paris, Helen is weaving "a great, double-folded purple web" on which she depicts scenes of the Trojans and the Achaeans fighting for her sake. In the context of the *Iliad,* where her marital status and social identity are ambivalent, Helen finds relief and escape from her sad reality by depicting on her loom images which actually record history as she herself sees it. Men like Achilles find consolation in singing of the *klea andrōn* (*Iliad* 9.189). Helen, as a woman, acquires a voice and identity, it may be argued, only through the creativity of her weaving. Like an epic poet who preserves through his song the glorious deeds of his heroes, Helen weaves on her loom the story of the war. Her web fulfills her need to overcome death by producing an artifact which will survive and "tell *her* story," her *kleos,* to all future generations.[9]

Andromache's condition in the *Iliad* (22.441–42) is in many ways similar to Helen's. Both women face an uncertain future and express themselves through the images they depict on their webs. Both are shown in the inner palace weaving purple double-folded robes. Andromache's web, however, is not *megas*. It may be artistically elaborate (*throna poikil',* 441) but it does not have the kind of social significance that the poet has bestowed upon the web of Helen. The subject matter of Andromache's web, although it is not specifically described, reflects her view of the world, for Andromache, unlike Helen, does not have a broader vision and purpose in life. Her role in her society and in the poem can only be defined in terms of her relationship with Hector. Consequently, her weaving does not have a social significance comparable to Helen's recording of history. It reflects merely the traditional idea of familial order which is based on the balance between two separate but nevertheless interdependent spheres, those of female domesticity and male politics. Andromache's loom acquires its function through

[9]The story of Tereus and Philomela (Apollodorus 3.14.8; Ovid *Met.* 6.572–674) is another example of how a woman's web can be a substitute for speech. Tereus, who was married to Procne, raped Procne's sister, Philomela, and cut out her tongue. Philomela, however, was able to tell her story by weaving the scene of her crime on her web.

this opposition. Once the balance is lost, the loom can no longer serve its intended purpose. Andromache's weaving, simultaneous with Hector's defense of Troy, expresses her hope that if she takes care of *her* duties, Hector's political and military success will also continue.[10] As long as the war continues, Andromache's domestic and marital stability is being threatened. It is therefore significant that the poet pictures her weaving while she is waiting for Hector and, more importantly, at the very moment when she receives the news of his death (22.440–47). Without Hector, Andromache passes from a state of insecurity into a state of complete and irretrievable loss of identity. At that moment, symbolized by the dropping of her shuttle (22.448), the function of the loom, both actual and symbolic, comes to its end.

Andromache's role in the poem ends essentially with the death of Hector, but Helen's presence continues far beyond the end of the *Iliad.* It can be no coincidence that when we see Helen again in the *Odyssey* (4.121) she is no longer weaving, but spinning wool with her golden spindle (4.130–35). In the postwar setting of the *Odyssey* Helen does not have to worry about her present or future status, since her identity as wife of Menelaus and queen of Sparta has been reestablished and a place for Menelaus and her in the Elysian Fields is assured (4.561–69). Secure in this position, Helen is now capable of benefiting others by redirecting her creativity towards other human beings. Instead of weaving, she now spins the thread which will empower other women, less fortunate than herself, to weave their stories and, in this way, to cope with their particular condition. Helen's new status is further symbolically epitomized in her gift of a robe to Telemachus (15.104–6, 123–30), a robe which she had woven in times of uncertainty and will help preserve her *memory* (15.126). Penelope will keep it as a wedding gift for Telemachus. With this gift Helen offers Penelope some hope for the future, since this artifact is reminiscent not only of Helen's past, but also of the happy ending of her story and her return to her previous royal and divine status.

Penelope herself is also characterized through her weaving. In fact, she proves that she is Odysseus' worthy wife when she deceives the suitors by turning her actual weaving of Laertes' shroud into "a wile." In this case, the web becomes not only a symbol of the female sphere of influence and the traditional idea of familial order that Penel-

[10] Hector expresses this distribution of duties when he orders Andromache back to her weaving (6.490–94).

ope seems to accept and represent in the poem, but also the very weapon which she uses in order to protect and maintain this kind of order by deceiving those who threaten it. It is significant that the design on Penelope's web is not described. Since her future with Odysseus has not yet been determined and will not be determined until Odysseus returns home, the subject matter of her weaving cannot take a specific shape. On the other hand, the purpose of her weaving is clear and indicative of her concern for the traditional social and familial order. Penelope's weaving of a shroud for Odysseus' father reflects her commitment to her husband's family and symbolizes her loyalty to the patrilinear order which she is determined to protect. However, when the "mature" Telemachus returns from his journey, ready to assume his responsibilities, Penelope is described as "spinning fine thread on her distaff" (17.96–97). Shortly after that, Odysseus himself orders Penelope's maids to help their queen with her spinning, not her weaving (18.315–16). The poet seems to suggest by this that with Odysseus' return, Penelope—although she does not yet know it—no longer needs to worry about the preservation of order at Ithaca. The replacement of her weaving with spinning symbolizes the renewal of her marital stability and the transfer of power and responsibility from her hands back to Odysseus'.

The looms of Helen, Andromache, and Penelope are further connected through images of death and *kleos*. Penelope weaves a funerary cloth in an effort to maintain order and also to preserve Odysseus' position and fame. Andromache, who works into her loom images of life when she receives the news of Hector's death, imagines that the clothes she and other women have woven in the palace will be used at Hector's funeral (22.512–15), in his honor (*kleos,* 22.514). Interestingly enough, the robes used at Hector's funeral are described as "purple," like the web that Andromache had been weaving.[11] As for Helen, her web depicts the struggles and death of the Greeks and the Trojans in order to make sure that the memory of the heroes and, therefore, their *kleos* will survive their deaths.[12]

The production of textiles is not limited to mortal women. Circe and Calypso are also shown as weaving in *Odyssey* 5.61–62 and 10.220–

[11] For the use of purple see Reinhold, *History of Purple* esp. 16.

[12] Helen's lament at the end of the *Iliad* is another effort to ensure *kleos* for Hector. This time the visual image of her loom is replaced by words. In effect, Helen joins the epic poet in singing the last song for a great hero.

23. The images the two goddesses depict on their webs are not described, except that Circe's web is said to be "delicate, exquisite, and dazzling." The fact that both goddesses are described as working at their looms when they are first introduced in the poem must have some significance. Calypso is weaving when Hermes tells her that she must let Odysseus go; Circe is weaving when Odysseus and his men arrive at her island. Although it may be said that gods do not necessarily experience human pain and anxieties, at least in the same way which mortals do, it is also clear that even goddesses like Circe and Calypso are not different from other female characters in the patriarchal setting of the Homeric poems. Their identity is defined and validated only through their relationships with male companions. Like their human counterparts, Circe and Calypso feel that their lives are incomplete without the presence of a man in their world (Odysseus in this case), a man whom ironically neither will be able to keep. In this sense, they use the creativity of their weaving to escape temporarily from their domestic instability. Their hopes and emotions are expressed through the images which they depict on their looms. But unlike mortal women, for whom the loom functions in part as a substitute for expression, Circe and Calypso are able to sing; in fact they are the only female characters in Homer who appear singing while they weave. Their singing points to and reinforces the connection between epic poetry and immortality. Just as the epic bard has the ability to confer immortality upon the subjects of his poetry by preserving them in the memory of future generations, goddesses like Circe and Calypso can also sing and promise their "hero" immortality. In this way, Circe and Calypso differ from Homer's mortal female characters. Through their weaving, however, they join all other Homeric women in their painful search for domestic harmony and order.

All five scenes mentioned above take place in situations characterized by a lack of domestic stability. Helen weaves while a war is being fought for her sake and is interrupted at the moment when her future is apparently about to be determined by the duel between her two husbands. Andromache weaves while Hector is fighting, and her work is interrupted by the news of his death. Penelope weaves Laertes' shroud and unravels it at night in order to maintain her domestic stability. Calypso weaves at the very moment when Hermes' arrival shatters her hope that Odysseus will stay with her forever. And Circe weaves when Odysseus first comes to her house. Like Calypso, she will fail to entice him to stay with her. Regardless of the differences we see in the

purpose, the subject matter of the web, or even the character of the weaver, there is no doubt that all five women, mortal or immortal, see their weaving as an escape from a state of domestic disorder. Unable to speak or act with consequence, they seek refuge in the most private part of their homes, where they reproduce on their looms literally and symbolically the images of their hopes. In contrast, the women who finally achieve domestic stability in the *Odyssey*—Helen at Sparta as Menelaus' wife and queen, and Penelope in Ithaca after Odysseus' return—cease their weaving and are depicted as spinning once the circumstances around them have changed.

Besides Helen and Penelope, another powerful woman, Arete, is described as sitting beside the hearth, turning her "sea-purple yarn" on her distaff (6.52–53, 305–6). Arete possesses unusual power and intelligence (7.66–74); she is honored and respected both by her people and by Alcinoos "as no other woman" (7.67). It is quite apparent that Arete has never experienced any fear of disruption of either her political or her domestic stability. Alcinoos indeed relies on her intelligence and allows her to play an important role in her society by resolving disputes among the Phaeacians (7.73–74). Most importantly, as Nausicaa warns Odysseus at least twice, it is Arete's favor he has to win in order to receive help from the royal family (7.53, 75). There is no doubt that the queen of Phaeacia deserves a place in the list of female Homeric characters such as Circe, Calypso, Helen, and Penelope, who, in Helene Foley's words, have "the special power to stop or transcend change in the sphere under their control."[13]

Arete, Helen, and Penelope possess an understanding of life that other Homeric characters never achieve. Their power comes from their intelligence and their ability to see the true meaning of events. In the *Iliad* Helen understands the social role of history and the need to preserve present events for future generations. In the *Odyssey* she is able to recognize Telemachus, although she has never seen him before, and to relieve men's pain with her drugs. Penelope uses her intelligence, literally weaves her wiles, to protect her family order. Last but not least, Arete uses her excellent mind (7.73) to assist her husband in maintaining social order in Phaeacia. Interestingly enough, these three women are not only the most powerful mortal female characters in Homer but also the only women associated with spinning. Arete is never shown weav-

[13] Foley, "Reverse Similes" 10.

ing, and it is obvious that she has enjoyed a status of power and security since her marriage to Alcinoos. Helen and Penelope cease their weaving as soon as all threats to their domestic harmony have disappeared.

The life–giving or life–preserving function of thread is a well–known mythological theme. We know, for example, that the Fates spin the thread of man's life, and that Theseus finds his way out of the Minoan Labyrinth by using Ariadne's thread. The theme of the all–powerful woman/goddess who spins and helps the "hero" can be seen in other mythologies. The Navaho myth of the Two Warriors, in which the Spider Woman advises and protects the Twin Warriors with her magic charms, provides an interesting parallel.[14] It could, therefore, be suggested that spinning and weaving carry different symbolic functions in the Homeric poems. More specifically, they signify the particular status of a female character. Women who feel uncertain about their future or identity, especially in regard to their marriage, use the creativity of their weaving as an escape from reality or as the means through which their identity will be preserved beyond the physical limitations of their mortal existence. On the other hand, women like Arete, Helen, and Penelope, especially in the later and established stages of their lives, do not have the need for such expression. Their identity and future have been determined. From a position of power and security, they are able to redirect their energies towards others by producing the thread, that is, the material other women may use in order to "weave" their own lives.[15]

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[14] Campbell, *The Hero* 7.

[15] I wish to thank Stephen V. Tracy, William Scott, and Romana Huk for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

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THE SECOND STANZA OF SAPPHO 31: ANOTHER LOOK

In the second stanza of Sappho's φαίνεταί μοι the unnamed Speaker turns to her own experience and introduces the description of her suffering that occupies the remaining lines:

. . . τό μ' ἦ μὰν
καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν·
ὠς γὰρ ⟨ἔς⟩ σ' ἴδω βρόχε' ὤς με φώναι-
σ' οὐδ' ἔν ἔτ' εἴκει, (5–8)

Since the 1920s, when Lobel published this text, interpretations of Sappho's poems have put increasing emphasis on what can be learned from studying their language and formal properties within the context of the ancient lyric and epic poetic traditions.[1] The meaning of this stanza, however, as its text is commonly printed, specifically the text of line 7, is not consistent with the results of such studies.[2] The adverb with ἴδω yields poor sense when the clause is interpreted in the light of what can now be understood about the first stanza. In addition, there are problems with the syntax of the subjunctive clause, with the metrical style effected by the word placements, and with the meaning attributed to βρόχε(α). Since this text is based on an emendation of a corruption in a quotation preserved in a single manuscript, it is open to reconsideration. I begin with an explanation of the four problems that have led me

[1] Lobel, Σαπφοῦς μέλη; he omitted the angle brackets and ended line 6 with a comma. The beginning of the intensive study of the tradition and of the conventions of Sappho's poetry can be dated to Turyn's 1929 collection of parallels for this poem, *Studia Sapphica*. Some recent writers maintain that Sappho imitated earlier poets, especially Homer; others follow the lead of Hooker, *Language and Text*, who argued that her poetry is an independent witness to the same source that the epic drew from. These positions need not be mutually exclusive. I assume that Sappho was heir to a separate tradition but also knew the hexameter epics, and that choral poetry drew from both traditions. But for the purposes of this essay, the exact nature of the relationship among the sources is not relevant.

[2] The text given above is essentially the same in virtually all modern editions and discussions. It appears in Lobel and Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*; Voigt, *Sappho et Alcaeus* (spelling φώνησ'); the Loeb edition of Campbell, *Greek Lyric I*; and, of course, Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (subsequent references by name to Page refer to his notes to fr. 31 ad loc. [pp. 22–24] and to Voigt, her apparatuses). Pindar is quoted from Snell–Maehler, the tragedians from the OCT.

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to believe that this text cannot be correct. I then review the history of this reading to show how it arose as a solution to other problems and how with a different emendation it is possible to remove most of the difficulties. Finally I propose an interpretation of the second stanza that clarifies the thought and structure of the whole of lines 1–16 and offer a new suggestion about the sequel. A complete text of the poem, with the revisions I propose, is presented in the Appendix.

I

The Interpretational Problem

Page translates the opening clause of line 7, "For when I look at you a moment, then . . . ." Let us assume for now that βρόχε(α) can denote a time interval. The bibliography on the flow of thought in this stanza, and on its relation with the previous one, is extensive.[3] Recent discussions assume the standard text for this line, and do not discuss what βρόχε(α) contributes. The general point is that the Speaker contrasts her inability even to look at the Woman briefly with "That Man's" sustained enjoyment or endurance of the Woman's presence and voice; the verb ἐπτόαισεν states her reaction succinctly, the γάρ sentence explains it. These analyses would be no different if the βρόχε(α) were omitted. But the verb ἰδεῖν is colorless, and the adverb is the only qualifier in the clause; it can hardly be otiose.[4] It must have an effect, and, to be consistent with these interpretations, that effect can only be to heighten the contrast between the brevity of the Speaker's look and

[3] Bibliographic notes and critical summaries of the various arguments can be found in Burnett, *Archaic Poets*; Race, "That Man"; Robbins, "Sappho Thirty-One"; and Saake, *Zur Kunst Sapphos* 17–38. The points most at issue are the exact nature of the man in stanza 1 and the antecedent of the relative in line 5. Although Snell, "Sapphos Gedicht," is notorious for its advocacy of the "wedding-song" theory, his analysis of the flow of thought in the poem, in which he takes it to illustrate an early stage in the evolution of the expression of the self, has been broadly influential. Of all the readings prior to Marcovich's thorough demonstration of the conventional character of Sappho's language and of the description of suffering ("Sappho, fr. 31" in 1972), the discussion of the first two stanzas by Privitera, "Ambiguità," gives the fullest attention to the possible meanings of the text with the fewest suppositions.

[4] Translations such as Lattimore's "glance" (*Greek Lyrics* 39) or Burnett's "glimpse" (*Archaic Poets* 231) evade the problem by creating the impression that Sappho used a verb more colorful than ἰδεῖν.

the prolonged attention which the Man gives the Woman (some translators add "even" or another intensifier to the adverb). Sappho must be constructing an a fortiori argument to suggest the depth of the Speaker's incapacity: "this disturbs me, for if I look at you for a moment, let alone for as long as he does . . . ."[5] The problem created by this understanding is that it keeps the poem's focus fixed on the specific contrast of the Speaker and That Man. In consequence, the disturbance the γάρ sentence is explaining would have to be caused by the Speaker's recognition of the gulf between herself and him: the symptoms are not caused by the Woman, but by the recognition of the difference between his state and her own. In that case, we would be thrown back on a version of a jealousy motif as the theme of the poem.[6] But modern scholarship has made clear that the Man is a rhetorical figure, a foil like the hypothetical man in Pindar's encomium who can look the lovely Theoxenus in the eye and remain unmoved (123 S).

The Man's place in the poem as a foil figure like the one in the Pindar fragment (providing a paradigm of self-possession) was fully demonstrated by Race in 1983 (simultaneously but less fully by Burnett); he followed Marcovich, who concluded in 1972 that "Sappho uses the casual presence of the man *only as a point of contrast*." The comparison to Pindar's encomium goes back to Turyn.[7] Another road to the same conclusion was followed by both Latacz and Winkler in the early

[5]Marcovich, "Sappho, fr. 31" 24, makes this point, but he separates it from his discussion of the first clause of line 7 (pp. 21–23), which he quotes without βρόχε', and from his analysis of the flow of thought in the stanza. He combines βρόχε(α) with αὔτικα in line 10 as part of the characterization of the Speaker (this reflects Snell's interpretation; see next note).

[6]The theory that the poem praised a "bridegroom" also required a diminished emphasis on the (inappropriate) contrast of the Speaker and the Man. Snell ("Sapphos Gedicht" 89) took βρόχε(α) with αὔτικα (10) to indicate "das Unmittelbar-Sinnliche" that is characteristic of Sappho in comparison to Catullus. Burnett has blunted the difficulty I discuss here by omitting γάρ in her translation, so that "fear" in line 6 appears to begin the symptom list; her discussion (*Archaic Poets* 240), however, makes it clear that she takes the speechlessness in line 7 to be the first of the symptoms of fear.

[7]Race, "That Man," passim; Burnett, *Archaic Poets* 233–35; Marcovich, "Sappho, fr. 31" 24, his emphasis (note that he considers both the man and the occasion real); Turyn, *Studia Sapphica* 10 (he cites it as the source of Welcker's interpretation of ἴσος θέοισιν). Race identifies the passage as a version of an amatory *topos*. Burnett (p. 234 n. 9) traces the history of the recognition of the Man's rhetorical character back to H. W. Smyth in 1899 (cf. "a creation of her fancy, perhaps the man who may win her lovely scholar," *Greek Melic Poets* 235).

1980s. They accepted Snell's description of the first stanza as a *makarismos* and as explicitly or implicitly describing a husband (but a potential rather than present one); they nonetheless argued that he functions to dramatize the Speaker's condition and not as an object of interest in his own right. Each stressed the importance of reading the poem as a form of speech directed to an addressee and compared it to Odysseus's address to Nausicaa (*Od.* 6.149ff.), in which the predicted happiness of the potential husband sets off the misery of the suppliant, who claims to be struck with awe by the sight of the woman opposite him.[8] By either argument, the Man, as a foil, has served his purpose by line 6 and should recede into the background: the poem is about the Speaker and the Woman.[9]

To avoid this conclusion, we could adopt Robbins's argument that the γάρ sentence explains φαίνεται . . . ἴσος θέοισιν.[10] This, however, leaves the τό . . . ἐπτόαισεν clause trivial—something that could be omitted without significantly changing the sense or logic. Since the verb πτοέω denotes a strong sensation, I—like most readers—find it difficult to make sense of any reading of the poem that does not make its clause an emphatic introduction to the record of the Speaker's reactions.[11]

[8] Latacz, "Realität" 87–89; Winkler, "Gardens" 73. Reading the poem as an adaptation of a supplication speech to an erotic context seems to raise as many questions about the problems of genre and audience as it attempts to solve.

[9] Lasserre, *Sappho* 148–51, has denied that the man can only be a rhetorical figure. He maintains a strictly functionalist theory of the poems (while reviving Wilamowitz's estimation of Sappho), and considers fr. 31 to be an encomium of a student delivered at a farewell ritual before her marriage. Unfortunately, the only defense of the rhetorical interpretation he claims to know is Latacz's, and, because his method gives priority at every point to any interpretation which construes a reference to a present occasion, he does not address the contrary arguments or analyze in detail the second through fourth stanzas (he also misidentifies the participles of lines 3–5 as aorists).

[10] Robbins, "Sappho Thirty-One," elaborates the observation (which he attributes to Wilamowitz) that the poem is built on a contrast, underlined by the repetition of φαίνεσθαι, of immortality and mortality. But I think the final word of the fragment (unknown to Wilamowitz) puts an emphasis on the dative pronouns that makes it less likely that that opposition was the structural principle of the poem.

[11] Robbins's trivialization of the relative clause is made easier by his adoption, at the point he defends his interpretation, of Page's "set . . . a-flutter" for ἐπτοίαισεν ("Sappho Thirty-One" 259–60, also LSJ for this passage). He rightly emphasizes, however, that Sappho does not identify her emotion. The word is discussed further, below. On the effects of such translations see Lefkowitz, "Critical Stereotypes," passim. Contrast Duban's "sets my heart pounding" (*Images of Sappho* 41).

As Privitera, "Ambiguità" 53–54, saw, τό in line 5 cannot be strictly defined. As the stanza proceeds, however, it becomes clear that τό refers to the possibility of being near

In sum, βρόχε(α) introduces an emphasis that does not give good sense. And if the adverb is not the emphatic word of the clause, it is otiose. It either confuses the exposition or violates the customary economy of Sappho's style. We are better off without it in the clause (and, as I shall show below, it can hardly have the meaning attributed to it). So it is not surprising that in Turyn's extensive documentation of the topos of emotion being aroused by vision, there is no parallel for this brevity of sight.[12] Without βρόχε(α), the subordinate clause would simply introduce an explanatory description of the event in question: the symptoms are extreme conditions that substantiate the initial statement of distress. That is also what Catullus's version provides.[13]

The Syntactic Problem

The second problem with the text as printed is the syntax of the sentence. The construction is unparalleled: a hybrid of a present general construction and of a Homeric narrative idiom for an immediate reaction which has the form of a simple relative temporal clause with a definite antecedent. As part of a present general construction, the use of the subjunctive here also involves an anomaly, the absence of κε(ν).[14] The Homeric idiom that is the antecedent for the ὡς . . . ἴδω . . . ὡς construction always uses the aorist indicative both for ἰδεῖν and for the verb of the main clause (e.g., *Il.* 20.424, ὡς εἶδ', ὡς ἀνεπᾶλτο).[15] The idiom was picked up by Theocritus, among others, most notably in the

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the Woman—unlike any other available referent, that possibility is not rhetorically designated as hypothetical. (I have noticed that it is easy to omit the τό clause, and so mistake the progression of thought, in paraphrasing the poem: e.g., "that man who sits near you seems godlike; when I see you. . . .")

[12] *Studia Sapphica* 32–41. He offers many parallels to αὔτικα in line 10 for the suddenness of the reaction.

[13] *Simul . . . aspexi* translates ὡς . . . ὡς, and there is no representation of βρόχε' at all; the significance of this is discussed further below.

[14] The parallels adduced for ὡς and the subjunctive without ἄν / κε, Herodotus 1.132.1 and 4.172.2 (see Page, and the fuller discussion in Privitera, "Ambiguità" 55–56), are different idioms; they have no expressed antecedent and combine ὡς with ἑκάστος to emphasize the repetition of the same action when there is a change in its subject or recipient.

[15] The second ὡς is a demonstrative; see references in Page. Allen and Munro print it with an accent in the OCT Homer, but Page accepts the conclusion that it is a proclitic; the question of the accent is discussed at length by Timpanaro, "*Ut vidi*" 241–70. It is certainly a prepositive. The ὡς + ἰδεῖν constructions in Homer are discussed more fully below, note 45.

Second Idyll, in which numerous passages seem to look back to this poem; he also uses the past indicative (and a third ὥς clause): 2.82, χὡς ἴδον, ὡς ἐμάνην, ὥς μοι πυρὶ θυμὸς ἰάφθη.[16] Because of the subjunctive in Sappho, some editors and commentators have rejected reading the second ὡς in line 7.[17]

But even without ὡς in the main clause, it is not at all clear what the subjunctive clause would mean in Sappho's poem. The commentators have offered various interpretations. Privitera's comes closest to actually defending it: its general nature distinguishes the regular effect the woman has on the Speaker from the particular occasion when she sees her with the Man, and it involves an unexpected change in perspective.[18] But since the Man would easily have been recognized as a "hypothesis" (Burnett's term), the subjunctive is not needed to mark the distinction. Burnett understands the subjunctive to make explicit the "generalizing tenor" in the song: the symptoms are "what happens 'each time I look at you.'" I think this contradicts her correct insistence on the poem as a fiction ("According to her own fiction, the singer of fragment 31 is preparing herself to approach someone who has aroused her desire and who consequently provokes her awestruck fear"). For a fiction is an imitation of a particular occasion, not a generalization.[19] In

[16] See Page for a list of imitations, and Timpanaro, "*Ut vidi*" 235 n. 23, for some discussion. On the relationship of Theoc. *Idyll* 2 to this poem (oddly slighted by Gow), see Timpanaro 236 n. 24, with further references, and Pretagostini, "Teocrito e Saffo," passim.

[17] Thus Braun, "Glottologia" 332, "lo schema che opponga un primo ὡς col congiuntiva a un seguente ὥς coll'indicativo non solo non esiste nel greco ma non esiste neppure in Saffo."

[18] "Ambiguità" 54–56. Race, "That Man" 99–100, sees in the subjunctive an extension of the parallel with the Theoxenos fragment, equating it with Pindar's εὖτ' ἂν ἴδω (line 11). But Pindar's verses, unlike Sappho's, are patently apologetic (in the rhetorical sense). The opening *gnōmē*, χρὴ . . . κατὰ καιρὸν . . . σὺν ἀλικίᾳ, asserts the need for proportion, according to one's nature, in amatory response; by implication, for restraint. With the comparison to the man who is unnaturally restrained, Pindar goes on to assert that he is not impassive by nature. The foil figure and Pindar are strictly parallel in circumstances: they look at attractive boys. The subjunctive expresses a general rule about Pindar and boys, which the present occasion instances. The passage thus defends Pindar's enthusiastic song against the contrived objection that he is responding excessively. In Sappho's poem the figure is not apologetic; rather it furnishes a negative paradigm within the narration: the Man's situation of intimate conversation is nothing like the Speaker's, and he thereby highlights the description of her inability to function.

[19] Burnett, *Archaic Poets* 230, 233–34. Her analysis of the clause follows that of Marcovich, "Sappho, fr. 31" 21, but he has no notion of fiction or hypothesis; to explain

some other interpretations the mood of the verb is an embarrassment. Latacz understood the pathography as the expression of the Speaker's sudden, fearful realization of her coming loss. But that would be better introduced by the indicative than by a subjunctive of repeated experience, and, indeed, Latacz ignored the subjunctive in his discussion, although he discussed at length the other uses of mood and tense in the poem. Winkler simply translated: "for as I look briefly at you, so I can no longer speak . . ."—which could equally well represent an original indicative.[20]

The subjunctive offers no advantages. It asks us to imagine a series of repeated "glimpses" of the Woman, after each of which the Speaker feels near death; in this latest incident in the series, the Speaker—despite the usual effect—addresses the Woman, something she for some reason did not do before. But the occasion thus becomes indistinct or inexplicable—there are not enough indications in the text for the complexity of the narrative we must imagine. And because the present general condition cannot distinguish the occasion of performance from the time when the symptoms are felt, it no more, or less, resolves the poem's central paradox than the indicative would—the paradox of what Winkler calls its "eloquent statement of speechlessness, its powerful declaration of helplessness."[21]

The γάϱ clause would introduce the description most clearly and forcefully if it were in the indicative expected in this formula; the generalizing subjunctive, with its suggestion of other experiences and other times, unnecessarily distracts the audience from the present occasion

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the subjunctive he is forced to project the time of ἐπτόαισεν into the more distant past, as an ingressive aorist recording the occasion that produced the state in which line 7 is generally true (p. 23). Burnett's apparent denial of the particularity of fictions seems to me an accidental consequence of her effort to extirpate the effects of historical and biographical criticism; cf 234 n. 9. The same thing happens in Lefkowitz's discussion: "The deliberate generality of the poem, the absence of proper names and specific references to time and place, indicate that this poem is meant to bring to mind no particular place or occasion" ("Critical Stereotypes" 122).

[20] Latacz, "Realität" 90; Winkler, "Gardens" 73.

[21] "Gardens" 74. The contradiction is a problem especially for those who emphasize that the poem is, at least potentially, a real address. O'Higgins, who calls the poem a "song of seduction" ("Silence" 167), attempts to turn the subjunctive to advantage; she locates the utterance "in the moment of fear between the vision of her beloved and the physical breakdown which usually results from such an encounter" (165), and reads the poem as the Speaker's resistance to her helplessness. But this would require either a past general condition or that the Speaker not be in sight of the Woman as she addresses her.

which the symptom list makes vivid and for the sake of which the contrast figure was adduced. As was the case with the adverb βρόχε(α), we would be better off without the subjunctive. The first stanza takes place in the indefinite present of a hypothesis; the second records the initiating event, which is part of the occasion, in the aorist; the third and fourth show the present tenses (perfect and progressive) of the occasion itself. The fifth presumably looked to the future (see below).

The Metrical–Stylistic Problem

Both βρόχε(α) and the subjunctive introduce difficulties which it would require special pleading to justify, and no such pleading is persuasive. The third problem is slightly different: it involves a failure to observe that these lines exhibit an anomalous patterning which a reconstruction of line 7 ought to take into account. The pattern involves the placement of word–ends. "Word–end" can be defined as the end of a word–group, or every word can be counted separately. If we begin by examining what is typical of Sappho's sapphic poems altogether, the number of hendecasyllabic lines with word–end after each of two positions is:[22]

after syllable 4: 56, or 52 percent, counting every word,
43, or 41 percent, counting word–groups;
after syllable 5: 57, or 55 percent, counting every word,
38, or 37 percent, counting word–groups.

Overall, in any given line there is likely to be a word–end after either the fourth or fifth syllable. If every word is counted, word–end occurs at both positions twenty–one times; this means that there are twenty–one monosyllabic words in the fifth position. Of these, four are lexical words, and seventeen are appositives; of the seventeen appositives, five are postpositives and twelve are prepositives.

Before proceeding, I should say something about the data I am examining, since I am modifying Maas's dictum that "we count as a

[22]These figures are derived from a study of 129 whole or fragmentary lines by Sappho, including the third hendecasyllabic "line" of the stanza. The percentages (which are rounded) reflect the different number of lines which are readable, for the purpose of this count, in each position (after the fourth syllable word–end can be determined with reasonable certainty in 107 lines, after the fifth in 104).

'word' not every part of a sentence that . . . is written separately, but the whole group" (*Greek Metre* 84). Like most procedural rules of thumb, this one should be used with caution outside its original context. Maas was restricting meter to a narrow set of descriptive "facts" against which the application of grammatical and stylistic criteria could be tested, and he was interested only in practices that were relatively unvarying throughout a corpus.[23] This rule refers ultimately to the observations that most violations of bridges (that is, patterns of avoided word–end) are due to appositives, and that bridges are more prevalent and better defined in Greek meter than caesurae (patterns of preferred word–end). The word–group rule is efficient because it regularizes and maximizes the instances of bridges. Metricians have always been aware that the rule per se is problematic (and it is not at all clear at what speech level caesura and bridge phenomena are operative). I leave open the question of whether the patterning formed by word–ends belongs in the realm of metrical or stylistic criteria. What is certain is that there is patterning, that appositives are part of the patterns, and that they function by effecting some kind of relatively reduced, or intermediate, separation (elision operates similarly).[24]

What is striking about fragment 31, in the context of Sappho's practice, is that it exhibits a very high preference for a word–end after the fourth syllable and avoids it after the fifth: line 15, the conclusion of the section that begins with line 1 (whatever follows), has a word–end after the fifth syllable and not after the fourth. *All* the other hendecasyllables of the poem, except for line 7, the line under discussion, have some kind of word–end after the fourth. And only this line and line 10

[23] See Maas, *Greek Metre* 92. Lobel, in the contemporary "Introduction," Σαπφοῦς μέλη, x–xi, more fully explains the importance of metrical data to the editor according to the same principles.

[24] Even the handbooks make the limitations of the rule evident. Maas devotes several pages to exceptions after he states the rule. West states the rule much more cautiously, showing awareness of the uncertain character of the word–juncture formed by appositives (*Greek Metre* 26, with further details under each of the separate caesurae and bridges). Korzeniewski recognizes that even the internal juncture of compound words is a feature whose position can be significantly manipulated by the poet (*Griechische Metrik* 16–17). Note Maas's conclusion to *Textual Criticism*, 40–41: "But the core of practically every problem in textual criticism is a problem of *style*, and the categories of stylistics are still far less settled than those of textual criticism" (his emphasis); the editor has a "responsibility for being continually alive to the author's style."

have a word–end after the fifth.[25] Such an extended exclusion of word–end at one of the two positions has a parallel in Sappho 1, where the exclusion coincides with a structural unit: there is no instance of a word–end after the fourth syllable in lines 6 through 13, which constitute the ecphrasis of Aphrodite's journey and arrival (it is framed by ἀλλὰ τυίδ' ἔλθ', . . . in line 5 and μειδιαίσαισ' . . . in 14).

Line 10 is clearly exceptional in its own way. Since there is a word–end after both the fourth and fifth position and appositives are not involved, this line is one of the four that have a lexical monosyllable in the fifth place, πῦρ:

αὔτικα χρῶι πῦρ ὐπαδεδρόμηκεν,

The three other lines are 16.2, φαῖσ'; 17.2, σὰ; 27.6, κἄμμ'. In these three the words involved are not lexically or phonetically independent to the same degree as πῦρ in line 10. The last two are pronominal forms; only the first is a meaningful word, and it is an enclitic in other dialects; and the first and the third are elided, which is another mode of reduced separation. Each is joined to what follows by either sound or sense or both, so that all three could be said to conform to the same style of verse form as the twelve lines with prepositives in this position. So πῦρ in line 10 is unique; and the preceding word, χρῶι, is also unique: it is the only example in Sappho (or Alcaeus) of an unelided lexical monosyllable in the fourth position.[26] Thus, line 10 exhibits a rhythm that is elsewhere avoided, and presents some kind of special effect.

On the other hand, no rare or unique feature is noticeable in line 7, which, as printed, has no word–end of any type after the fourth syllable, but does have a lexical word–end after the fifth. Nothing else in the line suggests that it has a special rhythmic effect, and, in any other context known to us from the fragments, it would stand as a perfectly ordinary line. In this context, however, the line is anomalous. For here Sappho either is building some kind of rhythmic tension (appropriate to the poem's subject matter) or is giving the passage a special rhythmic

[25] In lines 3 and 6 the fourth syllable is a prepositive, and a longer word follows: καὶ πλάσιον and ἐν στήθεσιν. These represent minimal conformity to the pattern.

[26] The only nonappositive monosyllable in the fifth place in Alcaeus's sapphics is Ζεῦς in frag. 361. In general, nonelided lexical monosyllables are uncommon, and nouns are very few. Any occurrence of one is unusual (cf. Sa. 1.2, παῖ; Alcaeus 69.1, Ζεῦ; both are initial syllables).

character (appropriate to the poem's structure) by using, until a conclusion in the last line, only variations of the line structure that has a word–end after the fourth syllable. Since some type of word–end is inevitable before βρόχε– (the two shorts fix its position), only a restoration of the line that had an unequivocal word–end after the fourth syllable while diminishing the separation between the words in the fifth and sixth positions would conform to the pattern closely enough not to call for further justification on the grounds of rhythmic effect.

The Semantic Problem

Page objected to restorations of the line that place βροχέως in the second, or main, clause, on the grounds that it is "meaningless" there. In fact, the meaning he gives the adverbial form of βραχύς, "for a moment," makes good sense. If we put a comma after ἴδω, the main clause would mean: "it is not possible *for a moment* for me to speak anything." The Homeric examples of people struck dumb by what they experience generally depict only a momentary inability (at *Od.* 4.704, for example, when Penelope finds out about the plot against Telemachus, and then questions the messenger).[27] The whole symptom list, then, would be introduced by a description of a brief seizure. This yields a somewhat different poem than we have come to expect, but not a meaningless one. It does, however, destroy the recollection of the ὡς εἶδον ὥς idiom, and with it the model for Theocritus; it exacerbates the problem of a word–end after the fourth position, by making it a phrase end; and it leaves the subjunctive intact. There is still another difficulty: it is doubtful that βρόχε(α) can have the meaning "for a moment," the meaning that is certainly required in the text as now printed.

Βραχύς is not a common word in early Greek poetry. It occurs here, and once each in Homer (probably) and Semonides. In the early fifth century Aeschylus has it four times. It is found once in Bacchylides, and in a quotation attributed to Diagoras of Miletus. It is more common in Pindar, in limited uses. Herodotus' sixteen uses of the word are even more restricted in application than Pindar's. It does appear

[27] Cf. *Od.* 10.246, 19.472; in *Il.* 17.696 the grieving Antilochus departs to make his announcement. Turyn was apparently aware of this possible meaning, since in citing A.R. 3.681 as a parallel (despite δήν; see below, note 70) he refers to "brevem vocis defectionem . . . ad exemplum Sapphonis fictam" (*Studia Sapphica* 46).

more frequently in Sophocles, and its sense in Thucydides, and later writers, is less specialized. The uses in the poets and Herodotus show that despite the common equivalence of space and time, this particular word (like "small" in contemporary English) referred primarily to extent in space. Its application to time is much less common and requires an explicit transference.

Βραχύς measured size or reach. In *Iliad* 10.226,[28] Diomedes suggests he be accompanied:

> . . . μοῦνος δ' εἴ πέρ τε νοήσῃ
> ἀλλά τε οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις,

and Semonides says that the monkey–woman is ἐπ' αὐχένα βραχεῖα (7.75). Note that both these instances are depreciatory, if not derogatory.[29] For uses of the word to measure physical size without such a tone, we have to look to Herodotus, who applies it in twelve cases to short items or spaces, or shallow rivers.[30] In Pindar we find the depreciatory μορφὰν βραχύς (*Is.* 4.53), and βραχὺς ἐξικέσθαι . . . θεῶν ἕδραν (*Is.* 7.44); and Diagoras contrasts divine providence and human: αὐτοδαὴς δ' ἀρετὰ βραχὺν οἶμον ἕρπειν (*PMG* 738(1).3).[31] These last two examples also illustrate variants of the *vita brevis* motif, to which this adjective is partial. It is explicit in Bacchylides: βραχ[ύς ἐστιν αἰών·] / . . . πτερ]όεσσα δ' ἐλπὶς ὑπ[ν]όημα (3.74). Three of the four remaining examples in Herodotus occur when Xerxes and Artabanus discuss βραχὺς βίος (7.46.2–3).[32] This use for length of life, of course,

[28] Nordheider in Snell, *Lexikon*, s.v., prefers to follow ancient grammarians in deriving the use of βράσσων here from βραδύς, although he grants that the derivation from the non–Homeric βραχύς is phonologically easier.

[29] This is not simply a consequence of the unpraiseworthiness of smallness; (σ)μικρός does not show this connotation so consistently (both readably instances qualify παῖς in the Lesbians: Alc. 75.8, Sa. 49.2). The most common and general word for "small" in Homer is ὀλίγος (see Kirk, *Commentary* I on *Il.* 5.800).

[30] He uses αἰχμή five times: 5.49.3; 7.61.1, 64.1, 71, 79. Cf. 1.50.2; 2.19.2, 123, 125.2; 4.52; 7.211, 223.

[31] Hubbard, *Pindaric Mind*, 27–32, discusses the opposition of βραχύς and μακρός in Pindar at some length, although only in terms of their respective negative and positive evaluation; he comments (42) that βραχυσίδαρον in *Ne.* 3.45 "represents limitation in comparison with his father's ὑπέραλλον spear (which sought to exceed all precedent)."

[32] Note that these uses are all in direct discourse (7.46 is misprinted as 4.46 in Powell's *Lexicon*).

implies a measurement of time, but note that the object being measured—what is being sized up—is indicated explicitly, and the use can be understood as a transference to time of the measurement of extent of space. This transference is particularly clear in another example of the word in Pindar to describe the shortness of mortal things: the Muses provide εὐρὺ κλέος, whereas deeds without song furnish only βραχύ τι τερπνόν (*Ol.* 10.93–95). The reference to time as transference from space—with loss of the depreciatory tone (see below for uses in break-offs)—is also seen clearly in *Pythian* 9.68: ὠκεῖα . . . θεῶν πρᾶξις ὁδοί τε βραχεῖαι. Even the last of the examples from Herodotus, which certainly denotes time (in a prepositional phrase which anticipates idioms common later), uses a verb that can suggest a spatial metaphor: οὐδέν κω ἄλλο χρῆμα οὕτω ἐν βραχέϊ ἐπεζήτησα ὡς σὲ ἰδεῖν (5.24.3). Aeschylus' one (very derogatory) temporal use, when Prometheus directs his contempt to the power of Zeus (not without a suggestion of a kind of mortality)—

> δράτω, κρατείτω τόνδε τὸν βραχὺν χρόνον
> ὅπως θέλει· δαρὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄρξει θεοῖς. (*PV* 939–40)

—fits the pattern by which the word is applied to temporal size only when the object being measured is explicitly given and when the context makes the application clear. The evidence indicates that at least before the later part of the fifth century, βραχύς used otherwise could not be expected to be understood as a measurement of time independently of space.

There is one other context in which βραχύς appears. In the remaining three instances in Aeschylus βραχύς is an attribute of speech and introduces a short, summary statement. Told that the Argives do not wish to hear a μακρὰν ῥῆσιν, the chorus replies: βραχὺς τορός θ' ὁ μῦθος (*Supp.* 274; the other instances are *Per.* 713 and *PV* 505).[33] This context accounts for the remaining instances of the word in Pindar. In two the context of speech is explicit: *Isthmian* 6.58–59, τὸν Ἀργείων τρόπον / εἰρήσεταί που κἀν βραχίστοις; and *Nemean* 10.19, βραχύ μοι στόμα πάντ' ἀναγήσασθ'. Elsewhere the adjective modifies οἶμος, μέτρον, and καιρός, and refers, in break-offs from lists or narratives, to

[33] In *Per.* 713, the mss. give πάντα . . . ἀκούσῃ μῦθον ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ, which some editors emend to λόγῳ; the reference is to speech either way.

the restrictions on the length of songs.[34] In speech, time and amount are directly proportional. But the uses make it clear that in these cases length of time was the dependent variable.[35]

The context of speech is not irrelevant to Sappho's poem, but it cannot be understood with ἰδεῖν. Nor does the verb govern an explicit object to be measured in terms of length (an implied cognate accusative with βρόχε(α) as attribute does not satisfy this expectation). The obvious sense of ἰδεῖν βρόχε(α) would be "to look a short distance," with the added implication of insufficiency (or mortal limitation), an implication that suggests that the subject could not adequately see what she was looking towards. And that is *exactly* what βραχύ means at Euripi-

[34] *Py.* 4.248, *Is.* 1.62, *Py.* 4.286 (part of the praise of Damophilus as a messenger of song); taking *Py.* 1.81–82 together with these makes it clear that καιρός and ἐν βραχεῖ there refer to the proper "amount" of song. *Py.* 9.62, quoted above, also functions as a narrative break-off.

[35] There are twenty-three instances of βραχύς in the surviving plays of Sophocles, twelve of them in the late *OC*. The range of its applications is greater, but eight uses refer primarily to speech. Physical size, weight, height, or length are measured ten times (the pathos of life's brevity may still sound in Electra's description of the urn supposed to contain Orestes' ashes [*El.* 757, 1113]). At *Trach.* 1217 χάριν βραχεῖαν πρὸς μακροῖς ἄλλοις depreciates the effort required, not the duration; cf. 1252–53, χάριν τραχεῖαν. In *OC* 1118 the temporal denotation in ἔργον . . . βραχύ (if that is the reading) actually derives from 1115–16, εἴπαθ' ὡς βράχιστ', . . . σμικρὸς . . . λόγος (cf. 1162). There are at most four uses in which time primarily is meant. Three (in the two latest plays) specify it explicitly; one of these also retains the spatial reference: ὡς δ' ἀπήλθομεν, / χρόνῳ βραχεῖ στραφέντες, . . . *OC* 1648 (the others are *Ph.* 83, νῦν δ' εἰς ἀναιδὲς ἡμέρας μέρος βραχὺ / δός μοι σεαυτόν, and *OC* 1341, βραχεῖ σὺν ὄγκῳ καὶ χρόνῳ διασκεδῶ—both depreciatory). The spatial metaphor may well be alive, or even dominant, in the fourth, too, the only one in an early play: *Ant.* 1327, βράχιστα γὰρ κράτιστα τἀν ποσὶν κακά.

Euripides uses the word twenty-five times in the extant plays (hence, proportionately less often than Sophocles). Most of the uses are parallel to those seen in Sophocles and Pindar, although the word occurs more often with χρόνος and other expressions of time (e.g., *El.* 940, *Med.* 1248). Various forms of the *vita brevis* motif appear (e.g., *Alc.* 649), as do several instances of the meaning "little," but uses with speech are especially frequent. Note that *Hipp.* 96, σὺν μόχθῳ βραχεῖ, "with little effort," refers to speech; and that at *Bacch.* 1279, σκέψαι νυν ὀρθῶς· βραχὺς ὁ μόχθος εἰσιδεῖν, Cadmus is saying that it is a small effort to look (that Agave need only look briefly is at most an implication). Another example is given below.

In Thucydides, on the other hand, among the more than sixty occurrences, there are some unquestionably temporal uses unlike any already discussed (e.g., 8.2.1, βραχὺν . . . πόλεμον), many with a preposition. Many others, including three of the four uses of βραχέως, refer to speech. The greatest number indicate insufficiency or smallness.

des *Ion* 744, ὅταν ἐγὼ βλέπω βραχύ, a line which otherwise could have been cited as a close parallel to the version of Sappho 31.7 that the editors print. I argued initially that βρόχε(α), meaning "for a moment," introduced an emphasis that did not give good sense; it turns out that even to understand that meaning requires special pleading for which there is no adequate basis.

II

Only a firm textual tradition could demand that we make so many adjustments to our best understanding of the poem, of the metrical style, of the syntax, and of the meaning of the words. The text for lines 7–8 relies on "Longinus" 10.2, cod. P, which actually reads:

ὡς|γὰρεἶδωβρόχεώςμεφωνὰςουδὲνἔτεἴκει·

This is short by one syllable. The solution of putting ἔς after γὰρ made up the deficiency neatly and economically: ὡς γὰρ ἔς σ' ἴδω. "Correxi," noted Lobel, with a nod to Hermann; Voigt traced the reading to Edmunds and Ahrens.[36] But the change of C to ECC is more than a correction of a haplography, it is an emendation to solve a problem in the line as a whole. There is nothing wrong with the transmitted sequence of letters, γὰρ σ' ἴδω. The meter can be saved by inserting a short, open syllable before γάρ while retaining a consonant after it (to make it long as the third syllable) as well as by putting a long vowel, or a short vowel plus another consonant, after it (keeping it short as the second syllable). Thus some earlier editors emended to provide a form of the verb in which the digamma was still represented, and put σὲ as the second syllable. But Lobel argued that such a use of the digamma was not tolerable in the Lesbian vernacular and that this poem belonged to a group written in the vernacular. Although this argument has re-

[36]The history of the text is partially summarized by Braun, "Glottologia" 332–33. For various emendations see the apparatus criticus in Voigt; the helpful synopsis in Bonaria, "Note critiche" 167–69; and (for the second clause) the comparison of modern printed editions in Braun's Table V. What follows is intended to be a guide to the major points at issue in the text and the variety of solutions, not a complete chronology of restorations or a full survey of all the expedients editors have attempted. For the text and the authority of cod. P see Roberts, *Longinus*.

cently lost favor, the insertion of εἰσ–, εἰς (σ'), or ἐς σ' was widely adopted.[37]

In the middle of the line the division of βρόχεώc into βρόχε' ὥς goes back to Toll, an early editor of "Longinus"; it has not been uniformly popular. Wilamowitz printed ὥς σε γὰρ Ϝίδω βρόχε', ὥς . . . but said in his note, "Eine andere ebensogute Fassung ist ὡς γὰρ εἰσίδω βροχέως."[38] The choice depends on the interplay of several factors.[39] Some editors are swayed by the Homeric idiom, others find the subjunctive intolerable in that construction (as was discussed above). If the adverb is kept whole in the subordinate clause, the main clause begins with the enclitic pronoun με. It is surprising that for many editors this was not a problem, even after Wilamowitz pointed it out; but others changed με to σὲ, either to avoid the enclitic, or to get the desired sense out of the verbal phrase. Most nineteenth-century editors construed a genitive φώνης (–ας) with οὐδὲν and described the verb εἴκει as a form of ἵκω (or emended it to ἵκει) to obtain with σὲ the meaning, "my voice does not reach you," or with με, "my voice does not come to me [i.e., to be spoken]." But the construction with the partitive genitive is unwieldy. And changing the pronoun to achieve the former sense seems excessive (especially if βρόχε', ὥς can solve the problem of the enclitic), while the latter sense is forced: με . . . ἵκει should mean "[your] voice does not come to me"—a failure of hearing

[37] On the digamma: Lobel, Σαπφοῦς μέλη 28–32; Hooker, *Language and Text* 23–27, argues against him, and, passim, against the hypothesis of poems in a pure vernacular. Lobel's ἔς σ' responds to his argument—never fully accepted—that the long form of the preposition is not possible, and it provides the pronoun that some critics prefer to see (see below). Diehl kept the pronoun as the second syllable by taking γάρ by itself to be long, although he observed (ad loc.) that ἐς σ' ἴδω matched Catullus' *aspexi* better (but the simple verb was not available to Catullus). Barigazzi (cited in Privitera, "Ambiguità" 39–40; omitted in Bonaria, "Note critiche") inserted κε in second place, keeping P's sigma as the pronoun; that at least relieves the line of one anomaly.

[38] *Sappho und Simonides* 56–57. Toll, *Commentarius* 78, saw in βροχε– the genitive of a variant of βρόγχος, although he records that Voss had recognized in it a dialectal form of the adjective.

[39] Timpanaro, "*Ut vidi*" 237 n. 25, quotes with approval the observation of B. Marzullo that the division has the advantage of retaining the manuscript's accents. Yet W. Rhys Roberts, in his edition of Ps.–Longinus, who is scrupulous to maintain the authority of the manuscript, finds no problem in following the contemporary editions of Sappho and printing βροχέως. No recent editor of Sappho records that in P (as it is reported in the editions of Roberts and of Jahn–Vahlen) there appears to be an erasure over the epsilon. So the question of the accent seems not to have a role in the reconstruction of the text.

that breaks up the logic of description completely.[40] Lobel (following a suggestion of Danielsson) chose to construe the infinitive φωναῖσ' (–ᾶσ') with an impersonal form of εἴκω for the needed sense of "I cannot speak."

The most important problem with εἴκει, and with understanding the main clause to mean "*it is not possible* for me to speak," is that there is no good evidence that εἴκω can be used impersonally in that meaning. Page accepted it in his translation, but admits in the note that this relies entirely on examples of the compound παρείκει in Attic, and says that we should leave open the possibility of an interpretation in terms of με φωναῖσ' . . . ἵκει ("'nothing any longer comes to me to speak', an improbable but not unintelligible expression"). Turyn, Braun, and others found reading a form of εἴκω unacceptable, and stayed with a verb from ἵκω and the genitive (so too in Diehl's edition). Privitera aptly observed that neither verb gives a very welcome meaning (the one expression is "pesante," the other "banale").[41] The fact is that we do not know what the word is, and, although the manuscript's εἴκει certainly looks like a Greek word, if not emended it ought to be marked as a *locus desperatus*. It seems clear only that it is to be construed to indicate a failure of speech.

In sum, the passage is short one syllable. The restoration ἐς σ' is neat, but it is not compelled by the manuscript. The attractiveness of the division βρόχε' ὥς depends on the Homeric idiom, but the grammar undermines the resemblance; otherwise, it rests on the mere assertion that the adverb is meaningful in the first clause, but not in the second. Lobel's text presents his responses to the various separate problems.[42]

[40]Thus, in the strongest dissent from Lobel's text in recent times, Wills, "Sappho 31" 191 n. 47, defends Seidler's ὡς γὰρ εἰσίδω βροχέως σε, φώνας . . . , which alters the inoffensive mu and makes the second clause mean, "I cannot hear," without avoiding any of the problems raised above (he also imports κεν into line 5). In some editions or texts in which βροχέως is not divided, it is not always clear to which clause it belongs, or how it was understood. Cf. note 27, above, on Turyn. Smyth in *Greek Melic Poets* printed a comma after ἴδω and glossed βροχέως with Hesychius' συντόμως (see below); did he understand it as a synonym of αὖτικα in line 10?

[41]Turyn, *Studia Sapphica* 7–8; Braun, "Glottologia" 329–30; Privitera, "Ambiguità" 40.

[42]The two most extended treatments of Lobel's text are by Page in *Sappho and Alcaeus* and by Braun in "Glottologia." Unfortunately, just as Page's notes acknowledge Braun, who attacks the ὡς . . . ὡς construction and the infinitive with εἴκω ("Glottologia" 328–33), but do not answer her, she in turn does not explain what she intends by βροχέως με or defend the genitive construction.

The great advantage of his reading would appear to be economy: it makes a single addition to the transmitted letters and presupposes only a single layer of corruption. The economy has turned out to be only apparent, given the cost to the poem.

While I am still discussing problems, I would like to suggest the possibility of one more, that the Hellenistic text itself (or some of the versions of it) was not intelligible.[43] The poem enjoyed a certain fame in antiquity. We have the very noticeable allusions to it in Theocritus' Second Idyll and, to a lesser extent, in Lucretius (3.154ff.), the quotation in "Longinus," and, of course, the translation by Catullus. The words that have given editors difficulty are the forms of βραχύς and φωνάω (or φωνή), and εἴκει. Catullus translated this sentence:

> nam simul te
> Lesbia, aspexi, nihil est super mi
> . . . . . .

The very words in question are missing from his text. Moreover, none of the other lines which are corrupt in the received text can be restored from Catullus.[44] There is also a curious entry in the lexicon of Hesychius, cited by the editors as a possible reference to this line: βρουχέων (B 1214). Is it the genitive plural, or a corruption of our adverb? The definition there—σαφῶς. συντόμως. Αἰολεῖς—certainly does not indicate a clearly intelligible text. Theocritus provides for this only οὐδέ τι φωνῆσαι δυνάμην (line 108)—the barest inferable meaning. What I am suggesting is that the lacuna in the text of Catullus and the lack of

[43] There is evidence for an Attic edition, for one by Aristophanes, and for one by Aristarchus. See Lobel, Σαπφοῦς μέλη, xiii–xiv; Hooker, *Language and Text* 11–12; Lasserre, *Sappho* 29–30, 131.

[44] *Identidem* is interpretive (like *spectat*), and does not necessarily respond to βροχε–, as suggested by Wills, "Sappho 31" 168 n. 8 (followed by Marcovich, "Sappho, fr. 31" 24), since the contrast exists in the Greek even without the adverb. (But I suspect that Catullus intended *identidem* to bring out the aspectual force of the Greek present participles.) Note too that in line 9 of Sappho, where the text may be corrupt, Catullus was interpreting with *torpet*, which translates the result that is common to both ἔαγε (supported by Lucretius) and πέπαγε (in defense of the latter, see Fowler, "Sappho fr. 31.9" 433–39, with references to earlier literature on the dispute; note that he and Pretagostini, "Teocrito e Saffo," adduce the same uses of πήγνυμι by Theocritus and Apollonius with conflicting assumptions about their relation to this line); both versions of the Greek were probably current. Line 13 is also a problem, but line 12 is the last for which Catullus gave a literal translation.

guidance for us in other quotations are not coincidences; the ancient evidence points to a text flawed at the same places as the one in the "Longinus" manuscript. Catullus omitted precisely the problematic words, and did so very cleverly, by constructing a gap that occupies the adonic tag but does not interfere with the general meaning. His audience, who would have known his Greek text, could have appreciated both the finesse with which he chose, in this first instance, to acknowledge its uncertainties, and the artistry by which he minimized the interruption in the rhythmic flow of his own poem.

III

It is time to make some positive suggestions. The poem has become so long familiar in the standard text that it is hard to hear an alternate reading. Nonetheless, I do not think that Lobel's version can be defended. The solution I propose is slightly farther from the manuscript letters, and involves the supposition of both an original corruption and probably a second layer of miscorrection, but it addresses the problems where they exist. The presence of the idiom with a second ὡς is strongly suggested by the imitation in Theocritus' Second Idyll, where there are so many imitations of this poem, and by Catullus's *simul . . . aspexi,* which precisely translates the force which the second ὡς adds to the sentence.[45] What is wanted, I have argued, is indicative

[45]In the *Iliad,* sentences with a single, subordinate ὡς and a form of ἰδεῖν occur almost twenty times (only five times in the *Odyssey*). Typically they depict a prompt reaction, usually with the aorist in the main clause, a few times with the imperfect or pluperfect, and several times with both an aorist and imperfect. There is no sharp distinction between these and the double-ὡς form; thus, compare to line 7 the scene of Iris' arrival at the cave of the winds: . . . τοὶ δ' ὡς ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσι, / πάντες ἀνήϊξαν, κάλεόν τέ μιν εἰς ἕ ἕκαστος (23.202–3). The addition of the second ὡς emphasizes a very close correlation between the two clauses; it appears in a modal use: . . . Θέτις δ' ὡς ἥψατο γούνων, / ὡς ἔχετ' ἐμπεφυῖα (1.512–3), and with a final clause (24.337), as well as in four temporal sentences: 13.494–95, 14.294, 19.16, 20.424 (never in the *Odyssey*). In the last three of these, which are in the form imitated by the Hellenistic poets and probably used by Sappho here—ὡς ἴδε, ὥς plus the aorist indicative—the brevity of the first clause intensifies the sense of simultaneity (13.494–95 has a pluperfect, and the main clause precedes). So the evidence of Catullus's idiom seem to me valuable here, even with the caution that the Greek text he used may have been uncertain. (There are only three nonindicative uses: the final clause of 24.337 with the subjunctive; another with the optative and one ὡς, 24.583; and an anticipatory subjunctive in an exclamatory sentence,

use of the idiom (its normal form), with an unequivocal word–break after the fourth position and a minimal one after the fifth, and with the adverb in the main clause. I suggest that the key lies in the second omega, now taken as the first–person subjunctive ending. It represents instead an original ὡς, the introductory word of the second clause. The indicative ending and augment should be restored to the verb, so that the line begins:

ὡς γὰϱ εἶδ⟨ον⟩, ὠ⟨ς⟩ βϱοχεως . . .

Word–end and clause–end now occur after the fourth syllable, and a prepositive in the fifth position. The temporal clause is in the form expected for this idiom.[46] Perhaps the error originated in a mistranscription of a pre–Ionic text, ONOC, by haplography. The sigma after γάϱ could have been introduced either by transferring the orphaned sigma after –δω, or from a corruption or miscorrection of the augment, E to C, once the verb was misunderstood as subjunctive.[47] If the object for the verb is desired, one could read εἶδον σ', ὡς. . . . But I have seen no compelling argument for including it, although an English translator has to add "you."[48]

The restoration of the indicative requires a past indicative in the main clause. An aorist would be best, but that is apparently impossible.

19.151.) On the double–ώς form as a temporal idiom (but not on its relation to the single form), see Wackernagel, "Griechische Miszellen" 64–66.

[46]The indicative had been printed by Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, γὰϱ εὖιδον βϱοχέως σε, . . . , and by Hartung, *Griechischen Lyriker* 73, γὰϱ εἶδόν σ', ἐκ βϱοχίοιο.

[47]Wilamowitz's assertion (*Sappho und Simonides* 83), that Aeolic Sappho herself wrote out the text in the Ionic alphabet, is, of course, unfounded. Apart from the fact that Alcaeus was quoted in fifth–century Athens, there is nothing to be said about the text before the fourth century.

[48]The object is frequently omitted in Homer. One argument against the omission of the pronoun, that confusion with the Man as object is possible (see Privitera, "Ambiguità" 39–40), loses its force once the Man is recognized as a formal device. Neither of the arguments for the presence of the pronoun adduced by Marcovich, "Sappho, fr. 31" 22, is compelling: (1) the words τῆς ἐϱωμένης ἐπιφανείσης in Plutarch *Amat.* 763a require only that we understand the object to be the Woman, which I take to be beyond dispute; (2) the evidence of Catullus's *te* is not decisive, since, together with his addition of *Lesbia*, it could be part of his greater specificity about the addressee. Against the pronoun I would add that, although elision at clause end is common in Sappho, με or σε at that position is not (only in the virtually parenthetical λίσσομαί σε, Sa. 1.2 and Alc. 34; and perhaps in Alc. 19.6). If τό is carried over as the object, the effective meaning is the same: "when I saw [that it was possible to sit next to] you."

Assuming that we are dealing with an impersonal verb meaning "it is possible," emendation to the imperfect εἴκε would be easy.[49] I add one more suggestion, if only to urge further thought on the difficulty here: that we have an impersonal use of the pluperfect ᾔκει of ἔοικα, a form known in Attic and perhaps in Alcman but unattested in the Lesbian poets,[50] and (what is more of a problem) with the same meaning as the personal form: "it seemed." The sense "it seemed that I did not speak . . ." (= "I was like one who did not speak"), instead of "it was not possible that I speak . . ." would foreshadow the description of outer appearance that becomes so striking at the end of the fragment. For the remainder of this discussion, however, I stay with the assumption of an imperfect of εἴκω, used impersonally with the infinitive.[51]

Since I have already argued that βρόχε(α) provides no good meaning in the first clause, it is time to look for what βροχεως could mean in the second. I think two possibilities have a claim on our attention. They represent different interpretations of the same letter sequence. The first, which I consider less probable, reincorporates Toll's word-division:

ὡς γὰρ εἶδ⟨ον⟩, ὠ⟨ς⟩ βρόχε', ὥς με φώναι-
σ' οὐδὲν ἔτ' εἴκε[ι],

"For when I saw you, then little, then nothing was it still possible for me to speak." There are two strong advantages to this reading. It makes use of βραχύς in one of its best and earliest attested fifth-century senses, to describe a small amount of speech; and it provides an antecedent or model for Theocritus' emphatic doubling of the second ὡς. Nonetheless, the construction seems to me unlikely. Sappho's style is syntactically precise, even in direct quotations. Although she uses unusual

[49] Hiatus after a short vowel is not a problem at end of stanza; cf. 1.24, and Lobel, Σαπφοῦς μέλη, lxvii.

[50] The stem in the perfect perhaps occurs at Alcman 110 P, although the manuscripts vary between οἴκας and εἴκας (and Page doubts the ascription). I am not suggesting that this is the normal Lesbian form, but that there is the possibility, in the case of a verb whose stem forms were not well established, of an ad hoc formation—perhaps from εἰκώς on the analogy of ᾔδει from εἰδώς. For a recent discussion of the pluperfect of this verb in Homer see Hackstein, "Zwei Bemerkungen," 47–54.

[51] The arguments against the genitive construction with a form of ἴκω are compelling. Page's "improbable" construction of ἵκω with the infinitive (above, section II, third paragraph) could be substituted throughout the rest of my discussion.

metrical forms expressively, as in line 10, or in the run–on of the third hendecasyllabic sequence with the adonic tag in 1.10, or even in possibly allowing hiatus in line 9,[52] I find no equivalent for the mimetic disruption in syntax that this reading presents. The word order also seems to me to count against this reading, since it does not provide the explicit, parallel contrast of "little" and "nothing" that the device requires. The postponement of οὐδὲν (to an otherwise normal position, see below) takes away the justification for the self–correction.

I prefer to read:

ὡς γὰρ εἶδ⟨ον⟩, ὠ⟨ς⟩ βροχέως με φώναι–
σ' οὐδ' ἓν ἔτ' εἴκε[ι],

If βραχύς primarily denotes insufficient reach or extension in space, then βροχέως φώναισαι means to speak with insufficient strength for your voice to be heard across the distance that separates you from your hearer. We lack an adverb for "small" in English, but the sense is of a "small voice"—perhaps one could translate "faintly" or "weakly." Although no other use refers to size of voice, this meaning is not conceptually or semantically unexpected.[53] The use of the concrete φων– makes clear what is being measured. Βροχέως . . . φώναισ' / οὐδ' ἓν means "to speak not even one thing in a small voice." Both the adverb and the negative are appropriately placed to obtain the needed emphasis, at the beginning of the clause and in the adonic. (The adonic is a typical place for an emphatic negative; compare especially 5.7–8, . . . , γένοιτο δ' ἄμμι / . . . μ]ηδ' εἷς, and 1.23–24, . . . , ταχέως φιλήσει / κωὐκ ἐθέλοισα.)[54]

One advantage of this interpretation is that the clause itself now has a specific, descriptive meaning—it is dramatic. Another advantage

[52] On the text of line 9, see above, note 44.

[53] Μικροφωνία is the established word in later Greek (citations from Aristotle on in LSJ; the best known is in the Life of Sophocles). In Homer ὀλίγῃ ὀπί occurs once (*Od.* 14.492) to indicate an intentional whisper; cf. the formulaic τὸν δ' ὀλιγοδρανέων προσέφη(ς) in the *Iliad* (15.246, 16.843, 22.337). (This interpretation of the word could also apply to the reading ὡς γὰρ ἔς σ' ἴδω, βροχέως . . .).

[54] Others are 16.16, 17.8, 41.2(?); I counted eighteen negatives in total in the sapphic poems, so the five–syllable adonic accounts for more than a quarter of them. I found no instances of a negative in the adonic in Alcaeus' sapphics, although he twice begins a stanza with οὐ, something Sappho never does.

is that line 9 now becomes a climax to lines 7–8, and not just a repetition of them. The two sentences describe separate components of speech: projection, or audibility, and articulation, or comprehensibility; but the second designates a more complete failure. The crescendo gives a prominence to the problem of speaking that suggests a rhetorical structure for the poem as a whole.[55]

IV

Snell noted in this poem the opposition, common in archaic lyric, between ἀμηχανία and τόλμα.[56] The latter element is obvious in the remains of line 17. The former, which Snell locates in the symptom list, in fact appears in line 6: καρδίαν . . . ἐπτόαισεν. This is the only decipherable context of καρδία in the Lesbian poets, but the occurrences in Homer show its semantic range.[57] The heart feels emotions (pain, above all, but also joy, anger, worry). In addition, some actions require that the heart show firmness, either absolutely or as endurance of a bad sensation, and so the heart is responsible for steadiness of purpose and for the ability to act on one's purposes. Thus, in *Iliad* 3.60 κραδίη . . . ἀτειρής is resumed by ἀτάρβητος νόος in line 63; Helen asserts her fixed intent by saying κραδίη τέτραπτο (*Od.* 4.260); and, most to the point, Odysseus in the hall exhorts himself to maintain his deliberate

[55] O'Higgins, "Silence," who directs her attention primarily to the paradox of Sappho's spoken declaration of speechlessness, has already offered an interpretation that emphasizes the importance of these lines. She remarks, "Just as Sappho evokes the girl with a double description of her voice—speaking and laughing—so Sappho's reaction begins with a double account of the poet's own voicelessness, a double wound to correspond to a double blow" (159). The suggested reading, βροχέως . . . φώναισ', would support her analysis better.

Toll, *Commentarius* 78, in his defense of βρόχε(ο) = *e gutture*, had drawn attention to the distinctions of breath and articulation as separate components of voice in later classical literature.

[56] He refers to Schadewaldt's discussion of *Is.* 8 in *Aufbau* 279. The palmary example, of course, is Archil. 7D = 13W. The opposition also occurs in Nausicaa's reply to Odysseus's description of his misery (*Od.* 6.190).

[57] I am examining only κραδίη (καρδίη), although κῆρ, which occurs mostly at line end, is not much different. All meanings of κραδίη are also among the meanings of θυμός (except for the designation of the actual organ), but the reverse is not true; see next note.

course of action with τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη (*Od.* 20.18).[58] The verb πτοέω makes it clear that this additional function is the one relevant here. Privitera has shown that πτοέω does not specify any particular emotion, but designates a disturbance that prevents some mental faculty (located in an organ) from acting in fulfillment of its purpose.[59] In the closest congener of line 6, Alcaeus 283.3–4, the verb (supplied by the editors) takes Helen's θυμόν as its object to introduce her irrational action.[60] So καρδίαν . . . ἐπτόαισεν declares that the organ necessary for purposeful action was so overwhelmed that the Speaker lost the ability to proceed toward her goal: to bridge the space that separates her from the object of desire. Odysseus, in the hall, must keep quiet, and he is able to. The Speaker would speak—yet she cannot.

. . . τό μ' ἦ μὰν
καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν,
ὠς γὰρ εἶδ⟨ον⟩, ὠ⟨ς⟩ βροχέως με φώναι–
σ' οὐδ' ἒν ἔτ' εἴκε[ι],
ἀλλὰ καμ μὲν γλῶσσα †ἔαγε . . .

[58]The several uses of κραδίη in *Od.* 20.10–24 illustrate its meaning well. The importance of the heart to purpose and action is also shown in negative examples. Hector sarcastically says that Polydamas does not experience the fear or danger of war because his heart is not μενεδήϊος οὐδὲ μαχήμων (*Il.* 12.247); Zeus does not know what to do about Sarpedon: διχθὰ . . . κραδίη μέμονε (*Il.* 16.435). The heart's role is essentially passive: when actual action is initiated, κραδίη appears only in a compound subject with θυμός (usually governing the verbs ἀνώγει, κελεύει, or ὀτρύνει); an interesting example is *Il.* 9.635, said of the father or brother who accepts compensation: ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμός.

[59]Privitera, "Ambiguità" 56–59. There are some examples of πτοέω in Voigt's second apparatus. Marcovich, "Sappho, fr. 31" 22–23, demonstrates that it is a *vox propria* of love poetry, but that is not an exclusive use, especially in poets before Sappho. Privitera takes the indeterminacy of the source of the disturbance denoted by πτοέω to create an ambiguity central to the structure of the poem (see below, note 63); I take it to mean that the word designates an effect, not a cause. (While Privitera, 45–46, is correct to point out that Sappho never actually says in the surviving lines that the Speaker is in love, I would suppose the generic or performance context suggested that the poem's subject matter would be erotic; even if not, the response of readers since antiquity, notwithstanding Lucretius' use of the same symptoms for fear, weighs against inferring an ambiguity that runs throughout the four stanzas.)

[60]The difference between Sappho's line and Alcaeus's conforms to the use of θυμός when action is involved.

. . . it made my heart shudder in my breast.
For as soon as I saw you, in a weak voice even to speak
one thing was not still possible for me,
But my tongue is broken . . .

"Longinus" marveled at the description of the symptoms of ἐρωτικαὶ μανίαι, in particular at Sappho's selection and combination of things which "all happen to people in love."[61] But this is slightly misleading. Love traditionally overwhelms its victim. Sappho's description of love's effect on the heart most resembles Archilochus 112D = 191W:

οἷος γὰρ φιλότητος ἔρως ὑπὸ καρδίην ἐλυσθεὶς
πολλὴν κατ' ἀχλὺν ὀμμάτων ἔχευεν,
κλέψας ἐκ στηθέων ἁπαλὰς φρένας.

Love does not, however, deter the lover from the pursuit of its own object, but from other preoccupations. It clouds the φρένες of Paris (4.442) and Zeus (14.294) in the *Iliad,* but Paris and Zeus do not lose their ability to speak to their immediate purposes as an effect of their φιλότητος ἔρως, any more than Anchises does in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* (91, Ἀγχίσην δ' ἔρος εἷλεν, ἔπος δέ μιν ἀντίον ηὔδα·; also 144); and the man in the Cologne Archilochus papyrus (S 478 Page = 196[A] West[2]) becomes quite eloquent. The sight of Theoxenos motivates Pindar's song.

The Speaker's inability to speak constitutes an ἀμηχανία precisely in regard to acting on *erōs*. The emphasis here associates her experience with those in which something inhibits a would-be lover's action and so threatens to defeat the erotic impulse. Theocritus makes the same connection; for he reworks most of the symptoms from Sappho's list into the description of Simaetha's lovesickness in the lines following ὡς ἴδον in 2.82, but delays the sudden attack of dumbness in order to couple it with the total paralysis that strikes Simaetha when Delphis actually appears in the flesh in response to her desire. In another poem Sappho names a sensation, closely associated with *erōs,* that ties the tongue. Although the circumstances of Sappho 137V,LP—at least as it is quoted by Aristotle—appear to be quite different from those of poem 31, the experience is the same:

[61] 10.3, in Campbell's translation of the citation.

θέλω τί τ' εἴπην, ἀλλά με κωλύει
αἴδως . . . [62]

The same sensation restrains even Apollo in *Pythian* 9, when he sees Cyrene, not only from acting on, but also from speaking the knowledge that he possesses (lines 38–43). Jason says to the silent Medea, when finally they meet alone, . . . μή με λίην ὑπεροπαίδεο (A.R. 3.978)

If the symptoms are taken one by one, no single emotion will account for them all (as "Longinus" pointed out). But the second stanza provides a structure for the rest of the list by defining the Speaker's experience and makes it unnecessary to infer emotions from the symptoms in order to make the poem intelligible.[63] Lines 5–6 introduce the Speaker's ἀμηχανία, and 7–8 explain it specifically as an inability to speak to her purpose. The crescendo in the next stanza makes her affliction physiologically concrete by describing it as the breaking of her tongue. This descriptive detail is then expanded and confirmed by a list of associated, and continuing, disabling symptoms. The description culminates with a reference to death and a reassertion of the persona of

[62] At least one ancient writer saw the connection between these two poems that I am making, Valerius Aediturus (fr. 1 Morel, quoted by Privitera, "Ambiguità" 73–74, with further references on its relation to Sappho's poems):

Dicere cum conor curam tibi, Pamphila, cordis
quid mi abs te quaeram, verba labris abeunt,
per pectus manat subito ⟨subido⟩ mihi sudor
sic tacitus, subidus, dum pudeo, pereo.

[63] Marcovich, "Sappho, fr. 31" 26; Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* 29 n. 1; and, especially, Burnett, *Archaic Poets* 239 n. 24, discuss the Homeric parallels for the symptom list (all following Turyn, *Studia Sapphica* 44–45). Loss of speech in Homer (see above, note 27) usually accompanies grief at a sudden discovery. Robbins, "Sappho Thirty-One" 260 n. 19, lists the different emotions which the commentators have attributed to the Speaker as the source of her symptoms: jealousy, love, anxiety, terror, fear, wonder. Recent scholarship has particularly emphasized fear and love (e.g., Pretagostini, "Teocrito e Saffo" 116; Privitera, "Ambiguità" 61–74, approved by Lasserre, *Sappho* 152; Rissman, *Love as War* 74–89, who treats πτοέω as the first designation of a symptom). Αἰδώς (which involves an acute consciousness both of oneself and of another) is not a sensation of the same order, and its use here as a structuring principle would confirm, not dispute, that fear and love have something in common in erotic poetry. See Redfield's comment, *Nature* 118, describing αἰδώς in Homer: "*Aidôs* accompanies an immediate emotion when that emotion is mediated by the social sense"; and Cairns's (*Aidōs* 2), that it is "based on sensitivity to and protectiveness of one's self image" (and see further, note 67 below).

the ἐγώ of the poem. Such a closing signals a return to the demands of the immediate occasion.[64] The disabilities are summarized (πάν) and dismissed with a *gnōmē* on τόλμα in line 17.

The pathography ostensibly is a rhetorical heightening of the essential fact that the Speaker cannot speak, but it takes on a life of its own as a flattering glorification of the Woman's powers.[65] And by describing the depth of her distress, the Speaker implies the goal she wishes to attain. The hypothetical man whose composure served, initially, the rhetorical function of a contrast to the Speaker's loss of self-control, can now retrospectively be inferred to present the paradigm of a happy state which the Speaker wishes to obtain. Her speech thus explains what she would say, even as it explains that she cannot.[66] Sappho 31.1–16 presents dramatically what Sappho 137.1–2 simply states.

The αἰδώς that disables speech is not necessarily and, in origin, probably, not at all, erotic. At *Odyssey* 3.22–24 it inhibits Telemachus from speaking to Nestor; at *Iliad* 4.401–2 it stops Diomedes from replying to Agamemnon's rebuke; at *Iliad* 1.331–32 fear and αἰδώς keep Agamemnon's heralds from speaking to Achilles. Perhaps a closer context is *Odyssey* 6.66–67, where Nausicaa cannot mention her θαλερὸν γάμον to her father.[67] But in each case, before or after Sappho, the

[64] See Race, "Elements of Style" 189–209, for a discussion of this pattern as rhetorical convention in the later poet. Burnett, *Archaic Poets* 240–41, describes how the final shift is prepared by the movement to symptoms that must be observed from the outside.

[65] Burnett, *Archaic Poets* 239, points out that the Speaker's negative description of herself actually serves to heighten, by contrast, the implicit suggestion of the Woman's beauty. Lasserre describes the pathography as the amplification of an encomium (*Sappho* 157–58, with his eloquent reminder that it need not be any the less sincere for being conventional); cf. the similar argument developed by Koniaris, "Sappho, Fr. 31" 173–86. Another example of an indirect auxesis through a negative description would be the depiction of Typhos in *Py.* 1 as praise of Zeus.

[66] Winkler, "Gardens" 75, who treats this poem as a reworking of Odysseus' speech to Nausicaa, argues that both Odysseus and Sappho "hint obliquely at the notion of a bridegroom" as a polite self-reference to invite the addressee to take the next step.

[67] These examples are distributed among different categories of αἰδώς in Homer, according to the analysis of either von Erffa, Αἰδώς 4–23, or Reidinger, "Deux αἰδώς," passim, who emphasize the social situations in which the subject feels αἰδώς and to which he necessarily responds by preferring or avoiding certain behaviors (see also Snell's article in *Lexikon*, s.v.). Von Erffa, 64–65, sees a great gulf between αἰδώς in the Nausicaa episode in *Od.* 6 and in Sa. 137. (I am grateful to Jinyo Kim for assistance with the literature on αἰδώς.) But these passages do have in common a moment of personal

person afflicted does not succeed in overcoming the effect; those who do finally overcome it require assistance from another person. Telemachus is urged on by Athena, and Achilles relieves the heralds of their burden. Diomedes rejects the assistance of Sthenelos. Tactful Alcinous understands his daughter's silence. Apollo is encouraged to act by Cheiron, Jason prompts Medea, Simaetha must be freed by Delphis himself. In Sappho 137, as quoted by Aristotle, the first speaker is seeking such encouragement, but does not receive it; the source of his αἰδώς is deliberately misunderstood.[68] In Catullus's translation of Sappho 31, the last stanza also represents a new voice, but also speaking in reproach instead of encouragement.

A response in Sappho 31 would create a dialogue. Dramatized dialogue is not foreign to Sappho's poetry. It occurs in the narrative poems, 44 and 44A, and in what are possibly purely dramatic poems, 114 and 140(a); 102 sounds like dramatized speech. The Hymn to Aphrodite contains a speech; most to the point are the conversations with a beloved in 94 and (probably) 95.[69] Perhaps the lines quoted by "Longinus" represent one speech in such a poem, and the whole of lines 1–16 should be enclosed in quotation marks. Line 17, then, would begin the reply of the Woman. P's ἀλλὰ πὰν τόλματον ἐπεὶ καὶ πένητα may conceal, for example,

---

contact that produces an acute feeling of self-consciousness in the subject. So too at *Od.* 14.145, where Eumaeus, merely remembering the warmth of his absent master's company, says, ὀνομάζειν / αἰδέομαι· πέρι γάρ μ' ἐφίλει καὶ κήδετο θυμῷ. Αἰδώς in the erotic tradition may be seen as another instance of this type, or as a modification of these examples. (At the same time, Sappho may also be suggesting that the Speaker is expressing one of the most straightforward categories of αἰδώς, that felt before a god.) Cairns, in *Aidōs*, recognizes the element of self-consciousness, but not distinct patterns of use. Because he is seeking a unitary idea behind all examples, he ignores or plays down the differential significance of literary contexts; for example, he never mentions Sa. 137, and he interprets Eumaeus's statement in terms of his social position, not specifically on the basis of what Eumaeus says (98–99).

[68] The interpretation of Sa. 137 as a dialogue goes back to a late scholium; whether or not the lines of the reply belong to a poem by Sappho, the quotation shows the form (cf. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* 104–9, and Voigt ad loc.).

[69] Lasserre, *Sappho* 165–67 (in connection with another poem), emphasizes the role of dialogue in the fragments of Sappho; he also observes that there is a type of ancient lyric, best exemplified by Hor. *Ep.* 2, in which the poet puts the words in the mouth of another speaker, but does not make that clear until the end (in this case, however, we do not know if line 1 is the beginning of the whole poem).

"ἀλλὰ πὰν τόλματον," ἔειπε κήνα

(perhaps the Woman, by encouraging the Speaker, implies, with equal indirection, how she would respond).

This last suggestion rests on the expectation that what follows line 16 will represent, at least formally, a continuation that is in some way conventional in rhetoric and thematic structure. I would not want to press too hard speculation about what is not there.[70] But in the study of what has survived, in the text of the second stanza, modern editors have accepted—to take egregious examples—the anomalous syntax of the construction ὡς ἴδω, ὡς εἴκει and strained parallels for constructions with εἴκει (whichever verb they derive it from), but ignored the inconvenient parallel in Euripides's βλέπω βραχύ; while insisting on the temporal sense of the adjective, they have disregarded or denied the obvious meaningfulness of that sense in βροχέως με φώναισ' οὐδ' . . . είκει. Their readings reflect the expectation of a rhetorically naive, emotionally overwrought poet—"Die Leidenschaft packt bei Sappho unmittelbar und schroff jeden einzelnen Sinn, und der Ausdruck ist einfach und hart"—that persisted as the assumption behind the text even after scholarship on the poem began to undo it as an assumption of literary criticism.[71] The text now printed cannot stand without that expectation to justify its strangeness. Although differences and disagreements about reconstructions must always remain, I have tried to offer a reading of the evidence for line 7 that meets the minimum stan-

[70] As Phaedra remarks (Eur. *Hipp.* 385–87), the meaning of αἰδώς depends on the καιρός. It does not necessarily entail ἀμηχανία; and the τόλμα that is urged in response to ἀμηχανία may be a call to desist (as in Archil. 13W) or a form of sympathetic encouragement (as in Nausicaa's reply to Odysseus). So there is no obvious convention or set of conventions to indicate whether the initial hesitancy here is overcome, or, if it is, what quality characterizes the action that follows. Whatever we may think of Delphis and Simaetha, we are told that after Apollo took Cyrene to Libya, Aphrodite ἐπὶ γλυκεραῖς εὐναῖς ἐρατὰν βάλεν αἰδῶ (*Py.* 9.12). There is a complex variation in the *Argonautica*, 3.681ff. (cited by Turyn as a parallel, *Studia Sapphica* 46): . . . δὴν δέ μιν αἰδὼς / παρθενίη κατέρυκεν ἀμείψασθαι μεμαυῖαν. It is her sister she must speak to, not the object of her desire; nonetheless, Apollonius attributes the end of her silence to the effect of the Ἔρωτες as a third-person power, and when she does speak, she dissembles her love.

[71] Snell, "Sapphos Gedicht" 89. To take an example from the context of text-criticism, in his review of *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* Latte addressed the question of supplements in the text similarly: "die Aussicht, Worte einer Dichterin von der schlichten Ausdruckskraft Sapphos zu treffen, sehr gering ist. Bei Alkaios liegen die Dinge schon günstiger, weil er konventioneller ist" (93).

dards of using βροχέως in a meaning consistent with its semantic history, and of providing an appropriate metrical, syntactic, and rhetorical structure. I hope that by supporting interpretations that place Sappho's originality not in her departure from conventions but in her participation in a poetic tradition, this reading has also shown the way to a clearer understanding of the poem itself.[72]

JOEL B. LIDOV

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APPENDIX 1
SAPPHO 31, WITH PROPOSED REVISIONS

"φαίνεταί μοι κῆνος ἴσος θέοισιν
ἔμμεν' ὤνηρ, ὄττις ἐνάντιός τοι
ἰσδάνει καὶ πλάσιον ἆδυ φωνεί–
σας ὑπακούει
καὶ γελαίσας ἰμέροεν, τό μ' ἦ μὰν
καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν,
ὠς γὰρ εἶδ⟨ον⟩, ὠ⟨ς⟩ βροχέως με φώναι–
σ' οὐδ' ἔν ἔτ' εἴκε[ι],
ἀλλὰ †καμ† μὲν γλῶσσα †ἔαγε† λέπτον
δ' αὔτικα χρῶι πῦρ ὐπαδεδρόμηκεν,
ὀππάτεσσι δ' οὐδ' ἔν ὄρημμ', ἐπιβρό–
μεισι δ' ἄκουαι,
†έκαδε† μ' ἴδρως ψῦχρος κακχέεται, τρόμος δὲ
παῖσαν ἄγρει, χλωροτέρα δὲ ποίας
ἔμμι, τεθνάκην δ' ὀλίγω 'πιδεύης
φαίνομ' ἔμ' αὔται."
"ἀλλὰ πὰν τόλματον," ἔειπε κήνα

[72]I am grateful to Andrew Miller, Dirk Obbink, and Jacob Stern for their comments on earlier versions and drafts. A shortened version of this essay was read at the 1992 meeting of the American Philological Association in New Orleans. The initial research was assisted by a City University of New York PSC–BHE Research Award.

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ARISTOTLE AND THE ELEPHANT AGAIN

Aristotle's zoological writings preserve an astonishing amount of information about the elephant, and much, though not all of it, is remarkably accurate.[1] From where does it come? Does Aristotle describe an animal which he has seen, or, as is sometimes thought,[2] one which he has dissected? To what extent does he make use of written sources? Is he discussing, according to the usual assumption, the Indian elephant? One recent scholar treats Aristotle's knowledge of the animal as if it is uninfluenced by what he has read, and suggests, moreover, that he writes about the African elephant.[3] Can this be correct? There is also the additional question of whether his information comes, as many have believed, from the period of Alexander the Great's Indian campaign.[4] Before we look at any of these issues, however, a few words should be said about his knowledge of India in general.

In none of his works does Aristotle in fact have much to say about the Indian subcontinent or about its inhabitants. Moreover, apart from the question of elephants, the little that he does relate clearly reflects

[1] A detailed assessment is provided by Scullard, *Elephant* 37–52. Relevant material is found in *PA* and *GA* as well as in *HA* 1–9. Doubts have of course often been expressed about the authenticity of *HA* 7–9 in particular, or of parts of these books, but also of earlier passages. There is, however, nothing in the passages discussed here which could not have been written by Aristotle or by contemporary collaborators, although it is often impossible to distinguish between the two. Moreover, the views of scholars on these questions are often very arbitrary; see the comments of Byl, *Recherches* xxiii–xxv, of Lloyd, *Science* 21–24, and of Balme, "Biology" 16–17, particularly in so far as they relate to the work of such scholars as H. Aubert, F. Wimmer, and L. Dittmeyer. (On the question of authenticity see also Balme, *Aristotle* 1–13, which appeared after this article was written.)

[2] E.g., by Wellmann, "Elefant" 2250, and Romm, "Aristotle's Elephant" 572.

[3] Romm, "Aristotle's Elephant"; however, he rightly emphasises the unreliability of the ancient evidence depicting Alexander as the instigator and subsidiser of Aristotle's zoological researches.

[4] See, for example, Manquat, *Aristote naturaliste* 98; Lee, "Place-Names" 61, 64; and Peck, *Historia Animalium* I lix, who believe such details to be late additions, the main part of *HA* having been completed much earlier. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 330, used their existence to support a late date for *HA* in entirety. For the orthodox modern view see Rist, *Mind of Aristotle* 16, 212–17, who argues that it was begun around 345 and for the most part complete by 339.

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the period before Alexander set foot in India.[5] In *Politics* 7.14.1332b23, for example, he makes a single comment about India's political system, claiming as his authority the sixth-century explorer Scylax. When he describes the mountain and river system of the eastern parts of the Persian Empire in *Meteorologica* 1.13.350a14, there is no sign of the influence of those who accompanied Alexander.[6] In addition, both here and elsewhere he knows no Indian river apart from the Indus, and is otherwise uninformative about Indian geography.

As for his account of the fauna of India, again we are clearly in the period before Alexander's Indian campaign. Aristotle's India is the home of the dart-shooting martichoras (*HA* 2.1.501a25) and the single-horned Indian ass (*HA* 2.1.499b18, *PA* 3.2.663a19), creatures which belong to the world of fable rather than to the real world.[7] We look in vain for the huge serpents and other snakes which so impressed the companions of Alexander, or for the crocodiles of the Indus, not to mention other animals.[8]

Aristotle's knowledge of India is obviously slender. However, he is remarkably well informed about the elephant, describing in detail its various parts, including the internal parts, as well as dealing with reproduction, way of life, and other matters. How has he acquired his knowledge? In his zoological writings in general he owes a great deal to personal observation and to the opinions of experts communicated to him orally. But he is also, it is clear, heavily indebted to what he has read.[9] Hence we should at least consider the possibility that he has been influenced by earlier written accounts of the elephant. Several authorities suggest themselves and should be discussed here. The earliest of these

[5] Cf. Bolchert, *Aristoteles Erdkunde* 43; Byl, *Recherches* 104; and Karttunen, *India* 94–95.

[6] See Daffinà, "Aral," esp. 370–72; and Louis, *Météorologiques* I x. Bolchert, *Aristoteles Erdkunde* 39–42, argues that Ctesias is Aristotle's primary source here, but this is unconvincing; see Jacoby, "Ktesias" 2072.

[7] See below, nn. 12 and 18, with related discussion.

[8] On the little snake of *HA* 8.29.607a33 see below. Large serpents are described by Nearchus (133 F 10a, b) and Onesicritus (134 F 16a, b); large and small snakes by Aristobulus (139 F 38) and Cleitarchus (137 F 18). For crocodiles in the Indus see Aristobulus (139 F 38), Onesicritus (134 F 7; and also the hippopotamus), and Nearchus (133 F 20, in the Hydaspes).

[9] A brief account of Aristotle's principal sources is given by Lloyd, *Magic* 211–12, who also lists the more important secondary discussions; Byl, *Recherches*, should now be added.

and the one with which it is appropriate to begin is Artaxerxes' physician, Ctesias.[10]

ARISTOTLE AND CTESIAS

Ctesias' Persian history and his *Indica,* both written at the beginning of the fourth century, were very influential works, and Ctesias was the first Greek author, so far as we know, to draw attention to the existence of elephants in India and also to describe the animal.[11] He is an obvious source of information for any fourth-century author. Aristotle, however, had serious misgivings, although these did not necessarily deter him from making use of Ctesias' works. We need to look at least briefly at his criticisms, for they tell us something of his methods.

Ctesias is explicitly named four times in Aristotle. The first passage, part of a discussion of animals and their teeth, concerns that remarkable creature, the martichoras (*HA* 2.1.501a25 = 688 F 45d).[12] Not surprisingly, Aristotle doubts that any animal so far defies nature as to possess three rows of teeth in each jaw, not one. His words "if we are to believe Ctesias" lay emphasis on his distrust. However, his scepticism is not such that it prevents him from giving a description of the animal, a description, moreover, which is not in all its details relevant to the context in which it occurs.

Even more interesting is a second passage, where Ctesias ("who is unworthy of belief") is censured for his statement that there are no pigs wild or tame in India (*HA* 8.28.606a8 = F 45kα). In its position in the argument the jibe seems gratuitous. Aristotle has in fact just re-

[10] For recent bibliography on Ctesias (*FGrHist* no. 688) see Bigwood, "Ctesias' *Indica*" 302 n. 1, to which Karttunen, *India,* should be added. Ctesias was at the Persian court from 404 to 398/7. Eck, "Ctésias," 427–32, revives the view that his residence there dates from 415/4. However, this makes his account of the reign of Darius II inexplicably brief; see Jacoby, "Ktesias" 2033.

[11] It is mentioned by Herodotus (3.114, 4.191.4) but not described. For the question of how well Ctesias' *Indica* has been preserved by Photius and the other excerptors see Bigwood, "Ctesias' *Indica*."

[12] A very fanciful description of the tiger, an animal unknown to the Greek world before Alexander's Indian campaign; cf. below, n. 22 and related discussion, and Steier, "Tiger" 949. Aubert and Wimmer, *Thierkunde,* and Dittmeyer, *De Animalibus,* consider this passage and also *HA* 8.12.597b21–30 (cf. note 19 below) to be interpolations, but for insufficient reason (cf. note 1 above).

ported, without naming his source and without criticism, the equally erroneous claim that there are no pigs and no deer in Libya.[13]

No less noteworthy, though for somewhat different reasons, is the third criticism, which we find in two passages (*HA* 3.22.523a26 and *GA* 2.2.736a2 = F 48a, b) and which concerns the elephant. Ctesias had stated that the creature's semen hardens so much in drying that it becomes like amber, a claim which Aristotle finds absurd. However, it should be emphasised that his comments here do not derive from personal observation or special knowledge of the elephant, as has sometimes been supposed.[14] They are based on his preconceptions about the nature of semen, which is thick and white when it leaves the body and then becomes thin and dark (*HA* 3.22.523a18). His censure of Herodotus in the same passages for suggesting that Ethiopian semen is black (*HA* 3.22.523a17, *GA* 2.2.736a10), is similarly unconnected with observation.[15]

Aristotle's criticisms do not necessarily imply exhaustive research or firsthand investigation, and they should also not lead us to conclude that he did not draw on Ctesias for information. As Byl has amply demonstrated, in his biological writings he names his predecessors on the whole only when he wishes to refute their views;[16] he also makes considerable use of those whom he thus criticises by name, as well as of unnamed authorities. Herodotus, for example, he names and condemns in three passages in language very similar to that which he uses of Ctesias. Herodotus is a liar (διέψευσται, *HA* 3.22.523a17; cf. οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει, *GA* 2.2.732a10). He also relates silly stories (μυθολόγος, *GA* 3.5.756b6; cf. μῦθος . . . ληρώδης, *HA* 6.31.579b2, although the historian is not specifically named there).[17] Nevertheless Aristotle

[13] Cf. Hdt. 4.192.2. Aristotle adds a detail (not in Herodotus) that there are no wild goats in Libya, a claim which is correct (see Byl, *Recherches* 28). He may have had information which contradicted Ctesias from a source which he considered more trustworthy.

[14] E.g., by Romm, "Aristotle's Elephant," 572–73.

[15] Cf. Byl, *Recherches* 101, 369 n. 81.

[16] For notable variations in the treatment meted out to individual authors see Byl, *Recherches* 3ff. Those named and criticised in the biological writings include many Presocratics, especially Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Aristotle does not, however, criticise Plato or Hippocrates by name, and other medical writers are rarely named when their views are being rejected.

[17] For ψευδέσθαι and ψευδής in reference to Ctesias see *GA* 2.2.736a2 and *HA* 3.22.523a26; for μυθολογεῖν see below, n. 25 and related discussion.

uses him extensively. His treatment of Herodotus indeed is very similar to the treatment earlier meted out to Herodotus by Ctesias, for Ctesias, while liberally employing his predecessor's material, also dismissed him as a liar (T 8 ψεύστης; cf. F 16.62) and as a purveyor of μῦθοι (T 13; cf. λογοποιός, T 8).

In the same way Aristotle certainly uses information from Ctesias in a number of passages, though the wording may suggest that he does not feel confident of its veracity. Aristotle's Indian ass, for example, with its solid hoof, single horn, and *astragalos* clearly originates with Ctesias.[18] However, in one of his references to this creature (*PA* 3.2.663a19, although not in *HA* 2.1.499b18), Aristotle betrays his reservations with the words "it is said" and "the so-called Indian ass."

Similarly Aristotle's brief description of the parrot (*HA* 8.12.597b27),[19] a bird not seen in mainland Greece until after Alexander's Indian campaign, surely owes something to Ctesias. The two differ, it is true, over the form of the bird's name. In Aristotle we have ψιττάκη, with a variant σιττάκη, whereas in Photius' summary of Ctesias the form is βίττακος,[20] as it is in a fragment of Eubulus (a poet of Middle Comedy), our only other literary reference to the bird in the period before Alexander.[21] Aristotle may indeed have had information in addition to that supplied by Ctesias. However, the fact that he considers the parrot to be a bird of prey certainly reminds one of the historian. Ctesias had compared it to a hawk in size and may have compared the two birds in other respects. Even more suggestive is Aristotle's comment τὸ λεγόμενον ἀνθρωπόγλωττον. It recalls (with again a hint of scepticism) Photius' words γλῶσσαν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχει (F 45.8).

Then there are the Indian dogs of *Historia Animalium* 8.28.607a4,

[18]Ctesias' description confuses several animals, one of which is the rhinoceros (unknown to Greeks at this time); see Karttunen, *India* 168–71. Aristotle's use of Ctesias is discussed by Byl, *Recherches* 99–104. For older views see Bolchert, *Aristoteles Erdkunde* 17–21, and Reese, *Nachrichten über Indien* 99ff.

[19]Part of a short digression sometimes regarded as spurious (see notes 1 and 12 above). For knowledge of the bird in the ancient world see Wotke and Jereb, "Papagei"; Toynbee, *Animals* 247–49; and Bigwood, "Ctesias' Parrot."

[20]Henry, *Bibliothèque* I, reads βυττάκου for βιττάκου (a misprint?). The common later forms (besides those in the manuscripts of Aristotle) are ψιττακός and σιττακός. The name is thought to be of oriental origin and perhaps Indian, although the precise etymology is uncertain; cf. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique* iv.1 1292.

[21]*PCG* 5 F 120 (123), from an unknown play. According to Hunter, *Eubulus* 10, his plays fall within the period ca. 380–335.

where once more Aristotle does not vouch for the information, as the repeated φασί shows. People claim, he tells us, that these creatures are the result of crossing a dog and a tiger, although as a parallel passage shows, he means something like a jackal, not the real tiger.[22] A breed of dog called "Indian" was well known to fourth–century Greece.[23] However, here too Ctesias may have made a contribution. He certainly describes huge Indian dogs, capable, so he says, of fighting a lion (F 45.10; Phot.). He may in addition have suggested Aristotle's deadly little snake (*HA* 8.29.607a33). At any rate we may compare the snake in Photius which is one span long (F 45.33).

There may be some uncertainty with regard to these last two animals. However, unquestionably Ctesias is Aristotle's main source on the fauna of India. Moreover, his lengthy history of Persia could have supplied details about the fauna of parts of the Persian Empire other than India.[24] We know that it provided Aristotle at times with historical information, as with the tale of Sardanapallus (*Pol.* 5.8.14.1311b35 = F 1pβ), although this is attributed by Aristotle to οἱ μυθολογοῦντες, and not to Ctesias by name.[25]

But what did Ctesias say about elephants, and could he have been a source for Aristotle here? Very little of this part of his account has been preserved. However, from a useful passage of Aelian (F 45b = Ael. *NA* 17.29) we learn that he claimed to have actually seen some with their Indian trainer in Babylon.[26] There is no reason to be sceptical of

[22] *GA* 2.7.746a34 substitutes for tiger "a wild animal like a dog," and no doubts are expressed. Since Aristotle does not mention the tiger elsewhere, M. Vegetti in Lanza and Vegetti, *Opere biologiche* 470, considers the *HA* reference to be an interpolation. However, it is not impossible that Aristotle (or even Ctesias before him) used the word τίγρις, a borrowing from Persian; cf. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique* iv.2 1116. The comments of Nearchus (133 F 7; Arr. *Ind.* 15.1–3), who claimed to have seen a tiger's skin, make it clear that τίγρις was applied by some to the θώς αἴολος (jackal?). On the problems of identifying the θώς see Peck, *Historia Animalium* II 377–79.

[23] Cf. Hdt. 1.192.4, 7.187; Xen. *Cyn.* 9.1, 10.1. On Indian dogs in general see Karttunen, *India* 163–67.

[24] Cf. F 10a and F 10b and Ff 34–36. Ctesias' *Periodos* and his *Phoroi* (if it was a separate work) were probably also rich in this kind of material.

[25] Bolchert, *Aristoteles Erdkunde* 21–29, discusses his debt to Ctesias' *Persica* in general, but as with geography (cf. note 6 above), goes well beyond what is certain.

[26] For what is known of his stay in Babylon see Bigwood, "Babylon" 32–33. Clay figurines of elephants found at Nippur (sometimes dated ca. 400 B.C.) are dated to the Seleucid or Parthian periods by Van Buren, *Fauna* 78.

this. Part of the Indian subcontinent (the Northwest and the Indus valley) was brought under Achaemenid control in the reign of Darius I. Whatever the exact relationship, there were clearly very close contacts between Persia and India at the end of the fifth century.[27] Nor is there reason to disbelieve Ctesias' statement that he saw these elephants uproot palm trees when their trainer gave the command. The animal can in fact push over a sizable tree with its forehead or wrap its trunk around it and uproot it.[28]

In addition to describing what he saw, Ctesias also related what he heard, including what he heard about the military use of elephants, as Aelian tells us in the same passage (F 45b). Ctesias' informants are unknown, and the numbers which he provides for these war elephants are, like most of his other figures, vastly exaggerated.[29] However, not everything is nonsensical. His elephants play two roles.[30] Some take their place in the battle line (F 45b). Indeed at least two episodes of his history depict battles in which they are involved. In F 9.7 (Phot.) Cyrus the Great faces Indian elephants in his campaign against the Derbices in the East. Earlier in the work we have the remarkable tale of Queen Semiramis of Assyria, invading India with a vast retinue of dummy elephants and having to contend with the real animals (F 1 = Diod. 2.17.7ff.).[31] This second episode is clearly fictional. The first one may be. But the use of elephants in battle is no invention. They must have been so employed in India long before Alexander's time.

Other elephants, Ctesias claims, were trained to tear down city walls (F 45b; cf. Photius' words περὶ τῶν τειχοκαταλυτῶν ἐλεφάντων,

[27] On the relationship see now Vogelsang, "Achaemenids."

[28] Carrington, *Elephants* 176 (cf. 65–66); Sikes, *African Elephant* 76–77, 281. Aelian does not in fact state how Ctesias' elephants uproot trees. They are said to demolish walls τοῖς στήθεσι, "by pushing with their chests (?)," though Aelian's version of the original could well be inexact. Onesicritus (134 F 14; Strabo 15.1.34), who must have seen elephants himself, but who seems also to have been influenced by Ctesias' account, reports the same activities, telling us that the animals rise on their hind legs and use their trunks to uproot trees and tear down battlements.

[29] For his statistics cf. Bigwood, "Inarus" 10–11.

[30] The passing reference in F 45.15 (Phot.) to the use of elephants in hunting is also credible; cf. Megasthenes 715 F 32 (Strabo 15.1.55).

[31] On Diodorus' use of Ctesias see Bigwood, "Diodorus." His comment (2.16.4) that the Indian elephant is larger than the African one is part of an addition by Diodorus to Ctesias' tale (cf. Jacoby, app. crit. p. 434), as is his statement (2.17.8) that the animals were equipped with towers (see Scullard, *Elephant* 241).

F 45.7), and again the assertion is not absurd.[32] Indian sources, although dating them is problematic, attest the practice. The *Arthaśastra,* for example, attributed to Kautilīya, a minister of Chandragupta (Sandracottus) in the last part of the third century B.C., includes in the list of the functions of the elephant the breaking of ramparts, gates, and towers.[33]

Ctesias clearly had a great deal to say about the elephant, and parts of Aristotle's description betray his influence. Aristotle's elephants take part in battle, tear down walls, and uproot palm trees (*HA* 9.1.610a19), the very activities described by Ctesias.[34] When Aristotle describes the hunting of wild ones (*HA* 9.1.610a24), he may again owe something to the historian, for Ctesias' *Persica,* we know, included at least one elephant hunt (F 1 = Diod. 2.17.7).[35] Indeed many of the other details in Aristotle (on the animal's physical attributes, on mating, the length of gestation, lifespan, etc.) may have been suggested by the historian. Ctesias may be the source, too, of the fable criticised by Aristotle that the elephant cannot bend its legs (*HA* 2.1.498a8; cf. *IA* 9.709a10). But this, although commonly believed,[36] is uncertain. At any rate we should also bear in mind that there may have been some confusions, but that many of his claims about the elephant are quite correct.

OTHER POSSIBLE SOURCES

But if Ctesias is Aristotle's authority for some details, other pieces of information come from elsewhere. The measures, for exam-

[32] Fortifications were sometimes of wood; cf. Megasthenes 715 F 17 (Arr. *Ind.* 10.3), and on Palimbothra F 18a (Arr. *Ind.* 10.5) and F 18b (Strabo 15.1.36). The walls of Palimbothra are known from excavation: see Hinüber, *Arrian* 1114, on *Ind.* 10.5.

[33] Kangle, *Arthaśastra* II 10.4.14. Some of the material in this work probably belongs to the period of Chandragupta; see Karttunen, *India* 146–47. For other Indian sources see Goukowsky, "Pôros" 475, and Karttunen, "Reliability" 106.

[34] They uproot trees with their trunks in *PA* 2.16.659a1 and *HA* 2.1.497b29; in *HA* 9.1.610a22 (φοίνικας) they use their foreheads and then their feet (the slight inconsistency may be due to the selecting of different details from the original; for discrepancies in Aristotle's account see below, nn. 40–41 with related discussion). In the same passage they use their tusks to destroy fortifications. As noted above (n. 28), what Ctesias said is not entirely clear.

[35] Later a popular topic; cf. Nearchus 133 F 22 (Strabo 15.1.43) and Megasthenes 715 Ff 20a (Arr. *Ind.* 13.1–14.3), 20b (Strabo 15.1.42).

[36] E.g., by Wellmann, "Elefant" 2249.

ple, in the description of what elephants eat and drink (*HA* 8.9.596a3), appear nowhere else in Aristotle's writings and occur in a combination that does not sound like Ctesias.[37] The historian might of course have referred to the *maris*, which is a Persian liquid measure.[38] However, the *medimnos* and the *metretes*, which are both described as Macedonian,[39] indicate a later source.

In addition to the unusual measures, there are one or two inconsistencies in what Aristotle relates. In the passage just mentioned we hear about wheat and wine. But these details do not harmonise well with a statement in *De Partibus Animalium* 2.16.659a3 which appears to claim (erroneously) that the animal gets much of its food from water. The second passage refers to the elephant in the wild, whereas the first concerns the animal in captivity, and this may explain the divergence. However, there are also inconsistent statements about such matters as the age at which the elephant starts to breed. According to *Historia Animalium* 6.27.578a17 this is before the age of twenty;[40] according to an earlier comment (*HA* 5.14.546b7), it is when the female is between ten and fifteen and the male is five or six.[41]

The discrepancies are minor but may be a further indication that Aristotle consulted an authority or authorities in addition to Ctesias,[42] and it is worthwhile looking at possible candidates. One, the Athenian physician Mnesitheus, is a problematic figure, but should at least be mentioned here.[43] Galen criticised him for claiming that the elephant had no gall bladder (II 569 Kühn = F 52), a claim also made by Aristotle (*HA* 2.15.506b1). Moreover, Mnesitheus and Aristotle were right and Galen, although he had dissected an elephant, was wrong. However, we

[37]Ctesias is also a very unlikely source for the statements in *Cael.* 2.14.298a9, discussed below (see n. 53 and related discussion).

[38]See Bivar, "Achaemenid Measures" 633–34, and Lewis, "Polyaenus" 86. It first occurs in Greek in a tablet from Persepolis dated ca. 500 B.C.; see Lewis, *Sparta* 12–13.

[39]They are otherwise unknown. We may note that in one passage of Ctesias (F 45.46, p. 508; Phot.) reference is made to Athenian *kotulai*.

[40]Reading πρὸ τῶν εἴκοσι with manuscripts P and D and Rose.

[41]A slight discrepancy was noted above (n. 34). Some discrepancies in numbers may involve copyists' errors: e.g., *HA* 5.14.546b11 (cf. *GA* 4.10.777b15) gives the period of gestation as two years; *HA* 6.27.578a19 as one year six months according to some, three years according to others (Rose reads δύο here).

[42]They could also be an indication, as Lloyd suggests (*Magic* 212), of multiple authorship, inauthentic material, etc.

[43]Bertier, *Mnésithée*, has collected and discussed the fragments (I follow her numbering).

do not know what else Mnesitheus had to say about the elephant, and we do not know exactly when he lived. Some scholars have dated him after Aristotle, but the evidence points rather to the middle of the fourth century or a little later.[44] In fact, as Scullard has suggested,[45] he could be a source for Aristotle, though we cannot be certain of this. We should also note that there is no evidence that Mnesitheus' claim about the elephant's gall bladder (or of course Aristotle's) means that he personally carried out or witnessed a dissection.[46] It could very well be based on secondhand information, perhaps even supplied by Ctesias, though other possibilities must be considered.[47]

When we turn to another doctor, Eudoxus of Cnidus (ca. 391–ca. 342), we are on somewhat firmer ground, for despite all the uncertainties of his career, he was at least well known to Aristotle.[48] An associate for a time of Plato and of the Academy, and an eminent mathematician and astronomer, he had spent some months in Egypt and was, in addition, a geographer. Only the most meagre remnants survive of any of his writings, among them the *Periodos gēs*.[49] However, this last was clearly a work of substantial size (seven books) and one which included, like other descriptive geographies, the fauna of the areas described, particularly unusual creatures.[50] Moreover, India was treated in the work,

[44] Wellmann, "Elefant" 2250, dates him ca. 300; Jaeger, *Diokles* 226, to around 300 at the earliest. Bertier, *Mnésithée* 144–47, put him in the mid–fourth century (cf. Harig and Kollesch, "Diokles"). But she is not certain whether his zoological observations influenced, or were influenced by, Aristotle.

[45] Scullard, *Elephant* 52.

[46] As suggested by Wellmann, "Elefant" 2250, who also believed, as noted above (n. 2), that Aristotle's knowledge depended on dissection. On dissection before Aristotle and on Aristotle's use of it see Lloyd, *Magic* 156–65.

[47] Aristotle's comments at *HA* 2.15.506b1 certainly show that someone dissected or carefully inspected an elephant's carcass. For Ctesias' interest in which animals possessed a gall bladder and which did not see F 45.45 and F 45q (Ael. *NA* 4.52). When Mnesitheus refers in F 39 (Oribas. II 68) to what those who have wandered through Asia say about the flesh of the wild ass, he surely alludes to Xenophon (cf. *Anab.* 1.5.2) and not to Ctesias, as Deichgräber, "Mnesitheos" 2283, suggests.

[48] For his career in general and for the problem of his dates see Lasserre, *Eudoxos* 137–39.

[49] Lasserre, *Eudoxos*, has collected and commented on all the fragments (my references follow his numbering). For the fragments of the *Periodos* see also Gisinger, *Eudoxos*.

[50] F 318, F 329, F 331, etc. His sources were no doubt multifarious; for his familiarity with Ctesias' writings cf. Gisinger, *Eudoxos* 17, 19–20, 132, and Jacoby, "Ktesias" 2071–72.

though to what extent we do not know,[51] as well as other eastern parts of the Persian Empire.

Aristotle has clearly been influenced by the geographical ideas of Eudoxus, in addition to his astronomy and mathematics, whether the influence came about through conversations or through reading his works or through both.[52] It has often been thought, for example, that Aristotle refers to Eudoxus when he writes in *De Caelo* 2.14.298a9 of "those who imagine that the region round the Pillars of Hercules joins on to the regions round India, and that in this way the ocean is one."[53] The discussion which precedes this observation and that which follows certainly suggest Eudoxus, for the one deals with the sphericity of the earth, and the other alludes to the mathematicians' measurement of its circumference. Moreover, there is also, it should be noted, a reference to the elephant. Aristotle comments that the proponents of the above view support it by observing that these animals are to be found at both eastern and western extremities of the world. But even if he does not have Eudoxus in mind here, the passage makes it clear that others among Aristotle's informants, besides Ctesias, were interested in the elephant.[54]

A final possible source of information for Aristotle deserves some attention. If we accept that some details about the animal could have been added to *Historia Animalium* in the 330s, we need to consider Aristotle's relative and protégé, the historian Callisthenes.[55] After all, Callisthenes, who accompanied Alexander's Asian expedition and was

[51] F 340 (Pliny *NH* 7.24) refers to Indians of the South. The real southern portions of India are unknown to Greeks of this period. However, despite Karttunen, *India* 101, this is no reason to deny the fragment to Eudoxus of Cnidus. Herodotus had already referred to southern Indians (3.101.2).

[52] For his influence in geography see Gisinger, *Eudoxos* 135; in astronomy, see Lloyd, *Magic* 173. Dugand, "Eudoxe" 122–25, discusses the influence of his Egyptian stay.

[53] Guthrie's translation in *On the Heavens*. For discussion see Friedländer, *Plato* I 114–19; Moraux, *Du ciel* cxxxii; and Lasserre, *Eudoxos* 253. In *Mete*. 2.5.362b28 Aristotle expresses similar ideas in a similar context.

[54] It will be remembered too that Plato's Atlantis boasts many (Critias 114e), such a large and unusual animal being very appropriate to that remarkable island.

[55] Despite Bosworth, "Callisthenes," Chares 125 F 15 (Plut. *Alex*. 55) is good evidence of the closeness of the relationship between the two; cf. Fox, "Theopompus" 112. On the date of *HA* and the possibility that additions were made to the completed work see note 4 above.

present at Gaugamela in 331, must have seen these animals.[56] Darius' forces at this battle included some fifteen Indian elephants (Arr. *Anab.* 3.8.6), although they apparently played no role in the actual fighting.[57] Afterwards they fell into Alexander's hands (Arr. *Anab.* 3.15.4, 6) and were presumably then taken to Babylon. However, nothing is known of their fate: they were probably left in Babylon when Alexander moved on.[58] But they must have aroused the curiosity of all members of the expedition, most of whom before this time would never have set eyes on an elephant, let alone have had to deal with one on the battlefield. They must in addition have aroused the curiosity of Alexander himself, as well as that of all the scientists and intellectuals who accompanied him.

This last-mentioned group included of course Callisthenes, whose wide-ranging interests clearly embraced scientific among other issues. The fragments of his *Hellenica* show that he concerned himself with the reasons for the Nile flood (124 F 12) and with earthquakes and their causes (Ff 19–21). In the latter passage his views, it should be noted, are very much in agreement with those of Aristotle.[59] His book on Alexander included comments on the flora and fauna of the lands through which the expedition passed (cf. F 42 and F 41). Given his interests and his close association with Aristotle, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he provided Aristotle with information about elephants, as no doubt about other matters.[60]

[56]He also knew Ctesias' *Persica*; see Prandi, *Callistene* 84 n. 28, 149 n. 25. On the last events treated in *Deeds of Alexander* see F. Jacoby *FGrHist* 2D, 420–21.

[57]They are included in the document which, according to Aristobulus, contained the Persian order of battle (Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.7 = 139 F 17). If this information is genuine, it suggests that they were to be used in the battle, though nothing is known of their training. According to the *Fragmentum Sabbaiticum* 151 F 1.12–13, they did participate. But this is a late text, dated by Jacoby not before A.D.150 and containing a number of untrustworthy details.

[58]According to Curt. 5.2.10, among the gifts received by Alexander from the governor of Susa were twelve Indian elephants, about which nothing is known. For the many gifts of elephants which Alexander received in India see Scullard, *Elephant* 65–75.

[59]*Mete.* 1.6, 2.8; see Prandi, *Callistene* 42–44. On the general interests shared by Aristotle and Callisthenes see Prandi 14–18.

[60]Cf. Goukowsky, "Pôros" 476. The measures discussed above (nn. 37–39 and related discussion) would be appropriate for Callisthenes. On the statement of the commentator Simplicius in the sixth century A.D. (124 T 3) that Aristotle asked Callisthenes to send him astronomical data from Babylon, see Schiffer, "Aristote et Callisthène." Simplicius here cites Porphyry's claim that Babylonian data had been preserved for 31,000 years, a claim usually regarded as absurd. See, however, the interesting explanation of Burstein, "Callisthenes."

CONCLUSIONS

We shall never know for certain all Aristotle's authorities. Other written accounts, such as the *Periplus* of Damastes at the end of the fifth century, or the *Persica* of Heracleides of Cyme in the middle of the following century, might have supplied details. In addition, information could have been transmitted orally by those who had visited such places as the capitals of the Persian Empire. Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties some conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, Aristotle had access to excellent information on the elephant. What he tells us is drawn from more than one authority, and at least one (Ctesias), though possibly more, was a written source. There is no incontrovertible evidence that he had dissected an elephant himself or had witnessed a dissection. We do not even need to suppose that he had seen an elephant—in a menagerie in Macedon, as one scholar has suggested, or, according to the hypothesis of others, one sent by Alexander after the battle of Gaugamela.[61]

Secondly, there is the question of the type of elephant which Aristotle describes. As we saw earlier, Aristotle was well aware of the existence of elephants in Africa as well as in India. However, he nowhere comments on the differences between the species. Most probably he did not know of any.[62] Indeed it is not clear how much was known in his lifetime about the African animal (the "forest" elephant, not the larger "bush" elephant, being the type familiar to the ancient world).[63] Early references are few and brief. Herodotus, for example, knows of elephants both in Ethiopia (3.114; cf. 3.97.3) and in the Atlas region (4.191), but has nothing to report of them. The latter, apart from Aristotle's allusion, receive a mention from the Carthaginian Hanno, though again it is a bare mention.[64] In addition we hear a little about trade in elephant products. The fifth-century comic poet Hermippus comments on Libya as a provider of ivory (*PCG* 5 F 63 line 15). In Pseudo-Scylax (*GGM* 1 § 112) in the following century there are references to trade in elephant skins and tusks.

These meagre allusions tell us nothing about how well the African

[61] For the first suggestion see Preus, *Science* 38; for the second see Keller, *Tierwelt* I 374, and Scullard, *Elephant* 65.

[62] Cf. the arguments of Romm, "Aristotle's Elephant" 573–74.

[63] See Scullard, *Elephant* 23–24.

[64] Hanno *Periplus* (sect. 4) *GGM* I. Hanno's voyage probably belongs to the early fifth century, even if the Greek text is much later; see Ramin, *Hannon* 4–5.

elephant was known. Nor does Onesicritus' assertion (which is in fact correct) that the Indian elephant is larger and stronger than its African ("forest") counterpart necessarily mean that he had good knowledge of both species, or that good knowledge was available.[65] It might be evidence only of his desire to portray India as a land where everything is bigger and better than elsewhere.[66]

As for Aristotle's account, while it is not impossible that some of the details originate in descriptions of the African elephant,[67] much of what he says clearly relates to the Indian animal. Ctesias certainly wrote about Indian elephants, as did Callisthenes, if he is accepted as an additional authority.[68] Besides, a great deal of Aristotle's description is of the domesticated animal. There is a reference to the trainer in *Historia Animalium* 2.1.497b28. In addition, Aristotle comments on the diet (*HA* 8.9.596a3) and on the diseases of elephants in captivity (*HA* 8.26.605a23), and on their temperament and the functions which they can be trained to perform (*HA* 9.46.630b18), including their use in war and in the hunting of wild elephants (*HA* 9.1.610a15). Such details point to the Indian elephant.[69] There is no secure evidence for the domestication of the African elephant before about 280 or a little earlier, when Ptolemy II, cut off from the supply of Indian elephants, first became seriously interested in the capture and training of the African variety.[70] In any case, in two passages (*HA* 6.18.571b33, 9.1.610a19) Aristotle re-

[65] Strabo 15.1.43 (134 F 14), who notes that others too made this claim; cf. Diod. 2.35.4 and 2.42.1 (Megasthenes 715 F 4), Diod. 2.16.4 (cf. note 31 above), and Curt. 8.9.17. On the relative sizes of the two species see Scullard, *Elephant* 60–63.

[66] Comparison of African and Indian elephants (*pace* Romm, "Aristotle's Elephant" 574–75) would have been difficult much before ca. 280 B.C. (see below, n. 70 and related discussion). Onesicritus' book was surely written before 310; see Jacoby *FGrHist* 2D 469.

[67] Did Eudoxus, who spent some time in Egypt (see above), and whose geography presumably included Ethiopia (cf. F 287) as well as Libya (cf. Ff 322–23) and India, have detailed information about African elephants?

[68] It is not of course impossible that Ctesias, or indeed any of the authors discussed above, made some reference to African elephants.

[69] As does the Persian measure in *HA* 8.9.596a7 (cf. n. 38).

[70] On the hunting expeditions to Ethiopia sent by Ptolemy II and his successors see Scullard, *Elephant* 126–33, and Desanges, *Recherches* 252–302. Despite Rice, *Grand Procession* 92, the domestication of the elephant in Meroë seems to have been learned from the Ptolemies; see Desanges, "Chasseurs d'éléphants" 34, and cf. Hofmann and Tomandl, *Bedeutung des Tieres* 165.

fers specifically to the inhabitants of India.[71] His description, and there can be no doubt of this, on the whole applies to the Indian, not to the African animal.

A third and final conclusion concerns the approximate date at which the material which we have been discussing was incorporated into *Historia Animalium*. As with Aristotle's Indian information in general, there is no good evidence that anything that he reports about elephants comes from the Indian portion of Alexander's campaigns, or indeed that any of it has been inserted posthumously. There are, it is true, one or two pieces of information which remind one of Onesicritus or of Nearchus. However, such resemblances deceive. As we saw above, very similar details are already to be found in Ctesias' account.[72] Moreover, there are also, it should be noted, one or two details which suggest an early date of composition rather than a late one. For example, in *Historia Animalium* 9.46.630b29 elephants are said to be unable to swim (cf. *PA* 2.16.659a13, where the same is implied). Nearchus, however, who knows that they can,[73] is better informed (133 F 22 = Strabo 15.1.43). In addition, as already noted, we find no trace in Aristotle of the view that the Indian elephant is bigger than the African one. Yet from the time of Onesicritus onwards this was a common view.[74]

In short, if *Historia Animalium* is imagined to be a "file," to which additions were continually being made in Aristotle's lifetime,[75] it should be noted that nothing has been added about elephants or about India from the information made available by the events of the 320s. Alexander's Indian expedition may have revolutionised Greek knowledge of

[71] The king in *HA* 9.46.630b20 is surely the Indian, not the Persian king, as suggested by Louis, "Domestication des animaux" 192. At least this is what Aelian (*NA* 13.22), who bases himself on Aristotle, believed.

[72] On the elephants' tearing down walls and trees cf. above, nn. 28, 32, and 34 and related discussion; on the hunting of elephants cf. n. 35. Other seeming reminiscences may also come from Ctesias, such as the animal's alleged lifespan of two hundred or three hundred years (much too high) found in *HA* 8.9.596a12 and in Onesicritus 134 F 14 (Strabo 15.1.43).

[73] See Sikes, *African Elephant* 273–74.

[74] Such details obviously have some relevance to the debate over which parts of *HA* are genuine. It should be noted that *HA* 9.46, in a part of the work often thought to be spurious, contains information which is old-fashioned in comparison with the reports of Alexander's companions.

[75] As is supposed, for example, by Peck, *Historia Animalium* I lix; Balme, "Biology" 17; and Rist, *Mind of Aristotle* 16, 214.

the East. However, there is no trace of this in Aristotle's zoological writings.

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NOTE SUR LE SENS DE *CARPO* DANS LUCILIUS, FRAGMENT 828 (KRENKEL)

Le texte du fragment 828 de Lucilius, tel qu'il a été établi par W. Krenkel, est le suivant:

hiemem unam quamque carpam

Ce passage du livre 29 des *Satires,* parvenu jusqu'à nous par l'intermédiaire de Nonius,[1] est une réflexion sur l'hiver. Le caractère succinct de l'extrait rend son exégèse malaisée. Le groupe cité par le grammairien est habituellement analysé comme un tout autonome et la forme *carpam,* comme un subjonctif présent à valeur optative.[2] La signification de la proposition n'en demeure pas moins ambiguë. Dans son édition, W. Krenkel traduit par: "jeden Winter lass mich geniessen."[3] E. H. Warmington comprend: "Let me pluck each winter's fruits."[4] Les traductions de ces deux critiques, qui donnent au verbe *carpere* le sens de "cueillir, goûter, profiter de," s'expliquent par un souvenir du *carpe diem* horatien.[5] Une telle interprétation offre l'avantage de reprendre un thème figurant dans l'*unique* autre fragment lucilien susceptible d'éclairer la manière dont le satiriste concevait la saison:[6]

[1] Lindsay, *Nonius* I 381. Au lieu de *hiemem* Marx (*Reliquiae* II 304) lit *hieme*: "ita ut spectetur fabula de formica quam exemplo proposuit lib. xix u. 561 seq." Rien n'impose cette correction, qu'ont écartée Warmington, Krenkel, et Charpin.

[2] On pourrait aussi voir dans ce fragment une partie de proposition subordonnée; d'autre part, *carpam* pourrait être un indicatif futur simple.

[3] Krenkel, *Satiren* II 455; il n'est nullement indispensable de considérer avec lui que "*Hiems* steht wohl für *annus* oder *tempus*."

[4] Warmington, *Remains* III 283.

[5] Hor. *Car.* 1.11.8, *carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero.* Sur cette métaphore, voir en particulier West, *Reading Horace* 58–64. Pour ce sens de *carpo* cf. également Verg. *G.* 3.435, *mollis . . . carpere somnos*: "goûter un doux sommeil."

[6] Le fr. 1318 (Krenkel, *ti tibernacu*) est difficilement utilisable; la reconstruction de Marx (*Reliquiae* I 89, ⟨*subierem largam nac*⟩*ti hibernacu*⟨*la ponunt*⟩) n'est qu'une possibilité parmi d'autres. On peut seulement affirmer qu'il était question dans le morceau de "baraquements d'hiver" (*hibernacula*). Quant au fr. 646 (Krenkel), *Pars difflatur uento, pars autem obrigescit frigore,* il évoque les gelées, hivernales ou non (voir le commentaire de Marx II 243; cf. un morceau analogue chez Lucr. 5.213–17, sp. 216, "gelées printanières").

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Sic tu illos fructus quaeras, aduersa hieme olim
Quis uti possis ac delectare domi te (564–65 Krenkel)

Ce thème est l'incitation à jouir des aspects plaisants de l'hiver (cf. *fructus quaeras,* 564; *uti . . . ac delectare domi,* 565).

Cependant, il est impossible de faire abstraction du commentaire de Nonius, qui introduit ainsi le fragment 828: *Carpere, celeriter praeterire.* Or, sous la même rubrique du *De compendiosa doctrina,* le grammairien mentionne deux autres exemples, empruntés aux *Géorgiques,* où *carpere* signifie indéniablement "traverser rapidement, parcourir": *carpere prata fuga* (Verg. *G.* 3.142, "parcourir les prés en fuyant," i.e., "fuir au galop à travers les prés," à propos de génisses) et *carpere . . . gyrum* (*G.* 3.191, "parcourir," i.e., "exécuter des voltes," à propos de poulains).[7] Dès lors, il n'apparaît pas justifié de mettre en doute son affirmation concernant le passage de Lucilius.

Dans sa récente édition du livre 29, F. Charpin semble s'en être avisé, puisqu'il rend le fragment par: "pour moi chaque hiver passera vite."[8] Toutefois, cette traduction s'éloigne de la lettre du texte—je présume que l'éditeur français analyse *carpam* comme un futur—et implique à nouveau que *carpere* soit chargé d'une connotation positive analogue à celle qu'il revêt dans le *carpe diem* horatien.[9] Or celle-ci est absente des autres morceaux où *carpere* signifie *celeriter praeterire.* Je suggère plutôt, en admettant avec Krenkel et Warmington que *carpam* est un subjonctif optatif, d'entendre le texte ainsi: "je voudrais traverser rapidement chaque hiver," autrement dit: "je voudrais en venir vite à bout de chaque hiver." A supposer que la première personne (*carpam*) représente le poète lui-même, ce qui n'est pas impossible,[10] une telle assertion n'est pas en désaccord avec l'opinion exprimée en 564–65 (Krenkel): sa conception plutôt sereine de l'hiver n'empêche pas le

[7]Pour cette signification de *carpo* cf. aussi Verg. *G.* 3.347, *uiam . . . carpit* = "parcourir la route," et Hor. *Car.* 2.17.11–12, *supremum / carpere iter* = "faire le dernier voyage."

[8]Charpin, *Lucilius* III 33.

[9]Cf. le commentaire de Charpin, *Lucilius* III 195.

[10]Charpin (*Lucilius* III 195) pense que "les propos sont tenus par un personnage qui, tel Syrus dans Térence (*Ad.* 590), s'organise pour profiter de l'existence . . . ," mais reconnaît lui-même que, dans les fragments en sénaires iambiques du livre 29, "selon les contextes, les pronoms des deux premières personnes du singulier peuvent désigner mari et femme, femme et amant, Lucilius et un ami, le philosophe et un disciple" (10).

satiriste d'y voir une source de difficultés potentielles (*aduersa hieme*, 564). Pour lui, la saison est un mauvais moment que quelques opportunités, si on veut les saisir, aident à mieux franchir.

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THE *SENTENTIA* IN *RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM*: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RHETORIC

in memoriam Stuart G. P. Small,
Northwestern University

Rhetoric at Rome was not only a means of persuasion, it was also an opportunity for self–invention for the would–be statesman, for the newcomer who could convincingly "speak the language" of his social superiors, who could incorporate the general views and opinions that were canonical to their class, who could successfully reproduce their patterns of speech and language, who, in short, could "act out" their own image of themselves. Such a man was a long way towards obscuring and overcoming whatever social disadvantages might hold him back. This rhetorical strategy is seldom discussed by modern philologists,[1] but it can be seen in the treatment of the *sententia* (the maxim or precept) in *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* especially in its most explicit prescription for the use of *sententiae*: *Sententias interponi raro convenit, ut rei actores, non vivendi praeceptores videamur esse* (4.25), "It is best to insert maxims discreetly, that we may be viewed as judicial advocates, not moral instructors."[2] This piece of advice is not just a call for moderation in the use of a rhetorical figure. When seen against the background of the general treatment of the *sententia* in this treatise, it suggests quite candidly that success in oratory depends on how successfully one is "viewed" as fulfilling the conventional role of a Roman advocate.

[1] For a more detailed and expansive discussion of this function of rhetoric at Rome see *The Sententious Historian: A Sociology of Rhetoric in Tacitus' Annales 1–6* (forthcoming from The Pennsylvania State University Press).

[2] Throughout I cite Achard's text, which I question in only two of the passages discussed here: see notes 37 and 47 below. Latin orthography has been regularized, and all translations are my own.

From first to last *Rhetorica ad Herennium* presents puzzling questions to literary historians. On the most basic level, neither the author nor his addressee has been identified with certainty. For convenience' sake (and since it is not the purpose of this paper to resolve every problem *Ad Herennium* presents), I simply refer to the author as "the Auctor" and follow the general consensus in dating the work to between 86 and 82 B.C. (the most recent discussion of the authorship and dating is that of Achard, v–xxxiv; see also Kennedy 111–13, 126–38).

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The Auctor's pragmatic view of rhetoric actually eschews the moral and philosophical dimension of oratory that Cato had asserted in his definition of the orator as a *vir bonus dicendi peritus* and that Cicero would soon try to promote.[3] But the rhetoricians' ongoing debate about the relation between rhetoric and philosophy is not the foremost lesson in the Auctor's advice about the *sententia*. He is more concerned with admonishing his reader not to appear to overstep the bounds of social propriety by seeming to dictate morality or by exhibiting too much enthusiasm for philosophy. For this reason it is significant that his examples of *sententiae* draw upon the formal aspects of generally accepted and objectified statements of Roman morality, especially the laws, rather than being original formulations of his own personal code of moral beliefs.[4] The Auctor assumes he does not need to explain, or reiterate, for his reader his view of rhetoric in general and its place within the code of the social elite; and this shared understanding exempts him in his treatment of the *sententia* from having to make any overt reference like Aristotle's recommendation that "one should conjecture what the listeners' presuppositions happen to be, in order to generalize about them" (*Rh.* 2.21.15). The Auctor's treatment of the *sententia* brooks no scruples about sincerity; rather, it provides an ideal *"in nuce"* model for the rhetorical strategy of a practical-minded Roman with a career to make in the Sullan period. Such an analysis of what might be called "the sociology of rhetoric" in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* has previously been totally neglected, although it is one of the most fascinating aspects of the treatise. In general, the work is not today one of the more highly regarded of the ancient rhetorical handbooks, and although its treatment of the *sententia* is not one to which modern scholars would turn first for a full analysis of its use (rather than to Quint. *Inst.* 8.5, or to Arist. *Rh.* 2.21 on the γνώμη), a thorough examination of the brief references to the *sententia* scattered throughout *Ad Herennium* and of the discussion of its forms at 4.24–25 can

[3] Contrast Crassus' statement at *De Or.* 3.57: *vetus quidem illa doctrina eadem videtur et recte faciendi et bene dicendi magistra; neque diiuncti doctores, sed idem erant vivendi praeceptores atque dicendi.* And cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.42, 12.2.6.

[4] The risks at stake are made evident in Cicero's parody of Cato the Younger's *severitas* at *Mur.* 61–62, where he accuses Cato of studying Stoic precepts not just to be able to incorporate them into a speech, but actually to try to enforce them in his daily life. See especially at 62: *hoc* [sc. *Zenonis stoici sententias et praecepta*] *homo ingeniosissimus, M. Cato, auctoribus eruditissimis inductus adripuit, neque disputandi causa ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi.*

deepen our understanding both of the rhetorical device and of the nature of this generally problematic treatise itself.

Before we turn directly to the Auctor's discussion of the *sententia* at 4.24–25, we should first try to assess his work's general orientation and the social and literary values that inform it. In this way we can see that the Auctor's conception of the *sententia* and its function was determined by the exclusive ethos of the elite, educated ruling order.[5] Although the Auctor's precise age is unknown, it is clear he is a mature and well-educated Roman citizen.[6] A request for instruction from a relative named C. Herennius has prompted him to set down precepts on rhetoric (1.1, 4.69). The tone of the Auctor's address to Herennius is uniformly one of respect, but there is also an easy familiarity, reflecting his confidence that they share views about the code of Roman public life and the function of rhetoric within it.[7] These views are expressed both in the Auctor's pragmatic orientation and in his somewhat unscrupulous sense of how one lives up to patrician society's image of itself. The Auctor's main interest is in judicial oratory, the arena in which a well-born and well-connected Roman could win the sort of distinction and form the sort of alliances necessary for realizing his social and political ambitions. At one point (3.3) he mentions—with an ironical wink—some of the skills such ambitions require: the art of bribery, for instance, and the related arts of enticement, dissimulation, dispatch, and betrayal. All these topics he may write about someday in a more appropriate context, like a work "On Generalship" or "On Statesmanship"![8]

In addition to these practical subjects, the Auctor twice expresses his interest in philosophy (1.1, 4.69); and many of the examples he

[5] *Rhet. Her.* is ostensibly addressed to C. Herennius alone, but the Auctor also envisions a wider readership (3.29). Cf. Achard, xiii.

[6] On the Auctor's social status see Marx 75: *rhetor minime erat sed homo non nobili ille quidem sed honesto loco natus qui ea qua solebant aetate rhetoris schola usus erat.* Cf. Caplan, xxi–xxii, and Achard, xxii, xxvi–xxviii, and xxxi–xxxii.

[7] See especially the concluding paragraphs of the treatise (4.69). Achard, xxx–xxxii, entertains the attractive notion that the Auctor may be somewhat inferior to Herennius socially and that *Rhet. Her.* may be intended to fulfill an obligation the Auctor has incurred.

[8] *Rhet. Her.* 3.3: *Dolus consumitur in pecunia, pollicitatione, dissimulatione, maturatione men⟨ti⟩tione et ceteris rebus de quibus magis idoneo tempore loquemur si quando de re militari aut de administratione rei p. scribere velimus.* I see more wit in this remark than others have (e.g., Calboli, *Cornifici Rhetorica* 258 n. 8; Achard, xxvi–xxx).

furnishes for his rhetorical precepts do in fact exhibit a wide-ranging acquaintance with some fundamental tenets of various philosophical schools. But although one might well sense a strong whiff of pretension in the Auctor's intellectual claims,[9] at the same time he is also rather cautious about taking up any strong philosophical stance. While he does not commit the blunder of subordinating rhetoric to a single philosophical doctrine, he also does not attempt to integrate his philosophical and rhetorical interests: he makes no effort to find any deeper or more comprehensive foundation for rhetoric in philosophy, as Aristotle did before him and Cicero does after him. It is in this context of the Roman elite's paradoxical and often ostentatiously hostile attitude towards philosophy that the Auctor's discussion of the *sententia* should be seen. His is the earliest extant treatise in which the Latin word *sententia* is used as a specialized rhetorical term, a usage that afterwards (as is well known) became common in the later first century B.C. and throughout the early Empire. But for the Auctor the word *sententia* has not yet developed a technical sense exclusive to rhetoric; it is an ethical generalization, a maxim, a precept, such as the Romans associated primarily with Hellenic philosophy.[10] Starting from the time of the Romans' initial contact with Greek philosophy and rhetoric, their attitude towards such philosophical *sententiae* and the men who mouthed them had taken on a definitely negative, disdainful cast.[11] A fragment of Pacuvius bluntly states, *Odi ego homines ignava opera et philosopha sententia* (*Trag.* 348 Ribbeck[3] = *Antiopa* frag. 11 Warmington, *ROL* 2.164).[12] It is against this background of antiphilosophical and anti-

[9]Cf. Clarke 14. Cicero says the maxims in his speeches attest to his own philosophical interests (*Nat. D.* 1.6).

[10]See Morillon 409–13.

[11]On the general topic of Roman attitudes towards intellectual life cf. Gruen's final two chapters, "Plautus and the Public Stage" (124–57) and "Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Roman Anxieties" (158–92).

[12]Cf. Plaut. *Curc.* 288–91 (a diatribe of Curculio): *Tum isti Graeci palliati . . . qui . . . incedunt . . . cum suis sententiis. . . .* Gruen (155–56) has a good socio-historical analysis of these lines, to which I would only add that the literary background can be fleshed out a little more. For Plautus the philosophical *sententia* is a familiar enough concept that he can use it to stigmatize and lampoon Greek "philosophy mongers" in general, just as Aristophanes had used the sophists' penchant for "waxing gnomic" to satirize them as a group. Aristophanes parodies the trained orator who overexerts himself in the use of maxims by bestowing upon him the epithet "maxim-forming" (γνωμοτύπος, *Nub.* 952; *Ran.* 877; cf. the verb γνωμοτυπέω at *Thesm.* 55) or, drawing an even more deadly bead and turning the sophists' penchant for abstract terms back on them,

intellectual posturing among the educated elite (cf. Cicero in note 4 above) that we should set the Auctor's cautionary precept for using *sententiae* only with discretion, "that we may be viewed as judicial advocates, not moral instructors" (4.25).

In general, such caginess is characteristic of the Auctor. He does not even give a fair account of his intellectual qualifications in rhetoric, the field in which he claims expertise. Although his theoretical understanding of rhetoric relies heavily on Hellenistic teaching (which he presumably learned from his studies with the person he refers to at 1.18 as *noster doctor*),[13] he repeatedly—and at times quite insistently—distances his own approach from that of his Greek predecessors, whom he does not even name. Of his two most important Greek forerunners whose treatments of the γνώμη are still extant today, Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.21) and the sophist Anaximenes (*Rh. Al.* 11), the Auctor's general attitude toward rhetoric is closer to the more "goal–driven" spirit that animates and motivates the sophist.[14] The portrait of the Auctor that emerges from *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is that of a man spurred mainly by social ambition and proudly self–reliant, in short, a late Republican *novus homo*.[15]

In keeping with his pragmatic outlook, the Auctor defines the aim

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"maxim–formative" (γνωμοτυπικός, *Eq.* 1379). The Greek comic poet belittles the maxims of this paragon of urbanity with the diminutive noun γνωμίδιον (*Eq.* 100, *Nub.* 321; cf. Latin *sententiola*, Cic. *Phil.* 3.21, Petron. *Sat.* 118.2, Quint. *Inst.* 5.13.37, 9.2.98, 11.1.52, 12.10.73; Gell. *NA* 9.16.7, 17.12.3). This literary background should perhaps be considered in connection with Csapo's analysis of "Roman Cultural Phenomena" (pp. 150–54) in the *Curculio* passage.

[13] As Caplan says (vii), the Auctor "gives us a Greek art in Latin dress, combining Roman spirit with Greek doctrine" (see further Caplan, xv–xvi and xxii–xxiv; cf. Kennedy 112). For discussion of various conjectures about the identity of the Auctor's teacher see Kennedy 128–29; Achard, xxiii–xxv and 229–33.

[14] Depending on when one dates Demetr. *Eloc.*, one might also compare sections 9 and 106–11 on the γνώμη and ἐπιφώνημα in that work. Calboli, *Cornifici Rhetorica* 328 n. 112, points out the correspondence between the Auctor's warning against using too many *sententiae* (quoted in my first paragraph above) and that of Demetr. *Eloc.* 9. See further note 30 below.

[15] Cf. Achard li: "Bref il a rédigé un manuel facile à comprendre, à exploiter—en particulier pour les jeunes Romains ignorants de la langue grecque. Ces Romains étant souvent de modestes chevaliers, il est sûr que la rédaction de l'ouvrage a comporté une visée politique. L'auteur a voulu fourbir des armes pour les *homines novi*." Cf. Marrou 252–53 and Clarke 14. On the values and aims of "new men" in Rome in the second and first centuries B.C. see Earl 44–58. Achard, xxvi–xxviii, argues for the Auctor's senatorial status.

of his handbook entirely according to the standards and values of the Roman senatorial order, emphasizing ethical qualities that inform the ideal of the urbane Roman statesman, namely, *gravitas, dignitas,* and *suavitas* (4.69): "a sound and imposing stateliness, nobility, and good taste." These are the criteria by which he evaluates the usefulness of the different stylistic figures in his fourth book, and they recur frequently as the very aim of rhetorical study and practice. Writing or speaking that lacks these qualities is mere *vulgaris sermo* (4.69), "commonplace language." *Gravitas, dignitas,* and *suavitas* are not to be interpreted exclusively in an aesthetic sense. *Dignitas* is a catchword in the Auctor's vocabulary, and it serves as his preferred term for stylistic adornment in general (4.18). Whether he is using *dignitas* in its generalized sense or as a specialized rhetorical term, it has indelible ethical and social connotations.[16] No other single term so comprehensively sums up the public self-image of the aristocratic class at Rome, that self-image by which aristocrats distinguished themselves from their social inferiors.[17] The Auctor's emphasis on *gravitas, dignitas,* and *suavitas* cannot be forgotten in discussing his precepts for the use of *sententiae,* since these ideals are fundamental to his notions about rhetoric in general.

In book 4, for example, where the Auctor supplies precepts on *elocutio* ("style"), he raises the subject of *sententiae* even before he begins his precepts proper for *dignitas* ("nobility of style," 4.18–69).[18] His preface (4.1–10) displays his self-consciously "Roman" side. There he indulges in a lengthy and vehement repudiation of the Greek rhetoricians' practice of illustrating stylistic precepts with quotations from others, rather than composing examples of their own, as he himself claims to do. In the midst of his diatribe the Auctor derides precisely that sort of writer who fancies himself refined and urbane because he can smoothly cull *sententiae* from Ennius (4.6–7). It seems that quoting Ennius' maxims was popular among the Auctor's contemporaries.[19]

[16] Rather than a "charged" term like the Auctor's *dignitas,* Cicero prefers *ornatus.* But even in a word as apparently lacking in overt ethical and political connotations as *ornatus* social values are inextricably tied up with stylistics and semantics (see Fantham 166–67; cf. Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics* 165–67). Wegehaupt (65–68) discusses *dignitas* in the terminology of Republican rhetorical treatises (cf. Hellegouarc'h 390).

[17] See Earl 31.

[18] On the organization of book 4 see Kennedy 118–21 and the outlines of Caplan, liv–lviii, and Calboli, *Cornifici Rhetorica* 68–74.

[19] Cf. Jocelyn, *Tragedies of Ennius* 52 (on *sententiae* in Ennius' tragedies in general see pp. 306, 347).

However, according to the Auctor it is the ability to compose one's own *sententiae* that is the mark of a writer who is truly *eruditus* ("cultivated"). If you resort merely to quoting another man's *sententiae,* you may think that you are *litteratissimus* ("consummately well-bred") and that "you have acquitted yourself with the utmost sophistication" (*si . . . artificiossime te fecisse putes*), but you are really *rudis* ("uncultivated") and *ineptus* ("unsophisticated," "foolish"). These criteria clearly display the contrast between "urbanity" and "rusticity" in style that pervades Greek and Roman literature, but scholars all too often overlook the fact that this literary distinction is based on sharply drawn lines of social class.[20] For the Auctor it is above all training (to which only men of the privileged upper orders at Rome have access) that enables a speaker or writer to display his intellectual superiority and hence achieve social dominance.[21] The conviction with which the Auctor puts forth his views reflects the social and political "stakes" involved for a man active in judicial oratory at Rome. Beyond the aims of a given legal case, an orator's social and political vitality is secured by his capacity for making an eloquent and forceful point, and by creating a dignified general impression. Most important of all, he should not appear to be *rudis* or, even worse, *ineptus*. To make oneself the object of mockery, derision, or ridicule is to risk forfeiting one's claim to being a man of political substance and consequence (again, see, e.g., Cicero's parody of Cato quoted in note 4 above).

In order for C. Herennius to present himself in public oratory as a preeminent member of the highly educated, urbane, and sophisticated social elite, the Auctor supplies him with the necessary rhetorical guidelines to promote that image. By insisting upon supplying his own original examples the Auctor is himself "teaching by doing." While many of the examples the Auctor uses are identifiable as adaptations from other orators, writers, and the general tradition of declamatory education, his insistence on a speaker's originality is not for that reason

[20] See Winterbottom, reviewing Ramage's *Urbanitas* (52): "*Urbanitas* was the code of attitudes and behaviour employed by the sophisticated ancient to make the outsider feel small."

[21] By emphasizing "training" I do not mean to imply that the Auctor does not put any store by natural talent and the careful observance of models. At 1.3 he cites the three conventional requirements of successful oratory: *ars, imitatio,* and *exercitatio.* Training and practice develop the first two factors. Cf. Brink, *Prolegomena* 255–57, and *The "Ars Poetica"* 75–76, 115–16, 121–22.

fraudulent, as some scholars have maintained.[22] The Auctor does not expect a Roman reader to cry foul if he catches the echo of another Greek or Roman orator or writer, or if he identifies notions common to the tradition of declamatory education.[23] Rather, the Auctor anticipates winning the reader's admiration with his ability to inject new life and vigor into a cliché or a familiar notion.[24] In fact, this sort of "creative quotation" is intended to demonstrate the soundness of his education and the integrity of his social and ethical values. The Auctor thereby reinforces his connections with the reader by implying that both are thoroughly erudite—that they are essentially "graduates of the same school." Actually, the "lesson" the Auctor teaches his reader through his "reinvention" of illustrations for his precepts on rhetoric is one of the most important in his handbook. His habit of molding generally acknowledged notions and the phrases of others to suit his own purposes and tacitly claiming these rephrasings as his own is accepted Roman practice. It is evident in his examples of *sententiae*.[25] Indeed, later writers on rhetoric assume that it is standard procedure for a Roman orator to best others by cleverly manipulating general, shared concepts (one thinks above all of Seneca the Elder).[26] In this way an

[22] Kennedy (132–34) documents the scholarship on the problem. Rawson (150) once again insinuates that the Auctor is disingenuous.

[23] Calboli, *Cornifici Rhetorica*, argues that the Auctor's examples were the common coin of the rhetorical tradition and schools of declamation at Rome (in pp. 46–50 he discusses only the relation between the Auctor's examples and his supposed Greek models, but in his notes to book 4 he also discusses Latin models).

[24] As Kennedy observes, (133–34) the Auctor does not quote verbatim but uses his own words in order to outdo his predecessor.

[25] In addition to the parallels for the *sententiae* in 4.24–25 cited in Calboli's commentary, see especially the Auctor's own demonstration of *expolitio* ("expansion upon a given theme") at 4.54–58, where he reworks a single *sententia* into a number of different forms. See Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome* 259–60.

[26] See Bonner, *Roman Declamation* 145. Seneca the Elder's attitude towards orators who "steal" or imitate the *sententiae* of others is not dissimilar from that of the Auctor: cf. Sen. *Controv.* 1 pref. 10, 9.1.12–14, 10.4.23 (see further my "Political Declensions"). For Seneca the Younger it is important that a precept be incorporated among the patterns of each man's own thought (*Ep.* 33.7–8). The literature of Stoic philosophy, which exhibits no "ipse dixit" among its *sententiae*, is his model. To a Stoic, *sententiae* are common property (*Ep.* 33.2, *publicae sunt*), and individuality in the sententious expression of Stoicism's basic tenets is encouraged: *non sumus sub rege: sibi quisque se vindicat* (*Ep.* 33.4). Stoicism affords an easy model, but in fact the method is sound Roman practice, and it is to this habit of the Roman mind that the *aemulatio* of *sententiae* in the

orator not only shows his superior knowledge of society, its standards, and its ways, he also advances his claims to power and prestige. This is the reason why the Auctor repeatedly emphasizes the importance of *exercitatio,* constant "training" or "drilling" in rhetoric.[27]

As was said above, the Auctor's detailed discussion of the *sententia* itself occurs among his precepts on the subject of style. At 4.18 he writes that stylistic *dignitas* ("nobility") can be attained through the use of *verborum exornationes* ("verbal embellishments") and *sententiarum exornationes* ("intellectual embellishments");[28] and at 4.24–25 he classifies the *sententia* among the verbal embellishments. Although the general presentation of style in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* has been criticized as poorly organized and inadequate,[29] this very "disorganization" and "inadequacy" enables us to identify precisely what the Auctor considers of greatest importance for a Roman orator's needs. For the Auctor the Greek rhetorical tradition is accepted convention. But his account of the *sententia* allows us to see his selective use of that tradition. Although he conspicuously does not acknowledge any connection between the *sententia* and the Greek concept of the γνώμη, his definition and discussion in general shows obvious dependence on Greek theory. In fact, he may be tacitly modifying the categorization of the γνώμη as a form of rhetorical proof, ultimately deriving from Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.21), by considering the *sententia* primarily as a means of contributing to stylistic *dignitas* through verbal polish (although his position is not en-

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schools of declamation is to be attributed, rather than to lack of material or lack of ingenuity.

[27] See the illuminating discussion of the imagery of gladiatorial and military combat as it is applied by Cicero and the Auctor to oratory, in Fantham 156–58. The Auctor's orientation among contemporary political factions (i.e., the *populares* and the *optimates*) is a subject much argued in attempts to identify him precisely. It is not in our interests here to get entangled in this complex debate; we may simply note that these political struggles were taking place *within* the ruling orders of the day. Calboli, "Cornificiana II" 103–8, discusses the relation of the Auctor's vocabulary (mainly his use of archaisms and vulgarisms) to his political position in terms similar to those used here.

[28] *Rhet. Her.* 4.18: *Verborum exornatio est quae ipsius sermonis insignita continetur perpolitione. Sententiarum exornatio est quae non in verbis, sed in ipsis rebus quandam habet dignitatem.*

[29] E.g., by Kennedy 118–19; Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics* 166–67; and Leeman 33–34.

tirely unified).[30] The Auctor and rhetoricians who share his pragmatism are more interested in the *sententia* as a means of espousing ethical truisms of the senatorial class than as a tool for genuine debate expressing sincerely held opinions.

At 4.24 the Auctor defines *sententia* as *oratio sumpta de vita quae aut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita breviter ostendit,* "a declaration derived from social behavior, which succinctly presents either what is or what ought to be a fact of life." According to this definition *sententiae* are precepts which take the form of declarative statements that either "typologize" and categorize social conduct (*quid sit in vita . . . ostendit*), or use such types and categories to prescribe correct social behavior (*quid esse oporteat in vita ostendit*).[31] As a declarative statement, the *sententia* defines and advocates the exclusive terms of an accepted ethos, and it does so as a statement of fact.[32] The Auctor's examples use generalized concepts and categories to identify ethical and social values as part of the established aristocratic code. For example, one *sententia* purports to define *liber* ("the free man"); another expounds upon *virtus* as the basis for *omnes bene vivendi rationes* ("all the rules for noble living"); and others succinctly propound various ethical aspects of *amicitia, fortuna,* and *virtus*. At first sight, neither the Auctor's definition and analysis of the *sententia* nor his examples appear very instructive next to the more detailed analyses and advice of Anaximenes and Aristotle. The Auctor mainly preserves from his Greek forebears only

[30] By contrast, for Quintilian, as for Aristotle, the *sententia* is not a rhetorical figure at all. Quintilian argues his point on several occasions, making it most forcefully at 9.1.18, where he clarifies the terminology of Cornelius Celsus (the encyclopedist of Tiberius' reign: see Leeman 238–39 and Kennedy 483–86; cf. Jocelyn, "The New Chapters" 303–5). At 9.2.107 Quintilian corrects a certain Visellius (a Julio–Claudian rhetor [see Rudolph Hanslik, "Visellius 7," *RE* IX A 1 (1961) 361]) and, at 9.3.98, one Cornificius (whom some believe to be in fact our Auctor). On this evidence (as well as Demetr. *Eloc.* 9; see Grube, *Demetrius on Style,* 34–35), the view that the *sententia* is a mere ornament rather than an effective element of argumentation may have been not uncommon prior to Quintilian (*contra* Calboli, *Cornifici Rhetorica* 325). What views Celsus, Visellius, Cornificius, and the Auctor may have shared beyond this one particular point is suggested by Celsus' utterly pragmatic view of oratory in general (Quint. *Inst.* 2.15.32): *non . . . bona conscientia sed victoria litigantis est praemium.* But see Winterbottom, *Problems in Quintilian* 150 (on *Inst.* 9.1.18).

[31] See Lausberg 2.804 (§ 1244 *sententia* II.F.1.a. α and β).

[32] See Lausberg 1.432 (§ 873). The forms of *sententiae* the Auctor describes coincide with what Gross identifies as "the aphorism pure and simple—brief direct statement, A equals B" (ix).

their purely formalistic classification of maxims into two *genera, simplex* and *duplex* (each having in turn two species: *sine ratione,* "without an appended explanation," and *cum ratione,* "with an appended explanation").[33] Unlike Anaximenes and Aristotle, the Auctor does not advise his reader about when it is necessary to bolster a *sententia* with an explanatory reason, nor does he give advice about how one might best utilize *sententiae.* Instead he simply observes that the brevity of a *sententia simplex* which needs no explanatory reason can bestow *magna delectatio* ("considerable appeal") and that, in general, when *sententiae* are used with discernment they add *multum ornamenti* ("much dignity").[34] The Auctor's omission of instructions on the syllogistic use of *sententiae* seems to be a result of his focusing primarily upon creating the impression of *dignitas* rather than upon building an argument.

To judge from the Auctor's examples of *sententiae, dignitas* resides in those which maintain a lofty level of generalization and forcefully and confidently advocate normative standards of moral obligation.[35] That this conception of the *sententia* presupposes a shared, exclusive ethical code is quite clear, for in concluding his discussion the Auctor grounds the use of *sententiae* in a communal moral order: *necesse est . . . conprobet eam tacitus auditor, cum ad causam videat accommodari rem certam, ex vita et moribus sumptam,* "inevitably a listener gives his tacit approval when he sees that an obvious principle derived from social life and human nature is being applied to a case." In fact, this statement is the Auctor's only piece of advice about how a *sententia* can function as a "building block" in an argument, and there is no question that it is a bit truncated in comparison with the precepts of his Greek predecessors.[36] Yet this single brief and inconspicuous statement represents a fundamental shift in assumptions about the political

[33] Lausberg 2.805–6 (§ 1244 *sententia* II.F.1.e). The *sententia cum ratione* evidently corresponds to Aristotle's enthymematic γνώμη: see Calboli, *Cornifici Rhetorica* 328 n. 110.

[34] *Rhet. Her.* 4.24: *Huiusmodi sententiae simplices non sunt inprobandae propterea quod habet brevis expositio, si rationis nullius indiget, magnam delectationem.* (Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.6.) And 4.25: *Cum ita* [i.e., *raro*] *interponentur, multum adferent ornamenti.* See Lausberg 1.432 (§ 875).

[35] Presumably the Auctor recognizes *admonita* as well as precepts among *sententiae,* although his examples are all of a prescriptive sort. Cf. Lausberg 1.432 (§ 873): "Die Sentenzen beanspruchen Geltung teils . . . als Pflicht-Normierungen (*Rhet. Her.* 4.17.24), die als Gebote oder Verbote auftreten können."

[36] Caplan (292 n. "a") appropriately compares Aristotle *Rh.* 2.21.15.

nature and practice of rhetoric. For the Auctor, it is not so important that *sententiae* be used to build a strong, logical argument. What matters more is that *sententiae* utilize familiar concepts in a forceful, sophisticated, and dignified manner, and thus appear to present an "obvious principle" that can be accorded "tacit approval" among audiences who hold the Roman aristocratic code as the ultimate authority.

In *Rhetorica ad Herennium, sententiae* gain their moral authority—their "ring of truth"—by tapping into common, received wisdom. Here again we must acknowledge the significance of the Auctor's habit of teaching by example. But this time we enter territory that previous scholarship has not only misjudged, but entirely ignored. This neglect is all the more regrettable in that we can hardly hope to understand the Auctor's conception of rhetoric and its function as a whole, if we are not prepared to entertain the notion that similarities of thought and style in his illustrations are not necessarily because of the limitations of his experience, imagination, or intelligence, but rather because he intends these examples to illustrate a specific purpose in rhetorical strategy. In the case of the *sententia,* it must be remembered that by categorizing it among the *verborum exornationes* the Auctor directs his readers' attention precisely to the verbal form of his illustrations. And when we read them from this viewpoint, we cannot help but see that his examples use a virtually uniform structure and rhetorical rhythm to enunciate ethical norms and values of the Roman ruling class. The Auctor's *sententiae* present commonplaces of the rhetorical schools, tags from the Greek and Latin classics, and familiar bits of philosophy in carefully articulated and balanced clauses. Conventional maxims are thus conveyed in a conventional style. In particular, five of his examples in 4.24–25 (out of a total of eight or nine; see note 37) display a pattern that makes them particularly lapidary and may be evocative of a rhythm that is slightly archaic and associated with Roman legal formulae: a demonstrative pronoun (a form of *is* or *hic*) is used in correlation with a relative pronoun, often with the identical grammatical configuration (e.g., *Qui fortunis alicuius inducti amicitiam eius secuti sunt, hi, simul ac fortuna dilapsa est, devolant omnes,* "Those who have been attracted by some man's prosperity and courted his friendship, these men, once his good fortune has given out, forsake him one and all").[37]

[37]On the use of deictic *is* and *hic* in laws see Daube 4–8. For a discussion of declining use of *qui . . . is* already in Plautus (in favor of *is . . . qui* or the omission of the

This pattern of correlation between a demonstrative and a relative pronoun seems to be the Auctor's preferred method of achieving clarity and regulating the flow and balance of *sententiae*;[38] that it is also a means of achieving stylistic *dignitas* can be seen from his use of the same device in his discussion of *continuatio* ("the period," 4.27). He defines the period as *densa et continens frequentatio verborum cum ab-*

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demonstrative pronoun altogether) see Hofmann and Szantyr 555–56 § 298 *Zusatz* "b" with the literature cited there (esp. Kroll 8–9); cf. Adams 86–87, Laughton 38, and (for a survey from the viewpoint of a later period) Löfstedt 260–63. Ennius, whom (as we have already observed) the Auctor regards as a master of *sententiae*, also exhibits this stylistic pattern on occasion: see *Ann.* 188–89 (Skutsch) and *Frag. trag.* 195–200, 256–57, 259 (Jocelyn).

The Auctor's first example of a *sententia* presents a textual problem that has not yet been satisfactorily solved. Marx finds a lacuna in the text at the beginning of 4.24 after *Difficile est primum*, and suggests reading *quidque* with a full stop (thus marking off the first *sententia*: *Difficile est primum quidque*), followed by the introduction of a second precept: *Item: "Non solet is potissimum . . . qui . . ."* But *Difficile est primum quidque* stands out as not consistent with the Auctor's other examples of *sententiae*, being more sophisticated in both its concision and its comprehensive synthesis of social behavior. On the other hand, Marx's second *sententia* (*Non solet is . . . qui . . .*) matches the Auctor's preference for balancing correlative clauses in his *sententiae*. Caplan, and Calboli, *Cornifici Rhetorica*, both reproduce Marx's text, but Achard now prints the first *sententia* as *Difficile est primum virtutes revereri, qui semper secunda fortuna sit usus*. This reading is also out of step with the more usual rhetorical rhythm of the Auctor's *sententia*, and, in addition, its omission of a demonstrative antecedent for *qui* makes it grammatically much more difficult than the usual formulations for *sententiae* in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.

[38]Other examples from the Auctor's discussion of the *sententia*: *Liber is est existimandus qui nulli turpitudini servit.* And *Egens aeque est is qui non satis habet et is cui satis nihil potest esse.*

Apart from 4.24–25 (and 4.13, 16, and 27, which I discuss below) this pattern of *is . . . qui* and *qui . . . is* (and variants) occurs almost exclusively when the Auctor is striving for a legalistic tone: cf. esp. 1.23, *et lex: qui parentem necasse iudicatus erit, ut is obvolutus et obligatus corio devehatur in profluentem*; 2.17bis, *"Maiestatem is minuit qui . . ."*; 2.24, *Nam qui se . . . fugisse rationem dicet, is animi vitio videbitur nescisse . . .*; 4.20, *"Qui nihil habet in vita iucundius vita, is cum virtute vitam non potest colere"*; 4.23, *Quia viri fortis est, qui de victoria contendant, eos hostes putare*; cf. 57bis, *At qui patriae pericula suo periculo expetant, hi sapientes putandi sunt* and *ii sapientes sunt estimandi qui . . .* But see also 3.8, *. . . ne deos quidem esse auxilio is, qui . . .*; 4.23, *Quos tantopere timeat, eos necesse est . . .*; 4.27, *Quodsi in eos . . . qui . . .*; 4.29, *"Hic, quos homines . . . eos . . ."*; 4.47, *qui equestrem locum splendidissimum cupit esse in civitate, is . . .* Of examples from earlier oratory cf. esp. Cato *ORF*[4] n. 8 fr. 206 Malcovati (= Gell. *NA* 14.2.26) and Scipio Aemilianus *ORF*[4] n. 21 fr. 17 Malcovati (= Gell. *NA* 6.12.5; the Auctor uses a similar form of *sententia* as an example of *exsuscitatio* ["exhortation"] at 4.55–56); and for an archaizing example of this pattern see Livy 1.24.3 (with Ogilvie ad loc.).

solutione sententiarum, "a succinct and cohesive compression of words embracing a complete thought," and says it is most fitting to the *sententia,* the *contrarium* ("contrast"), and the *conclusio* ("conclusion"). The example given of a "periodic" *sententia* fits with the Auctor's category of the simple *sententia* which contains no explanation, and it also exhibits the structure frequent in the examples in 4.24–25: *Ei non multum potest obesse fortuna qui sibi firmius in virtute quam in casu praesidium conlocavit,* "That man can fortune little harm who has founded his camp more solidly upon virtue than upon chance."[39] The Auctor recommends periodic structure in the *sententia,* the "contrast," and the "conclusion" because he believes these figures require forcefulness.[40] His concern is entirely directed toward creating and sustaining the impression of authority by firmly asserting beliefs conforming to the political order's cultural and political expectations (popularized philosophy, conventional truths, borrowings from the accepted classics of literature). By modeling one's *sententiae* to meet these expectations, one's abilities cannot be seen as weak (*infirma facultas oratoris*).[41]

Clearly the Auctor's views on style are inseparable from his social and ethical disposition. And, indeed, the role *sententiae* play in this connection is even more explicit in one of the most important passages of his treatise. At 4.11–16 the Auctor presents his doctrine of the three styles: the *gravis figura* ("the grand style"), the *mediocris figura* ("the middle style"), and the *extenuata* or *attenuata figura* ("the plain style"). He illustrates each style with a correct example (4.11–14) and then gives three examples demonstrating common errors that weaken each (4.15–16). It is only into the passages exemplifying the middle style (4.13) and its imperfect form—the *genus dissolutum* or *fluctuans* (the "loose" or

[39] Gotoff, "Concept of Periodicity," identifies the Auctor's conception of the period as tacitly Aristotelian (i.e., conventional). On p. 222 he describes the *sententia* at *Rhet. Her.* 4.27 as having a "bipartite" structure, but that is not to say that it is a *sententia duplex,* for in structure it repeats the pattern found in the Auctor's examples of *sententiae simplices* (4.24).

[40] *Rhet. Her.* 4.27: *In his tribus generibus ad continuationis vim adeo frequentatio necessaria est ut infirma facultas oratoris videatur nisi sententiam et contrarium et conclusionem frequentibus efferat verbis.* Habinek (134–35) suggests some aspects of the rhetorical use of *is . . . qui* in prose colometry.

[41] Adding to the forceful tone of the Auctor's example of a "periodic" *sententia* is the military metaphor *in praesidium conlocavit* with which it concludes (see *praesidium* in *TLL* 10.2.6 [1991] 889.48–49 [Ramminger] with cross-references to the entry for *colloco*).

"undulating" style, 4.16)—that the Auctor incorporates *sententiae*.[42] Here we find that the *sententia* in his example of the middle style (4.13) is harmonious in structure and rhythm with the *sententiae* at 4.24–25 and 4.27 that were discussed above:

> Nam rerum inperiti qui unius cuiusque rei de rebus ante gestis exempla petere non possunt, ii per inprudentiam facillime deducuntur in fraudem; at ii qui sciunt quid aliis acciderit facile ex aliorum eventis suis rationibus possunt providere.
>
> For the unworldly, who cannot extract from history patterns for every single situation, these men are very easily deceived on account of their lack of discernment; but those men who know what has happened to others can easily take counsel for their own conduct from the fate of these others.

The use of demonstrative and relative pronouns in this *sententia* (. . . *rerum inperiti qui* . . . , *ii* . . . *at ii qui* . . .) is one of the primary means by which the Auctor punctuates and articulates his movements of thought clearly.[43] But the maxim in the loose style (which is one of only two sentences in his brief illustration) lacks this overt articulation of its clauses and is for that reason "weaker" and more diffuse: *Solent enim diu cogitare omnes qui magna negotia volunt agere* (4.16), "For accustomed to long deliberation are all who intend to undertake great ventures." Commenting on this passage, the Auctor warns that the absence of semantically clear and distinct demarcation of clauses is a negative feature.[44] What the example of the slack style lacks is the *nervi et articuli* ("the sinews and joints") that the *sententia* of the middle style exhibits:

> Qui in mediocre genus orationis profecti sunt, si pervenire eo non potuerunt, errantes perveniunt ad confine genus eius generis, quod appellamus dissolutum, quod est sine nervis et articulis, ut hoc modo appellem "fluctuans" eo quod fluctuat huc et illuc nec potest confirmate neque viriliter sese expedire.

[42] Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.60: *medius hic modus . . . sententiis dulcis, lenior tamquam amnis* . . . .

[43] Unfortunately, Habinek (152–55) does not discuss the colometry of this *sententia* in his analysis of the passage.

[44] *Rhet. Her.* 4.16: *Non potest huiusmodi sermo tenere adtentum auditorem; diffluit enim totus neque quicquam conprehendens perfectis verbis amplectitur.*

> Those aiming for the middle style, if they are unable to attain it, mistakenly achieve a type nearly related to this type, which we call loose because it is without sinews and joints; consequently I might call it "undulating," since it undulates in this direction and that, and cannot strike out with resolution and manliness.

The ideal of masculine strength exhibited by the Auctor's metaphorical language in this passage[45] is harmonious with his belief that *sententiae* evince *dignitas* through one's familiarity with, and advocacy of, the social ethos of the governing elite. He therefore adopts a style that is full and balanced, one similar to that used by the political class at its most authoritative, namely, the style of Roman legal formulae. What he finds particularly conducive to his aims in the *is . . . qui* correlation is not just its rhythm and clarity but, more importantly, its ability to define whole categories of behavior—i.e., human types—with precision and power.[46] The Auctor's rhetorical precepts for, and examples of, *sententiae* seek to harness for political aims the authority embedded in the language and rhythm of Roman legal culture.

By mastering human "types" one learns to master other men. This aim is expressed most vividly in a dramatic scene the Auctor creates near the end of his treatise. He practically states outright (again, through his habit of teaching through his examples) that *sententiae* distinguish the speech of the politically empowered from that of their social inferiors, who are less well educated and do not have as intimate a knowledge of, and sense of participation in, the same ethical code. At 4.65 he depicts a single aspect of *sermocinatio* ("dialogue"): *sermocinatio est cum alicui personae sermo adtribuitur et is exponitur cum ratione dignitatis,* "Dialogue is when speech is ascribed to some person and this is presented in accordance with his social status." The Auctor's example of "dialogue" consists of a scene in which clear class lines are drawn. A typical *miles* invades the home of an equally conventional *dominus* and *domina,* and before the soldier plunges his real weapon into the proud *dominus* there is a brief display of verbal swordsmanship in which the aristocrat relies upon his elegant and sophisticated sensibilities and institutions to protect him:

[45] See Fantham 174–75.

[46] See especially Daube 6–8.

Ille [dominus] cum magno spiritu: "Verebar" inquit, "ne plane victus essem. Nunc video: iudicio mecum contendere non vis, ubi superari turpissimum et superare pulcherrimum est; interficere vis me: occidar equidem, sed victus non peribo." [et miles:] "At in extremo vitae tempore etiam sententias eloqueris![47] Neque ei quem vides dominari vis supplicare?"

The master, with great disdain, replies: "I was afraid I might really be conquered. But now I understand: it is not in court you wish to engage me, where to be subdued is most ignominious and to subdue is most glorious. You simply wish to kill me. I shall surely be killed, but I will not die subjugated." [To which the soldier scoffs:] "Even at the point of death you declaim your maxims! Are you unwilling to bow to the man you see is your master?"

[47] Achard prefers the reading *sententiose loqueris*, for which Calboli (in his review of Achard's edition) tries to adduce further support. Calboli bases his argument on evidence for the expression *sententias eloqui* (furnished by *TLL* 5.2 [1932] 419.8–9 and 421.43–46 [I. Kapp and G. Meyer]) and for the adverb *sententiose*. He correctly observes that *sententias eloqui* occurs nowhere else with this precise meaning, that *sententiose* is confined to Cicero's rhetorical works (as a translation of the Greek γνωμικός at *Inv. Rhet.* 1.106, *De Or.* 2.286, and *Orat.* 236; cf. Ernout 27), and that the Auctor may be basing his example of *sermocinatio* on a topic sometimes set in the schools of declamation (namely, the death of Sulpicius). For Calboli, this evidence "renders acceptable the more literary *sententiose loqueris* compared to the more immediate *sententias eloqueris*." This assessment of the difference in stylistic levels between the two Latin expressions is right on target, but the judgment about what is needed for this particular passage must be rejected for reasons the Auctor has attempted to make perfectly clear. In his illustration of *sermocinatio* he concentrates on one single, essential aspect: "conformity with the social status of the speaker" (*cum ratione dignitatis*). The Auctor's detailed description of his *miles* (*cum sago, gladio succinctus, tenens iaculum*; see Fiebiger, "Sagum," *RE* I A [1920] 1754: the *sagum* is the uniform of the common soldier) purposefully indicates that his social status (and therefore his educational level) is lower than that of the *dominus*. At the conclusion of his example the Auctor comments on it in terms that again make clear that he has tried to differentiate the stylistic levels of his interlocutors' language: *Puto in hoc exemplo datos esse uni cuique sermones ad dignitatem accommodatos; id quod oportet in hoc genere conservare*. A career soldier brought to life for the purposes of a declamation or a forensic speech should not wax erudite with the refined language of a Ciceronian rhetorical handbook; he should speak the "more immediate" language, and with the scoffing tone, of a stock *miles* (cf., for example, another stock character suspicious of Hellenic rhetoric and its noble-sounding maxims, Curculio's harangue quoted above in note 12 [Plaut. *Curc.* 288–91]). *Sententias eloqueris* seems precisely suited to the *miles* in the Auctor's example of *sermocinatio*.

The *dominus* "naturally" turns to his moral maxims to defend himself, as if he were speaking to a man for whom they expressed the same standards of social conduct. He regards the knowledge of these precepts as a power to which the soldier must necessarily give his "tacit approval" and submit. But the Auctor has purposefully created a scene in which two worlds, two codes of behavior, collide, revealing the glaring discrepancies between their definitions of power. Similarly, it has been my argument in these pages that the Auctor endeavors to teach his reader the technique of appealing to the social code of the ruling elite at Rome, for it is the knowledge of the maxims of that class and the rhythms of its discourse that will empower the reader politically.[48]

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THE USE OF *ALETHEIA* FOR THE "TRUTH OF UNREASON": PLATO, THE SEPTUAGINT, AND PHILO

Orthodoxy about the semantic evolution of ἀλήθεια in the Hellenistic period represents Philo Judaeus and Plutarch as the non–Christian representatives of a line of development beginning in Plato (where ἀλήθεια is said to denote abstract, conceptual Truth, "*die* Wahrheit")[1] and ending in the sense of absolute truth, specifically "the content of Christianity as absolute truth."[2] The problem of such a stemma is that it fails to stand up to close inspection; the present study considers one of the circumstances under which "truth" was equated with doctrinal content in the Hellenistic period.[3] Specifically, I undertake to demark the distinction between "truth" as Philo Judaeus understands it from "truth" as it is used by the philosophers who are his stylistic and intellectual models; I intend to show that Philo's notion of pure truth is not a natural semantic extension of Platonic (or even contemporary philosophic) usage, but is rather an expression of deeper cultural determinants.[4]

[1] Bultmann, "ἀλήθεια." The passages he cites here in support of this development (Plut. *De Isid et Os.* 351c, e, and Hierocles *Carm. Aur.* 21–23 Mullach) are far too late to represent the direct semantic development of Platonic usage of the term. The same objection holds for Bultmann's citation of Epictit. (*Diss.* 1.4, 31; 3.24, 40) for the extension of ἀλήθεια into "the sense of 'correct learning.'" From these observations he proceeds into his second major heading in the discussion of the Classical and Hellenistic evolution of the word, "The Usage of Dualism." In this section he again fails to make the crucial distinction between fourth– and third–century (and later) usage.

[2] Bauer, Arndt, and Gingrich, *Lexicon,* s.v. "ἀλήθεια," cite Plutarch (*Is. and Os.* 351e) and Philo (*Spec. Leg.* 4.178, "the proselyte is a μεταναστὰς εἰς ἀλήθειαν") as the non–Christian antecedents for ἀλήθεια denoting "the content of Christianity as absolute truth."

[3] This is not to say that Philo Judaeus is the first instance of such semantic development: he is, however, the best documented instance of it.

[4] In my discussion I wish to avoid using the term "absolute" for truth defined with reference to specific doctrinal content, since truth in this sense is not objectively absolute but relative to the belief of the adherent of it. The number of truths which stand defined in relation to specific doctrinal content corresponds to the number of prejudices which lay claim to being *the* Truth; the truth of a Christian fundamentalist will differ radically from the truth of the Muslim fundamentalist, although the adherents of both faiths may each aver that his own world view is *the* absolute truth. Truth of this sort is clearly relative; the term "absolute" is surely misapplied in reference to it (what is meant rather is "abstract,

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The difference in the conception of truth between Philo and his Hellenic models—especially the Stoics and Plato—needs to be spelled out precisely. Of the two great philosophic influences which shape and inform Philo's writings, Plato and the Stoics, Philo's approach—the inspired interpretation of a classical text—is closer to Stoic hermeneutics than to Platonic flights of poetic fancy.[5] Stoic notions of truth, however—strongly empiricist and reliant upon objectifiable criteria—are repugnant to Philo's thought. The very seductiveness of what Philo terms ἀσαφεῖς λογισμοί—by which he intends puzzles of logic[6]—actually poses a risk to the pure truth of Philo's archetypal "Mosaic" Philosopher.[7] In Philo's epistemology there is nothing resembling the Stoic concession of bivalence, and no allowance for a need to suspend judgment in the face of bivalent impressions.[8] Philo's ideal philosopher is far less limited and hemmed in by the criteria of objective truth than is the Stoic sage. For the concept "truth" to a Stoic is ultimately a function of propositional logic, whereas Philo is very clear about his distaste

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idealized, conceptual" truth). The distinction I intend to observe is essentially the same distinction Bertrand Russell makes in a speech delivered in 1935 (*Essays* 61–79), namely that between the truth of rationality and the truth of unreason. The former makes "appeal to a universal and impersonal standard of truth, the latter amounts to little more than the apotheosis of subjective opinion; the former is rationalist, pluralist, and democratic in spirit, the latter is doctrinaire, atomic and authoritarian" (*Essays*, 56). I avoid the confusion by banishing the term "absolute truth" from my discussion.

[5]In Plato's *Phaedrus*, Socrates' *muthos* of the soul is spoken under the spell of a θεία μανία. Socrates claims no more explicit authority for his utterance than ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία . . . , whose form of expression will seem unconvincing to the uninitiated (ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή, 245b). The tone of the conceit is ironic and playful—a far cry from the serious claim of absolute authority which Philo makes for the "words of Moses" that he interprets.

[6]Those of the Skeptics especially, though such a factor appears in Stoic logic as well. For Philo's views on the Skeptics see Wolfson *Philo* I 109; Philo *Cong.* 10.52.

[7]*L.A.* 3.228–30. For Philo, *exegesis*, not syllogism, becomes the avenue of approaching the truth of the world. And truth, once apprehended, must be kept beyond the reach of quarreling and disputations. In this conception, there can be no approximation to it, no degrees or gradations of it: as it exists in the human mind, truth is a standard (κάνων, *L.A.* 3.233) which can be corrupted by sophistic riddles and plausible arguments. Where for the Stoics truth acquires authority—i.e., becomes firmly established—*only* through demonstration (and the sage's assent to the proofs thereof), Philo considers conviction (τῷ πιστεύειν) to precede apprehension of truth.

[8]Cf. Long and Sedley, *Philosophers* §§ 34G (= Sext. Emp. *Contr. Math.* 8.88–90 [= *SVF* 2.214]); 37H (= Cic. *Acad.* 2.92–96). Cf. also their discussion, I 229.

for problems of logic. At the level of semantics, then, ἀλήθεια in Philo runs little risk of being confused with τὸ ἀληθές of Stoicism[9]—this despite Philo's clear reliance on Stoic method, especially in the matter of textual exegesis.[10] At the level of metaphor and imagery, however, Philo's debt to Plato is said to be so pervasive that a practical distinction between them seems difficult to make. It is precisely at this philological level that there emerges the subtle but real difference between Philo the Jew and his Hellenic antecedents; it is a difference which allows Philo to speak of text as oracular truth, of philosopher as "interpreter of the divine." Although it is true, as Thomas Billings has argued, that in representing speculative insight as a sort of unaccountable inspiration Philo closely adheres to Platonic idiom and imagery—whereby "the poet, the philosopher, the law-giver, the prophet and the rhapsode all act, according to Plato, under the influence of divine inspiration"[11]—in his attitude toward the written word Philo differs most tellingly from Plato, and from the Stoics as well. This is a difference of the first order, for, *pace* Billings, Plato's "view of the place of divine inspiration in philosophy" cannot be fitted into the same mold as the "doctrine of inspiration" in Philo precisely *because* Philo's work "takes the form very largely of the interpretation of a divinely inspired book."[12] Nowhere is this difference more clear than in the imagery Philo uses to convey his conception of ἀλήθεια (and derivatives from the same stem). If metaphor is the medium of unconscious editorializing for the writer, whereby he conveys his deepest thought, the elucidation of the author's use of imagery should be revealing indeed. What emerges from an examination of the imagery that Philo applies to ἀλήθεια is an often non-classical—or even non-Hellenic—conception which appears to be strongly colored by the use of ἀλήθεια in the Septuagint. Comparison of Platonic with Philonic metaphor, then, will be the avenue by which

[9]Cf. Annas, "Truth" 88: "For [the Stoics] 'true' and 'false' have their primary application to propositions. . . . So a presentation must be a kind of thing which has a content which can be expressed in propositional form."

[10]On Philo's debt to Stoic exegesis cf. Wolfson *Philo* I 132–33; he also discusses (I 41–43) Philo's attitudes toward Hellenic mythology. There appears to have been a strong tradition of allegorical tradition in the Greek-speaking Jewish community, of which Philo was well aware, e.g., at *quod omnis probus liber sit* (12); cf. Wolfson I 133–38 for a discussion of Jewish allegorical method in Philo's day.

[11]Billings, *Philo* 67.

[12]Billings, *Philo* 68.

we shall arrive at a fair appraisal of the difference between these authors on this crucial issue.[13]

First, however, a brief summary of the semantic development of ἀλήθεια is in order.

Current consensus holds that etymologically ἀλήθεια signifies "that which does not remain unnoticed" (from alpha privative + λαθ–, the base of λανθάνω);[14] originally it is used with reference to a verbal account of facts, and always in Homer occurs "only in opposition to a lie."[15] From this primary sense the word is extended to denote "the actual fact," as opposed to the appearance of a thing. Common to these early meanings of ἀλήθεια (as the contrary either of ψεῦδος or of δόξα) is its association with terms denoting eristic endeavor. Whether the metaphor is developed along the lines of court action (e.g., as the objects of κρίνειν or ἀμφισβητεῖν) or athletic activity,[16] the early Greek notion of truth is steeped in the competitive spirit of Hellenic society: the truth or reality of a thing is that which can be *proven* and objectively demonstrated to be actually so. Hence in early Greek the concept "truth" is frequently associated with the notion of authority (or, more correctly, authoritativeness), being that which by objective proof or demonstration has been established as valid (κύριος). Such is certainly

[13] A comparison between Philonic and Stoic metaphor in this area is impossible, because mere fragments of the corresponding Stoic literature have survived. It is certain, however, that no Stoic writer would equate ἀλήθεια with πίστις or define τὸ ἀληθές as the content of doctrine.

[14] Boisacq, *Dictionnaire* 42; Hofmann, *Wörterbuch* 12; Frisk, *Wörterbuch* 70; Mette, *Lexikon* I 477; Chantraine, *Dictionnaire* III 618; Heitsch, "ἀλήθεια" 24–26; Kritscher, "ΑΛΗΘΗΣ" 161–64; Boman, *Thought* 201–2. Friedländer *Plato* I 404–5 (in an addendum to ch. 11 n. 2, "Aletheia") suggests that the accepted derivation from λαθ– is "by no means unshakable," since the alpha in other words of the semantic set to which ἀληθής belongs (ἀτρεκής, ἀκριβής, ἀπάτη) cannot be shown to be alpha–privative; ἀτρεκής, ἀκριβής, and ἀπάτη are probably of non–Indo–European origin.

[15] So LSJ, s.v. In epic usage ἀληθείη/ἀληθής are more limited terms than ἐτεός, ἔτυμος, and ἐτήτυμος, against which they are defined. The former denote a reliable account of something perceived, the latter a reality which may not be doubted: Krischer, "ΑΛΗΘΗΣ" 161–67.

[16] As, e.g., Thuc. 1.20.3, where the imagery (οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται) seems to suggest a physical activity, such as hunting or the like. Krischer, "ΑΛΗΘΗΣ" 172–74, suggests that the original concrete sense of "information based on personal experience" becomes attenuated in the Ionian context of ἱστορίη, where differing accounts are combined and compared. This observation is consistent with the view that abstract ἀλήθεια implies an eristic context.

the case with the way Hesiod deploys the theme in his proem to the *Theogony* (28–31), where he attempts to establish the superior authority of his account by citing the Muses as his source, and by distinguishing the truth of his poetry from the deceptions of other poets, who also claim to act as spokesmen of the Muses. Similarly, in public settings—in the *dicasterion,* by historians, by philosophers—the establishment of truth by appeal to facts amounts to the same attempt to lay claim against counterclaim to a superior authority for one's own version of things. From its use to denote demonstrable facts and deeds, ἀλήθεια is applied by extension also to the character of language which makes such things clear: to speak the truth—either before the dicasts or in defense of one's historical or philosophical views—is to win the conviction of one's hearers, so that ἀληθῆ λέγειν becomes interchangeable in sense with πιστὰ λέγειν.[17] From here ἀλήθεια develops the sense of truthfulness, i.e., the *quality* of one whose words are worthy of belief.[18]

In his discussion of the semantic evolution of ἀλήθεια in the classical period, Bultmann[19] argues that from this latter sense of truth as a quality there arises the notion of a universal truth, since the philosophers of the period (notably Plato) set out to discover that single truth which underlies the many truths of the world.[20] Hence, Bultmann maintains, ἀλήθεια acquires the further sense of "rechte Lehre" and as such appears as a synonym of ἐπισήμη—"and can be used to denote the teaching of a religious proclamation." It is on Bultmann's account of this latter development, especially as it pertains to Plato and his influence upon Philo, that I focus the present discussion. The difficulty is that to make Plato's notion of truth the natural semantic antecedent of Philo's "divine" truth[21] is to place Plato far afield from the essential base of the Greek conception of ἀλήθεια: namely, that truth is a highly

[17] Bultmann, "Ἀλήθεια" 239, cites Hdt. 1.182, 2.73. In a similar development the adjective ἀληθής becomes synonymous with ὀρθός, for the reason that what has been established as true (and worthy of belief) has been set straight; for establishing truth as a corrective process see Plato, *Soph.* 234c, d; also Soph. *OT* 1220, cited by Bultmann.

[18] As in Mimn. fr. 8, ἀληθείη δὲ παρέστω σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί, πάντων χρῆμα δικαιότατον (cited by Bultmann).

[19] "Ἀλήθεια" 240, under the rubric "The Original Greek Usage and its Differentiations."

[20] "Ἀλήθεια" 239.

[21] Bultmann, "Ἀλήθεια" 240: "If Plato still uses ἀλήθεια formally to denote genuineness, or that which truly is, in Hellenism it comes to imply the 'eternal' or 'divine' in the sense of cosmological dualism."

disputable term which requires objective validation.[22] Simply put, the question is, Does the imagery Plato applies to ἀλήθεια agree with such traditional conceptions, or does his usage justify approximating it to "the absolute *content* of knowledge"?

Although Platonic truth is to be found in the realm of thought (and hence can only imperfectly be apprehended through physio–rational means),[23] Plato does not actually speak of truth as an idea (in the technical sense) on the order of justice, the good, etc.[24] The *abstraction* "truth" is not itself the object of the quest for knowledge, but is rather an *attribute* or property of the objects of knowledge. That is to say, goodness, justice, beauty, and other knowables exist unto themselves, and the mind at the end of its quest latches onto the truth and reality *of* these things (*Epist.* 7.344a, b). The term is implicitly comparative on several counts. First, truth expresses the seeker's recognition of the object of his quest, and hence pertains to the *relationship* between seeker and object. Second, because it stands distinguished from falsehood, "truth" suggests a context of pluralities and is used to make a distinction. Third, the use of the term suggests either a deliberative or a collaborative effort to grasp an object of quest: ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ . . .

[22] In his conception of truth Plato remains a follower of Socrates; Philo is profoundly adverse to the Socratic spirit. The Socrates of the *Apology* only appears extreme by virtue of his disdain of courtroom practice; the format and context of the dicasterion—where form predominates over content—he regards as inimical to the discovery of truth by reason (cf. *Theaet.* 172d–173b). In the prologue of the *Apology* (17b) Socrates says of his accusers that "they have said little or nothing that is true (ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν). But from me you will hear the entire truth (πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν)." Here truth is not a conceptual absolute, but denotes that which is substantive and verifiable; i.e., it is pragmatic truth. For Socrates is distinguishing arguments that aim to convince by virtue of rhetorical tropes from those which rest upon objectively demonstrable proofs. Hence he regards "arguing fairly and to the point (δίκαια λέγειν)" and "speaking the truth (τἀληθῆ λέγειν)" as interchangeable terms (18a): καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι . . . σκοπεῖν . . . εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

[23] *Phaedo* 65b.9, 66d.7.

[24] Truth is an attribute of knowing (*Theaet.* 816d; *Epist.* 7, 342b) and a by–product of discourse (*Theaet.* 172d). Where ἀλήθεια appears to denote "reality" in Plato (as throughout the sections of the Phaedo 64b–69b, ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις . . . ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται . . . τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται . . . καθορᾶν τὸ ἀληθές . . . καὶ γνωσόμεθα πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές, etc.) it actually indicates that which is distinguished from false perception. Hence ἀλήθεια is an implicitly comparative term.

οὐσίας καὶ ἀληθείας δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι (*Theaet.* 186d). The context of such apprehension is pluralistic, dialectical, and competitive, whether the discourse preceding it is internal (thought being a sort of debate within the mind, *Theaet.* 189e, *Soph.* 263e) or external. Within Plato's epistemology, the grasping of the truth or reality of a thing is the result of a vigorous process involving constant application and effort (*Theaet.* 153b); the intellect is brought to the point of grasping reality through a life of training and preparation (*askesis*) comparable to athletes' (*Epist.* 7.340c–d, 344a–c).[25] The recognition of the truth of a matter *results from* the exercise of accurate judgment and is preceded by "a true account of its grounds."[26] Hence truth for Plato is a property *of* the objects of knowledge because it is the natural result of the public process which sifts "true" from "false" (*Epist.* 7.341c).

The public connotations of the notion "truth" prevent there being any single criterion or authority about truth for Plato. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates takes issue with both the title and the substance of Protagoras' treatise Ἀλήθεια (or Περὶ ἀληθείας) on the grounds that truth cannot be authoritatively defined—most certainly not in writing. If, as Protagoras had argued, any and every man's perceptions are true for him, there can be no means of distinguishing true from false judgment. As it is, the measure of true judgment is not subjective perception; truth insofar as it is an attribute of judgment, is a public property. We must rely on discourse, the collaborative technique of sifting out the true from the false,[27] to correct our understanding of reality. Neither man nor any of his faculties may serve as the measure of truth, as Protagoras had held.[28] The proof of this is Protagoras' claim to have authoritatively defined The Truth in writing οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη . . . ἀληθής, ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων (*Theaet.* 150e.7). This lack of authority for the truth of judgments renders the Protagorean theorem untenable (*Theaet.* 177c–179c); with it falls all claim to providing a written account of reality. Plato for his part refused to set forth his most serious understandings in a written form precisely because ῥητὸν οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα (*Epist.* 7.341c; cf. 344c).

Because no mortal person—and no written document—may

[25] Cf. *Theaet.* 153b.

[26] Ἀληθὴς λόγος, *Tim.* 52a–c; cf. *Theaet.* 200d–201c. See Cornford, *Theory* 141.

[27] *Soph.* 230c; cf. 228c.

[28] Cf. Sext. *Pyrrh. hyp.* 1.218; Cornford, *Theory* 32–36.

stand as an *authority* about truth,[29] Plato also challenges the position traditionally accorded to poets and playwrights, since their pronouncements will not stand up under scrutiny (ἔλεγχος). While conceding that poets, seers, and rhapsodes may be vouchsafed a certain momentary perception of a higher order—that poetic truths spoken in a state of inspiration may contain an element of reality[30]—Plato holds such moments to be rare and a matter of happenstance. His attitude toward the texts generated by the forebears of *his* culture, then, differs markedly from the reverence with which Philo regards the Pentateuch. Indeed, Plato actually banishes the bulk of the Greek literary tradition from his ideal state because the claim of the poets to speak truth may not be confirmed by an objectively valid authority—i.e., because to the Greek mind any claim to truth may be matched by a counterclaim. Because the Greek conception of society is fundamentally pluralistic and necessarily disallows any single arbiter of values, Plato proposes an elaborate system of controls for establishing and preserving a central ethical and cultural authority in his ideal state. The motive for the theory of the Grand Lie[31] is to remove the authority of the guardians of the state

[29]One has to distinguish the claim to truth made by the epic poet, who appeals to a source—i.e., the collective memory of an oral tradition—as his authority, from the claim to truth made by the dogmatic or doctrinaire. Plato treats these two types of claim to truth quite differently; the former is a social issue—control of the media of culture and education—to be addressed by political programs; the latter is a matter of logic and is addressed by argumentation. Logical truth proves relatively manageable for Plato; his attitude toward the "truth of unreason"—i.e., opinion elevated to the status of reality—is clear, for example, from the discussion of Protagoras' Περὶ Ἀληθείας, *Theaet.* 160c–170c. Moreover, in referring to Pythagorean and Orphic material, Plato is always careful to emphasize the speculative nature of the theories he adduces; he clothes no text or author with the vestments of truth. The poetic truth of the oral and mythopoeic tradition, on the other hand, ultimately eluded his control. Cf. Popper, *Open Society* I 144: "It would have been impossible [for Plato] . . . to define the concept of truth in the same utilitarian or pragmatist fashion [as his theory of justice]. The Myth is true, Plato could have said, since anything that serves the interest of my state must be believed and therefore must be called 'true'; and there must be no other criterion of truth. . . . But Plato himself retained enough of the Socratic spirit to admit candidly that he was lying. The step taken by the school of Hegel was one that could never have occurred, I think, to any companion of Socrates."

[30]It is noteworthy that Plato's concession that a rhapsode (who is always οὐκ ἔνους) may hit on the truth is considerably removed from Philo's notion that Moses-as-philosopher in his writings invariably expresses the truth in the most exact words.

[31]I prefer "grand" to "noble" as a translation of γενναῖος, since γενναῖος means "high-born" or "of noble descent" but not "lofty," "altruistic," as the English "noble" suggests.

beyond all controversy and challenge. The educators of the proposed republic—men trained in the art of the dialectic—judiciously and selectively appropriate myths and poetry, as physicians using drugs, to attain the desired effect of predetermining men's opinions: the claims of the Muse to be the central authority in matters of belief and convention is to be upheld, and only the *content* altered. *Because* truth, as a public property,[32] may *not* be dogmatically and indisputably defined, Plato proposes to establish in society a presumptive authority in the Grand Lie. It is to be noted that the lie in the Platonic conception is not the specific content of the stories told, but is the presumption of authority with which they are invested: the Grand Lie in the Platonic state amounts to telling the subjects that the stories they hear are The Truth.[33] Nothing in the state should work to undermine the authority of this Lie.[34] Nonetheless, the essential eristic component of the basic Greek conception abides in Plato's notion of truth in even this most sheltered of contexts: the minds of the individual rulers, and the rulers of the state as a collective, are to be kept in a condition of constant and rigorous training (*Resp.* 521c–531c, 535a–541b); the continual attention required of them is consistently represented in imagery derived from the athletic and military training field.

Bultmann's misinterpretation of Platonic truth rests on the implications of the imagery in *Sophistes* 228c–d (cited by him in support of his view), where ἀλήθεια is the target of the soul's motion in a metaphor developed from archery: τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη. In the proper context of the dialogue, the stranger has advanced the metaphor of learning as a kind of sifting process (*catharsis*), of which the archer serves as further illustration:[35] understanding a thing results from the corrective alignment of sight to target; such

[32] Cf. Voegelin, *Plato* 63: "In developing such pairs of concepts, which illuminate truth by opposing it to untruth, Plato continues the tradition of the mystic–philosophers, as well as the poets back to Hesiod, who experienced truth in their resistance to the conventions of society."

[33] The "authority" of those who are reared to be guardians is relative, not absolute: *Resp.* 413c, ζητέον τίνες ἄριστοι φύλακες τοῦ παρ' αὑτοῖς δόγματος τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον, ὃ ἂν τῇ πόλει ἀεί δοκῶσι βέλτιστον εἶναι αὐτούς ποιεῖν. It is interesting that the final arbiter of religious matters in Plato's republic is Apollo, since his authority in this area is universally acknowledged: *Resp.* 427c, οὗτος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητὴς ἐξηγεῖται.

[34] *Leg.* 664a, b.

[35] Cornford, *Theory* 177–83.

focusing involves the selection of a precise point from a range of many and hitting the target squarely is a consequence of accurately aligning missile with target.[36] It is to be noted that the target is a function of the act of aiming; misapprehension (παραφροσύνη) results from a misalignment (ἀμετρία) of sight and target, comprehension from drawing an exact bead (κατιδεῖν) on the object.[37] Truth in this metaphor has no more content than the point (σκόπος) at which the archer aims his dart. The imagery is consistent with Plato's conception of education as a corrective process of constant readjustment and realignment of one's sights. Common to the act of aiming and the act of learning is the use of a sort of cross-examination (ἔλεγχος): the dialectical process of sorting, sifting, comparing, and finally homing in accurately on the objective. There is nothing here which intends that abstract truth in Plato is universal.

Quite to the contrary: for all of his distrust of the open society,[38] Plato's conception of truth as a public property remains profoundly traditional in two respects. First, the discursive truth of the philosophe resembles pragmatic truth in an open society. The sifting of evidence in the give and take of *elenchos* may clarify the object of inquiry, but absolute certainty remains elusive; the context of discursive philosophy is pluralistic and competitive, and the results of it are disputable. Though his epistemology aims at absolute certainty, Plato concedes the ultimate relativity of truth in a public context. However, this is not the only possible context for truth in Plato, since an intuitive apprehension of reality also appears in certain mythic and poetical passages: in the

[36]The quest for truth in Plato does not suggest the hypostasis of a norm, ethical or otherwise, *pace* Bultmann, "Ἀλήθεια" 240. In *Resp.* 413a, adduced by Bultmann, ἀληθεύειν is said to be τὸ τὰ ὄντα δοκάζειν; there is nothing normative about it. In the passage of *Sophistes* which Bultmann cites, Plato describes the mental and visual act of corrective alignment of sight. In 228c (ὅσ' ἂν κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καθ' ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνῃ, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πασχεῖν;) Harold Fowler (in the Loeb edition) incorrectly translates συμμετρία and ἀμετρία as "right proportion" and "disproportion" respectively. He supposes the reference to be to the balance or imbalance of the missiles in flight: "The explanation that a missile . . . which is not evenly balanced will not fly straight fails to take account of the words πρὸς ἄλληλα." The translation should read: ". . . shall we say that this happens to them because of their alignment in relation to one another, or conversely because of their lack of alignment?"

[37]For κατιδεῖν = "to see clearly" see Cornford, *Theory* 189.

[38]Popper, *Open Society* I 169–201; Stone, *Trial* 68–69.

long speech in the *Phaedrus* (244a–257b), in Diotima's speech in the *Symposium* (201d–212b), in the myth of Er in the *Republic* (614b–621b), etc. But in suggesting such intuitive truth Plato adheres to conventional forms; this is the second respect in which Platonic truth remains traditional. For the inspired truth of philosophic insight in Plato is akin to the transported utterance of traditional bards (the ἀπόδειξις of the great speech of the Phaedrus will be δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή, 245c; cf. *Ion* 533d–534e); and yet the stated authority for such truth remains collective and public.[39] What matters is that Plato appears to ascribe such beatific visions to a collective, ancient and open source: the myths of Er in the *Republic* and of the soul-guide in the *Phaedo* (107d–108c) are attributed to ancient stories; the tale of Atlantis was familiar to Solon (*Tim.* 20d); similarly, the wisdom of Diotima in the *Symposium* is invested with great antiquity (*Sym.* 201d). The truth even of suprarational provenance has the presumption of authority in notions of community, consensus, and established usage: hence Plato avoids representing even intuitive truth as self-evident and simple.[40]

For Philo, on the other hand, the dialectic, far from being the most authoritative method[41] for sorting out the truth of a matter, is relegated to an ancillary position: in Philonic terms, philosophy is a handmaiden of true wisdom.[42] In his use of ἀλήθεια Philo has altogether banished the uncertainty implicit in the Greek conception of truth—for which, as we have seen, there is no ultimate authority. Rather, for Philo the relationship between truth (ἀλήθεια) and conviction (πίστις) is radically different.[43] Where for Plato truth acquires authority—i.e., becomes

[39]The Myth of Theuth (*Phaedr.* 274c) is an ἀκοὴν . . . τῶν προτέρων, the veracity of which only those forebears know with certainty (τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν); cf. *Tim.* 40d. In *Gorg.* 523a Socrates recounts a fiction in the belief that it is actual fact (ὡς ἀληθῆ . . . ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν), but he is also careful to remark that the story is not his own (524a, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι). Cf. *Meno* 81a, ἀκήκοα . . . ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα (λόγον) . . . ἀληθῆ . . . καὶ καλόν. See also *Polit.* 268d, *Leg.* 713b. Protagoras (*Prot.* 320b) regards *muthos* and *logos* as equally acceptable modes for presenting a theory.

[40]*Phaed.* 107b.

[41]Plato calls it the μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων, *Soph.* 230d.

[42]Cf. Wolfson, *Philo* I 138–54.

[43]The simile of the line (*Resp.* 509d–511e) most clearly demonstrates the relative value of these terms in Plato's conception. Here πίστις falls at the lower end of a continuum of states of perception, running from picture-thought at the lowest to complete intellection at the highest end of the spectrum: "the division with respect of reality and truth or the opposite . . . is expressed by the proportions: as is the opinable to the know-

firmly established—through persuasion, with evidence and through argumentation (τῷ πείθειν), Philo considers conviction to precede the apprehension of truth (*L.A.* 3.228–30):

> ἄριστον οὖν τῷ θεῷ πεπιστευκέναι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἀσαφέσι λογισμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ἀβεβαίοις εἰκασίαις. . . . ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστι δόγμα τὸ πιστεύειν θεῷ, ψεῦδος δὲ τὸ πιστεύειν τοῖς κενοῖς λογισμοῖς . . . οὕτως γὰρ ἄλογον τὸ πιστεύειν ἢ λογισμοῖς πιθανοῖς ἢ νῷ διαφθείροντι τὸ ἀληθές.[44]

The medio–passive rather than the active sense of the verb πείθειν predominates in Philo's conception here. It is noteworthy that the imagery Philo uses of truth emphasizes a static condition (πεπιστευκέναι) rather than the end of an activity, as is typical of Plato. Truth for Philo is a state of being, a condition or virtue which one cultivates by routine and right living;[45] it is a province with definite boundaries to which one arrives or from which one may depart.[46] Hence conversion to Judaism is spoken of as πρὸς εὐσέβειαν μεθορίσασθαι (*Spec. Leg.* 1.51) or ἀποικίαν στείλασθαι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν μυθικῶν πλασμάτων πρὸς τὴν ἀληθείας ἐνάργειαν (*Virt.* 102). For this reason converts to Judaism are said to be surrounded by the pure truth of their faith (περιέχονται ἀκραιφνοῦς ἀληθείας, *Spec. Leg.* 1.52); truth, in other words, is an atmosphere or light which envelops the adherent. In developing the imagery of truth as a way or avenue, suggested by the Septuagint text of Genesis 24:48 (ὃς εὐόδωσεν μοι ἐν ὁδῷ ἀληθείας), Philo (*QG* 4.125) stresses the ele-

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able, so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness." (The latter is Paul Shorey's Loeb translation of 510a, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη.)

[44] Cf. Wolfson's comment on this passage, *Philo* I 152: "When [Philo] says that it is best to have faith in God and not in our dim reasonings and insecure conjectures, he means that it is best to have faith in the immediate knowledge given by God through revelation rather than in the result of our reason."

[45] Cf. *QG* 4.115 (on Gen. 24:27): "The righteousness and truth among men are . . . likenesses and images, while those with God are paradigmatic principles and types and ideas. Deservedly, therefore does he [Abraham] give thanks that he had both, and that God gives him both virtues uninterruptedly and daily, and that there grows in his soul an estrangement from falsehood and unrighteousness and a familiarity with truth and righteousness." Cf. *QG* 4.125, "Truth is a wonderful and divine virtue (θαυμασία καὶ θεία ἀρετή), and a force (δύναμις) destructive of falsehood. . . . [It] is so called because of unforgetfulness, since virtue is worthy of remembrance."

[46] Cf. *L.A.* 3.232 for the image of the boundary of truth: ⟨ὁ σοφίστης⟩ ὑφ' οὗ κατασοφίζονται οἱ τὸν ὅρον τῆς ἀληθείας ὑπερβαίνοντες.

ment of conformity required in a regimen of education, rather than the image of motion toward a goal.[47] Truth, for Philo, insofar as it lies within human reach, is a condition of the soul that is to be maintained by the enforced conformity of practice and routine.[48] The Philonic version of the Grand Lie interestingly applies only to the life of the private person, without wider implications to the rest of society; in speaking of the need for a man of truth to practice deception Philo appears to have in mind the sort of inevitable compromises and dissimilation that an observant (and philosophical) Jew must make in dealing with the Gentile world around him.[49] Falsehood and truth in Philo are predominately *ethical* notions.

Particularly revealing of Philo's state of mind is his belief that insofar as truth in the actual world amounts to the content of one's belief, it is a fragile and easily destructible thing.[50] The greatest threat to Philonic truth, in its temporal expression, lies in the cleverness and

[47] "Now, the way that leads to [truth], so far as it lies with us, is knowledge and wisdom, for through these it is found. But by an involuntary principle it is found through prophecy. And since that which is proportioned and equal is a safe road, it leads to truth more evenly, briefly and smoothly than the former." The Loeb translator, Ralph Marcus, comments: "Philo evidently means that the way of prophecy leads to truth more directly than does the way of knowledge." Bauer, Arndt, and Gingrich, *Lexicon* s.v. "ἀλήθεια," cite Pindar *P.* 3.103 as parallel with Gen. 24:48, and with Philonic and N.T. usage: e.g., 1 Ti. 2:4, 2 Pet. 2:2, J, etc. But Pindar develops the μυρίαι κέλευθοι motif as a variation on the standard rhetorical *aporia*.

[48] *L.A.* 3.128. As distinct from Moses the philosopher, who attains understanding through a sort of divine revelation, Aaron relies on exegesis (= σαφήνεια) and truth for his salvation: χρώμενος . . . ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τοῦ λόγου, σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ· εἰ γὰρ παιδευθείη ὁ θυμὸς οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ λόγῳ εἴκειν καὶ σαφηνείᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀψευδὲς ἀσκεῖν, ἑαυτὸν τῆς πολλῆς ζέσεως ἀπαλλάξει τήν θ' ὅλην ὕλεων κατασκευάσει. Note that the object of education is the attainment of an optimum *ethical* state. Hence τὸ ἀψευδές becomes a matter of lifestyle (*askesis*).

[49] Cf. *QG* 4.204 (on Gen. 27:16): "The wiseman is gleaming and naked to the truth; and just as in the case of other virtues, so also does he . . . exhibit . . . courage. And if it is necessary, as sometimes happens, that he conceals this . . . because of the necessity of the occasion and uses economy, he remains in the same state . . . but he changes to another kind of form, as in a theater, for the benefit of the spectators. For this is what physicians are accustomed to do. . . . And sometimes he will speak falsehoods, not being a liar, and he will deceive, not being a deceiver, and he will insult, not being an insulter." Similarly at *QG* 4.206, "When Jacob says to his father 'I am Esau' he speaks the truth according to the principle of nature (κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον) for his soul is moved in accordance with that form (τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ἐκείνου εἶδος κινουμένης)."

[50] So at *L.A.* 3.230, cited above, where the phrase νῷ διαφθείροντι τὸ ἀληθές occurs. The metaphor of διαφθείρειν may be obliquely sexual.

subtlety of the sophistic (i.e., the Hellenic) mind. The danger of sophistic inventions resides in their strong appeal to the mind and their use of pleasure to deceive: i.e., the corruptive potential of Hellenism rests in the dual evils of pleasure and plausibility. Hence, in the diction of Philo, the adjective πιθανός, applied to the products of human reasoning, has a distinctively negative flavor. The risk of corruption by the plausible allurement of Hellenism is so great that the only final recourse is to complete and uncompromising segregation from such influences. In order to express this notion, Philo in one passage (*Quis Her.* 305) uses the metaphor of geographical separation:[51] as compared with the risk of shipwreck on the high seas of Greek subtleties, the Truth concerning God provides a haven and safe anchorage.

> But if even all the plausible fallacies (αἱ ψευδεῖς πιθανότητες) are refuted by true convictions (διελεγχθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν πίστεων) we shall run away from the land of falsehood and sophistry, eager to find an anchorage in the most secure of all roadsteads, the haven of truth (τοῖς ἀληθείας ναυλοχωτάτοις ὑποδρόμοις καὶ λιμέσιν ἐνορμίσασθαι ἐπειγόμενοι). For it is *impossible* to turn back from, to hate, to leave the plausible falsehood, unless the sin involved in it (τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ἁμάρτημα) be revealed complete and consummated. And this revelation will be made when, confronted by the firm evidence of truth, it receives the much

[51] Plato and Philo differ in the metaphors they use of truth. Plato favors imagery which emphasizes the strenuous—and continuous—effort involved in attaining truth. Truth itself is an objective to be espied (*Phaedo* 66d, 99e.6), grasped (*Phaedo* 65b.2), held (*Leg.* 709c.8); the attainment of it is a skill (*Leg.* 709c.8) comparable to an athlete's: in *Crito* 48a truth is an athletic trainer (cf. *Phaedo* 90d.7); in *Phaedo* 66a.6 truth is the prize in a race; in *Crat.* 436c.3 the wordsmith is likened to an archer whose target is the truth; in *Crat.* 421a–b δόξα is a sort of inaccurate aiming. In *Theaet.* 150c.7 Socrates represents himself as a "midwife of truth." Truth to Plato is necessarily dynamic, since it is the focus of the incessant activity of the mind; hence the etymology he gives ἀλήθεια in the *Cratylus* (421a–b): "the divine movement of the real," ἡ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φόρα . . . ὡς θεία οὖσα ἄλη. Even semantic ambivalence is described in kinetic terms as a sort of civil unrest among words (*Crat.* 43d.2, ὀνομάτων στασιώντων). Philo on the other hand prefers imagery which emphasizes the union or fusion of seeker and truth. In *Ebr.* 6.6 the union with truth is represented as a wedding; in *Ebr.* 86.5 truth is a pure white gown to be worn; in *QE* 1.20 truth is a suffusing light from on high (cf. *Vit. Jos.* 68.3, *L.A.* 3.7 and 3.45; in the latter passage the light comes from within); the imagery of a safe place or refuge from one's travels or troubles is found at *Quis her.* 305 (truth as a safe harbor), *QG* 4.125 (truth as the end of one's road), *L.A.* 128.1 (truth as a beam salvaged from shipwreck). The teaching which leads to the truth is spoken of as a road, path, or practice: *Gig.* 58.3, *QG* 4.125, *L.A.* 128.7, *Cher.* 9.8.

> needed refutation (ἐκ τοῦ μὴ περιέργως διελεγχθῆναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀντίταξιν καὶ βεβαίωσιν).

We should note that in this encounter between false plausibilities (ψευδεῖς πιθανότητες) and true convictions (ἀληθεῖς πίστεις) there is no room for cross-examination and dialogue (ἔλεγχος) in the Socratic spirit. Falsehood will be refuted (διελεγχθῆναι), not by the dialectical process of discourse (ἔλεγχος), but unilaterally by πίστις; of this Philo has no doubt. Nonetheless, the encounter with πιθανὰ σοφίσματα is to be avoided, at all costs. The tone of this passage reveals a man who speaks from bitter experience.

It appears, then, that despite the Platonic posture of his diction, Philo means by ἀλήθεια something rather different from what Plato intends. In the first place, Philo's emphasis on truth as the *content* of belief (ἡ ἀληθὴς περὶ θεοῦ δόξα = τὸ πιστεύειν θεῷ) obviates the problem that Plato had had with truth in the social arena, namely, how to establish and institutionalize the lasting authority of the philosopher's perception of it once he had got it. For Plato, removing the ambivalence implicit in the notion "truth" involved a radical restructuring of society, with the best minds actively and constantly being focused—to the greatest extent humanly possible—on τὸ ὄν. All human institutions—convention, belief, even stories and entertainment—are generated from the precepts of these few men. The solution to the lack of an ultimate authority about reality among men is an authoritarian restructuring of society. Only the Oracle at Delphi remains intact, because its authority is universally recognized. For Philo, on the other hand, the authority which rises above all dispute is that document wherein the "all-wise" philosopher Moses has encoded his understanding of truth. More significantly, the forms (εἴδη) of truth subsist in the actual text of the Pentateuch (*QG* 4.168):

> The Holy Scriptures . . . are more truthful than any other thing. . . . [Those who] dwell on the literal meaning only rather than on the content of the narrative, and teach and deal with the words and literal text . . . are blind and thick-skinned. But they are unable to look into the inner meaning at the intelligible forms (πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ εἴδη).

For Philo, *exegēsis,* not *elenchos,* becomes the avenue of approaching the truth of the world. And truth, once apprehended, must be kept beyond the reach of quarreling and disputations. In this conception,

there can be no approximation to it, no degrees or gradations of it: as it exists in the human mind, truth is a set standard (κάνων, *L.A.* 3.233) which can be corrupted by sophistic riddles and plausible arguments.

There can be no doubt that Philo found confirmation of his understanding of truth in the text of the Septuagint; to a certain extent his use of ἀλήθεια is shaped by his familiarity with Septuagint usage. Here, in appropriating the Greek noun ἀλήθεια as one among several possible renditions[52] of the Hebrew word *'EMET,* the translators typically expanded and enhanced the semantic range of the Greek word. The most fundamental difference between Hebrew *'EMET* and Greek ἀλήθεια may be stated to be this: *'EMET,* denoting that which is "firm" and hence "'solid,' 'valid' or 'binding'"[53] requires of those who recognize it conformity to it;[54] this is a normative conception with significant ethical implications. To the present day, in fact, "in Judaism . . . truth is predominately an ethical notion: it describes not what is but what ought to be."[55] To the Greek mind, on the other hand, truth is, as we have noted, imbued with the eristic and highly pluralistic life of the polis, with its law courts and gymnasia. A brief survey of several uses of ἀλήθεια in the Septuagint demonstrates the extraordinary new senses that the word acquired in serving to translate *'EMET.*

Most prominent in the use of ἀλήθεια in the Pentateuch is the suggestion that truth is a quality immanent in God's relationship to, and

[52] Cf. Bultmann, "Ἀλήθεια" 233: "in the LXX ἀλήθεια is mostly used for *'EMET* (87 times). The equivalent in Gen. 24:49; Josh. 24:14; Is. 38:19; Dan. 8:12, and 9.13 is δικαιοσύνη, . . . and πίστις only in Jer. 35 (28):9; 39 (32):41; 40 (33):6. . . . In Is. 38:18, 19 there is an alternation between ἐλεημοσύνη and δικαιοσύνη."

[53] Bultmann, "Ἀλήθεια" 242.

[54] Bultmann, "Ἀλήθεια" 242 n. 1: "The Hebrew says *amen* ('firm' or 'sure') to denote that he accepts as authentic what is laid before him. It is then predominately used in cultic situations, whether of the community . . . or with a distinctly religious accent. . . . The expression 'God of the Amen' (Is. 65:16) derives from this liturgical use." The *LXX* translate the latter phrase ὁ θεὸς τῆς ἀληθείας, "the God of Truth."

[55] *Encyclopaedia Judaica* s.v. "Truth," col. 15. This is not to deny that Jews can be any less litigious and eristic than anyone else, when the occasion affords. The pragmatic truth of everyday situations for Jews and Greeks was roughly synonymous. With the above quotation, compare Boman, *Thought* 202–3: "The . . . Hebrew concept of truth is expressed by means of derivatives of the verb *'aman* – 'to be steady, faithful'; *'amen* – 'verily, surely'; *'omen* – 'faithfulness'; *'umnam* – 'really'; *'emeth* – 'constancy, trustworthiness, certainty, fidelity to reported facts, truth'; cf. *'omenah* – 'pillar, door-post'. In short, the Hebrews really do not ask what is true in the objective sense but what is subjectively certain, what is faithful in the existential sense."

treatment of, his servants. Particularly striking is the persistence of the connection established by the Septuagint translation between ἀλήθεια as an abstract noun and as the metaphor of the master–servant relationship. Truth is coupled with justice (δικαιοσύνη) and compassion (ἐλεημοσύνη or ἔλεος) as an attribute of the authority of God (so at Gen. 24:27, 32:10); on the other side of the relationship ἀλήθεια characterizes the devotional attitude of the servant before his God—as, e.g., at 1 Samuel 12.24, where the translators treat ἐν ἀληθείᾳ as synonymous with ἐν καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν (modifying δουλεύσετε αὐτῷ). Similarly, piety (literally "fear of God") and truth are effectively identical in the rendering of 2 Chronicles 19.9, ἐν φόβῳ κυρίου, ἐν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ἐν πλήρει καρδίᾳ (cf. 2 Kings 20:3). Truth (as faithfulness) appears first on the list of ethical traits for which Job is noted: ἐκεῖνος ἀληθινὸς ἄμεμπτος δίκαιος θεοσεβὴς . . . (Job 1:1). More directly significant for the development of Philo's philosophy, perhaps, is the use of ἀλήθεια in the Twenty–fourth Psalm, where the words ὁδήγησόν με ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειάν σου καὶ δίδαξόν με ὅτι σὺ εἶ θεός "would naturally be taken as a prayer to be divinely taught and so led to a knowledge of 'the truth.'"[56] Moreover, the Septuagint translation of this psalm encourages the view, developed in Philo, that truth amounts to living one's life in conformity with the Covenant of Moses: πᾶσαι αἱ ὁδοὶ Κυρίου ἔλεος καὶ ἀλήθεια τοῖς ἐκζητοῦσι τὴν διαθήκην αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια αὐτοῦ (v. 10). Truth becomes an abstract and absolute attribute of the authority of God, who is master of *the* Truth, which in turn stands contrasted to empty beliefs: Κύριε ὁ θεὸς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἐμίσησας τοὺς φυλάσσοντας ματαιότητας (Ps. 30:6). On the theological and philosophical implications of the use of ἀλήθεια in the Septuagint Dodd aptly makes the following observation:

> In many such passages it is not easy to read in the Greek the true meaning of the Hebrew, and the result is a certain intellectualizing of religion. Not the "faithfulness" of God, but abstract "truth" in God becomes the supremely worshipful thing, and the pursuit of "truth" becomes a characteristic activity of the religious man. This intellectualizing tendency in

[56] Dodd, *Bible* 73. Segal sharply criticizes Dodd for his approach, whereby he finds "the translation of Torah as *nomos* to be a significant problem in the study of ancient Judaism" ("Torah" 20). Segal's conclusions about the use of *nomos* among Jewish writers—"the agenda of the Jewish community involved removing unwanted association from a term which was ambiguous to the Gentiles, but appears not to be ambiguous to Jews at all"—cannot be applied to the use of ἀλήθεια among these same authors.

> Hellenistic Judaism reaches an advanced stage in Philo, for whom ἀλήθεια is "the power that brings revelation of things that were wrapped in shadow" (*Ebr.* 6).[57]

To be sure, Philo's use of ἀλήθεια is determined by many factors in his environment, of which the Septuagint text is but one. And yet the way the text was read, and how this particular word was used in the Greek-speaking Jewish community of Alexandria, undoubtedly acted as a counterweight to the more conventional senses of the word to which Philo was exposed in the course of pursuing his general ("encyclical") education. The reconstruction of these influences at this remove, and with the loss of so much of our primary evidence, is of course impossible. Nonetheless, Philo's view of the Greek notion of truth—especially in its contemporary, highly relativistic expressions—indicates a wide psychological chasm which separates Philo the Jew from the spirit of the Hellenic world around him. In this respect it is worthwhile to ask what underlies the marked, almost emotional tenor of Philo's strong aversion to πιθανὰ σοφίσματα and αἱ ψευδεῖς πιθανότητες. The reference is unmistakably to a species of Hellenic philosophy. In matters of philosophical doctrine Philo is generally very clear about where his sympathies lie. His regard for Plato approaches emulation, almost to a fault, whereas his debt to Stoicism is extensive and bespeaks a profound admiration of much that this school had to offer. In fact, that such Greek philosophers came so close to what Philo regards as the true philosophy of Moses only confirms his convictions; after all, Plato's ultimate source for *his* understanding was the Hebrew Lawgiver. As to the Epicureans, there is no risk of enticement from that quarter, since they are a godless abomination of the worst sort; Philo would hardly call the Epicurean philosophy "plausible." Rather, by πιθανὰ σοφίσματα are undoubtedly meant primarily the logical arguments of the Skeptics, who were the true inheritors of the Platonic practice of the dialectic—and to a lesser extent the propositional logic of the Stoics, whose notion of truth admits of bivalence. It is, in fact, the sheer open-endedness of (Skeptical) dialectic which Philo finds so inimical to the security afforded by his notion of truth as ethical practice (*askēsis*).

One passage is particularly revealing about the psychology of Philo's understanding of "truth": the literary trope which he deploys in

[57] Dodd, *Bible* 74.

the exordium to his treatise *On the Creation of the World according to Moses* (*De Opificio Mundi*). The passage in question deserves to be cited in its entirety:[58]

> While among other lawgivers some have nakedly and without embellishment drawn up a code of the things held to be right among their people, and others, dressing up their ideas in much irrelevant and cumbersome matter, have befogged the masses and hidden the truth under their fictions, Moses, disdaining either course, the one as devoid of the philosopher's painstaking effort to explore his subject thoroughly, the other as full of falsehood and imposture, introduced his laws with an admirable and most impressive exordium. He refrained, on the one hand, from stating abruptly what should be practised or avoided, and on the other hand, in face of the necessity of preparing the minds of those who were to live under the laws for their reception, he refrained from inventing myths himself or acquiescing in those composed by others.[59]

The rhetorical emphasis of the passage is worth noting: τῶν ἄλλων νομοθετῶν, οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπικρύψαντες. Μωυσῆς δὲ . . . τὸ μὲν ὡς . . . ἀφιλόσοφον, τὸ δὲ ὡς κατεψευσμένον. In

[58] Philo *De Opificio Mundi* 1.1–2 (tr. F. H. Colson, Loeb edition vol. I). See Goodenough, *Philo* 35–36.

[59] L. H. Feldman has called my attention to the proem of Josephus' *Antiquities*, where similar language occurs (1.15–16): "At the outset, then, I entreat those who read these volumes to fix their thoughts on God, and to test whether our lawgiver has had a worthy conception of his nature and has always assigned to him such actions as befit His power, keeping his words concerning him pure (καθαρόν) of that unseemly mythology (ἀσχήμονος μυθολογίας)" (tr. H. St. J. Thackeray, Loeb edition). For the contrast between Moses and other lawgivers, cf. Josephus *A.* 1.21–23: "He [Moses] did not, when framing his laws, begin with contracts and the mutual rights of man, as others have done; no, he led their thoughts up to God and the construction of the world; he convinced them (πείσας) that of all of God's works upon earth we men are the fairest; and when once he had won their obedience (ὑπακούσαντας) to the dictates of piety, he had no further difficulty in persuading them of all the rest (ῥαδίως ἤδη περὶ πάντων ἔπειθεν). Other legislators, in fact, following fables (τοῖς μύθοις ἑξακολουθήσαντες), have in their writings imputed to the gods the disgraceful errors of men and thus furnished the wicked with a powerful excuse; our legislator, on the contrary, having shown that God possesses the very perfection of virtue, thought that men should strive to participate in it, and inexorably punished those who did not hold with or believe in these doctrines (τοὺς μὴ ταῦτα φρονοῦντας μηδὲ μὴν πιστεύοντας)." In his note to the latter passage Thackeray observes that Josephus here "has before him Philo's *De Opificio Mundi*." (Cf. Jos. *Contra Ap.* 2.256–57.) For Josephus and Philo alike the recognition of truth proceeds from—and is secondary to—obedience and trust (πίστις).

effect, Philo begins his treatise on creation with a priamel, or rhetorical focusing device, which aims to establish the authority and veracity of the account that he is about to offer: "Some say this, others that, liars; the truth, however, is . . ."[60] The locus classicus for the motif that Philo here deploys is to be found in the prologue to Hesiod's *Theogony*.[61] In this passage Hesiod relates how the Muses came to him while he was tending his flocks on Mount Helicon. In their epiphany the Muses distinguish the falsehoods typical[62] of (epic) poets from the truth which they themselves have come to proclaim to Hesiod. Being so informed, Hesiod then, at their direction, breaks off for himself a wand as a symbol of his position as spokesman for the Muses; whereupon the goddesses breathe into him a divine utterance (αὐδὴν θέσπιν) that he might proclaim (v. 31) τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα—a phrase which effectively glosses the substantive ἀληθέα of verse 28. The sum effect of this account is to affirm the veracity of the theogony that is to follow, and to declare that the authority for it is unimpeachable.

Rhetorically, Philo's proem to *De Opificio Mundi* serves the same purpose as the Hesiodic prologue. Philo here distinguishes between true and false law codes in order to affirm the authority of the account he is about to render: lawgivers other than Moses lacked the inspiration of true philosophy, and hence they either promulgated unauthoritative and prosaic edicts, or falsely ascribed their laws to mythic superhuman sources (e.g., Lycurgus citing Apollo as author of his legislation).[63] The

[60] I emphasize the shape and not the content of the proem. Prosaic *nomothetae* are not explicitly condemned as false, although their approach is said to be ἀφιλόσοφον, which for Philo means something short of the truth. For a discussion of the priamel-as-proem cf. Bundy, *Pindarica*; also Siegmann, "Theogonieproömium," and Walcot, "Proemium." The traditional nature of this opening may be illustrated briefly by the (preserved) opening lines the Homeric *Hymn to Dionysus* 1–5, οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ . . . φάσι οἱ δὲ . . . οἱ δὲ . . . ἄλλοι δ' ἐν . . . ψευδόμενοι.

[61] That Philo knew Hesiod well cannot be doubted. In *De Aeternitate Mundi* 17–19 he cites Hesiod's *Theogony* 116–17 directly, and refers to Peripatetic as well as Stoic interpretations of Hesiod (Runia, "Interpretation" 127). Moreover, in this same passage Philo compares Hesiod's account of the emergence of Chaos and Gaia with the Biblical creation account. Hesiod's *Theogony* was an important text for the cosmological speculations of some of the leading philosophical schools; Stoics, Peripatetics, Neoplatonists. Furthermore, it is clear from the papyri fragments of ancient Egypt that Hesiod was very widely read in Egypt throughout the Hellenistic and Roman Periods, as Pack, *Papyri* 46–48, demonstrates.

[62] The point of ψεύδεα πολλά (verse 27) is that lying by poets is frequent.

[63] Plut. *Vit. Lyc.* 42.5.3, 43.6.1, 43.6.5.

source on which Philo draws has claim to being a higher authority. Elsewhere Philo amply establishes the transcendent authority of Moses; Moses is inspired directly by God, and serves as a spokesman for a higher form of knowledge in the same way that the Homeric poet served as spokesman for the Muses. Furthermore, Philo makes it clear that he regards the writings of Moses—and in particular the Septuagint text—as a divinely inspired expression.[64] Not infrequently he refers to the writing of Moses as oracles,[65] and in his exegesis of the text he regards the words of Moses as literally the words of God. Moreover, to define in precise terms the relationship of Philo the interpreter of Moses to Philo the philosopher is actually impossible, since for Philo Moses is at once a historical figure who wrote actual words, and an ideal form or archetype of the philosopher, whom Philo as exegete (presumably) embodies, however imperfectly. At any rate, the rhetorical shape of Philo's exordium to *De Opificio Mundi* suggests that at one level Philo, in his own view, stands in relation to Moses as Hesiod stands to the Muses, while at another level Philo also (perhaps) stands in the same relation to Truth as does Hesiod to his Heliconian Muses.

What is of interest in Philo's use of this conceit—in effect investing his own words with a transcendent and superhuman authority—is that the only preserved examples of this figure in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods occur among Jewish authors.[66] Such a pattern of occurrences most likely reflects reality rather than the randomness of our preserved evidence because of the associations which the Hesiodic "declaration of divine truth" has acquired in the cultural discourse of the Hellenistic period.

The technique of the dialectic had, in the early Hellenistic period, made a frontal assault on the very notion of truth, in the hands of

[64] Cf. *De Vit. Mosis* 2.7.38–40.

[65] As in *De Vit. Mosis* 2.188: οὐκ ἀγνῶ μὲν οὖν, ὡς πάντ' εἰσι χρησμοί, ὅσα ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς βίβλοις ἀναγέγραπται, χρησθέντες δι' αὐτοῦ. Cf. *De Vit. Mosis* 2.34, 69; *De Opif. Mund.* 8, *et alibi.*

[66] Josephus, in a passage discussed in note 59 above, and *Orac. Sib.* 4.2–5, to be considered below. The latest Greek author to deploy the *topos*—as far as I have been able to tell—was Plato, *Phaedrus* 244a (οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτυμος λόγος . . .). Cf. also Parmenides fr. 1, and Epimenides fr. 1. The latter two authors represent a tradition in which the philosopher–poet establishes the authority of his *sophia* by representing his vision as a revelation vouchsafed in an encounter with a goddess–abstration: in Parmenides' case, Dike; in Epimenides', Aletheia, most probably. For Epimenides' encounter with Aletheia see West, *Theogony* 162.

dialecticians such as Diodorus Cronus. The notorious Liar Paradox attributed to Eubulides of Megara had excited the intellectual world of Alexandria in the days of Ptolemy Soter with the provocative notion that truth is logically impossible.[67] The Liar Paradox, as we have it, is formulated around the verse attributed to the Cretan Epimenides, that Cretans are always liars (Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται). If Cretans are *always* liars, Eubulides had asked, how can Epimenides, who is a Cretan, assert that Cretans always lie without contradicting himself? And if he is lying in stating that Cretans are always liars, has he stated a truth, or is he lying? As Cicero puts the problem (*Acad.* 2.96), *si dicis te mentiris verumque dicis, mentiris; dicis autem te mentiri; mentiris igitur.*[68] A further complexity for the ancient reader lies in the fact that the verse of Epimenides—Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θήρια, γάστερες ἄγραι—is fashioned after Hesiod's *Theogony* (25–27), in which the Muses have proclaimed the truth of their utterance to the poet:

[67] Diogenes Laertius (2.108) credits Eubulides of Megara with inventing the Paradox of the Liar. The paradox in the form associated with the name Epimenides was brought to Alexandria in the 290s B.C. by Diodorus Cronus, according to D.L. 2.111–12. A logical antinomy about truth and lying was known to Aristotle, and Theophrastus (*Soph. Elench.* 25 = 180a, 32–34, ὅμοιος δ' ὁ λόγος περὶ τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα καὶ ἀληθεύειν; cf. D.L. 5.49, where περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου α', β', γ' are ascribed to Theophrastus), but the form of the paradox which became notorious among Jewish and Christian thinkers was evidently the one associated with the name Epimenides.

[68] As to how the "dialecticians" (by whom he means the Stoics and Antiochus; cf. *Acad.* 2.97) treat the Liar paradox, Cicero says, *sed hoc extremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia,* and then characterizes their embarrassed treatments of the Sorites and the Liar as *quas plagas ipsi contra se texuerunt.* The Liar was regarded as "inexplicabile" because it failed to conform to one of the basic patterns of propositional logic (see Long, *Philosophy* 143). Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 45.10, *quid me detinas in eo quem tu ipse pseudomenon appellas, de quo tantum librorum compositum est?*; and Front. 146 Naber, *discere te autem ceratinas et soritas et pseudomenus, verba contorta et fidicularia, neglegere vero cultum orationis . . . hoc indicat loqui te quam eloqui malle.* See Pease, *Cicero* 364, note. For history and discussion of the Liar Paradox (also known as the Epimenides Paradox) see Martin, *Liar.* Cf. Bertrand Russell's summary in *Meaning and Truth* 62, note: "A man says 'I am lying', i.e., 'there is a proposition **p** such that I assert **p** and **p** is false.' We may, if we like, make the matter more precise by supposing that, at 5:30 he says 'between 5:29 and 5:31 I make a false statement', but that throughout the rest of the two minutes concerned he says nothing. Let us call this statement '**q**'. If **q** is true, he makes a false statement during the crucial two minutes; but **q** is his only statement during this period: therefore **q** must be false. But if **q** is false, then every statement that he makes during the two minutes must be true, and therefore **q** must be true, since he makes it during the two minutes. Thus if **q** is true it is false, and if it is false it is true." Russell (ibid.) evades the paradox by positing a hierarchy of languages.

ποίμενες ἄγραυλοι, κακ' ἐλέγχεα, γάστερες οἷον,
ἴδμεν ψευδέα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

The paradox had been known at Alexandria since the 290s, for Callimachus makes pointed use of his audience's familiarity with it in his *Hymn to Zeus*.[69] In this poem, in fact, Callimachus appropriates the paradox of Eubulides to signal that Hesiod's conception of poetic utterance as truth is no longer valid for audiences of his day: for the sophisticated Hellenistic audience of the Alexandrian court, truth is a matter of perception, not objective reality: "Let me tell such lies as could convince the ear of the hearer" (ψευδοίμην αἴοντος ἃ κεν πεπίθοιεν ἀκουήν, *H.* 1.64), the narrator of the hymn prays. This programmatic pronouncement, made in the context of an evocation of the Liar Paradox, effectively disavows the literary topos which Hesiod and the Homeric rhapsodes (and Parmenides, Epimenides, and Protagoras after them) had used: the confident declaration of the authoritative truth of one's own account. For all effects and purposes this figure in Greek literature—certainly among the poets—is dead;[70] poetic truth is henceforth entirely subjective. In the realm of logic as well, the antinomies of Di-

[69] Verse 8, where in response to the narrator's demand to the god, πότεποι, πάτερ, ἐψεύσαντο; comes the reply (unattributed, but perhaps from Zeus, who may be Cretan born, and certainly is Cretan born, or perhaps from the Cretan Epimenides): Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται. Callimachus' evocation of the Liar Paradox probably attests to the influence of Diodorus Cronus at the Ptolemaic court in the late 290s. It is certain that logical antinomies held a certain vogue at the court of Ptolemy Soter because of the influence of Diodorus Cronus: the preposterous anecdote preserved at D.L. 2.111–12 at least documents Diodorus' presence in Alexandria; and Callimachus himself, in his epigram about Diodorus Cronus (fr. 394; see Pfeiffer ad loc. for the difficulties in the reconstruction of this fragment) comments on his influence. More significantly yet, a παίγνιον that Athenaeus (*Deipn.* 9.64, 401e) quotes as the epithet of Philetus of Kos attests to the notoriety that the antinomy had acquired already in the third century B.C., and something of the seriousness with which it was studied—by Philetas of Cos, no less: ξεῖνε, Φιλητᾶς εἰμί. λόγων ὁ ψεύδομενός με / ὤλεσε, καὶ νυκτῶν προντίδες ἐσπερioί.

[70] Cf., however, *SVF* Cleanthes fr. 557 (= Clemens Alex. *Protrep.* 7.72): "Κλεάνθης . . . οὐ θεολογίαν ποιητικήν, θεολογίαν δὲ ἀληθινὴν ἐνδείκνυται," "Cleanthes set forth, not a poetical, but a factual account of divinity." This is not a direct quotation of Cleanthes, of course, but an observation by Clement of Alexandria. The spirit of Stoic etymologizing very much accords with Philo's approach, particularly the impulse to find philosophical truth in traditional literature. The issue at stake with both Philo and the Stoics is to establish the traditional medium of folk wisdom once again firmly in the seat of unassailable authority. It is an open question to what extent the Stoics were subject to Semitic influences in their treatment of traditional stories.

odorus had compelled the Hellenistic schools to define their criteria of truth most precisely.[71]

There is some evidence[72] that the Liar antinomy was known in Jewish circles of Philo's day, and I would suggest that Philo himself gives some indication of obliquely arguing against it.[73] The Christian writer of the Pauline letter to Titus (1:12, 13) quotes the words, Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, and in fact gives the entire hexameter from which they were taken.[74] What is noteworthy is that in his citation of this verse Deutero–Paul seems to betray a familiarity with the Liar Paradox; for in admonishing Titus on the heretical tendencies of the Cretans he says, εἶπέν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν (i.e., of the Cretans), ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης, "Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θήρια, γάστερες ἄργαι," and he adds directly: "This testimony is true" (ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη ἀληθής). If Deutero–Paul's use of ἀληθής here hints at the Liar Paradox, as the emphasis he gives this word suggests,[75] the verse he cites was probably closely associated in his day, and among Jewish intellectuals of his training, with this logical antinomy.

Within this context it is curious that the only Greek writers after Callimachus (to our knowledge) to use the Hesiodic proclamation of truth as a literary sphragis or seal are Jewish authors: Philo in the proem to *De Opificio Mundi*; Josephus, who evidently had a copy of Philo before him; and the anonymous author of the Jewish *Sibylline Oracles*.[76]

[71] See Sedley, "Diodorus Cronus." D.L. 7.54 (= Long and Sedley, *Philosophers* §§ 40A 1) calls καταληπτικὴ φαντασία the criterion of truth for the Stoics, namely Chrysippus, Antipater, and Apollodorus.

[72] See my discussion of the Pauline epistle to Titus 1:12, 13, below.

[73] At *OG* 4.206 the man of virtue (ὁ σπουδαῖος) is incapable of deceiving even when he acts deceptively (i.e., the man of truth cannot lie even when he tells a lie). Therefore "when Jacob says to his father 'I am Esau' he speaks the truth according to the principle of nature (κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον), for his soul is moved in accordance with that form (τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ ἐκείνου εἶδος κινουμένης)."

[74] The words Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται may have been a sort of folk saying, and need not themselves be the creation of Epimenides; but the point of the Liar Paradox derives from the fact that the speaker is recognizably himself a Cretan.

[75] The point of the irony seems to be that the pagan Cretans cannot speak the truth since they don't know The Truth. For a general discussion see Anderson, "Epistle to Titus."

[76] *Orac. Sib.* 4.2–5:

μέλλω ἀφ' ἡμετέρων παναληθέα μαντεύεσθαι·
οὐ ψευδοῦς Φίβου χρησμηγόρος, ὄντε μάναιοι
ἄνθρωποι θεὸν εἶπον, ἐπεψεύσαντο δὲ μάντιν.

Perhaps not insignificantly, the author of the Johannine Gospel, in creating a dramatic encounter between Jesus of Nazareth, the man of God, and Pontius Pilate, the pragmatist and skeptic, highlights the differences between their two world views by the contrast of their understanding of truth.[77] Such a constellation of Jewish examples is most likely not accidental. There can be no question that Philo, with his classical training, was familiar with the text of Hesiod; whether he actually knew the Liar Paradox may be an open question,[78] But Philo seems obliquely to refer to it at times—as in *QG* 4.206, where the antinomy appears to be turned on its head: the man of truth (meaning Joseph) cannot tell a lie even when he says a patent untruth (e.g., "I am Esau"). The writer of the Pauline epistle to Titus probably knew the paradox, and it seems to have enjoyed some notoriety among the Jewish and Christian intelligentsia.[79] If such a familiarity with the antinomy existed, the appropriation of the Hesiodic topos by Jewish authors, in disregard of the disfavor it had fallen into among educated Hellenes

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The Epiloguist to the Book of Qoheleth makes a statement to similar effect: "Qoheleth tried to write in an attractive style and to set down truthful thoughts in a straightforward manner."

[77] John 18:37–38: ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰουσοῦς· "σὺ λέγεις ὅτι βασιλεύς εἰμι. ἐγὼ εἰς τοῦτο γεγένημαι καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα μαρτυρήσω τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· πᾶς ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκούει μου τῆς φωνῆς." λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Πιλᾶτος· "τί ἐστιν ἀλήθεια;"

[78] It seems unprovable, at best, that Philo is consciously forming his proem to the *De Opificio Mundi* after the model of Hesiod's prologue to the *Theogony*—even if the two works share a certain thematic common ground. But in his instincts as a writer Philo has happily hit upon a rhetorical articulation of his theme which must derive at some level from his familiarity with Greek literary conventions. (*De Opificio Mundi* is intended to impress educated gentiles; cf. Goodenough, *Philo* 35–36.) The implications of such a motif are worth noting: Philo's conception of text as authority is profoundly Semitic and alien to the tenor of Greek culture. And yet his instincts as a Hellenically educated Jew are so thoroughly Greek that he anticipates the Hellenic objection to the question of authorization, and he responds as any good Greek writer—at least before Plato—would respond: he summons his Muse.

[79] Christian apologists are fond of citing the Liar as evidence of the spiritual bankruptcy of pagan culture; Clement of Alexandria, in his discussion of the fundaments of education (*Strom.* 5.11.6, 12.1), labels destructive all investigation περὶ ψευδαφάσκοντος λόγου καὶ κερατίνου διαλεληθότος . . . περί τε ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ σοφισμάτων, whereas τὸ . . . ζητεῖν περὶ θεοῦ, ἂν μὴ εἰς ἔριν, ἀλλὰ εἰς εὕρεσιν τείνῃ, σωτήριόν ἐστιν. Jerome and Augustine of Hippo also speak of the Liar with utter contempt (Hier. *In Amos* 1, p. 229 Vall.; *Adv. Ruf.* 1.30, p. 486 Vall.; *Tract. de Ps.* 115 (*Anecd. Mareds.* 3.2.214–15); Aug. *Contra Acad.* 2, 5, 11).

(ever since Diodorus' promulgation of the Liar Paradox), amounts to a defiance of a basic tenet of Hellenistic culture: that truth must always be established by objectifiable criteria.[80]

Given Philo's understanding of "truth," in the light of the imagery he applies to his discussion of it, his use of the Moses–as–Muse motif in the exordium of *De Opificio Mundi* amounts to an open renunciation of the prevalent Hellenic skepticism (in both the technical and nontechnical senses) about truth. More significant yet, Philo's use of this trope violates the spirit in which Hesiod had used it: for Philo is dualistic and binary in his conception of truth ("Greeks lie, God doesn't"), whereas Hesiod is pluralistic, working within an open oral tradition ("the tradition preserves many lies, but it also knows many things resembling reality"). Philo's is a self–evident truth, the truth of belief (πίστις), the truth of unreason. Defined as the *content* of belief, Philonic truth reclaims the security and safety inherent in closed, "traditional" systems. The emotional tenor of attacks on Hellenic dialectic by both Jewish and Christian writers evidently derives from a sort of siege mentality and a willful self–isolation from the intellectual openness of the wider Hellenistic environs. For Philo—and, in a parallel development, among the incipient Christian communities—truth defined as the content of belief and the object of faith becomes an abstraction of binary thought: either one believes it and knows it, or one does not.[81] Truth of this sort ceases to be the object of pluralistic, ongoing discourse in an open society, and becomes rather a shibboleth marking the lines between inclusion and exclusion. The motives for such a semantic development of the term

[80] Cf. Paul's unapologetic admission of the unphilosophical and essentially illogical nature of the Christian credo, in 1 Cor. 1:17, 18: . . . οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου, ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ. ὁ λόγος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῖς μὲν ἀπολλυμένοις μωρία ἐστίν, τοῖς δὲ σῳζομένοις ἡμῖν δύναμις θεοῦ ἐστιν.

[81] The psychological need for security and closure underlies the systematization inherent in Hellenistic philosophy, notably Stoicism and Epicureanism (Long, *Philosophy* 1–13; for a discussion of the sociology of closed systems cf. Berger, *Canopy* 81–101, 154–71.) For the Stoics τὸ ἀληθές was vouchsafed by certain criteria of truth; the Stoic sage was himself master and authority (κύριος) of a domain which encompassed the universe, which was finite, however. The Epicurean, on the other hand, found emotional security in an infinite universe within the safe confines of a closed brotherhood of converts; the role of authority about truth was assumed, in this closed society, by the person and writing of Epicurus.

ἀλήθεια must, then, be ascribed to the psychology of the users, and not to the philosophy of their literary antecedents.[82]

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CENSORSHIP OF CLAUDIUS AND VITELLIUS, A.D. 47–48

The orthographic reform of the emperor Claudius[1] did not long outlive him, and the whole subject might seem to be more of antiquarian than historical interest. But the fact that literary sources half a century later mention these innovations indicates that they played a larger role in the principate of Claudius than in modern accounts of his principate; Suetonius might have been in love with the stray fact, but Tacitus' record of the reform cannot be explained away so easily. I argue here in favor of two main conclusions: that the orthographic reform of Claudius should not be divorced from his censorship,[2] and indeed probably contributed to his decision to undertake the censorship; and that Claudius was motivated throughout his censorship by a strong sense of family tradition.[3]

First, orthography. At the end of a short list of *munia censoria*, Tacitus states that Claudius introduced new letters and made them com-

[1] It was commonly thought that Claudius wished the old Italian symbol for the Greek rough breathing (Ⱶ) to denote the Latin sound intermediate between *u* and *i* (Mar. Vict. *Ars Gramm.* 1.4). Oliver, "Claudian Letter," pointed out that the letter Ⱶ in the fifth-century Boeotian alphabet represented a sound between *ē* and *ī*. While the origin and sound of the letter is disputed, the form of the letter is fixed by inscriptions. For the second Claudian letter the situation is reversed. It is clear that the letter was intended to represent the sound of *bs* and *ps* (Prisc. *Inst.* 1.7.42), but it has not been preserved epigraphically and its form is disputed. This second letter was always considered an anti-sigma (Ↄ), but Oliver pointed out that the pictures of the letter in the manuscripts of Priscian resemble the Locrian and Arcadian symbol for *psi*, Ⅹ or Ж: "The imperial pedant did not use ψ precisely because he knew that in the Western Greek alphabet, from which the Latin had been derived, that letter represented the sound of *ch*, not of *ps*." There is no doubt that the third letter was in form a reversed and inverted digamma (Ⅎ) and was used to distinguish consonantal *v* from the vowel sound *u* (Prisc. *Inst.* 1.4.20; Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.26; cf. Gell. 14.5.2).

[2] Momigliano discussed the reform in a chapter entitled "The Man of Learning"; Scramuzza placed it in a chapter called "Claudius' Personality." Levick, *Claudius* 19, treats the reform in her chapter "The Education of a Prince" but notes correctly that "he put theory into practice as censor in 47."

[3] Levick, "Antiquarian or Revolutionary?" has argued ably that Claudius took the domination of Julius Caesar as the model for his principate; I do not want to gainsay her view, but merely to amend it by making the censorship of Claudius an exception to the general pattern.

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mon.[4] Suetonius is silent about the censorship and mentions the reform in a chapter devoted mainly to Claudius' literary efforts (*Claud.* 41.3). Since the connection between the reform and the censorship is made only by Tacitus, we might doubt whether his chronology is correct. If his chronology is correct, Tacitus has perhaps misunderstood as a censorial duty a task which Claudius performed as *princeps* during the period of his censorship. On what grounds might we support the union of orthography and the censorship? The answer to this question may be found in the late fourth century B.C., and specifically in the advent of the rhotacized Latin medial *s* in personal names. Cicero tells us that L. Papirius Crassus (cos. 336, 330) was the first to stop using the form Papisius (*Fam.* 9.21.2). Varro knew of a change from Valesii to Valerii and from Fusii to Furii,[5] and this change was attributed to Appius Claudius Caecus, who was credited with the invention of the letter *r*.[6] Since Varro used censorial records, Palmer concluded that the tradition on rhotacism reveals Appius Claudius and his colleague to have been the first censors to draw up a written list of senators.[7] The ancient sources show that Appius Claudius Caecus undertook orthographic reforms but do not tie that action specifically to his censorship in 312. Nevertheless, his name is tied to the rhotacization of *nomina,* and it is hard to imagine an occasion for this other than the redaction of the senatorial list in his censorship. We may say, then, that the Lex Ovinia established the possibility of a connection between the censorship and orthography; Appius Claudius made this possibility a reality by drawing up a written list.[8] The historical precedent justifies the acceptance of Tacitus' statement that Claudius' reform was one of his *munia censoria.* It is well known that the emperor had written a treatise on the Latin alphabet

[4] Tac. *Ann.* 11.13, *ac novas litterarum formas addidit vulgavitque.*

[5] Varro in Macr. *Sat.* 3.28; cf. Varro in *Praen.* 1 on Volesus Valesius. Quint. *Inst.* 1.4.13 remarks on the same change without citing a source. Festus 22, 232L may rely on Varro for his information on the Auselii, Valesii, and Papisii. Cf. Palmer, *Archaic Community* 259, who points out that Varro must have depended on local Sabine tradition for the Auselii, as no Aurelius is found among the consuls before 252. A Fusius may be found at L. 3.4.1.

[6] Pomp. in *Dig.* 1.2.2.36. Appius was also thought to have abandoned the use of the letter *z* (Mart. Cap. 3.261).

[7] Varro *LL* 6.86; Palmer, *Archaic Community* 258–59.

[8] Pronunciation was not at issue: Appius Claudius will have spelled the names phonetically rather than as they had been spelled previously; see Palmer, *Archaic Community* 259.

before his accession (Suet. *Claud.* 41.3); Claudius consequently will have been altogether familiar with his ancestor's contribution to Latin orthography.[9] Since Claudius waited until his censorship to effect changes which he had advocated before he became emperor, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he followed the lead of his ancestor and officially introduced the new spellings when he drew up the list of senators with his colleague L. Vitellius.

The historical tradition on Appius Claudius not only corroborates the link Tacitus makes between the censorship and orthography but also suggests that Claudius was motivated by a sense of family tradition during his censorship. Levick has pointed out that both Caesar and Claudius created new patricians.[10] There can be no doubt that Claudius did so in his capacity as censor rather than as emperor; Tacitus refers to these adlections as *munia censoris* (*Ann.* 11.25). In the same place Tacitus mentions the precedents of Romulus, L. Junius Brutus, Caesar, and Octavian: a king, a consul, a dictator, and another consul. Claudius was the first censor in Roman history to adlect men into the patriciate, and therefore might not have had a model in mind when he performed these *munia censoris*. The very fact that Claudius assumed the censorship suggests that the example of Caesar was not uppermost in his mind.[11] The patrician Claudii, on the other hand, had an association with *munia censoria* which antedated the censorship itself. C. Claudius Inregillen-

[9] Apart from his scholarly work, he might have possessed documents from the censorship of 312 B.C.: Dionysius (1.74.5) reports that the descendants of censors preserved censorial records.

[10] Levick, "Antiquarian or Revolutionary?" 105.

[11] Caesar added Gauls to the Senate, and Claudius gave a speech in support of the *primores* of Gallia Comata, who had requested the *ius adipiscendorum in urbe honorum* (Tac. *Ann.* 11.23–24). Here I pass over this parallel since Claudius' speech in support of the leaders of Gallia Comata (*FIRA* I^2 43 = *ILS* 212) is associated with his censorship only in point of time. As emperor he might have granted them the *latus clavus* on his own authority, but he chose to have the Senate sanction the grant. It is always assumed that Claudius adlected Gauls into the Senate as censor, but there is no evidence in favor of this view. Since Claudius had refrained from granting the *latus clavus* and from the exercise of *commendatio,* presumably in order to placate the Senate, it is unlikely that he added Gauls to the Senate by the most direct route of all, adlection. It might be thought that he used the favorable Senate vote as a pretext for adlection, but the Senate quite jealously had extended the *senatorum in urbe ius* only to the Aedui (Tac. *Ann.* 11.25); Claudius would have been hard pressed to interpret this vote as a vote in favor of adlection. Since Tacitus attributes the initiative in this matter to the *primores* of Gallia Comata, the whole episode should be separated from the censorship of Claudius; their coincidence in time must be regarded as a historical accident.

sis Sabinus (cos. 460) undertook the census but was prevented from completing it by the death of his colleague.[12] Six patrician Claudii served in the censorship itself during the Republic.[13] Since no imperial predecessor of Claudius had served in the censorship, the model or models Claudius might have taken for himself are probably to be found among the republican censors of his own line.

One member of the Claudian family who was in the emperor's thoughts during his censorship was his own father. In A.D. 47 he completed the road between Italy and Germany. The road had been planned by his father; the inscription commemorating the event gives full credit to *Drusus pater* (*CIL* V 8002 = *ILS* 208). But a case can be made that the one Claudian censor whom he took as a model was Appius Claudius Caecus. Appius was remembered as the builder of the military road from Rome to Capua and of the first Roman aqueduct.[14] In addition to his father's road (Via Claudia Augusta), Claudius' censorship witnessed the completion of the Via Claudia Nova in Samnium (*CIL* IX 5959 = *ILS* 209). Claudius built and repaired roads both before and after his censorship, but it may be more than coincidence that both his father's road and his own eponymous road in Italy were finished during his censorship. Inscriptions do not provide a secure parallel in the field of aqueducts. The Aqua Virgo (*CIL* VI 1254 = *ILS* 5747b) was restored before his censorship, and the Aqua Claudia (*CIL* VI 1256 = *ILS* 218) seems not to have been completed until several years after the censorship.[15] Claudius might have officially inaugurated work on the Aqua Claudia during his censorship; at any rate, the supervision of work on aqueducts is given as one of the reasons why Claudius was unaware of his wife's dalliance with C. Silius (Tac. *Ann.* 11.13).

The sphere of religion offers another parallel. Tradition credited Appius Claudius with increasing the role of the state in religion: the cult of Hercules at the Ara Maxima, hereditary among the Potitii, was trans-

[12] Livy 3.18.8, 3.22.1; cf. Suolahti, *Censors* 140, 159.

[13] In 312, 225, 204, 169, 136, and 50 B.C. The plebeian M. Claudius Marcellus was censor in 189. Claudius' Antonian great-great-grandfather (M. Antonius, cos. 99) and great-great-uncle (C. Antonius, cos. 63) served as censor in 97 and 42 B.C., respectively.

[14] Diod. 20.36.1–2; Frontin. *Aq.* 1.5; Pomp. in *Dig.* 1.2.2.36.

[15] Platner and Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary* 22–23, wondered whether Tac. *Ann.* 11.13 indicates its completion in 47; but see Richardson, *New Topographical Dictionary* 16–17.

ferred to state slaves.[16] This was the Roman history which Claudius will have learned at the knee of Livy, whether or not it was correct in all details.[17] In A.D. 47 the imperial censor[18] secured a senatorial decree which ordered the pontiffs to determine what institutions of the *haruspices* needed to be maintained or supported.[19] The decree seems to have brought the *haruspices* under official control and to have organized or reorganized them in a college.[20] Like his ancestor, the imperial censor lessened the importance of private individuals in the public religion and increased that of the state.

Further grounds for comparison are provided by the censorial control over the lists of senators and *equites equo publico*. No *equites* lost their status in the *recognitio equitum* conducted by the censors of 312; since the only other known figure comes from the censorship of 252, when four hundred were expelled, it is safe to say that both numbers were preserved because they were extraordinary.[21] The emperor

[16]Livy 9.29.9–11; Fest. 270L; Macr. *Sat.* 3.6.13. Modern scholars have usually interpreted L. 9.30.5–10 as evidence that Appius forbade some flutists (*tibicines*) the right of association in the temple of Jupiter. Livy did not name Appius Claudius, but says the musicians were *prohibiti a proximis censoribus* (9.30.5). Palmer, "Censors of 312 B.C." 309–10, emphasized the fact that Appius and his colleague were still in office at the time Livy spoke of *proximi censores*, a phrase chosen because he did not know the names of the censors in the immediately preceding college.

[17]Palmer, "Censors of 312 B.C." 293–308, argued that the *potitii* were never members of a Roman clan, but public slaves like their successors; the urban praetor probably began his supervision of the cult in 312, replacing the Pinarii. Though the removal of the *potitii* could have resulted from the censorial power to let out contracts for the purchase of slaves, Claudius with his teacher might have believed that the republican censorship exercised a supervision over the state religion. But Claudius perhaps understood the censorship better: he asked for a decree of the Senate when undertaking the sole religious reform of his censorship.

[18]Tacitus (*Ann.* 11.15) places Claudius' speech on the *haruspices* directly after his excursus on the alphabet (11.14), so the speech appears to be a resumption of the topic *munia censoria* (11.13). The speech Tacitus gives Claudius advocates that measures be taken *ne ritus sacrorum inter ambigua culti per prospera oblitterarentur*, and refers to the examination of entrails as *vetustissima Italiae disciplina*. Claudius perhaps saw his own role here as a censorial stewardship of the *mos maiorum*.

[19]Tac. *Ann.* 11.15, *viderent pontifices quae retinenda firmandaque haruspicum.*

[20]An *ordo* of 60 *haruspices* (perhaps Augustan in date) was already in existence; the possible differences between this *ordo* and the *collegium* established by Claudius are not known. Cf. Levick, *Claudius* 87, 213 n. 19.

[21]Diod. 20.36.5 (312 B.C.); Val. Max. 2.9.7; Frontin. *Strat.* 4.1.22 (252 B.C.). Cf. Astin, *"Regimen Morum"* 26–27.

was not quite so lax,[22] but his leniency in the *recognitio equitum* gave rise to anecdote. A young man of evil character was kept on the list simply because he enjoyed the approbation of his father; an infamous adulterer was punished only with the advice that he should give in to temptation *cautius* if he could not give in *parcius*. And—though the story looks apocryphal—the emperor consented to removing the *nota* beside one man's name on the condition that the *litura* remain visible (Suet. *Claud.* 16.1). Claudius did not refrain from expulsions in the *lectio senatus,* but he invited senators notorious for their bad conduct (*famosi probris*) to resign voluntarily.[23] He promised to publish a single list containing the names of those who had been expelled and those who had resigned of their own accord, in order to lessen the *ignominia* of those punished with expulsion (Tac. *Ann.* 11.25); he must have hoped to be spared the unpleasant task of removing men from the Senate. Tacitus explicitly contrasts the modern leniency of Claudius (*mitis et recens reperta ratio*) with the old-fashioned severity (*severitas prisca*) which censors once displayed. Of the *lectiones* for which the total number of men expelled is recorded, we learn of two in which there were no expulsions at all. One was the censorship of Scipio Africanus and Aelius Paetus in 199; the other was the censorship of Ap. Claudius and C. Plautius in 312.[24] The *mitis ratio* of Claudius, though modern in the method of voluntary resignations, was just as ancient as *severitas,* though less typical of the censorship. Claudius' decision to forgo the full exercise of an ancient power of the censorship might have stemmed in part from an awareness of his imperial position and a desire to obscure his real power. But Suetonius preserves a scrap of evidence which proves that the *lectio* of Appius was remembered and imitated by the emperor: he adlected a freedman's son to the Senate on the condition that he first be adopted by an *eques Romanus,* and justified the action by

[22] Suetonius (*Claud.* 16.2) says that many were removed from the list (*notavitque multos*) on the novel charge that they had left Italy without the emperor's permission. The *multi* concerned were probably *equites* rather than senators, since Suetonius has Claudius claim as a precedent the trial of C. Rabirius Postumus for *maiestas* (a mistake for *de repetundis,* perhaps arising out of confusion with his adoptive father C. Rabirius, who was tried for *perduellio*); Rabirius Postumus was still an *eques* when prosecuted in 54, and did not begin his career as a senator until 49 (*MRR* III 181). From the context it cannot be determined whether the list at issue was that of the *equites equo publico* or the *album iudicum.*

[23] For this there was Augustan precedent: Dio 52.42, 54.13.

[24] Diod. 20.36.5 (312 B.C.); Livy 32.7.3 (199 B.C.); cf. Astin, *"Regimen Morum"* 28.

citing the precedent of *Appius Caecus censor, generis sui proauctor.*[25] Performance of the *lectio* as censor called to mind the first censor entrusted with the *lectio senatus*;[26] publication of a written list also placed the emperor squarely in a tradition which may be traced back to 312 B.C.

The censorship of Claudius emulated and honored that of his ancestor with respect to roads, aqueducts, the reform of the alphabet, the expansion of the religious powers of the state, the *recognitio equitum,* and the *lectio senatus*. Roads and aqueducts so typify the censorship that Claudius cannot be shown to have taken Appius as a model. But it cannot be a coincidence that the two roads in which Claudius had the greatest personal interest were completed now, so it must be conceded that the opening of those roads influenced the timing of the censorship, if not the decision to take up the censorship itself. The leniency of Appius in the *recognitio equitum* and in the *lectio senatus* was extraordinary and altogether atypical of the censorship; the probability that Claudius was following the lead of his ancestor here is much less susceptible to doubt. The orthographic reform and the expanded state supervision of the public religion leave no room for doubt: the sole precedent for censorial activity in these spheres was the censorship of 312 B.C. Claudius' desire to institute these changes will have been a prior decision which informed his later decision to assume the censorship. Thus the anomaly of an emperor reviving an obsolete republican institution is explained: he modeled himself after the most untraditional of republican censorships and was less concerned with the traditions of

[25] Suet. *Claud.* 24.1. This information does not come in the chapter devoted to the censorship, but then neither does Suetonius' notice about the reform of the alphabet. Suetonius says that Claudius awarded the *latus clavus* to the freedman's son but indicates that this action contradicted a promise he had made about choosing senators (*lecturum se senatorem*). Up to this point in the passage it is not clear whether membership in the senatorial order or membership in the Senate itself was at issue. The citation of the censor Appius as precedent (*libertinorum filios in senatum adlegisse*) tips the balance in favor of viewing this incident as a case of direct adlection to the Senate by the imperial censor.

The senators of course argued that the *libertinus* of Appius' day was the son of a freedman, not the freedman himself, and this argument is important here only as proof that Claudius actually did refer publicly to the *lectio* of Appius Claudius.

[26] Though Hofmann, *Der Senat* 17–18, believed that the Ovinian law was passed shortly after the Licinio-Sextian rogations of 367, since the late nineteenth century it has been dated to or shortly before 312: see Willems, *Le Sénat* 155–56; Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* 418 n. 3. The law has been dated recently to ca. 315: see Hölkeskamp, *Entstehung* 142 n. 15.

the censorship (hence the absence of *severitas prisca*) than with the traditions of his own family.

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BRIEF MENTION

THE SELECTED CLASSICAL PAPERS OF BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE

Edited by Ward W. Briggs, Jr. Atlanta: Scholars Press for the American Philological Association, 1992. xxxii + 355 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $39.95.

Ward W. Briggs, Jr., and the American Philological Association deserve the thanks of the Journal and of all American classicists for this carefully edited volume of thirty-one studies by the founding father of advanced research in classical languages and literatures in the United States. Briggs has grouped the selections into five chapters, of which the first two contain articles and lectures on the value of classical studies and their status in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, most reprinted from sources not easily available to many readers; the second two contain scholarly essays, ranging in subject from Pindar and Herodotus to Julian and Paulus Silentarius, several reprinted from *AJP*; and the last is a series of sketches of other scholars whom Gildersleeve knew and admired: Friedrich Ritschl, George M. Lane, Frederic D. Allen, Thomas R. Price, Ingram Bywater, and Kirby F. Smith. The *Selections* complement Gildersleeve's own collection of *Essays and Studies* of 1890, C. W. E. Miller's *Selections from the Brief Mention of B. L. Gildersleeve* of 1930, and Briggs's fine volume of *The Letters of Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve* of 1987; and these works, together with the volumes of the Journal edited by Gildersleeve from 1880 to 1921, his published books, the Gildersleeve Prize awarded annually for the best article in the Journal, and the Gildersleeve chairs recently endowed at Virginia, Johns Hopkins, and Harvard, constitute a lasting monument to his memory.

Before Gildersleeve, the teaching of the classics in America was pedantic, shallow, and sterile; his great achievement was to set it on a course by which it could become imaginative, profound, and enriching. His inspiration was the scholarship he had encountered in Germany; the context into which he introduced philological research was the expanding interest in scientific methods in America. In his introduction, Briggs remarks on the fact that the scholarship encouraged by Gilder-

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sleeve turned away from the use of the classics for political purposes—for example, as arguments in support of republicanism in the late eighteenth century or for and against slavery in the early nineteenth. Instead, Gildersleeve used modern experiences, including the Civil War, as tools for understanding the ancient world. In the late twentieth century humanistic scholarship is frequently charged with becoming politicized, but at least in classical studies it seems to me that the primary objective is, as it became for Gildersleeve, the discovery in contemporary experience today, in thinking about race, gender, and class, insights into the experience of the ancient world which were until recently obscured by humanistic idealization of the "classic." Gildersleeve, under the influence of Goethe in particular, encouraged that idealization and in so doing contributed to the neo–humanism that we have come recently to distrust. Contemporary interest in his work should not lead to a Gildersleeve cult in classical studies. What should speak most directly to us is his insistence on method, discipline, and patient study of language and style in understanding texts and on elegance and wit in discussing them.

G. A. K.

BOOK REVIEWS

JON D. MIKALSON. Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. xvi + 359 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95.

This book looks promising. Mikalson, an established scholar on Greek religion, examines presentations in tragedy of the gods, rituals, and religious ideas to see how closely they resemble "popular religion," the religion of everyday Athenian practice and belief. Better than many literary critics, he knows the perils of treating stage pronouncements on the gods as evidence of general Greek opinion. Besides his learning on popular religion, Mikalson brings to the task sound literary sensibilities, scrupulous attention to the texts, a sober and judicious temper, and a happy freedom from eccentric preoccupations, hobby-horses, and the sort of theoretical schemes that stomp evidence under instead of standing upon it.

Unfortunately, Mikalson's work suffers from the defects that often accompany such virtues. It begins well, with a careful dissection in the opening chapter of the various religious elements that crowd the tragic stage and the problems of identifying popular religious material in the plays. But chapters 2 through 5—the real core of the book—are disappointing, full of slow, ponderous exposition of divine interventions, suppliant scenes, oaths, divination, burial rites, and other topics. References are laboriously assembled and pigeonholed (Mikalson has clearly worked his eyeballs to the bone on this one), but the resulting text is more a miscellany than an analysis. We can perceive a good overall outline of how the gods are portrayed in tragedy, but it emerges through a jumble of such odds and ends as the only broken oath in tragedy that goes unpunished (the Guard's promise at Soph. *Ant.* 388–96 not to return to Creon, dramatically insignificant) (85) and the fact that prophetic dreams in tragedy always prophesy ill and are always given to women (101–4). This is supposed to be an analytical study, not a compilation or a reference work; what is one to *do* with such knowledge? The discussions of particular plays are often sketchy, more like notes than analyses, seldom original, and frequently too long for what they have to say. The style tends to be heavy; Mikalson is capable of being pithy and trenchant but usually chooses not to be. The work is heavily overdocumented. The text drips with line numbers in parentheses, and no book should be permitted 1,123 endnotes without a dispensation from the pope or the Delphic oracle. Basically, the work is worth doing, and future scholars should appreciate the fund of material assembled. But there should be less of it, and it should be more streamlined and better focused so as to be more helpful to the reader.

Towards the end, things get better. The last half of chapter 5 is a good

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analysis of *timē* in its several related senses (the office or function of a god, the honor the god receives from mortals as a result of having such a function, the specific acts of worship that express such honor, and the honor which the god in return shows mortals) as the central concept of Greek piety. This makes sense, and it helps put modern preoccupations with the justice and morality of the gods in proper perspective. The sixth and final chapter is a good summing up of the general picture of the gods and their doings in tragedy, together with a discussion of how the three tragic poets handle religious material. Aeschylus predictably emerges as a distinctive religious thinker who makes a lot of Zeus and justice, but the discussions of Sophocles and Euripides may surprise. Sophocles, despite his reputation for piety (a reputation which Mikalson effectively picks apart), takes great liberties with popular religion for dramatic effect. For example, Mikalson regards the notorious double burial in *Antigone* as a dramatic construct that has little to do with Greek funeral practices. On the other hand, Euripides, supposedly so skeptical and rational, is the tragedian most interested in popular religion: etiologies abound, cults and rituals are represented accurately and in detail (partly because of the poet's realism and relative fondness of everyday detail), and the laws of the gods (such as they are in Greek religion) are regularly upheld. Things like this do much to make up for the prolixity of the earlier chapters.

Mikalson's main concern is identifying what in tragedy comes from popular religion and what does not. This is a limited objective. So be it; it is not an easy one, and a scholar usually needs to delimit a study if it is to say anything at all. But the limits prove narrow indeed, and they make for a book full of implications tantalizingly raised and frustratingly underexamined.

For one thing, Mikalson tends to keep the different strains of religion in tragedy separated, without considering their interactions. Myth and popular religion are treated as different programs broadcast on different channels (see esp. 3–5). Hence Mikalson has little to say about divine justice (178) and Euripides' criticism of the gods (225–26) because these matters involve the gods of myth, not those of everyday worship. But could the two "sets" of gods be as sharply divided in the mind of the average Greek as they are in Mikalson's book? The Athena who was worshiped at the Parthenon was also the goddess who was born from the head of Zeus, strove with Poseidon over Athens, and fought in the gigantomachy. At least, she was shown doing all those things in the sculptures of the Parthenon, and these myths, like the temple, gave her honor. What *did* the Greeks do with the disparate pictures of the gods presented to them in and out of popular belief? For example, popular religion tells us that Hippolytus' haughty refusal to worship Aphrodite is foolish and dangerous since people should be careful to honor all the gods, not just a personal favorite (144–47). But what happens to that pious judgment when the old servant prays to Aphrodite to pardon the young fool "because gods ought to be wiser than mortals" (Eur. *Hipp.* 120)? The Olympian preoccupation with honor is confronted, if only for a moment, with a standard that is more lenient and humane.

The former standard (by Mikalson's account) reflects popular religion, the latter does not. Does the confrontation criticize Olympian rules, or deepen the pathos of Hippolytus' suffering, or what? Mikalson does not say. He puts us in a good position to see such confrontations, but his tendency to keep different kinds of gods in different boxes gets in the way of exploring them.

Further, what is the main value of Mikalson's findings? His frequently stated purpose is to learn more about popular religion, augmenting his prose-based *Athenian Popular Religion* (Chapel Hill, 1983). But this project promises, and produces, few gains. Mikalson has a fine sense of the problems involved in extracting popular religion from tragedy, and he is rightly hesitant to label anything in tragedy as popular religion unless it is confirmed from other, less ambiguous sources. Hence tragedy can tell us little about popular religion that we do not know already. It fills in some details on asylum-seeking and funeral ritual, and it shows some of the emotions which attended (for example) supplication and oath-breaking; there is not much else.

If *Honor Thy Gods* has little to tell us about popular religion, it has quite a lot to tell us about tragedy. The discrepancy between Mikalson's stated intentions and his actual accomplishment is vexing (for one thing, it helps make for a diffuse book), but the accomplishment still deserves credit. As Mikalson develops his picture of stage gods and their ways, the differences between those gods and the gods of real life emerge as more important than the similarities. Stage gods are both harsher and more intrusive, more apt to cause bad fortune and apt to intervene more directly and forcefully in mortal affairs. They regularly punish impious conduct—breaking oaths, violating the rights of suppliants and *xenoi*, denying the right to burial, defying the gods directly. The prophecies they give always come true. In tragedy, the divine order of the world is harsher and more cruel than in "practiced religion," but it is also more sure and regular. Real life is far less tidy but more livable. It is a sobering paradox that tragedy's powerful and subtle examinations of the human condition are set in a world strictly governed by the most banal Sunday-school pieties. A more thorough examination of such paradoxes is too far from Mikalson's purpose to wish for here. But for this reviewer the main value of *Honor Thy Gods* is in exposing the paradoxes more clearly.

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EDWARD SCHIAPPA. Protagoras and *Logos*: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. xvii + 239 pp. Cloth, $29.95.

This book is divided into three parts. Chapters 1–4 constitute a *prolegomenon,* which introduces and justifies the study that follows. Chapters 5–9

deal with the major fragments of Protagoras. And chapters 10–13 focus on specific areas: education, politics, philosophy, and rhetoric. The entire book deserves attention; certain portions will be of greater interest to philosophers, others to rhetoricians, and still others to historians working on fifth-century Greece. My own concern in this review will be first with Schiappa's treatment of the *ipsissima verba* of Protagoras and then with his characterization of fifth-century rhetoric.

In chapter 2, Schiappa raises an issue central to his study of Protagoras: namely, how scholars should approach an author whose works have not survived intact. He advocates focusing on fragments in the technical, narrow sense, i.e., the *ipsissima verba* of the author in question. He rejects the idea that genuine fragments can never be securely identified (32–33) and recommends understanding fragments in the context of their own time (21–23). In chapters 5–9 he applies these principles in a detailed discussion of five major fragments: the "two-*logoi*" fragment (80B6a D–K) and that concerned with the "stronger and weaker" *logoi* (80B6b), the "human-measure" and "impossible to contradict" fragments (80B1 and 80A1, 19), and that "concerning the gods" (80B4). ("Two more Protagorean fragments" are discussed in conjunction with the fragment concerning the gods: 80B7 D–K and the alleged new fragment.) Throughout his treatment of these fragments Schiappa demonstrates considerable knowledge of the scholarly literature. He also makes clear his commitment to seeing Protagoras as a Sophist interested in *logos* generally. The connection with pre-Socratic science is explored, as is the connection with subsequent developments in logic and epistemology, metaphysics and theology. I shall not attempt a full survey of his remarks. Instead I want to focus on one fragment and raise some issues which may be of interest.

The "two-*logoi*" fragment—καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις—is discussed first (in chapter 5) and thereby given pride of place. That is striking, for Schiappa has emphasized the importance of beginning an investigation of the individual Sophists with their *ipsissima verba*. Yet this fragment gives the appearance of being a report and not a quotation. It is recorded by Diogenes Laertius 9.51 in indirect discourse: "he was the first to say" followed by subject-accusative and an infinitive. Strictly speaking, that rules out *ipsissima verba*. Schiappa acknowledges as much when he cites Catherine Osborne's concern that apparent fragments are often paraphrases (89) and then argues that "even if Diogenes Laertius is paraphrasing, Protagoras' actual words must have included three key notions: *logoi*, opposition and things (πράγματα)" (89–90). My concern here is of a general nature. I think that Schiappa and many other scholars tend to overstate the importance of *ipsissima verba*. Reports lacking direct quotation are often accurate, and they can be especially helpful if the source-author supplies an idea of the original context. Moreover, there are some fragmentary authors—I include Protagoras—for whom *ipsissima verba* are so few and uncertain that their primacy is open to question. And what is or appears to be a quotation may have been

transmitted through one or more intermediate sources. The "two–*logoi*" fragment, at least as reported by Diogenes Laertius, is just such a case, for Diogenes' source appears to be an earlier anthology, perhaps one devoted to "firsts." We may compare a later section in Diogenes' *Life*, where the biographer tells us that Protagoras was the first to distinguish four parts of discourse (9.53) and then adds that others recognize seven and Alcidamas four (9.54). The addition is not relevant to the *vita* and reflects Diogenes' cut–and–paste method. Instead of excerpting only the Protagorean material, he gives us the entire report as found in his source.

A Latin version of the "two–*logoi*" fragment is found in Seneca: *Protagoras ait de omni re in utramque partem disputari posse ex aequo et de hac ipsa, an omnis res in utramque partem disputabilis sit* (80A20). Schiappa refers to this version (89) but does not discuss it, presumably because translation into Latin rules out *ipsissima verba*. It might have been better to do so, for the Latin version is two centuries earlier than that of Diogenes and fuller in interesting ways. Of course, earlier is not always better, and in this case earlier is still at considerable remove from Protagoras himself. Nevertheless, it should be clearly stated that the first occurrence of the "two–*logoi*" fragment gives it a dialectical/rhetorical flavor: i.e., the words *in utramque partem disputari* suggest a thesis which is argued both *pro* and *contra* (cf. Cic. *Off.* 3.89, *De Or.* 3.80, *Or.* 46). The early history of the thesis is, of course, problematic, and on one occasion Cicero says that Aristotle was the first to discuss issues from opposed points of view (*Tusc.* 2.9). Cicero cites no source; Olof Gigon suggests an introduction to a lost Aristotelian dialogue (*Marcus Tullius Cicero: Gespräche in Tusculum* [Munich, 1951] 489). However that may be, and allowing that Aristotle may have played an important role in developing the method in question, it is, I think, clear that the fifth–century Sophists, including Protagoras, were capable of presenting opposed display pieces, some of which were directly relevant to oratory.

It should be noted that the Latin version offers material missing in Diogenes. This material may be an addition reflecting a later interpretation, but it should not be rejected without discussion. We may compare the fragment "concerning the gods" (80B4 D–K) discussed by Schiappa in chapter 9. It falls into two parts, of which the second is suspiciously general: πολλὰ γάρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ'ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Indeed, the idea that life is too short is already found in Empedocles (31B2 D–K) and would become a staple in later intellectual history (cf. Cicero's report of Theophrastus' dying words, no. 34A FHS&G). Nevertheless, Schiappa takes the second part of the fragment seriously, perhaps correctly (142–43, citing J. Mansfeld, "Protagoras on Epistemological Obstacles and Persons," in *The Sophists and their Legacy*, ed. G. Kerferd [Wiesbaden, 1981] 38–53).

What then should we say about Seneca's version of the "two–*logoi*" fragment? The phrase *ex aequo* is in itself unobjectionable; it can easily be a translation of the Greek ἐξ ἴσου. How it relates to the "stronger and weaker" *logoi*

fragment (80B6b) is not immediately clear and for that reason is of interest. What follows—*et de hac re, an omnis res in utramque partem disputabilis sit*—is also of interest, for at first reading it seems to count as evidence for a "subjective interpretation": i.e., understanding the "two-*logoi*" fragment in terms of "issues" and "questions" which can be argued from opposed sides (90). Hence I am uneasy with Schiappa's later assertion that "there is no evidence that Protagoras ever considered statements (*logoi*) as a subset of things (*pragmata*)" (137). Whether or not the passage in Seneca is *good* evidence, it is evidence and merits discussion. But having said that, I want to acknowledge that there is reason to take the entire clause *et de hac ipsa,* etc., as an addition to the Protagorean portion of the fragment. Seneca is attacking studies which do not contribute to wisdom and virtue. He criticises liberal studies at length (1–41) and then turns briefly to philosophers, including Protagoras, who are said to take away the hope of knowledge (45). In this context the clause in question may well be an addition by Seneca, intended to emphasize and denigrate the sceptical possibilities of Protagoras' work.

Schiappa says correctly that we should consider how persons contemporary with Protagoras might have understood the phrase περὶ παντὸς πράγματος (90–91). He also tells us that "*pragmata* is most often translated from documents in Protagoras' time as 'things'" (91), but curiously he offers no fifth-century text for our consideration. Instead he refers to M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists,* tr. K. Freeman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954) 19, and T. Robinson, *Contrasting Arguments* (Salem, N.H.: Ayer, 1979) 90n. My suggestion would be a look at the Second Tetralogy of the sophist/orator Antiphon. (According to Plutarch, *Pericles* 36.3, Protagoras and Pericles debated the case at issue there.) In *Tetr.* 2 πρᾶγμα is clearly used in reference to cases which are argued by litigants and decided by judges (2.2.1, 2.4.1). And when one considers that the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon are opposed *logoi,* it seems reasonable to ask whether these fifth-century speeches can help us interpret not only the "two-*logoi*" fragment but also the title Ἀντιλογιῶν α′ β′ (D.L. 9.55). Could the title refer to a collection of opposed speeches or discourses (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.24 1402a24–27 and Cic. *Brutus* 46)?

Here I want to acknowledge that interpreting titles is difficult, and prudence may suggest silence. Nevertheless an in-depth study of an individual Sophist would benefit from a careful, systematic survey of all titles. At very least such a survey would help prevent variations in translation which seem to serve special purposes. I am thinking particularly of Schiappa's translation of Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων (D.L. 9.55). When discussing geometry (149), he translates *On Mathematics* (as in the Loeb edition); when discussing education (160), he translates *On Subjects of Learning* (which seems to me the better choice). In the absence of a systematic survey, the titles should be carefully indexed. For Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων a single reference is given (to 160). An interesting title like Περὶ πάλης (D.L. 9.55) is entirely omitted from the index, so that Schiappa's remarks in Appendix C (215–16) may be missed by some readers.

I turn now to my second major concern: Schiappa's characterization of fifth-century rhetoric. In chapter 3 he argues against viewing the Sophists narrowly as teachers of rhetoric. He tells us that they were concerned broadly with *logos,* so that "Sophistic teaching is best understood if scholars focus on the Sophists' role in privileging *logos* over the mythic-poetic tradition" (40). That is correct, and so seems to be the claim that "rhetoric"—i.e., the Greek word ῥητορική—was not coined until the fourth century, perhaps by Plato when he wrote the *Gorgias* (40–49; cf. Thomas Cole, *The Origin of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991] 2, 98, 121, and on Cole see *Gnomon* 65 [1993] 385–89). Nevertheless, I am worried that too much is made of new coinage. For while the development of a specialized vocabulary can contribute to changes in intellectual enterprises (49; cf. 54, 200), words of late origin need not be misleading when applied to an earlier period. In particular, "rhetoric" need not mislead when used in reference to the accomplishments of Corax and Tisias. For these fifth-century Greeks seem to have instructed would-be orators in *eikos*-argumentation and to have composed one or more handbooks for instructional purposes. The material contained in their handbooks will not have measured up to fourth-century standards, but by all accounts these books were an important first. They began a long series of written *artes.*

Schiappa is sceptical of this traditional view. He even suggests that Aristotle wanted "to offer his [own] rhetoric as the final product of an art in evolution" (53) and that toward this end the Stagirite engaged in a fiction according to which Corax and Tisias originated *eikos*-rhetoric. That may be the case; but I think we can treat Aristotle in a kinder manner and at the same time do justice to what he actually says in both *Sophistical Refutations* and *Rhetoric.* Chapter 34 of the former work contains a brief account of early rhetoric. For our purposes the important point is that Tisias does not appear as the originator of the art. He is placed after the pioneers (μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, 183b31) and grouped with those who enlarged the art (ηὐξήκασι, 183b31) step by step (κατὰ μέρος, 183b19, 30). Apparently Tisias contributed to an ongoing development and did so by addressing one or more particular topics: most obviously, *eikos*-argumentation. Moreover, Aristotle does not say that his own rhetoric is "the final product" of the art to which Tisias contributed. In fact, he is quite silent concerning his own teachings on rhetoric. His focus is on dialectic, which he claims as his own; and if he takes time to name Tisias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus (183b32), it is only in order to set up a contrast with dialectic.

In *Rhetoric* 2.24 Aristotle tells us that the *ars* of Corax was composed of *eikos*-arguments in which qualifiers were omitted. As an example, he gives the case of a weaker man who attacks someone stronger (1402a17–20). The same case is found in *Phaedrus,* where Plato has Socrates attribute it to Tisias (273B4–C4). That may raise questions about the relationship between Corax and Tisias, but it does not undermine—it may actually strengthen—Aristotle's credibility concerning fifth-century rhetoric. For he is in general agreement with Plato, who first has Phaedrus attribute observations on *eikos*-argumenta-

tion to the τεχνικοί (273A3) and then makes Socrates say that Phaedrus has carefully read Tisias (lit. "tread with accuracy," 273A6). Plato even has Socrates summon Tisias to speak: "Then let Tisias tell us this as well" (273A7). Here Plato is using the dialogue form to call attention to the fact that he is drawing on the written *ars* of Tisias; and he underlines the point at the beginning of Socrates' next speech with the words "He (Tisias) wrote" (273B4). In addition, Plato has Socrates indicate how Tisias characterized the *eikos*: namely, as that which seems to be the case to most people (τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν, 273B1). The extent to which Tisias went beyond this brief description and elaborated on the *eikos* is uncertain; but if I understand Plato's dramatic technique, then the *ars* of Tisias will have contained not only the illustration concerning the weak and the strong man (273B4–C4) but also the comment embedded in the illustration: "neither party ought to tell the truth" (273B6). Furthermore, some of what Socrates says at 272D8–E5 is likely to reflect remarks by Tisias: e.g., truth is unimportant in the law courts; plaintiffs and defendants focus on what is persuasive, and that is the *eikos*.

In *Brutus* (46) Cicero cites Aristotle as his source and reports that Corax and Tisias were the first to have composed (*conscripsisse*) a handbook. Far from being a fabrication, this report seems to me essentially correct. This is not to claim that the work of Corax and Tisias constituted a beginning *ex nihilo*. On the contrary, much of what their work contained will have been traditional, so that the primary accomplishment of Corax and Tisias was to organize and to write down what earlier generations—the pioneers—had observed and taught. Indeed, Plato seems to indicate as much, when he has Socrates speak of Tisias or some other person "discovering" a buried art: ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν (273C7–8). Here the translation "inventing" would be out of place. Tisias' accomplishment was to bring to light—in writing (ἔγραψεν, 273B4)—what speakers had been doing and their teachers advising for a long time.

In concluding my review, I want to be clear that much of what Schiappa says about fifth-century rhetoric and about Protagoras in particular is interesting and credible: Protagoras began discoursing about discourse (162, 197); he popularized the lecture, dialogue, and debate as prose forms suitable for gaining and transmitting knowledge (158, 197–98); he did not anticipate Aristotle by developing a discipline of persuasive speech restricted to political assemblies, law courts, and civic ceremonies (199–200). This last point is certainly correct: Protagoras did not advance an art defined in terms of three "settings" (199). But acknowledging that, I am worried that Protagoras' contribution to the field of rhetoric may be understated. There will certainly be further discussion of the matter. At this time, however, we should all congratulate Schiappa for a clear and vigorous discussion of Protagoras—a discussion which helps us see the Sophist in relation to pre-Socratic science and the movement from an oral to a literate culture.

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LINDSAY WATSON. *Arae,* the Curse Poetry of Antiquity. Leeds, Wilts.: Francis Cairns, 1991. viii + 263 pp. Cloth, £30, US $52.50.

In his preface Watson remarks that Hellenistic curse poems are "the central concern of [this] work, and it is here, perhaps, that this monograph will prove most useful." He is correct. The core of this work is a seventy-page section reconstructing the characteristic features of curse poetry of the Hellenistic period. He organizes his analysis in ten sections, including mythological counterparts, justice, catalogue form, patterns of destruction, obscurity, abuse, and humor. His tendency toward loose organization is illustrated by two sections apparently treating the same feature of these curse poems. One discusses paradigmatic exempla on the theme of ultimate justice; the other treats the theme of ultimate justice supported by paradigmatic exempla.

Watson's reconstruction is seriously hampered by the very limited number of extant curse poems. The primary item of evidence and the only fully extant curse poem is Ovid's *Ibis,* described by the poet as an imitation of its Hellenistic predecessor, the Ἶβις of Callimachus. This poem is no longer extant and we are wholly dependent on later *testimonia* for knowledge of it. Three other items of evidence are fragmentary poems by Euphorion: Χιλιάδες, Θρᾷξ, and Ἀραὶ ἢ Ποτηριοκλέπτης. Of these, only the *testimonium* of the *Suidas* identifies Χιλιάδες as a curse poem. There is only one certain line preserved of Ἀραί (Powell fr. 8), and assignment of fragment 9 to the poem is debated. Moero's Ἀραί exists only in a summary of a single episode, although its title is instructive. To broaden the evidence for his analysis, Watson has included a brief section (lines 103–14) of Theocritus' *Idyll* 7 and the fragmentary Sorbonne papyrus 2254, neither of which are genuine curse poems, although they follow certain similar patterns. It should be noted that the texts of all of the Greek examples are reproduced with translations in Appendix 3 of the book.

The scarcity of evidence mars Watson's thesis that a common procedure of curse poetry is the collocation of curses with similar fates. While the fragments we possess of Euphorion's Θρᾷξ certainly fit this description, the pattern in the poet's other poems is not certain. Of Χιλιάδες we know only that the catalogue was of oracles fulfilled after a thousand years, not what fates the oracles predicted. Only two consecutive similar punishments remain from Ἀραί. Ovid's practice is irregular and sometimes includes the insertion of dissimilar myths, breaking up a sequence. Watson notes that Callimachus' own style cannot be determined. How, then, can this procedure be considered common?

Watson's most interesting suggestion is the humorous intent of some curse poems, as revealed by the incongruity between trivial offenses and dire punishments, superfluous massing of fatal curses and traditional comic themes. The tendency among classicists has often leaned toward taking our subjects too seriously, and Watson's thesis could provide a helpful corrective. Some of the evidence presented here, however, is inconclusive or contradictory. In the section treating incongruity between crime and punishment, Watson cites one ex-

ample of a curse poem, Euphorion's response to a certain guest who has stolen one of his fine cups (Ἀραί). For a second example, he turns to a Theocritean idyll which includes a series of provisional curses, directed at the god Pan, should he not advance the love interests of the narrator. None of the Theocritean curses, however, have any mythological counterparts, an element that Watson himself identifies as characteristic of Hellenistic curse poetry. Or perhaps he considers the reference to the cultic flogging of Pan's statue as a historical counterpart, a type of exemplum that he names but never defines or illustrates. Other instances of incongruity are "embezzlement, if, as may have been the case, the sum involved was insignificant [Χιλιάδες] and perhaps literary rivalry [Call. Ἶβις]—though this will have been taken seriously in the emotionally supercharged atmosphere of the Alexandrian Museum" (133). Watson further erodes his own argument with a footnote pointing out the seriousness of the crime of embezzlement. Finally, he notes that the horrible crime of guest murder, alleged by Euphorion in Θρᾷξ, if literal, fully justified the poet's curses.

Watson closes his monograph with a well-reasoned reconsideration of the common assertion that *defixiones* constituted a major influence on Hellenistic curse poetry. He easily rebuts earlier arguments, often by pointing out that the characteristics shared by curse poetry and *defixiones* are also shared by other types of curses. In line with this argumentation and with Watson's own classification of curses as a type of prayer, I would like to point out two prayer formulae that find parallels in curse poetry. In his influential 1910 dissertation on the influence of *defixiones* on Hellenistic curse poetry, Zipfel compares the phrase *devoveo teque tuosque* in Ovid's *Ibis* (56) to curses of familial relations and associates in *defixiones*. As Watson points out, this is a very common theme in curses. It is also a common concept in petitionary prayers, as witnessed by the formula *mihi, domo, familiae,* which appears in the prayers of the Augustan Ludi Saeculares (e.g., *CIL* VI 32323.99). Ovid includes another phrase typical of prayer formulae, *illum ego devoveo, quem mens intellegit, Ibin* (95). The phrase *quem mens intellegit* functions in exactly the same way as the formula *quos nos sentimus dicere* found in the annual vows offered for the well-being of the emperor and his family (*CIL* VI 32363). This formula insures that the requested benefits are delivered only to the intended party.

Watson's presentation in general is irregularly organized, leaving this reader with the feeling that a series of essays might have shown off the author's work to greater advantage. Detailed commentaries on a number of individual poems are the real strength of this monograph. This interest in individual poems is confirmed by the author's occasional comments on examples according to their inherent interest. For example, in his discussion of Hellenistic humor, he writes, "Nothing need be said about the vigorous, but highly stereotyped ἀραί of New Comedy. Far more interesting are . . ." (141–42). Clearly his personal predilection is toward detailed analysis rather than broad survey.

Outside the Hellenistic period, Watson treats the subject of curse poetry

in considerably less detail. As a result, the subtitle of this monograph is misleading: it encourages the prospective reader to anticipate a comprehensive examination of curse poetry throughout the literature of Greece and Rome. The actual topic is more modest in scope. Careful consideration of the Greek title *Arae* might cause the reader to suspect that greater emphasis is laid upon poetry in the Greek language. Indeed, almost twice as much space is allotted to the discussion of Greek as Latin examples, although the author comments that curses in Roman elegy "are so prevalent as almost to constitute a subject in themselves" (145). A more realistic organization and title might have been *Studies in Hellenistic Curse Poetry: Its Character and Influence.*

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SETH SCHWARTZ. *Josephus and Judaean Politics*. Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 18. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990. xii + 257 pp. Cloth, $57.25.

Schwartz's aim in this work is to reconstruct the history of Jewish politics in the thirty years after the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. His method is first of all to sketch Josephus' life in this period, to identify "his friends and enemies, patrons and opponents," and to study his writings in the light of this information in order to "determine how and when his interests, opinions, knowledge and literary style changed" (2–3). Since Josephus tends to report the same events in different works, Schwartz believes that an examination of the works (principally the *Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquities*) will provide "evidence of major changes" in Josephus' knowledge of "various traditions and literatures" (22). By combining this knowledge with what can be learned about the survival after the Destruction of the Jewish priesthood (especially the high priests and "upper priests"), of the later Herodians (especially Agrippa II), and about the Pharisees and early Rabbinic Judaism, and noting the insistence in *Jewish Antiquities* on accurate observance of the law, Schwartz concludes that the new political leadership in Judaea is to be found in the "early Rabbinic movement" (216). In fact, he maintains, *Jewish Antiquities* "promotes acceptance of the Rabbis, or some group much like the Rabbis, among the Jewish upper classes" (216).

Schwartz's boldness as a commentator is commensurate with his honesty. Most historians, I believe, if asked to compose a history of Judaean politics in the last thirty years of the first century, would reply that the sources were too sparse and too unreliable for more than a very general outline. Schwartz fully recognizes the inadequacy of the evidence but is prepared to press on regardless. A good example of this is his assessment and use of the Rabbinic writings. He recognizes that this material was not published until the third century, that it was edited by lawyers, not political historians, that its few historical stories are

so distorted that their "historical kernel" is practically unrecoverable, and that it "presumably" represents only "a tiny part of the actual legal teachings of the early Rabbis" (2–3). Nonetheless, Schwartz regularly cites Rabbinic material in support of his arguments. Whether his procedures (and his boldness) in this and other areas are justified can be determined only by a closer examination of the material he seeks to exploit to build up his case.

Some of Schwartz's claims about Josephus' writings will provoke surprise. For example, he holds that in the *Jewish War* Josephus' "tendentious account of the war . . . his tremendous concern for the Temple and the sacrificial cult, show that he retained an interest in the restoration of Jewish political power." Josephus owned landed property in Judaea and was presumably concerned for its security and therefore interested in stable government. But Josephus had more to hope for from the Romans, to whom he owed his life and status, than from any Jewish power; many Jews regarded him as a renegade; he is ignored in the Rabbinic writings (a point Schwartz does not consider). What had he to gain from the restoration of Jewish political power? Josephus' interest in the Temple and cult can readily be granted—he was after all a priest—but a case can be made for thinking that interest historical. It is sometimes claimed that there remained a lively hope that the Temple would be rebuilt, but how realistic was such a hope? Josephus himself records that Jerusalem was razed to the ground (*BJ* 7.1–3); the war had resulted in many Jewish casualties; many of the survivors were enslaved. Who was to pay for a new Temple? Josephus had probably good reason to know that the Romans were unlikely to do so; the lands and income of Agrippa II were reduced; there was no new Herod in sight.

Schwartz bases his arguments in part on a supposed second edition of *Antiquities* and on the claim that book 7 of *War* was not published until early in the reign of Trajan (p. 21). Rajak (*Josephus,* London 1983) had already shown, convincingly in my view, that there was no need to believe in a second edition of *Antiquities,* the arguments in support of which were weak. The late dating of book 7 of *War* depends in part on the identification of the Roman governor Catullus (*BJ* 7.439) with L. Valerius Catullus Messalinus, the informer, who was still alive in A.D. 93. But this identification was rejected by Groag in *PIR*² II 582, and has not been generally accepted.

Schwartz tends to minimize Josephus' knowledge of Greek, at least when he was writing the *Jewish War.* He appears to cast doubt on the report (*Vita* 15–16) of Josephus' embassy to Rome just before the outbreak of the war, but offers no grounds for his scepticism. He argues that even if the report is true, it "cannot be used as evidence that he had attained a good knowledge of Greek by the age of 26" (36 n. 44). But then, what language is Josephus supposed to have used in his meetings with Poppaea? Greek seems more likely than, say, Aramaic. Certainly among the Greek cities of the time it was usual to send men of education, philosophers and orators, on embassies to Rome.

The priesthood is dealt with in chapter 3. In book 20 of *Antiquities* Schwartz detects hostility to the behaviour of the high priests on the eve of the

war, but Josephus continues to be well disposed to the "upper priests," the class to which he himself belonged. In actual fact, despite Schwartz's careful and searching examination, there is not much that can be said about the priestly class in this period. Only fourteen priests, including Josephus, can be claimed as survivors of the war (pp. 72–74), together with a few others whose fate is unknown. It is hardly surprising that Schwartz writes that "we still cannot compose a history of the post–70 priesthood" (100). This surely is not difficult to understand, for even if some priests survived the war, and priestly dues continued to be paid, the base of financial support for the priests must have declined given the decline in population resulting from war casualties and enslavements, and the presumed impoverishment of Judaean territory. Since the priests had lost their function with the destruction of the Temple, their prestige in the community was bound to be affected, in the long run if not immediately. Their place, in a sense, was eventually taken by the Rabbis, but when the authority of the priests in effect came to an end and the authority of the Rabbis really began are dates impossible to determine. This is the awkward gap that Schwartz seeks to bridge, claiming to find in Josephus' later works "the conflation of priesthood and Rabbinism, or something like it" (100). Is it merely a slip that he declares his aim to be to "determine with a reasonable degree of *inaccuracy* something of the relations between priests and Rabbis" (100, emphasis added)? His own thorough discussions of the character of the Rabbinic writings and of the survival of the priesthood suffice to convince me, at any rate, that the evidence does not exist to make a solid join between the two groups.

A major difficulty of Schwartz's method lies in his belief that differences between *Antiquities* and *War* can be used as evidence not only for changes in Josephus' opinions but also for changes in Judaean politics. The method seems to me to be mistaken, for the following reasons. It assumes that Josephus, who continued, as far as we know, to reside in Rome and who remained a Roman client at least under the Flavians, had a vital interest in Judaean politics. It implies that differences recorded in the later works were intentional, whereas as Schwartz himself occasionally concedes (e.g., 129 and n. 73) they may be due to mistakes, lapses of memory and faulty methods of working. It lays great weight on the text of a writer whom Schwartz himself accuses of "sloppiness."

In his preface (ix) Schwartz indicates that he now thinks he "should have paid more attention to the role of the Jewish upper classes of Palestine outside Judaea." I am inclined to think that the lay aristocracy of Judaea should also have been considered. But to my mind the most obvious omission is any reference to the role of Rome in Judaea. The mere fact that after the Destruction a legion (later two legions) was stationed in the province would suggest that Rome was in no hurry to bow out. Agrippa II may have had other reasons for visiting Rome, but like any other client king he knew that was where the important decisions were made. It would be surprising if Josephus himself was unaware of that fact.

Summing up, I would say that in my view the evidence is insufficient in

quantity and quality to enable Schwartz to attain his aim. It would be negligent, however, not to mention the numerous specific discussions of persons and events which make clear his command of what evidence exists, and which will have to be weighed by future students of the period.

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CARL C. SCHLAM. The *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius: On Making an Ass of Oneself. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. x + 176 pp. 6 figs. Cloth, $24.95.

Fewer than fifteen years ago, there was no full-length literary study of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses,* and if the last few years have seen a surge in interest in this author, it is due in no small measure to Carl Schlam, who in 1971 published an annotated bibliography of Apuleius which made it criminally easy to master Apuleian criticism. Several other articles by Schlam written in the late 1960s and 1970s (e.g., "The Curiosity of the *Golden Ass,*" *CJ* 64 [1968] 120–25) also helped initiate new literary investigations into a work that was not only neglected, but also reviled as sloppy and unserious. The present book, written against the formidable background of John J. Winkler's *Auctor and Actor,* renews Schlam's earlier arguments for the unity of the *Metamorphoses* through thematic analysis and also advances the thesis that the work is neither entirely serious nor entirely comic, but rather combines, in a manner more familiar to the reader of the second century than to us, both the serious and the comic, the sacred and the profane.

As anyone who has ever studied Apuleius knows, *the* Apuleian problem is how to interpret book 11, the apparently serious account of Lucius' conversion to the cult of Isis, as the culmination of a novel full of entertaining and often bawdy *fabulae*. Critics no longer resort to the argument most often associated with Ben Edwin Perry, that the *Metamorphoses* is simply a poorly constructed patchwork. Yet there is no general consensus. Some have seen book 11 as Lucius' reward for suffering into truth and consequently treat the conversion as reverent and serious. Others point to problems in the conversion experience (Lucius is still overeager and curious; there are too many stages of initiation) to support a view of the final book as a continuation of the comic/satiric tone. More recent views make a virtue of the perceived disunity; Nancy Shumate, for example, argues that conversion should represent a total break from one's former life (*Phoenix* 42 [1988] 35–60). Of course, the greatest revolution in Apuleian studies came with Winkler's *Auctor and Actor* (almost always referred to with the epithet "brilliant"). Winkler points out that books 1–10 are not written from the perspective of a devout initiate and hence that the sudden appearance of book 11 changes the "conditions of intelligibility." Book 11 causes us to

wonder about the relationship between "auctor" and "actor" (narrator and "experiencing I") in ways that call attention to tricks of narrative. Winkler also sees Lucius as an unreconstructed dupe in his naive willingness to undergo more and more initiations. Winkler's work has partly shifted attention toward questions of narratology rather than unity, but does suggest another sort of answer to the problem of the final book.

The most significant contribution made by Carl Schlam's book to the state of Apuleian interpretation outlined above is its attempt to demonstrate that the comic and the serious are not mutually exclusive. Schlam argues that book 11 is not really so discordant with the tone of the rest of the novel, and that throughout the work serious themes are treated in entertaining ways. In the course of ten chapters and a conclusion (making up the obligatory Apuleian eleven) he investigates various themes and episodes with the aim of showing that the comic in Apuleius always has a serious purpose. For example, he shows that the polarity between the sacred and the profane is brought out through the contrast between the laughter of mockery and that of delight. In the chapter "Animal and Human" he discusses compellingly the ways that humans are often portrayed as wilder, fiercer, and more animalistic than animals themselves, "often challenging the traditional hierarchical superiority attributed to humanity" (100). Conversely, he talks about the way that even Lucius' re–transformation and conversion have a comic side that is not meant to nullify the serious religious meaning: "There is a note of the ludicrous in the conception of divine providence guiding an ass to gobble roses, a tone reinforced in the description of the event. The comic does not, however, take all force from the picture of providence" (116–17). Book 11, for Schlam, also represents the culmination of Lucius' search for the *rara* and *mira* and the reverent satisfaction of his *curiositas*.

One argument that Schlam makes that will probably find disagreement among scholars of the ancient novel is that the lost Greek *Metamorphoses* (of which the surviving pseudo–Lucianic *Onos* is probably an epitome and which was clearly a major source for Apuleius) may have ended on a note of religious salvation. The *Onos* ends with the hero, Lucius, being driven out of the house of the woman who had been his mistress because, as an ordinary man, he no longer possesses that attribute of the ass which she found so pleasing. Schlam feels that this satiric and mocking ending is not consistent with the tone of the endings of most Greek romances, which typically conclude (like the *Odyssey*) on a note of joyous reunion, sometimes under the guidance of a saving deity. It is the *Onos,* he contends, that fails to follow this pattern, not Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*: "The search for love, of man and of god, and the protection offered by a divinity are essential parts of the narrative tradition of the Greek romances. It may well be that the original Greek *Metamorphoses* had a religious ending" (25). If, then, the readers of the second century expected a religious ending, or at least a harmonious one, once again it follows that book 11 is less disturbing and intrusive than it has usually been considered.

Most will feel, however, that the ending of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* is very different from those in the Greek romances. Reunions of heroes and heroines and their parents, ends to arduous trials, and even the occasional appearance of Isis (*The Ephesian Tale*) or other gods do not have the same effect as the profound conversion experience (whether one sees it as serious or ironic) of a recently re–transformed human as described over the course of thirty pages. While it is true that the satiric ending of the *Onos* does not follow the usual pattern, there are other aspects of book 11 that make it anomalous. Probably most readers expect Lucius to return to his former state, and perhaps many see the necessity of divine intervention to effect this change, but how many could foresee that entertaining *fabulae,* however edifying, would be supplanted by the narrative of endless initiations into the cults of Isis, Osiris, and Anubis? Moreover, as Winkler points out, what we discover about the persona of the narrator comes as a total surprise. Thus I am torn between the feeling that this book offers an important balance to current criticism which seems to see the *Metamorphoses* as either serious or comic, with its attractive view of the *spoudaiogeloion* of the second century, and the feeling that book 11 still seems fundamentally disjunctive.

Some random observations: The title of the book is somewhat mysterious: "On Making an Ass of Oneself." Presumably, it refers partly to the moral/allegorical reading of the novel which sees Lucius' transformation as an appropriate figure for the sort of man he was at the start. Yet this title gives no sense of the major thrust of the book. In the chapter "Sex and Witchcraft," much of which is indebted to his own earlier work, Schlam somewhat surprisingly talks of the "Priapic model" and of comic attacks on women functioning as "a mechanism of male group reassurance." Again using the approach and terminology of Amy Richlin's *Gardens of Priapus,* he concludes, "The rich treatment of these themes allows the ultimate submission of Lucius to the will of the goddess to be something other than mockery, reinforcing the value of male dominance" (80). Shortly thereafter, Schlam mentions the stories of heroic women and the *furiosa libido* of men, concluding that the "Priapic model is both presented and mocked." Apart from the fact that the introduction of such ideas does not mesh with the tone of the rest of the book, one might go rather further in the other direction, emphasizing Lucius' submission to a female deity. While there are horrifying women in the *Metamorphoses,* the ultimate dominating force is a benign female. Finally, the chapter on Cupid and Psyche is one of the high points of the book, presenting background on the complex issue of folktale and Platonic elements in the tale. In this section, Schlam's clear manner of presentation and his emphasis on allegorical interpretation work particularly well.

The book is designed primarily for a general audience rather than for the Apuleian scholar. Latin quotations are relegated to the footnotes, with translations or references in the text; scholarship is alluded to and footnoted rather than grappled with minutely. Nonetheless, the book shows an acute awareness of the relevant scholarship and current issues. It is clearly written and argued

and deftly arranged, and it usefully isolates some of the problems and themes that have been of primary interest to students of Apuleius. Doubtless some will see this book as a throwback to the state of affairs before Winkler. Yet Winkler's book was a tour de force that cannot be repeated and whose assumptions and terminology are difficult to incorporate into criticism that does not address issues of narratology. Schlam's book will be especially useful for those just beginning to think about Apuleius, and it reintroduces important issues that still have not been resolved.

ELLEN FINKELPEARL

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